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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is mainly about the ‘flexible production’ debates, which were 
introduced by the 1970s and are still concerned in various scientific disciplines. The debate 
has been considered not only as concerns of the transformations within the production, but 
also in parallel to the holistic transformation of the capitalist system. The fundamental 
emphasis has been on the fact that capitalism is a historical system and on its relations with 
‘industrial production’ and ‘industrialization’ processes.     
From this perspective, the three widely known approaches to flexible production, 
namely the ‘neo-Schumpeterian approach’, the ‘flexible specialization approach’, and the 
‘regulation school approach’, have been evaluated in detail. It has been firmly emphasized 
that each of these approaches provided considerable statements within the debates on 
flexibility. The thesis in general has favoured the regulation school approach with its 
methodological means, and highlighted that it has developed the most appropriate 
approach in comprehensively explaining the ongoing processes.      
The thesis has focused on the spatial relations of flexible production debates at the 
city and regional levels, and highlighted the transformation on/of space throughout the 
transition processes. By means of a comprehensive case study on the changes in the spatial 
organizations of Turkey and on locational distribution of industry in relation to flexible 
production processes, it has been emphasized that space has a major role in current 
economic and social changes, and furthermore, that the experienced transformations are 
quite related with the successes in the urban and spatial organizations. Within the study, 
the urban and regional level changes have been analyzed quantitatively, and the subjects 
such as growth rates, comparative priorities, and the development of spatial advantages 
have been tested by the use of shift-share analysis.         
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ÖZ 
Bu tez temel olarak 1970’lerle birlikte gündeme giren, halen de  bilimsel alanının 
birçok farklı disiplinine konu olan ‘esnek üretim’ tartışmalarıyla ilgilidir. Tartışma salt 
üretim süreçleri içinde yaşanan bir dizi değişim olarak değil, kapitalist sistemin bütünsel 
dönüşümü ile paralel olarak ele alınmış, kapitalizmin tarihsel bir sistem oluşuna ve aynı 
zamanda modern kapitalizmin ‘endüstriyel üretim’ ve ‘endüstrileşme’ süreçleriyle 
ilişkisine özel bir önem verilmiştir. 
Bu perspektifte, esnek üretim tartışmalarının yaygın üç teorik yaklaşım, ‘neo-
Schumpeterian yaklaşım’, ‘esnek uzmanlaşma yaklaşımı’ ve ‘düzenlemeci okul yaklaşımı’, 
ayrıntılı olarak incelenmiş, bu teorik yaklaşımların her birinin, halen netleşmemiş olan 
esneklik tartışmaları içerisinde önemli tespitlere ulaştığı fikri savunulmuştur. Çalışmanın 
genelinde ise, düzenlemeci okulun yaklaşımı yöntemsel araçlarıyla benimsenmiş, mevcut 
süreçleri bütünsel açıklama yönünde en yetkin yaklaşımın bu alanda geliştiği fikri öne 
çıkarılmıştır. 
Esnek üretim tartışmalarının mekanla ilişkisine kent ve bölge ölçeğinde 
yoğunlaşılmış, yaşanan geçiş sürecinin mekanda yarattığı değişimler incelenmiştir. Ayrıca, 
Türkiye’de mekansal organizasyonlarda yaşanan değişimleri ve imalat sanayinin mekansal 
dağılımını esnek üretim süreçleriyle ilişkili olarak inceleyen geniş kapsamlı bir çalışmayla, 
mekanın mevcut ekonomik ve sosyal değişimlerin önemli bir parçası olduğu, dahası 
yaşanan dönüşümlerin kentsel ve mekansal organizasyonlardaki başarılarla eşit olduğu 
fikri uygulamalı olarak vurgulanmıştır. Bu çalışma sırasında kentsel ve bölgesel ölçekte 
yaşanan değişimler niceliksel olarak incelenmiş, shift-share analiz tekniği sayesinde 
büyüme hızları, karşılaştırmalı üstünlük ve mekansal avantajların gelişimi gibi alanlar test 
edilebilmiştir. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The historical realities of the 1970s and the following years seem to be one of the 
most important periods of the world history. The most favored debate of the period, in 
which considerable rhetoric were originated from the economic depressions, political 
confusions, conflicts/clashes, changed/transformed, was on ‘what is finished’ and on ‘what 
has started’. Within this period, it was declared that the hegemony of industrial production, 
classes, modernism, national-states, liberalism, socialism, and even capitalism and history 
had come to an end. On the contrary, knowledge, flexibility, deindustrialization, classless, 
post-bourgeois, post-economic society, neither socialist nor capitalist governing systems, 
postmodernism, globalization, neo-liberalism, and non capitalist capitalism were 
emphasized both as the formed features and as the signals of the newly started or the 
emerging ‘new’ era. But no one could develop a satisfactory claim on what is finished, and 
what is emerging. Among these discussions, the most prominently claimed were mostly 
under suspicion of ‘ideological’ interpretation.        
At the outset, it would be better here to remind what has happened throughout this 
historical period: there have been drastic changes in mode of production and production 
technologies. The structural changes within the production were accompanied by the new 
organizations of production. The structure of labour and related societal organizations has 
been renewed. The international trade has been restructured towards a new dimension. 
Market relations, national economies, sectoral priorities have experienced considerable 
shifts. The development of information technologies, communication possibilities, and 
high-tech production units, all has been highlighted as the accelerating and sometimes the 
determining factors of these changes. Consequently, there has not been yet a common 
claim on what is finished and what is started. On the other hand, that there have been 
considerable changes within the procedural running of capitalism has been widely 
accepted. 
The concept of ‘flexible production’ has gone in front as being one of the most 
referenced within these debates. Though there exits no mutual understanding on flexible 
production, many scholars from varying disciplines have claimed on the transition from the 
standardized mass production of Fordism to the demand based flexible production of post-
Fordism. Among many ambiguous redefinitions, the debates on flexible production have 
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been favored by means of the most fruitful efforts to explain the changes in production and 
economic and social relationships using by particular perspectives and methodologies.  
Another area of interest highlighted within the flexible production debates has been 
space. The urban restructuring processes, changes in regional economies, and formation of 
new industrial regions and districts have all been important issues within the debates. It is 
possible to state that a considerable number of theses on flexible production have exceeded 
the state of being economic/social studies with particular spatial references, and has given 
rise to a conceiving of space as a major determinant of production and accumulation. Some 
approaches on flexible production perhaps have been developed deeply providing by the 
cases including industrial districts, localities, regions or cities. 
 
1.1.The Definition of the Problem 
“The debate on transition to flexible production”, which is the label of this thesis, is 
based on the emphasis that different approaches to the transition to flexible production all 
create a debate. Although some studies claim that there exists a consensus in this area, 
there is truly one thing that there has emerged a change in production systems and 
capitalism, if to be considered as a base of consensus. Furthermore, there are fundamental 
differences on the definition of the changes experienced, and especially on the 
determination of what will take place in the future.  
These diversifications gave rise to different methodologies and forms of 
interpretations. Thus, the first thing to be looked at in response to the claims on ‘flexible 
production’ is the original base that these claims stem from. Occasionally, as it is possible 
to see the interpretations that conceive flexible production as a set of reformations in 
manufacturing industry, but also there exist tendencies considering it in relation to the end 
of capitalism.  
This thesis is underpinned by the comprehension that Turkey should not be isolated 
from these fundamental debates that has been based on transformations in world economy 
and production systems. A particular set of changes such as the increase in 
telecommunication possibilities, the restructuring of the international market, the 
deepening of dependency relations that directed almost all of the countries towards a 
vulnerable position directly affected by the current transition periods. The drastic changes 
that took place in the national economies and world economy following the Great 
Depression have immensely affected the socio-economic environment in Turkey, and 
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moreover how could an adaptation to these changes would be built has been identified. As 
it is reasonable that these processes and debates could not be evaluated in isolation from 
that of the world conjuncture, but also the specific conditions and changes should also be 
emphasized. 
Throughout the process beginning with the establishment of the republic in 1923 up 
to the end of 1979 comprising the Great Depression, Turkey followed a variety of 
strategies and policies within varying cross sections. Between 1962 and 1979, the last 
section of this wide period, that has been dominated by, roughly saying, protectionist and 
state control centered policies; there has been a transition to planned economy and a rapid 
industrialization related with the import-substitution strategy – like in the similar countries 
of the world -. Consequently, Turkey entered the depression period in a formation labeled 
by some economists as a ‘late-industrializing country’.    
Following 1980, the economic restructuring, the changes in the production 
processes and regimes of accumulation experienced in the world have also affected 
Turkey. Within this period, the “Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Program” (SSAP) 
was put into practice and there was the effort on transition from the inwards economic 
structure to the liberal one based on exportation. While the export oriented industrialization 
strategies – especially successfully experienced by particular East Asian countries - were 
being carried out, there could not be a continuous procedural political-economic transition 
due to the self-genuine/specific conditions of the country such as the structure of the 
capital and labour, some faults and political struggles provided by the industrialization 
processes. On the other hand, there have been considerable changes and transformations 
within industrial production and spatial organizations.            
It should be clarified that the changes of the post-1980 period have had deep effects 
on the industrial agglomeration centers and urban economies, and this situation has given 
rise to a set of changes within production processes and regional agglomeration areas. 
There has been experienced a process of transition by some industrial regions which are 
formed in 1970s, and a formation of spatial foci having both decreasing and increasing 
weights within the spatial-economic environment. It may be set forth that these changes; 
increasing uneven growth, shifts in spatial foci, sectoral differentiations within urban 
economies, and development of the industrial agglomeration centers should all be 
examined. 
In spite of a drastic transformation processes in Turkey, the restructuring of the 
economic system, channels of accumulation, and the social structure are discussed rather in 
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the context of problems, but are rarely related with the world level transformations. Within 
the literature, there are relatively few studies focusing on the changes within the production 
processes and on the adjustments to such changes. Furthermore, the spatial dimension of 
the debate, which has been an important focus of interest within the Western literature, is 
considerably neglected, and except a few theses, there has been less concentration on the 
subject than it desires.             
It should also be noted here that these limited studies has an important problem that 
is to be coped with. These studies, like as the ones in the world, have mostly focused on 
the manufacturing industry, and occasionally encompass the changes in the service and 
finance sectors. In some studies on Turkey, covering the statements to the extent that a new 
development model going frontally with its spatial context has emerged, considerable 
notice that there are few references to economic growth and competition, which are 
inevitably the integral parts of sector analyses and are the frequently cited areas within the 
Western literature. 
As a consequence, having been backgrounded by a comprehensive review of the 
approaches to “flexible production”, this thesis has a tendency in examining and discussing 
how this processes have been experienced in Turkey and its provinces. 
 
1.2.The Aim of the Thesis 
This thesis aims to define the right basis of the debates on transition to flexible 
production, to evaluate the most prominent approaches of these debates, and to analyze the 
changes experienced – whether really occurred or just claimed - in relation to flexible 
production processes in Turkey. Thus, this study is contributed to overcome the lacking on 
the areas such as transformation, inter-sectoral changes, local economic growth, and 
competition advantages for spaces. Without loosing these contexts, the main aim is to build 
a linkage between urban and regional processes and flexible production debates.     
On the other hand, all these evaluations bring about many deep comments together 
with their contexts. As mentioned above, ‘flexible production’ is yet an area of immense 
discussion. Therefore, the thesis tries to pay attention to the task of comprehensiveness but 
also it avoids undervaluing the variety of provided approaches throughout the constitution 
of the methodology. At this point, there are some sub-aims to be mentioned here:  
 To define the dominant system, that is the capitalism, within a historical 
comprehensiveness and a context of its procedural laws in order to understand flexible 
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production truly 
 To identify and evaluate the most prominent approaches on flexible production.  
 To point out the changes within the processes of city, region, and space, and to explain 
the importance of these changes within the debates.     
 To evaluate the changes experienced in Turkey in relation to the determinants that 
make the flexible production debates up-to-date.    
 To identify basic concepts and indicators of the debates with respect to the spatial 
analyses, to test them, and to reach to (not-pre-controlled/directed) results.  
It would only be possible to evaluate the flexible production processes and to see 
their consequences in Turkey by means of achieving the sub-aims listed above. The 
methodology, mentioned in the third section of this chapter, is provided as to contribute to 
such a process. 
   
1.3.The Context, Methodology, and Limits of the Thesis 
The thesis has mainly two parts, which are comprised of subdivisions: the first is 
the body of the theoretical arguments, and second is the case study. Each part has different 
context and methodologies, and both are mutually formed to provide a general 
comprehensiveness throughout the whole thesis. 
For the first part of the thesis, a widened literature overview within a variety of 
fields underpins the fundamental work. The matter of this overview is comprised of major 
books, periodicals, and Internet. Following this first task, there has been a constriction 
while both in defining the problem areas and in forming the general content, and a 
constitution of a thesis text that centers the fundamental debates and aims to represent them 
in a sufficient depth. 
The case study, that is the second essential part, focuses on Turkey. Since this part 
contains the evaluations on the historical processes of the country as well as the particular 
technical analyses, it has a differing image than that of the first part. Furthermore, there has 
been a careful effort towards preserving the integrity of meaning by means of laying the 
derived definitions from the literature overview into the spatial analyses over the formed 
data set.     
It would be proper here to give the basic outline of the study by the quite brief 
explanations of each chapter: 
The first chapter; tries to give the introductory explanations of the thesis. 
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The second chapter; includes several evaluations made on capitalism. This chapter 
fundamentally discusses the thought that considers capitalism as a historical system 
functioning by its own procedural laws. Following this essential interpretation on what 
capitalism is, the definition of modern capitalism and its relation with industrial 
production and industrialization processes are made. This second section also 
encompasses the Fordist period of modern capitalism in a detailed manner, because this 
period resembles evidently the direct linkage between modern capitalism and 
industrialization. At the end of the chapter, particular major tendencies that have emerged 
as accompanying with the flexible production are described.             
The third chapter evaluates the approaches in explaining the flexible production 
and post-Fordism. The chapter, based on three major approaches, fundamentally focuses 
on the basic underpinnings of each approach and the perspectives provided by each on 
Fordism and flexible production. A general evaluation is placed in the last section of the 
chapter, upon which the basic assumptions of thesis are constituted.   
The fourth chapter involves the urban, regional, and spatial dimensions of the 
flexible production debates. The chapter overviews the changes in the spaces and places, 
and the shifts within the varying perspectives on these entities accompanying the 
unraveling of Fordist mode of accumulation. The changes in the conceiving of the concept 
of ‘region’ which is frequently subjected to the debates on flexible production, and the 
transformations experienced within the regional economies are the very concern of this 
chapter. Furthermore, one crucial emphasis was on the industrial regions and localities, 
and on the importance of them throughout the flexible production processes.   
Chapter 5 is where the whole process of case study is given. There are two strategic 
points underpinning this case study: 
 The case study should be built on the comprehension, content, and methodology 
encompassing all three highlighted areas of interest that the previous chapters dealt 
with. 
 The case study should be capable of explaining the changes pointed out by the flexible 
production indicators, as well as of clarifying the linkages/connections of changes 
between the world economy and the production systems.           
In order to respond to these identified requirements, the case study has a wider 
perspective covering a broad array of subjects, data, and knowledge. At the outset of this 
chapter, Turkey’s economic formation and the industrialization processes that took place 
within the country in pre-1980 periods, and hence the very condition of the country are 
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brought up. The post-1980 Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Program (SSAP) 
practices and the relationship between the program and the changes experienced in global 
scope are all evaluated within this chapter. What follows is the set of analyses on the 
manufacturing industry. In this section of the chapter:     
 The changes in post-1980 period in regional structure and urbanization processes are 
interpreted by the use of several analyses and evaluations.  
 The post-1980 changes in the industrial agglomeration regions of the 1970s are 
analyzed, and the relations between these changes and flexible production systems are 
explored.     
 The possibilities and capabilities of flexible production provided by the manufacturing 
industries demanded by the provinces are analyzed, and evaluated within the context of 
economic growth, competition, and spatial advantages. 
It should be noted here that dealing with the flexible production debates and their 
spatial implications, the case study on manufacturing industry in Turkey is established in 
relation to former studies made in both national and international level. Thus, some 
conceptual and empirical inputs are defined by means of these studies: 
 General perspective is developed by means of ‘regulation approach’ because of its 
considerable power of understanding on the production, political, and economic 
dimensions. 
 The methodology is established via the evaluations on the related studies on Turkey 
and other countries, which are examined with respect to methods, techniques and data 
used. 
 The analysis techniques used are developed with references to the former major studies 
overviewed such as the studies of Sforzi (1988), Eraydın (1992), Yunusoğlu (1995) 
Cho (1997), Erendil (1998), and Pınarcıoğlu (2000) because their studies are capable to 
respond the thesis’ requirements. 
Consequently, the methodology included in the case study is fundamentally based 
on the testing of the general comprehension and interpretation process by the use of some 
quantitative analyses. Therefore, the case study is characterized both by its description of 
particular transformations within varying fields and by bringing about holistic outcomes 
via the quantitative techniques. 
There is a large amount of techniques used within the flexible production debates. 
The techniques providing data for a general interpretation, such as raw count, percentage 
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and calculating growth rate, are also employed within this case study. In addition, as a 
means of providing data for an interpretation on economic growth, local competitiveness, 
adjustment capabilities, and investment conditions, which are of the crucial integral parts 
of the flexible production debates within the manufacturing industry, the technique of 
Shift Share Analysis is also preferred.      
This case study adopts the most basic version of the model. According to it, the 
industrial shift-share analysis is actually a descriptive method. The main idea is the 
determination of ‘local (regional/urban) growth’ depending on the three factors (see 
Yunusoğlu, 1995 and Knudsen, 2000): 
1. the growth of the reference economy (country) itself in which it takes place, 
2. the growth of the regional/urban industries within the system, 
3. the spatial advantages of the region/city within the system compared with other 
regions/cities. 
The method is also used with respect to three components, in parallel to above 
factors: 
1. National Growth Component (regional share related with national growth) 
2. Industrial Mix (Shift) Component (structural effect) 
3. Competitive Growth Component (total regional shift) 
The ‘national growth component’ shows the effects on the sector of the local 
economy: if sector j in location i exactly matches the national trend. The comparison of the 
value in a certain evaluation criteria in a region/city is related to the development of the 
country, that is, a comparison of an increase in manufacturing employment of a region/city 
and the national growth. Evaluation of this component reveals the existing positive or 
negative momentum.  
The “industrial mix component” calculates the change in the sector j that can be 
attributed to the country’s industrial mix. Thus, it is a measure of the change in the selected 
indicator determined by the types of industry located in the country. If the region/city has a 
‘favorable’ mix, comprising faster growing industries, it will experience faster growth for 
the selected indicator than the rest of the economy.  
The “competitive growth component” defines the competitive and locational 
advantages of the sector. It is used to evaluate the capability of structural adjustment and 
improvement in region/city with respect to the reach to the levels of faster growth and 
more applied investment. 
The shift share analysis is applied by employment, GDP and value-added values. 
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By the way, the regions and provinces in Turkey are classified according to the indicators 
of structural and flexible transformation in manufacturing industry. 
With this respect, it should be noted that there are some problems which underpin 
the context of the study. These can be classified in two groups: the first is related to 
common debates which are developed for the advanced capitalist countries; and the second 
is related to the lack of studies on Turkey. First group of problems causes general limits: 
 The studies on transition do rather focus on the developed capitalist countries and but 
less on the less developed or late industrializing countries of the Third World.    
 The Western countries present a relatively more stable capitalist development and thus 
provide the opportunity with respect to the standardization of models and approaches. 
 In the less developed countries, there is rather the effectiveness of internal factors 
stemming from the social and economic originalities, than that of the external, 
especially the political, factors related with the dependency processes.     
Second group of problems causes spatial limits: 
 It could be unfortunate to reach a fresh and valid study on which the regional studies of 
the case study would be based.  
 The statistics on the manufacturing industry are not as deepened and varied as the case 
study required. Furthermore, there has been a currency problem within the most of the 
data used. 
Consequently, this thesis tries to respond to the requirements identified within the 
aims, as well as to construct a theoretical and analytical unity covering the whole of the 
thesis. 
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Chapter 2 
ON CAPITALISM:  
A HISTORICAL AND INDUSTRIAL SYSTEM 
“The history of industrialism has always been a  
continuing struggle… against the element of ‘animality’ in man. 
 It has been an uninterrupted, often painful and bloody process 
 of subjugating natural (i.e. animal and primitive) instincts to new, 
 more complex and rigid norms and habits of order, 
 exactitude and precision which can make possible the 
increasingly complex forms of collective life 
 which are the necessary consequence  
of industrial development.” 
(Gramsci, 1971 cited in Elam, 1990: 56) 
The underlying reason for the considerably growing importance of flexible 
production and its becoming so widespread is that the changes of the mode of production 
and the social relationships are considered to be directly related to the capitalist system as a 
whole. It has become a quite widespread vision that especially the transformations in the 
production processes – for instance within the 1920-70 period - could not be limited to the 
efforts inclining just towards the more efficient and profitable, and that the experienced 
changes and transformations has pointed to a comprehensive restructuring encompassing 
the worldwide economic and social change, and to a new formation of the societies that are 
defined by their labour organizations, technological developments and communication 
potentials.  
At this point, it should be noted that especially what the crises of the post-1970 
period and the disentanglements and changes explained via particular local samples 
corresponding to the whole system of capitalism have become an important debate. It is 
notable that almost none of the debates on flexible production or post-Fordism could be 
excluded from the changes within general, macro, processes of economic, social and 
spatial structures. Hence it is crucial to interpret the flexible production, or post-Fordism, 
debate within the modern capitalist progress. 
The definition of the capitalist system and its determining factors is to provide the 
possibility of interpreting the flexibility arguments explained in the following chapters.     
This chapter is comprised of two general parts. The former is fundamentally based 
on the emphasis that capitalism has a historical continuity and this could be interpreted by 
particular basic contexts/processes forming a system. The historisicity of the system is 
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explained by the concepts of ‘mode of production’, ‘capital accumulation processes’, ‘class 
conflicts’, and ‘crisis’. The totality of the defined basic relationships aims at interpreting 
the three features of capitalism set forth by Harvey:       
 “Capitalism is growth-oriented. A steady rate of growth is essential for the health of 
capitalist economic system, since it is only through growth that profits can be assured 
and the accumulation of capital be sustained… (Thus) Crisis is then defined as lack of 
growth 
 Growth in real values rests on the exploitation of living labour in production… 
Capitalism is founded, in short, on a class relation between capital and labour. 
 Capitalism is necessarily technologically and organizationally dynamic… But 
organizational and technological change also play a key role in modifying the dynamics 
of class struggle, waged from both sides, in the realm of labour markets and labour 
control.” (Harvey, 1989: 180) 
The latter part employs a reference to the industrial dimension of the ‘modern 
capitalism’, which is considered as covering the past two centuries. This period, cited by 
most of the scholars, for instance Peet (1991) and Amin, S. (1999a, 1999b and 2000), as 
the completed phase – such completion refers to a stability and a relative decrease in the 
conflicts mentioned in the first part - of capitalism, is a process parallel to the industrial 
growth and its provided/necessitated set of regulations. As a consequence, the importance 
of industrial development and its transforming power within capitalism are placed within 
this section of the chapter. What follows is an explanation the period of Fordism and the 
debates on flexible production.  
 The relatively bulky content and the wider basis of the argument within the latter 
part is due to its inclusion of flexible production and the Fordist period as the main fields 
of interest. To explain the most consistent industrially centered growing modern capitalism 
by its mutually understanding constitutive contexts is what this chapter tries to clarify. 
Furthermore, within the following chapter, a detailed comprehension on both the flexible 
production based arguments, and the differing evaluations on Fordism are laid out.    
    
2.1. Capitalism As a Historical System 
The interpretation of capitalism as a historical system is based on the traditional 
Marxist approach. Within this approach, Marx explains all material bases in relation to the 
historical foundations of social actions as which is known ‘historical materialism’. The 
concepts of mode of production, accumulation of capital, class struggle, and crisis are 
generally defined on the basis of his historical materialism.  
The main emphasis is on the fact that capitalism has not some prior direction 
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towards which all history tends. It came about through the dissolution of previous societies 
and the recombination of their elements in new forms. In addition, capitalism is the 
synthetic result of internal societal dissolution and external plunder and trade. Thus, a 
transformational change comes from the contradictions internal to a entity and the external 
relations one thing and another (Peet, 1991: 107-9). And each transformation process has 
its own special tendencies based on crisis, recession and expansion (Amin, S., 1999a: 14). 
Historical trends are represented by defined periods of capitalist development, such 
as period of mercantilism, period of traditional capitalism, postwar period, and current 
period (Amin, S., 1999b: 13-5). Followers of Marx use the methodology of periodical 
view, though with differing periodization intervals. It can be seen that each scholar defines 
his/her own breaking points; thus, it is almost impossible to define apparent intervals 
common to all. Although reaching the consensus is not so important because the studies do 
not need specific times and braking points, but definitely need an historical view in order 
to understand capitalist system. Marxist approach is one of the approaches which provides 
such a comprehension.  
The evaluation of flexible production depends on the understanding of and 
positioning within the capitalist system. And this study claims that such an understanding 
of the capitalist system can be provided only by means of a historical perspective. The 
debate on the transition to flexible production could not be examined by static approaches 
in which the main focus only changes in relation to production types or society. According 
to Peet (1991), it consists of dissolution and recombination processes; thus the period 
following the year of 1972 coupled with the signs of a new mode of production should be 
examined in a historical perspective. In this section, in order to constitute our historical 
view, three Marxian terms are explained: mode of production, accumulation of capital, and 
crisis dialect of the capitalist system. 1  
 
2.1.1. The Mode of Production 
The concept of the mode of production is a key concept in order to understand the 
phenomenon of capitalism. This concept was firstly used by German philosopher and 
economist Karl Marx. Marx believed that social development has its own conditions  
(procedural laws) and capitalist societies are not frizzed, they are, on the contrary, inclined 
                                                 
1 It is impossible to summarize the framework of Marxist theory here. In this section, it is only tried to 
explain basic features that allow establishing a total view in order to understand transition to flexible 
production which is examined in the later parts. 
 13
to change (Schellenberg, 1976: 15). Thus, changes, or transformations, in capitalist system 
depend on two fundamental factors: production and labour relations (society). The 
regulation of both the production and society does not appear coincidentally, in contrast it 
is determined by a series of special regulator, by the so-called ‘mode of production’. 
The Marxian definition of mode of production consists of two elements: first, the 
forces of production, the technology underpinning the production process; and second, the 
social relations of production, the legal system of property rights and trade union 
legislation that govern the system of production (Knox and Pinch, 2000: 30). Peet supports 
this context of mode of production, but adds the importance of both the organization of 
workers and applied technologies. In addition, he highlights that it is an abstract system of 
social relations organizing the forces of production throughout the transformation of the 
nature. Furthermore, any capitalist mode of production has two social objectives. These are 
“…the production of material goods used to reproduce labour power; and a surplus of 
products, used partly for investment in new means of production, and partly to support and 
protect the life-style of the rich and famous” (Peet, 1991: 62). 
The forms of consumption and surplus socially determine the reproduction process. “Social 
structures interact with production processes by determining the rules for the appropriation 
distribution, and uses of surplus. These rules constitute modes of production, and these 
modes define social relationships of production, determining the existence of social classes 
that become constituted as such classes through their historical practice. The structural 
principal under which surplus is appropriated and controlled characterizes a mode of 
production” (Castells, 1997: 16). 
Marx, in fact, uses the concept of mode of production in different ways. He 
generally means “…the characteristic form of the labour process under the class relations 
of capitalism (including the production of surplus value), presuming production of 
commodities for exchange” (Harvey, 1982: 25). He sometimes uses the concept including 
production, exchange, distribution and consumption relations, institutional-juridical-
administrative arrangements, political organizations, ideology, and social reproduction. It 
should be noted that this wide context in fact do not cause confusion, rather the main idea 
is clear: Capitalism is not just the ownership of wealth; it is a set of social relations, or 
institutional arrangements that affect the relationships between two classes that are 
inevitably in conflict. Moreover, it enables the owners of capital to command labour to 
produce further wealth (Knox and Pinch, 2000: 30). More clearly, under capitalism, “…the 
separation between producers and their means of production, the commodification of 
labour, and the private ownership of means of production on the basis of the control of 
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capital (commodified surplus), determined the basic principle appropriation and 
distribution of surplus by capitalists, although who is (are) the capitalist class(es) is a 
matter of social inquiry in each historical context, rather than an abstract category.” 
(Castells, 1997: 16) 
Furthermore, capitalist mode of production is closely related to technological 
ensembles (groups of new, profitable, and compatible technologies) that are driving forces 
behind the capitalist dynamic (Knudsen and Boggs, 1996: 3). In this context, the most 
clarified explanation comes from Manuel Castells, stating that it is sure that technology 
does not determine society.  
“Neither does society script the course of technological change, since many factors, 
including individual inventiveness and entrepreneurialism, intervene in the process of 
scientific discovery, technological innovation, and social applications, so that the final 
outcome depends on a complex pattern of interaction. [Technology does not determine 
society: it embodies it. But neither does society determine technological innovation: it uses 
it] (footnote of the author). Indeed, the dilemma of technology is society, and society cannot 
be understood or represent without its technological tools.” (Castells, 1997: 5) 
 
2.1.2. The Accumulation of Capital, Classes, and Crisis 
The concept of the accumulation of capital is used often for referring to the 
processes by which capital is acquired. The concept also refers to a system in which the 
ownership of wealth and property is highly concentrated and not just to a system based on 
profit making (Knox and Pinch, 2000: 392). The important thing is that the expansion of 
the capitalist mode of production is realized through the process of accumulation. 
Accumulation of capital is the social process of conversion of capital into surplus value 
and of surplus value into capital on an expanded scale (Castells, 1980: 47). 
The accumulation of capital is controlled by the division of labour which is 
controlled by the production of goods and services to be sold in the market. Such processes 
aim to realize the maximum profit (Hoogvelt, 1997: 15). Thus, capitalism has to achieve 
two objects in order to survive: first, the creation of new ways to develop to provide 
reaching larger scales exceeding the previous ones (see section 2.1.3. in this study); and 
second, to decrease the tension between capital and labour to prevent the emergence of 
class struggle which may threaten the future of the system. 
Class relations are the most effective factor of shaping capitalist accumulation. 
They are effective not only for accumulation processes but also for the mode of 
production, and for sure, of society. It is possible to state basically that social relations 
 15
have been altered by means of a reorganization of labour processes (Castells and 
Henderson, 1987: 1). Capital is a social relationship, and therefore the process of capitalist 
accumulation is a process of class struggle (Castells, 1980: 75). According to Castells, the 
main contradiction in a capitalist society, and in the process of capital accumulation, is the 
contradiction between capital and labour. The nature of capitalism has an insoluble 
contradiction called as class struggle the latter appears in the contradictory relationships 
existing in all processes of production in societies, especially the contradiction arising 
between producers and organizers of production. Thus, societies are produced, structured, 
shaped, and transformed by historically defined processes of class struggle. Although 
societies are much complex and although there are too much ideological propaganda 
claiming the end of the class struggle, this basic contradiction is still a key for explaining 
the world (Castells, 1980: 43-4). Peet’s words (1991: 106) support Castell’s thoughts, and 
add a note to the arguments about origins of the capitalist system. If the class relationships 
and the class struggles cause internal changes; and trade and its consequences cause 
external changes, thus the dialectics between internal and external changes provide to 
discover the exact origins of the capitalist system. 
Harvey provides on analysis to expand these arguments. For Harvey, productive 
growth requires improvements in labour productivity and in forms of industrial 
organization, communication, exchange, and distribution. These improvements cause 
increasing division of labour and specialization of function. The technical and 
organizational basis of society changes, thus it creates the potential for social 
differentiation. The distinction between manual and intellectual work, for example, may be 
reflected in the social distinction between blue-collar and white-collar workers. The 
division of labour and specialization of function may part the proletariat and the capitalist 
class into distinct strata. Social conflict may take place between strata and thus replace 
class struggle in the Marxian sense as the guiding principle of social differentiation 
(Harvey, 1985: 113). 
The relationships among the mode of production, the accumulation of capital, and 
the class struggle can only go free of problems by means of driving force of the profit of 
capital (history of capitalism demonstrates that this is not possible). Thus, the surplus value 
must be appropriated after reproducing constant and variable capital and after using the 
value required for the reproduction of social relationships of production. Because of the 
necessity of social reproduction, the limit to capitalist accumulation comes from the 
general crisis of the social relationships (Castells, 1980: 47-8). To produce adequate profit 
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to allow new investments and reproducing society may create opportunity to solve all 
problems. In other words, the main requirement for survival of the capitalist system does 
not permit the falling rates of profit, which is whereas limited to labour power including 
class struggle and development of productive forces by means of increasing the technical 
composition of capital. These limits and tendencies force the system towards 
‘overaccumulation’ and ‘crisis’. That is the capitalist system does not escape from 
economic crisis not only in advanced capitalist countries but also at the international level 
(Castells, 1980: 75-6). Although some economists claim that this process is a problem for 
only advanced capitalist countries, the crisis actually becomes a world crisis because of 
international relations of capital and market (see section 2.1.3. in this study). 
It is commonly accepted that the world has been in conditions of crisis represented 
in many economic signs. Harvey claims that the underlying the logic of capitalist 
accumulation and its crisis tendencies remain same. He fundamentally asks whether the 
closest crisis means the birth of a new regime of accumulation that includes the 
contradictions of capitalism for the next generation, or these changes mean constituting a 
transitional moment of grumbling crisis for the late twentieth century (Harvey, 1989: 189). 
An answer to this important question is taken up in the following chapters. 
 
2.1.3. The Relationship Between Capitalism and Crisis 
The core idea of the relationship between capitalism and crisis lies at the heart of 
the fact that capitalist crisis is dialectically related to capitalist development. Because 
capitalist development has to produce the sources of reproduction for the survival of 
capital accumulation: it must reach greater development trend than prior expansion 
following each economic stagnation period (see Amin, S., 1999a; 1999b; and 2000). 
According to Amin, there is no society which has the capability of expanding 
permanently and limitlessly. An expansion of each society thus has to pass under periods 
of expansion, stagnation, and even recession. And each point, or period, that causes to 
change tendency of development is named as the period of crisis (Amin, S., 1999a: 13). 
Capitalism reached to its completed form by means of industrial revolution that 
started in the early 1800s. After that time, the basic contradiction that lies at the core of 
capitalism is to produce more than what to be consumed. Thus, threat of relative stagnation 
is chronic illness of capitalism, which always leads to the disequilibrium in the economic 
system. And each expansion period produces not only crisis and disequilibrium, but also 
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specific conditions of them (Amin, S., 1999a: 14). 
The regulationist approach (for this approach and its specific concepts, see chapter 
3) defines three types of crisis: Micro crisis, conjectural crisis, and structural crisis. Micro 
crisis may be brought about at each level of the accumulation process. This can be 
theoretically ignored. Conjectural crisis is based on the circles of economy. It can be 
regulated by minor interference. And structural crisis is brought about as being coupled 
with the collapsing relationship between regime of accumulation and mode of regulation. 
A new regime of accumulation in order to survive of the future of the capitalist system 
must be created (Tickell and Peck, 1992: 192). 
On the other hand, crisis can be simply classified as short-run crisis and long-term 
crisis – disequilibrium - (Amin, S. 1999a, 1999b, and 2000; Knudsen and Boggs, 1996; 
Harvey, 1982; Castells, 1980). Short-run crisis is based on the problems accrued in 
accumulation process. It generally takes a few years. Long-term disequilibrium, which is 
called in some sources as misregulation or Kondratiev (for more detailed analysis of these 
terms see chapter 3 in this study), is based on economic (production, investment, price, 
income, distribution, etc.) and social (consumption, division of labour, geographical 
changes, etc.) statutes of the capitalist system, and is explained by long-wave. Amin 
defines the long-waves of capitalism as the periods of; 
 1790-1814 expansion and 1814-1848 stagnation 
 1848-1872 expansion and 1872-1893 stagnation 
 1893-1914 expansion and 1914-1945 stagnation 
 1945-1968 expansion and 1968-…… stagnation (Amin, S., 1999a: 18). 
Each expansion period is defined by two factors; first, technological innovations 
and second, political development by means of expansion of the market.  
 1789 French Revolution and first industrial revolution 
 The building a complete railway thanks to Italian-German cooperation 
 The colonialist impacts 
 The emergence emperor of automobile, postwar rebuilding in Europe and 
Japan, and modernization. (Amin, S., 1999a: 19) 
Amin states that these periods may be explained by the determination of economic 
circles, and that may be true, but are definitely incomplete. The social realities, whereas, 
are not dependent on the strict models. On the other hand, this model represents a fact that 
capitalism could survive by means of greater economic expansion periods than being the 
one just before. Thus, capitalism must reach growth more rapidly, and overcome the prior 
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growth in each expansion period. (Amin, S., 1999a: 19-24) 
At least after 1972, the world economy has been undergoing a process of a global 
restructuring that redefines capital-labour relationships while furthering the asymmetrical 
interdependency of economic functions across national boundaries. There are now many 
social and political conflicts with deep crisis. It has some common features that allow us to 
consider it as a global process that has affected the capitalist world system at least since 
early 1970s (Castells and Henderson, 1987). Should this be seen as an emergence of a new 
model of accumulation, or only as an adaptation to changes in production and market? This 
question is well related to the flexible production debates, which are examined in the 
following chapters. 
 
2.2. Modern Capitalism As an Industrial System 
It is essentially stated that this section of the study offers the answers to the 
questions, such as ‘why industry is so important?’ and ‘why industrialization is so 
important?’ Afterwards, there is an examination of the Fordist era so as to bring about the 
historical relationships between industrialization processes and modern capitalist hitherto. 
The history of modern capitalism reveals that manufacturing industry has been 
closely linked with economic growth. The countries, which have the wealthy conditions 
and better living standards, have achieved them by means of the increase in industrial 
products. In addition, in modern capitalist period, not only industry has become the engine 
of growth, but also industrialization has become the engine of the structural 
transformations, which have brought about in the crisis periods and created new 
accumulation regimes. 
Fordism, symbolically referring to the period between 1911 and 1972, is to be 
considered as the most important period of the capitalist system. During this era, many 
changes took place, such as the ones on the way people work, the way industrial 
production proceed, the organization of society, and so on. The ways of production and 
consumption were particularly coordinated.  
The end of the 20th century has witnesses with many crises, such as the oil price 
shock of the 1970s and the foreign-debt crisis, and these crises have been related with the 
Fordist accumulation processes. Also, the emerging flexible production debates are 
concerned with these periods of crisis, thus the last part of this section provides an 
evaluation of the flexible production. 
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2.2.1. Industry As the Engine of Economic Growth 
For this thesis, it is of special importance to answer the question why industry is so 
important. To begin with an interesting note, it should be marked that all less developed 
and underdeveloped countries have had weak manufacturing structure. In other words, they 
have never had an industrial revolution or created productive manufacturing differing from 
developed countries. Thus, it can be clearly seen that people living in these countries – 
three quarter of world’s population (Todaro, 1994: 6) – regularly confront poverty and 
experience lower levels of healthy living conditions.  
What is industry? Peet’s (1991: 145) answer to this question is notable: “Industry 
refers to the final processing of natural materials into material objects which directly 
satisfy needs (consumption goods) and provide means of further production (investment 
goods)”. According to him, industrial manufacturing more efficiently determines the 
human actions than other production ways such as agriculture or mining do. Todaro 
approaching from the counter side confirms this idea: “It is known that the most 
underdeveloped countries’ leading sector is agriculture in economic structure. Social and 
cultural structure, thus, takes on a shape under the agrarian domination” (Todaro, 1994: 
36). Furthermore, it is known that developing strategies in less developed countries are 
determined by ‘degree of interdependency among its primary, secondary and tertiary 
industrial sectors.’ Primary sector refers to agriculture, forestry and fishing; secondary 
refers to manufacturing; and tertiary refers to commerce, finance, trade, transport and 
services. As a considerable example in reaching a successful developing trend based on 
secondary sector the following statement may be cited here: “Taiwan, South Korea, Hong 
Kong, and Singapore greatly accelerated the growth of their manufacturing output and are 
rapidly becoming industrialized states” (Todaro, 1994: 36).  
Although it is not the only indicator for defining development levels of countries, 
GDP is one, and most referred, of the economic indicators. Increasing GDP values of 
manufacturing actually provides rapid development rather than agricultural value growths. 
Furthermore, “…economic development has also been typically seen in terms of the 
planned alteration of structure of production and employment so that agriculture’s share of 
both declines and that of the manufacturing and service industries increases” (Todaro, 
1994: 14). This claim does not prove the idea that manufacturing industry is more 
important than agriculture. It implies raising share of the manufacturing and services 
industries in total economy can create more functional growth rather than agriculture. 
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“These principal economic measures of development (in fact) have often been 
supplemented by causal reference to noneconomic social indicators: gains in literacy, 
schooling, health conditions and services, and provision of housing for instance” (Todaro, 
1994: 14). Manufacturing industry is commonly accepted as the engine of the economy 
providing not only GDP growth but also basic human needs, social living standards, 
urbanization, social protection and so on. 
According to World Bank Development Report, the vast majorities of people in 
Third World countries (for classification, see Appendix A), including whole less developed 
and underdeveloped nations, live and work in rural areas. Over 65% are rurally based, 
compared to less than 27% in economically developed countries. Similarly, 62% of the 
labour force is engaged in agriculture, compared to only 7% in developed nations. 
Agriculture contributes about 20% of the GNP of less developed nations but only 3% of 
the GNP of developed nations. While developed countries establish their economies 
producing manufacturing goods, less developed countries focus on the exportation of 
primary commodities. Although the rate of primary commodities export is 72%, the rate of 
manufactures export is 28% in less developed countries out of Asian countries, in 
developed countries, the rate of primary commodities is 19%, and the rate of manufactures 
export is 81%. 
Peet highlights that the growth rates can be statistically increased at least 10 percent 
in a year by support by manufacturing industry if productivity grows at rates 5 percent to 
10 percent in a year as to adopt new technologies in a more organized structure:  
“An economy can therefore be transformed, in terms of structure and productivity, by 
industrial development over a period of twenty to thirty years… Industry has the potential to 
spread material benefits evenly among the mass of human participant. Large numbers of 
workers live in urban-industrial areas, sharing essentially similar productive and 
reproductive conditions. Industrial labour is more collective organized and more active in the 
pursuit of its share of the product than any other mass of workers in history. As a result, 
industry is inextricably linked with high levels of economic development.” (Peet, 1991: 145)  
The inextricable link between industry and development may be considered as 
similar to equating industry with development. Indeed, many authors commonly agree with 
the use of the concept of industrialized in place of developed, and of non-industrialized in 
place of less developed within their classification of the countries (Ersoy, 2001: 33). This 
may be taken as a representation to the fact that the manufacturing industry may be 
conceived as the engine of growth because “…it is characterized by dynamics of increasing 
returns to scale (the positive relationship between the growth of output and the growth of 
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productivity).” Nixson (1994), referring to Weiss (1988), tries to ratify this statement, that 
“…growth of the manufacturing sector raises productivity not just in the sector itself, 
through an extension of the division of labour, but also in the major sectors” (Nixson, 
1994: 6-7). 
A final statement, referring to Sutcliffe’s words, may be given here: “No major 
country has yet become rich without having become industrialized… Greater wealth and 
better living standards under any political system are closely connected with 
industrialization” (see Peet, 1991: 146). 
 
2.2.2. Industrialization As the Engine of Transformations 
Following the question of ‘why industry is so important?’ the second question 
emerges: ‘Why industrialization is so important?’ This question should be put on the 
agenda because of the fact that the concept of industrialization has been a fundamental 
topic in many economic studies for almost three centuries, at least after the publication of 
the very popular book of Adam Smith in 1719, named as ‘Wealth of Nations’. That being 
industrial production as the most efficient means of economic growth, stated within the 
above section, does not explain why it has been a popular topic within many studies. This 
is in fact closely related to the concepts which have been mentioned in the former sections 
of this chapter. 
In order to clarify why industrialization is so important, we could begin with 
Elam’s questions: “Why is that the unavoidable chaos, instability and conflict in every 
structural crisis of capitalism does not prevail? How is social cohesion and economic 
stability achieved and maintained despite the unremitting pressures of disrupting 
cleavages?” (Elam, 1990: 56). The most valid answers to these questions have been offered 
by regulation school whose approach and methodology are examined in the following 
chapter (section 3.3.).  
Referring to the description placed in the previous part of this chapter, it may be 
stated that capitalism is a system which has to grow/expand continuously and limitlessly. 
Thus, this tendency creates many conflicts that cause the short-term and long-wave crises. 
As modern capitalism (modern capitalism and industrial capitalism are often used 
interchangeably) broadly covers the past two centuries, it has been able to overcome all 
structural crises by means of increasing industrial production. In depression periods, the 
provided means to overcome the crises, such as ‘first industrial revolution’, ‘building the 
 22
widespread railway system in Europe’, or ‘emergence of Fordist mass production’, all 
created huge increase in industrial production, expansion of newly produced goods in 
markets and spread out the channels of accumulation.  
This fact partly provides answers to Elam’s questions. Certainly capitalist system 
has many regulators to overcome the emerging bottlenecks in the crisis periods. On the 
other hand, last two centuries indicate that the system has found ways to cope with 
structural problems by means of developing industrial accumulation channels that can be 
called as ‘industrialization process’. In other words; as mentioned above, in modern 
capitalist period, not only industry has become the engine of growth, but also 
industrialization has become the engine of the structural transformations which occurred in 
the crisis periods and created new accumulation regimes. 
Finally, it should be noted that capitalism reached the most stable period, called as 
the ‘Golden Age’, thanks to Fordism, and this is not easily defined as only a production 
system. What it is and what it includes will be explained in detail in the following sections. 
 
2.2.3. Fordism 
Although the concept of Fordism has been developed by a group of French 
Marxians, who are known as regulation school theorists (see chapter 3), “the origins of this 
concept can be traced back to the Italian communist Gramsci” (Knox & Pinch, 1982: 32). 
Gramsci noted the “Americanism and Fordism as the biggest collective effort to date to 
create, with unprecedented speed, and with a consciousness of purpose unmatched in 
history, a new type of worker and a new type of man” (Gramsci, 1971 cited in Harvey, 
1989: 126). This view of Gramsci, which is based on new type of worker, is the origin of 
the Fordism. Today Fordism, as a mode of production, is not only based on this new type 
of worker but also on the enlarged types of society, production, governments, geography, 
organizations, world politics, etc. 
According to Knox and Pinch, Fordism can be summarized within at least three 
different historical changes: “…first, changes in the way people work; second, changes in 
the way industrial production is structured; and third, changes in the organization of 
society as whole - in particular the ways in production and consumption are coordinated” 
(Knox and Pinch, 2000: 32). It is possible to say that Fordism actually consists of a wide 
socio-historical context. 
In relation to this wide context, Fordism can be defined in many different ways, for 
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example, Allen describes the Fordism “…as a way of working and a way of organizing 
industry is associated with the factory system developed in the early part of the twentieth 
century by Henry Ford in Detroit to mass produce automobiles” (Allen, 1992 cited in Knox 
and Pinch, 2000: 32). Knudsen and Boggs additionally point to the attributes of Fordist 
production, or Fordism, as the fact that “…given large and rapidly expanding mass markets 
that enable mass production, firms able to harness huge internal economies of scale that 
allow correspondingly large investment in fixed-process technologies” (Knudsen and 
Boggs, 1996: 6). Similarly but more broadly, Lipietz defines his term “Fordist 
compromise” on the basis of mass production, growing polarization between deskilled 
operatives and mental labours, increasing mechanization, increasing productivity, stability 
in firms’ profitability with plant used at full capacity, and full employment (Lipietz, 1992: 
6). Moreover, Rupert’s (1997) description conceives Fordism, in relation to mass 
production, as involving high output of standardized goods while using specialized 
machinery and less skilled labour. Additionally, he highlights “…in return for a huge 
increase in fixed costs (relative to variable costs), manufacturers were able to take 
advantage of economies of scale, spread fixed costs over vast production runs, and 
suppress unit costs to historically unprecedented levels” (Rupert, 1997: 59). Fordism, 
what’s more, is fundamentally the Americanism that is based on American hegemony, with 
hierarchical organizations and vertical integrations of institutions, all over the world. The 
main reference of this system is the Bretton Woods system, which is one of the most 
important foundations of the Fordist world order by means of American hegemony 
(Rupert, 1996). On the other hand, Eraydın points out a technical fact that the emergence 
and the raise of Fordist production in manufacturing determined all other sectors, and it 
was, perhaps have been, an efficient factor to increase the value added (Eraydın, 1992: 15).  
In sum, Fordism can be described as the production system that consists of the 
mass production on the assembly line model using special purpose machinery, and mainly 
unskilled labour with a division of labour based on fragmentation of tasks. In addition, 
Fordism implied a definite type of society; an industrial society based on homogeneous, 
male, full-time working class concentrated in large plants and in large industrial cities. The 
concentration of labour in large plants and a full-employed economy had promoted the 
central role of the unions and workers’ parties in politics. The Fordist era is characterized 
by the dominances of mass markets that were dominated by few large firms (monopoly 
market and vertically integrated firms), and by long runs of standardized goods; politically 
American hegemony (neo-liberalism) of the world by means of regulators of the Bretton 
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Woods system. 
 
2.2.3.1. Taylorism 
Harvey claims that the so-called innovations of Henry Ford were, in fact, not 
original. To Harvey, Ford succeeded in using, and developing, well-established trends. 
Furthermore, “he likewise did little more than rationalize old technologies and a pre-
existing detail division of labour, through by following the work to a stationary worker he 
achieved dramatic gains in productivity” (Harvey, 1989: 125). When Henry Ford 
developed the Fordist factory system, he in fact borrowed main ideas from an American 
engineer, Frederick W. Taylor. Taylor’s well-known book, Principles of Scientific 
Management published in 1911, established the basis of Ford’s systems. In his book, 
Taylor “…described how labour productivity could be radically increased by breaking 
down each labour process into component motions and organizing fragmented work tasks 
according to rigorous standards of time and motion study” (Harvey, 1989: 125-6). Knox 
and Pinch summarized Taylor’s principles, an possibly to be called as Taylorism, by three 
matters: 
 All work tasks should be simplified as much as possible. 
 There should be a clear divide between physical and mental labour with all planning and 
organization undertaken by managers. 
 ‘Time and motion’ studies should be used to identify the most efficient working 
practices. (Knox and Pinch, 2000: 33) 
According to Lipietz (1992), Taylorism can be seen as the rationalization of 
production. It is based on separation of the ideas people and organizers of production 
(engineers, and organization and maintenance staff) and the operatives carrying out 
production. Henry Ford integrated this rationalization with the moving assembly line, and 
developed the model based on the fact that “…each worker on the assembly line did a 
relatively simple task, assisted by specialized machines” (Lipietz, 1992: 4). This approach 
enhanced productivity to such an extent that Henry Ford was able to reduce the cost of his 
car production almost a half, while at the same time paying his workers $5 a day, a sum 
that was originally twice the average industrial wage (Knox and Pinch, 2000: 33). 
Lipietz claims: “when Taylor and his followers introduces these principles, the aim 
was in fact to generalize the ‘best practice’ of craft and specialized workers, while 
depriving them of the prime position which their monopoly of skills gave them in the 
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workplace” (Lipietz, 1992: 4). Ford actually achieved to reach more than Taylor could 
envisage. Harvey sheds a bright light at this point: “What ultimately separates Fordism and 
Taylorism was Ford’s vision, his explicit recognition that mass production meant mass 
consumption, a new system of reproduction of labour power, a new politics of labour 
control and management, a new aesthetics and psychology, in short, a new kind of 
rationalized, modernist, and populist democratic society” (Harvey, 1989: 126). 
 
2.2.3.2. Postwar Period and Keynesianism 
Harvey states “the symbolic initiation date of Fordism must surely be 1914, when 
Henry Ford introduced his five-dollar, eight-hour day as recompense for workers manning 
the automated car-assembly line he had established the year before at Dearborn, Michigan” 
(Harvey, 1989: 125). It is possible to say that the world did not change after this symbolic 
time, whereas after World War II, it actually did. According to Lipietz, to understand 
Fordism and today, the postwar period must be carefully analyzed: “The prolonged boom 
of this era amounted to a real golden age of capitalism… It was not a paradise, but at least 
one of the ways, perhaps the way, to paradise” (Lipietz, 1992: 1). 
Although the main target of the Fordist approach was to reach more labour 
productivity in consumption goods sectors and to decrease the costs of production, Fordist 
systems additionally created the consumers who have enough gain and enough time to 
consume (remember Ford’s formula: 5$ for eight-hour per a day!). While Rupert asserts 
“the products of mass production could potentially be made available to masses of people 
who for the first time could afford to become consumers” (Rupert, 1997: 60), Harvey 
explains this situation as follows:  
“Ford believed that the new kind of society could be built simply through the proper 
application of corporate power. The purpose the ‘five-dollar’, ‘eight-hour’ day was only in 
part to secure worker compliance with the discipline required to work the highly productive 
assembly-line system. It was coincidentally meant to provide workers with sufficient income 
and leisure time to consume the mass-produced products the corporations were about to turn 
out in ever vaster quantities” (Harvey, 1989: 126). 
In the postwar period, this formula expanded to almost all advanced capitalist 
countries. Furthermore, the Third World (less developed or underdeveloped) countries 
were regulated under the same perspective. The process not only provided raising capital 
under the control of few big firms, but also caused the emergence of a new accumulation 
regime. When Fordist characteristics got dominated all over the world, Keynesianism 
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played a key role. According to Harvey, between 1945 and 1973, capitalist system built on 
“…certain set of labour practices, technological mixes, consumption habits, and 
configuration of political-economic power” provided by Fordist-Keynesian model. This 
model, as Gramsci predicted, could be so effective by means of Keynesian nation politics 
(Harvey, 1989: 124). 
Perhaps Keynesianism could be effective only in the United States after the war. 
But the ‘welfare regime’ supported by Keynesianism provided the global restructuring 
from the end of the 1940s onwards. Hence, Fordist system achieved a spreading out from 
the United States, the countries of Western Europe, and Japan. Afterwards, “Fordist model 
came to dominate OECD countries, if one excepts Turkey and includes Finland, though the 
letter before the war was among the less advanced countries” (Lipietz, 1992: 9). 
Consequently, Keynesianism came to dominate in advanced countries and to determine the 
institutions and societies in most Third World countries, which were marginalized. 
What is Keynesianism? The term is based on the economic principles of the banker 
(and politician) John Maynard Keynes. “Keynes argued that governments should intervene 
to regulate the booms and slumps that characterize capitalist economies. In particular, 
governments should spend in times of recession to create more effective demand for 
private goods and services” (Knox and Pinch, 2000: 34). Parallel with this approach, 
Keynesian welfare state appeared. It may be defined as a welfare state underpinned by 
Keynesian demand-management policies, and also characterized by universal benefits, 
citizens’ rights and increasing standards of provision through the social wage. Finally 
Keynesianism is relationally described: “a set of policies underpinning the welfare state in 
the 1950s and 1960s. The objective was to manage economies by countering the lack of 
demand in recession through government spending – ‘demand management’ (Knox and 
Pinch, 2000: 142). 
According to Harvey, Keynes saw the main problem of economy in terms of 
scientific managerial strategies and state powers that can stabilize capitalist system. In 
addition, he succeeded to avoid irrationalities stemming by ‘cold war’ conditions, such as 
nationalism, national socialist solutions etc. And finally capitalism achieved high rates of 
growth by means of Keynesianism (Harvey, 1989: 129). During this period, “Fordism 
became firmly connected with Keynesianism, and capitalism indulged in a splurge of 
internationalist world-wide expansions that drew a host of de-colonized nations into its 
net… the ability to provide collective goods depended upon continuous acceleration in the 
productivity of labour in the corporate sector. Only in that way could Keynesian welfare 
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statism be made fiscally viable” (Harvey, 1989: 139). 
Beside Harvey’s economic analysis on Keynesianism, Rupert develops a more 
political approach. He points to another component of Fordist-Keynesianism as ‘Cold War 
Ideology’. According to him, Cold War conditions played a crucial role in the political 
stabilization of Fordist institutions first in the United States, and tyhen in other non-
communist countries. It is possible to think Fordist regulations with Keynesian welfare 
states took under control the labour unions, and rebuilt the liberal capitalist lines under the 
view of American hegemony (Rupert, 1996). 
It is known American way of life came to dominate at the international level. 
Lipietz claims that “it became known throughout the world after the war as the ‘American 
way of life’ – productivity model was ‘hedonist’ in that it was based on the pursuit of 
happiness through the mass availability of a greater number of goods.” (Lipietz, 1992: 6) 
The claims on American hegemony and American way of life cannot be easily 
ignored. It is known that American way of life in societies, and American hegemony in 
international markets has been the case for half a century. Though, recently it is commonly 
argued, advanced capitalist countries accepted these facts because of protecting benefits of 
Fordism, which provided great development in the Fordist era. But in fact, “Not everyone 
was included in the benefits of Fordism, and there were, to be sure, abundant signs of 
discontent even at the system’s apogee” (Harvey, 1989: 137). 
 
2.2.3.3. Variants of Fordism in Core and Periphery Countries 
The one-car-per-minute production method was implemented by the Ford Motor 
Company at its Highland Park plant in 1914. It has had a profound effect not only on the 
automobile industry, but on virtually every other industry as well.  Various ways of the 
Ford system were received and modified.  
“In addition to the USA, the birthplace of the Ford system, seven other major auto-
production nations are looked at: England (Herbert Austin and William Morris), France 
(André-Gustave Citroén and Louis Renault), Germany, Italy (Giovanni Agnelli Fiat), 
Sweden (Volvo), China, and Japan (Kiichiro Toyoda)… Case studies of representative 
manufacturers are taken up in a multidimensional approach that highlights the various Ford 
systems that developed in those countries. (…) In 1916, less than two years after the 
appearance of the Ford system, annual US automobile production reached 1 million units, a 
level not destined to be reached by any other nation until England achieved that figure in 
1945, well after World War II. West Germany hit the 1 million units mark in 1956, followed 
by France in 1958, and by Italy and Japan in 1963” (Shiomi, 1995: 1-3). 
Shiomi states that there were some problems in areas of implemented Ford system 
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outside the USA in order to achieve the level of mass production, such as material 
purchasing, sub-assembly inventory, quality control, equipment maintenance, and process 
management, in addition to sorting out various employment-related issues; i.e. hiring, 
training, and discipline. “The kind of systematic effort needed to implement and modify 
the Ford system was an ongoing process that went on in the various countries well into the 
1960s” (Shiomi, 1995: 3). 
This implementation and modification process leads up to the late 1960s in terms of 
three trends (Shiomi, 1995: 3-4): 
1. towards mass production of different models with a variety of specializations (multiple 
versions). Ford’s Highland Park and River Rouge plants were specially designed to 
produce only one model, the Model T. It was needed to modify for more flexible system, 
and Toyota succeeded it by means of establishing a mixed assembly line. 
2. the process of the international implementation and modification of the Ford system 
application of transfer automation. It is a precursor to today’s robotized factories, 
representing the imposition of rather inflexible automation directly on traditional 
dedicated production lines. 
3. the application of the Ford system to small lot assembly, with reference to sports car 
production by BLMC of England and Nissan of Japan, and luxury car production by 
Volvo of Sweden. Nissan is able to produce niche cars in lots less than ten, but this is 
completely different from the craft production techniques that were used before the 
adoption of the Ford system; partial, or skillfully modified use some of the elements 
making up the Ford system can be seen.  
The emergence of the variants of Ford system is almost as old as Ford’s companies. 
In fact, during the period between the world wars, the Ford Motor Company set up 
transplant manufacturing facilities in Copenhagen (1919), Sao Paulo (1921), Trieste 
(1922), Yokohoma and Buenos Aires (1919), a suburb of Paris and the German city of 
Cologne (1925), and the London suburb of Dagenham (1928); the Canadian Ford 
Company was establishing plants in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and other 
countries (Shiomi, 1995: 5-6). Some of these plants were essentially versions of River 
Rouge plant. But especially after the Yokomo plant (Toyota), built in order to facilitate 
significant expansion in the Far East, Ford system faced its variants; some of them really 
differed from the classical system. “Yokohoma plant was equipped with modern conveyor 
systems for chassis and body assembly, and it was capable of production a maximum of 
200 cars a day, or 20,000 cars per year” (Shiomi, 1995: 6). 
Wada states: “in 1955 the USA produced about 9,2 million vehicles; Japan, just 
about 69,000 vehicles. After the years 1960s Japanese automobile assemblers constructed 
new dedicated plants for passenger cars. In 1980 Japan produced over 11 million vehicles 
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and became the largest car producing country in the world, passing the USA. In the same 
year Toyota and Nissan made 3,2 million and 2,6 million vehicles respectively” (Wada, 
1995: 11). In this process, Nissan’s approach in fact was a ‘direct technology transfer’ 
while Toyota’s was an ‘indirect technology transfer’. Thus, Nissan faced many lacks of the 
implementation of mass production; meanwhile Toyota tried to adapt the imported 
technology to existing conditions. Finally, Toyota succeeded to reach flow production, 
based on integration between Ford production system and existing conditions. This method 
has not developed in the Japanese automobile industry, but in Japan’s manufacturing 
industry as a whole (Wada, 1995:11-2). It should be noted that the Japanese practice is the 
most interesting and important variant of Fordism. Sayer states that the Japanese 
experience should better be named as ‘flexible rigidities’ (Eraydın, 1992: 15). 
 According to Eraydın, in 1960s, outside of the Japanese experiences, Fordist 
production system spring to periphery countries. Most of these plants, except the ones in 
newly industrializing countries, were established by national or multinational firms. They 
were followed in accordance with the advanced countries’ strategy focusing highly on the 
national market. All these experiences indicated the fact that Fordism was not capable to 
spread to whole economy (Eraydın, 1992: 19-0). On the other hand, Harvey claims that in 
1960s there was a wave of competitive Fordist industrialization to entirely new 
environments by means of especially import substitution policies in many Third World 
countries and offshore manufacturing in South-East Asia. Thus, Western Europe, Japan, 
and newly industrializing countries were capable of competing with the USA, and thus the 
hegemony of USA started to collapse (Harvey, 1989: 141). 
Peck and Tickell’s table (see Table 2.1.) successfully summarizes the variants of 
Fordism, though there exists no consensus in relation to their terms. It may be possible to 
say that each model is decomposed from others especially by differences in state politics, 
conditions of workers, flexibility in production, organization of capital, and so on. While 
core countries are decomposed each other by degree of flexibility, financial integration, 
state politics, and social segmentation; periphery countries are decomposed each other by 
degree of authoritarianism, less democracy, exploitation, totalitarian states politics – 
especially on workers -, and primitive technologies. 
That the term of ‘delayed Fordism’ gained a considerable area of interest and that 
the Fordist assembly line was driven to a local instrument is commonly accepted is a well-
known fact. Here, the dominant consideration is that Fordism had formerly experienced a 
crisis period in which the initial flourishing of localization had existed, and that a Fordist 
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sub-stage development had been experienced within the less developed countries in 
relation to import substitution strategy. Another considerable opening of the term is the 
claim that Fordism did not lasted, but rather, was revised (see chapter 3). It is possible to 
state that the ‘delayed Fordism’ may be considered as a derivative of Fordism; but to place 
it within a strictly defined period will be the negligence of the fact that Fordism did always 
have differences and that the emphasis on the phenomenon of locality has an importance in 
all practices.         
Table 2.1. Variants of Fordism 
Type of Fordist 
Regime 
Characteristics of Coupling Examples 
Classic Fordism Mass production and consumption underwritten by social 
democratic welfare state. 
USA 
Flex-Fordism Decentralized, federalized state. Close cooperation between 
financial and industrial capital, including facilitation of inter-firm 
cooperation. 
West Germany 
Blocked Fordism Inadequate integration of financial and productive capital at the 
level of the nation state. Archaic and obstructive character of 
working class politics 
Great Britain 
State Fordism State plays leading role in creation of conditions of mass 
production, including state control of industry. 
France 
Delayed Fordism Cheap labour immediately adjacent to Fordist core. State 
intervention played key role in rapid industrialization in the 1960s. 
Spain, Italy 
Peripheral 
Fordism 
Local assembly followed by export of Fordist goods. Heavy 
indebtedness. Authoritarian state structures coupled with movement 
for democracy, attempts to emulate Fordist accumulation system in 
absence of corresponding MSR. 
Mexico, Brazil 
Racial Fordism Dualistic workforce. Privileged minority has north American-style 
working conditions and remuneration levels. This relies upon 
authoritarian state structure and the ‘super-exploitation’ of majority 
population. 
South Africa 
under apartheid 
Primitive 
Taylorization 
Taylorist labour process with almost endless supply of labour. 
Bloody exploitation, huge extraction of surplus value. Dictatorial 
states and high social tension. 
Malaysia, 
Bangladesh, the 
Philippines 
Hybrid Fordism Profit-driven expansion based upon modified Taylorism. Truncated 
internal market, societal segmentation and upper-developed welfare 
state. Indirect wage indexation.  
Japan 
Source: Peck and Tickell, 1994: 286 
Finally, it would be proper here to mention about the entrance of Fordist production 
to less developed countries and about the mode of development within these geographies. 
There stands a dominant comprehension in explaining Fordism’s development in less 
developed countries by means of dependency relations. If the importance of local 
dynamics in south Asia is put aside, especially Wallerstein’s ‘core-periphery’ distinction 
provides an effective perspective for our understanding. According to Wallerstein, one, 
perhaps the most popular, of the ‘world-system’ theorists, ‘the capitalism is a negative-sum 
game’ meaning that “…the rise of some nations is always accompanied by the fall of 
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others” (Hoogvelt, 1997: 4). Thus, the entry of the Fordism into less developed countries is 
not be considered as the possibility to jump to an upper development level, such as from 
the level of being less developed to that of being advanced. 
The fundamental reason for the leaping of Fordist production to less developed 
countries is the plugged market relations within the capitalist environment. The provided 
supplementary of the core-periphery, in turn, caused the prevalence of this mode of 
production. In other words, the problem to make mass production permanent gave birth to 
the imperativeness of the expansion of Fordist production to less developed countries. 
Although the increase in national income and in sectoral development have been evident 
during this period, it has been well observed that a total Fordist mode of accumulation 
could not develop in accordance with its supportive national and social organizations 
(Eraydın, 1992: 50).           
 
2.2.4. Crisis of Fordism 
Following the discussion in the previous sections, it is possible to say that Fordism 
began to flourish towards the end of the 1960s. The actual time or period of the crisis 
conditions of Fordism is not specified exactly; rather, there are different approaches trying 
to clarify the starting point of the crisis of Fordism. One of them belongs to Aglietta (1979) 
emphasizing the year of 1966. But it should be noted that the common acceptances on the 
emergence of new mode of production alternatives for Fordist production point to the time 
after 1972 (Eraydın, 1992: 17).  
The most emphasized reason of the crisis is the rigidity of the Fordist system.  
“…more generally, the period from 1965 to 1973 was one in which the inability of Fordism 
and Keynesianism to contain the inherent contradictions of capitalism became intensified 
and apparent. On the surface, these difficulties could best be captured by one word: rigidity. 
There were problems with the rigidity of long-term and large-scale fixed capital investments 
in mass-production systems that precluded much flexibility of design and presumed stable 
growth in invariant consumer markets. There were problems of rigidities in labour markets, 
labour allocation, and in labour contracts (especially in the so-called ‘monopoly’ sector)” 
(Harvey, 1989: 141).  
During the Fordist period, though these rigid relations could establish specific 
governments and institutions so as to survive the Fordism, changing conditions of demands 
cause inadequacy of existing institutions and Keynesian politics. Furthermore, the 
emergence of diffusion of Fordism to less developed countries in order to arrive 
satisfactory levels in advanced capitalist markets accelerates the crisis (Eraydın, 1992: 17). 
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Lipietz claims the crisis related with two sides: demands size, of crisis related to 
increasing international integration of production-consumption circuits (mainly due to 
trade between developed countries) led to difficulties in regulating concurrently both the 
growth of inner demand and the trade-balance; and supply side, the decreasing the rate of 
growth in productivity due to weaknesses of Taylorism, and the increasing cost of 
mechanization, led to a decrease in profitability of investment. In addition, Lipietz states 
the importance of increasing competition in the international market. According to him, 
diffusion of Fordist production towards periphery countries particularly increased the 
international competition, and caused a new division of labour. Accompanying the fall of 
the rate of profits, labour wages calmed down and unemployment increased. These impacts 
forced the system to build new regulation mechanisms for the accumulation of capital 
(Lipietz, 1998). Furthermore, Eraydın claims that nations started to loose their powers that 
provide to go on Keynesian politics 1972 oil crisis. Production costs increased with dollar, 
so trade possibility with periphery countries was plugged. This conjuncture causes to break 
down both Keynesianism and Fordism (Eraydın, 1992: 18-9). 
Harvey explains these processes in relation to the nature of capitalism, which has 
dialectical relationship with economic crisis caused by overaccumulation. After 1972, 
overaccumulation of Fordist production was not controlled, and financial problems such as 
inflation appeared.  
“The attempt to put a brake on rising inflation in 1973 exposed a lot of excess capacity in 
Western economies, triggering first of all a world-wide crash in property markets and severe 
difficulties for financial institutions… The strong deflation of 1973-5 further indicated that 
state finances were overextended in relation to resources, creating a deep fiscal and 
legitimation crisis… Technological change, automation, the search for new product lines and 
market niches, geographical dispersal to zones of easier labour control, mergers, and steps to 
accelerate the turnover time of their capital surged to the fore of corporate strategies for 
survival under general conditions of deflation” (Harvey, 1989: 145). 
 
2.2.5. Flexible Production 
Following the crisis of Fordism, the capitalist nations are recently undergoing 
wrenching economic, social and political transformations. At its core, these 
transformations involve a shift away from the mass production of highly standardized 
goods and services for mass markets to small-batch production of relatively customized 
goods and services for niche markets (Knudsen and Boggs, 1996: 1). These 
transformations are broadly based on the transition from Fordist production (mass 
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production) to post-Fordist production (flexible production): “The crisis of Fordism in the 
1970s led to the worldwide collapse of the mode of accumulation and regulation which 
were its characteristics. This crisis continues: a new, stable, international, hegemonic ‘post-
Fordist’ development has so far been unable to impose itself” (Esser and Hirsch, 1989: 76).  
Considering the debate on the process of transition from mass production methods 
to a ‘post-Fordist’ form of production organization, there is no consensus as to define 
exactly what constitute post-Fordist modes of production organization, labour processes, or 
macroeconomic arrangements (Storper, 1989: 196). Thus flexible production is yet a 
debate summarized and evaluated in the following chapter. In this section, it is aimed to 
define well-known signs and tokens of flexible production, tough there exists no consensus 
what it exactly includes. In other words, only the facts of the flexible production, 
commonly referred as the realities, are matters of this section. 
It is possible to say that there are three main driving forces behind the emergence of 
Post-Fordism, which may be listed as; the rising of new technologies, internationalization, 
and the paradigm shift from Fordism to post-Fordism. Firstly, the competition with the 
newly industrialized countries (NICs) has forced the advanced capitalist economies to 
specialize in the new core technologies. Secondly, the internationalization puts weight on 
the wages as costs of production rather than the sources of home demand. They have to 
secure the maximum benefit to their home-based transnational firms and banks. And 
thirdly, the new paradigm of post-Fordism means that the primary economic functions of 
states are redefined. States are focused on the supply-side problem of international 
competitiveness and they attempt to subordinate welfare policy to the demands of 
flexibility (Lipietz, 1998). 
The prior reality of flexible production is that it exists in connection with the crisis 
of Fordism (Eraydın, 1992: 23). In other words, flexible production is marked by a direct 
confrontation with the rigidities of Fordism. “It rests on flexibility with respect to labour 
processes, labour markets, products, and patterns of consumption. It is characterized by the 
emergence of entirely new sectors of production, new ways of providing financial services, 
new markets, and greatly intensified rates of commercial, technological, and organizational 
innovation” (Harvey, 1989: 147). 
The changes from the above, mentioned by Harvey, are generally considered as 
true. On the other hand, claim of Storper and Scot (1988) is not easily ignored. They say 
flexible production has been materialized particularly in manufacturing industry and 
economy, but how they affect the other areas still remains (see in Eraydın, 1992: 23). 
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Instead of production of standardized goods by assembly line and with huge stocks, 
flexible production is based on a system that is dependent on the demand. This system 
supports total quality control systems, product differentiation, and vertical disintegration of 
production. In addition, these trends cause raising small-batch production and sub-
contracted (Eraydın, 1999: 22-6). “Small-batch production and sub-contracting certainly 
had the virtues of bypassing the rigidities of the Fordist system and satisfying a far greater 
range of market needs, including quick-changing ones” (Harvey, 1989: 155-6). 
Furthermore, organized sub-contracting opens up opportunities for small business 
formation, and in some instances permits older systems of domestic, artisanal, familial 
(patriarchal), and paternalistic (‘godfather’, ‘guv’nor’ or even mafia-like) labour systems to 
revive and flourish as centerpieces rather than as appendages of the production system 
(Harvey, 1989: 152).  
Flexible production consists of two important features: first, the intricate variety of 
subcontracting arrangements (that connect small firms to large-scale -often multinational- 
operations), and second, the formation of new production ensembles within agglomeration 
economies. These conditions provide the integration of small business to financial or 
marketing organizations. Many scholars state that enhanced capacity of small-scale 
business and geographical dispersal could led to diminution of corporate power by means 
of integration possibilities. In contrast, for Harvey: “the well-organized corporation has 
marked competitive advantages over small business” (Harvey, 1989: 158). 
On the other hand, the role of labour power on production is completely changed. 
While labour unions and labour organizations loose their importance, skilled labours are 
entrenched at the center of manufacturing production. Thus, unskilled workers, especially 
ethnical and women employees have to work under more exploiting conditions (Eraydın, 
1992: 23-4). 
The changes in the labour relations, including division of labour, are related to 
changes in firms’ structures. It is possible to state that both may support and provoke each 
other. This situation appeared after the 1972 oil crisis, when advanced countries, except 
Japan, were faced with increasing unemployment that could not be predicted in the postwar 
period. The tools to resolve the problem have been developed by means of ‘two save bouts’ 
in the 1970s. “Flexibility and mobility have allowed employers to exert stronger pressures 
of labour control on a workforce” (Harvey, 1989: 147). Actually, the labour market has 
undergone a radical restructuring. Labourers have had to be forced through more flexible 
work conditions and labour contracts:  
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“It is hard to get clear overall picture, because the very purpose of such flexibility is to 
satisfy the often highly specific needs of each firm. Even for regular employers, systems 
such as ‘nine-day fortnights’, or work schedules that average a forty-hour week over the year 
but oblige the employee to work much longer at periods of peak demand, and compensate 
with shorter hours at periods of slack, are becoming much more common. But more 
important has been the apparent move away from regular employment towards increasing 
reliance upon part-time, temporary or sub-contracted work arrangements” (Harvey, 1989: 
150). 
Fig. 2.1. Labour market structures under conditions of flexible accumulation 
 
Source: Harvey, 1989: 151 
The figure given above illustrates the recent flexible labour market (see Fig.2.1). 
The core (a steadily shrinking group according to accounts emanating from both sides of 
the Atlantic) is made up of employees with full time, permanent status and is central to the 
long-term future of the organization. Enjoying greater job security, good promotion and re-
skilling prospects, and relatively generous pension, insurance, and other fringe benefit 
rights, this group is nevertheless expected to be adaptable, flexible, and if necessary 
geographically mobile. The periphery encompasses two rather different sub-groups. The 
first consists of full-time employees with skills that are readily available in the labour 
market, such as clerical, secretarial, routine and lesser skilled manual work The second 
peripheral group ‘provides even greater numerical flexibility and includes part-timers, 
casuals, fixed term contract staff, temporaries, sub-contractors and public subsidy trainees, 
with even less job security than the first peripheral group. All the evidence points to a very 
significant growth in this category of employees in the last few years (Harvey, 1989: 151). 
 36
Table 2.2. Contrast between Fordist production and just-in-time (post-Fordist) production 
Fordist Production 
(Based on economies of scale) 
Just-in-time production 
(Based on economies of scope) 
THE PRODUCTION PROCESS 
Mass production of homogenous goods Small batch production 
Uniformity and standardization Flexible and small batch production of a variety 
of product types 
Large buffer stocks and inventory No stocks 
Testing quality ex-post (rejects and errors 
detected late) 
Quality control part of process (immediate 
detection of errors) 
Rejects are concealed in buffer stocks Immediate reject of defective parts 
Loss of production time because of long set-up 
times, defective parts, inventory bottlenecks, 
etc. 
Reduction of lost time, diminishing ‘the 
porosity of the working day’ 
Resource driven Demand driven 
Vertical and (in some cases) horizontal 
integration 
(quasi-) vertical integration sub-contracting 
Cost reduction through wage control Learning-by-doing integrated in long-term 
planning 
LABOUR 
Single task performance by worker Multiple tasks 
Payment per rate (based on job design criteria) Personal payment (detailed bonus system) 
High degree of job specialization Elimination of job demarcation 
No or only little on the job training Long on the job training 
Vertical labour organization More horizontal labour organization 
No learning experience On the job learning 
Emphasis on diminishing worker’s 
responsibility (disciplining of labour force) 
Emphasis on worker’s co-responsibility 
No job security High employment security for core workers 
(life-time employment). 
SPACE 
Functional spatial specialization 
(centralization/decentralization) 
Spatial clustering and agglomeration 
Spatial division of labour Spatial integration 
Homogenization of regional labour markets 
(spatially segmented labour markets) 
Labour market diversification (in-place labour 
market segmentation) 
World-wide sourcing of components sub-
contractors 
Spatial proximity of vertically quasi-integrated 
firms 
STATE 
Regulation Deregulation/re-regulation 
Rigidity Flexibility 
Collective bargaining Division/individualization, local or firm-based 
negotiations 
Socialization of welfare (the welfare state) Privatization of collective needs and social 
security 
International stability through multi-lateral 
agreements 
International destabilization; increased 
geopolitical tensions 
Centralization Decentralization and sharpened 
interregional/intercity competition 
The ‘subsidy’ state/city The ‘entrepreneurial’ state/city 
Indirect intervention in markets through income 
and price policies 
Direct state intervention in markets through 
procurement 
National regional policies ‘Territorial’ regional policies (third party form) 
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Firm financed research and development State financed research and development 
Industry-led innovation State-led innovation 
IDEOLOGY 
Mass consumption of consumer durables: the 
consumption society 
Individualized consumption: ‘yuppie’-culture 
Modernism Postmodernism 
Totality/structural reform Specificity/adaptation 
Socialization Individualization the ‘spectacle’ society 
Source: Swyngedouw, 1986 cited in Harvey, 1990: 177-9 
In the Fordist period, the costs were reduced by means of the provided advantage of 
the internal economies of scale. Whereas, in flexible market, there are much smaller 
product runs and therefore decreasing internal economies of scale. The tendency for firms 
to subcontract functions to other firms and agencies, which can be called as externalization 
of production, caused to reduce costs by getting a variety of organizations to compete to 
provide goods and services. In addition, it can help to offload the risks associated with new 
joint ventures with other companies, the so-called strategic alliances. A major 
consequence of these developments is that firms are becoming much smaller. This has 
arisen because existing firms have been subdivided – vertical disintegration – as well as 
through the rapid growth of new small firms. Rather than the internal economies of scale 
dominant under Fordism, flexible firms are therefore based on external economies of scope 
(Knox and Pinch, 2000: 39) (see Table 2.2).  
Besides these changes, the deindustrialization process has been experienced in 
advanced capitalist countries related to high-tech production, communication technologies, 
and rising competition (Ersoy, 2000). And if the process that explained above think with 
the recent living deindustrialization process in advanced capitalist countries, it can be seen 
that changes in labour market, changes in firms’ structure and changes in organizations of 
production are closely related and depended each other. And this is the fact that it is shaped 
under decisive domination of large-scale firms, while providing considerable possibilities 
to small-scale firms. 
Finally, it should be highlighted that service employment has developed more than 
the world had ever seen after 1972. “The rapid growth of service employment, not so much 
in retailing, distribution, transportation, and personal services (which have remained fairly 
stable or even lost ground), as in producer services, finance, insurance, and real estate, and 
certain other sectors as health and education.” (Harvey, 1989: 156-7) 
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2.2.5.1. Japanization and Just-In-Time Production 
Since the emergence of flexible production, Just-in-time production (JIT) and Total 
Quality Management (TQM), originally adapted by the Japanese variant of Fordism in 
postwar period (see section 2.2.3.3 in this study), have an important place in flexible 
production debates (Eraydın, 1992: 23). In contrast to the Fordist just-in-case 
manufacturing system, JIT system minimize inventory at each stage of the production 
processes. Tomaney offers a clarified definition:  
“the just-in-time system is conceptualized as a semi-horizontal operational coordination 
method, which requires shop level flexibility in adjustment the amount, kinds and timing of 
in-process materials. The minimal use of inventories necessitates effective control of low 
level disruptions, such as machinery malfunctions, worker absenteeism, quality defect and so 
on, in order to minimize their effects on the smooth operation of production. This is aided by 
a form of work organization in which job demarcations are minimal and job rotation is 
maximized” (Tomaney, 1994: 166). 
Advantages of JIT are explained in terms of total quality management (TQM), 
where both innovations are popularized by Japanese corporations.  
“Since with JIT all the arriving parts must be defect free and the flexibility of JIT 
manufacturing requires total quality management structures which can quickly identify 
systemic failures and ‘bottlenecks’ in the production process… At the heart of TQM are 
quality control circles of workers and managers who work closely with each other and not in 
the traditional, hierarchical and compartmentalized Fordist way” (Rupert, 1997). 
JIT system sometimes is called as Japanization or Japanese production system. 
“The Japanese production system is based in three principles: flexibility in utilization of 
facilities; minimization of quality problems as they arise; minimization of production-flow 
buffers, whether material, manpower or time-buffers” (Tomaney, 1994: 165). In addition, 
Japanese production can be evaluated held to challenge some assumption of ‘Western 
orthodoxy’ in mass production industries by means of concerning with the elimination of 
wasted output and wasted time contrast of the Western models. 
Some scholars examine how Japanese experiences effect the environment of today 
and future. For example, Amin and Malmberg modestly highlight the relationship between 
JIT and the growing significance of networking as a form of organization and governance 
(Amin and Malmberg, 1992: 237). More assertively, Sabel, who state that the world has 
entered to a ‘flexible specialization’ age, considers JIT as an integral part of this new age 
(Sabel, 1989: 34). On the other hand, some scholars, such as Kenney and Florida (1988) 
pay more attention to JIT. They believe that the Japanese model has been described as the 
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quintessential of the post-Fordist society, and the industrial principles, which are taken as 
to underpin Japanese competitive success, are considered to be transferable to other 
countries (Tomaney, 1994: 164). In contrast, there is a statement related to Japanese model 
claiming that people are in an age of neo-Fordism which is attempting to overcome the 
limitations of the old Fordist system without a cause in fundamental transformation (Knox 
and Pinch, 2000: 41). 
There are two conflicting points about Japanization: First, although it is claimed 
that the Japanization approach offers a much more humane working employment, there is a 
counter argument on the fact that it intensifies exploitation of labour conditions; and 
second, although Japanization is supported by scholars of post-Fordism, this method 
actually do not suggest the ‘end of mass production’. And yet, it seems really hard to 
support any of the two. But it may be easily stated that the Japanese production focuses on 
the work organizations and managements by means of JIT and TQM systems. That the 
capability to attain hegemonic production system all over the world requires more drastic 
arrangements is a possible further comment. 
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Chapter 3 
APPROACHES ON THE TRANSITION  
TO FLEXIBLE PRODUCTION 
The only general point of agreement is that  
something significant has changed 
 in the way capitalism has been working 
 since about 1970. 
(Harvey, 1990: 173) 
The concept of ‘flexible production’ refers to a set of regulations to increase the 
capacity of firms, adjust the variations in market demand, reduce the costs of production, 
and to more flexible labour relations, mechanization, and even society. In addition, flexible 
production includes ‘the emergence of new sectors of production, new ways of providing 
financial services, new markets, rates of commercial, technological and organizational 
innovations’ (Harvey, 1990). It should also be noted that the debate on the ‘flexibility’ in 
production systems, markets, labour relations, and so on, is strongly related with the 
concept of ‘post-Fordism’. 
Post-Fordism is no longer a strange jargon in the academic literature (Amin, 1994). 
It refers to the new accumulation processes based on flexible production, sometimes 
(perhaps generally) understood as the opposite of Fordism based on mass production, 
though having not a consensual basis. “Defenders of the Fordist/Post-Fordist concept argue 
that, just like the car factories of the past, the new industrial spaces are the key propulsive 
industries that drive much of the economy and help to determine its overall shape” (Knox 
and Pinch, 2000: 41).  
Within the debate, there are some agreements on the interpretation of current 
changes such as the fact that transition to post-Fordism started in relation to changing 
production types, and that these changes, thus, have caused or accompanied with social, 
economic, and institutional changes. Post-Fordism debates mostly turn around two 
questions: first, does the system go through a new phase of capitalism or only pass through 
a temporary period to reach more stable conditions? And second, which dynamics do 
determine these changes? Seeking for the answers of these questions, different theoretical 
approaches – they can be called as ‘transition models’– have been built. In this chapter, 
within an explanation of these models, flexible production debates are explored. 
Many scholars, like Amin (1994) and Elam (1990), claim that there are three 
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transition models that are commonly accepted and laid at the heart of the post-Fordist 
debate because of the emphasis on the dynamics of structural economic changes within 
production. Though all these theoretical frameworks are different from each other, they 
have actually similar areas of concentration such as Fordism, mass-production and current, 
sometimes future, capitalist structure including dimensions of production, administration, 
organization, and social formation. These approaches are listed below: 
1. The Neo-Schumpeterian (or Fifth Kondratiev) Approach 
2. The Flexible Specialization (or neo-Smithian) Approach 
3. The Regulation – School – (or neo-Marxist) Approach 
These approaches are separated from each other by the differences in basic 
perceptions, methodologies, priorities, and so on. On the other hand, all three models may 
be defined and it is not possible to eliminate one of them from others by their degrees of 
importance, in discussion what post-Fordism is and how the scholars approach it. Shortly, 
each model is useful to explain one side of flexible production, and thus none is able to 
explain the whole. Therefore, it would be better here to explore each model individually. 
 
3.1. The Neo-Schumpeterian Approach 
This approach has been associated with the focus on ‘innovation’ by Freeman and 
Perez and their colleagues established at the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) of 
Sussex University (see Freeman and Perez, 1988, Elam 1994, Amin, 1994). 
Freeman and Perez (1988) have been inspired by Kondratiev’s studies in 1920s and 
Schumpeterian studies in 1930s. Kondratiev claimed that capitalism lived traditional fifty-
year long-waves of ‘boom’ and ‘bust’ during its development process (see section 2.1.3. in 
this study). On the other hand, Schumpeter believed innovative entrepreneurs have a path-
breaking role to give birth to the new technical paradigm with reference to the process of 
creative destruction for the future. Freeman and Perez’s hypotheses, which are based on a 
conceptualization of long-wave development booms and innovations, are crucial in the 
constitution of the approach. Their concept of ‘innovation’ include not only new 
production techniques and industrial processes but also work organizations, management, 
new high growth sectors, transport and communication technologies, geographies of 
location, and so on.  
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3.1.1. Creative Destruction, Key Factor and Revolution 
When Schumpeter built his theory on ‘technological innovation’, often labeling it 
as ‘new’, he gave special attention to the entrepreneurs. To Schumpeter, all revolutions 
started when they reached to the point of ‘creative destruction’. Schumpeter’s ‘creative 
destruction’ was based on ‘long-term changes in the technological base of the economy’: 
“The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from 
the new consumers’ goods, the new methods of production or transportation, the new 
markets, the new forms of industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates” (see 
Elam, 1990: 44).  
The two factors, first the quantum leaps in industrial productivity (they are secured 
once pioneering advances in technology diffuse across the economy), and second 
‘matching’ innovations (within the framework of socio-institutional norms and regulations) 
determine the successful transition from one long-wave to another. “Once these conditions 
are achieved, a new long-wave of growth can be said to be in full swing, with a distinctive 
techno-economic paradigm that establishes a universal standard across the economy” 
(Amin, 1994: 12). 
According to Elam, “Freeman and Perez have been responsible for the significant 
extension and refinement of Schumpeter’s original formulations and have thereby greatly 
added to our understanding of the nature of technological change.” When Freeman and 
Perez define the revolution as consisting of a cluster of radical innovation, they introduce 
“…a new set of common sense principles into capitalist production and a clearly defined 
‘best practice’ frontier” (Elam, 1990: 45). If the system arrives at the ‘boom’ point, then 
transition starts unavoidably. The only thing for the system what the problem is reaching 
successful transition. 
Freeman and Perez’s emphasis on ‘new’ not only includes the techno-economic 
changes, but also new governments, new locations, new growth sectors and so on.  
“The systemic nature of technological revolution gives rise to the notion of ‘techno-
economic paradigms’; qualitative changes in capitalist production exceeding the simple sum 
of new engineering trajectories – completely new worlds of work with new standards of 
efficiency; new models for management; new locational patterns; new high growth sectors 
and redefined optimal scale of production” (Perez, 1985 cited in Elam, 1990: 45). 
Although Freeman and Perez discuss the conditions of transition in a wider context, 
the scholars claim that the techno-economic paradigm, labeled as key factor, plays a 
steering role in the transition period. Thus, neo-Schumpeterian approach explains each 
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long-term related to the directing capability towards a techno-economic paradigm (the key 
factor) in a specific industry as the fact that cotton and woven industry did between the 
years 1740 and 1840. Each long-term has similar key factors (Eraydın, 1992: 34).  
Neo-Schumpeterian scholars clearly define the key factor, which must fulfill 
following conditions (Perez, 1986; Freeman and Perez, 1988 cited in Elam, 1990: 45): 
1. Clearly perceived low and rapidly falling relative cost; 
2. Almost unlimited supply for all practical purposes; 
3. Potential all-pervasiveness in the production sphere; 
4. A capacity to reduce the cost and change the quality of capital equipment, labour 
inputs and other inputs to the system  
In sum, neo-Schumpeterian approach basically claims that ‘old industrial 
organizations’ are continually changed by means of a process of creative destruction. In 
this process, entrepreneurs start to create more technology based and more innovative 
firms in order to increase their profits and market shares. This tendency brings about new 
sectors, some of which have the capability to play the steering role. If the transformed 
firms success, new innovations cause destruction within the existing market structure. 
Afterwards, old firms are departed or loosed their efficiencies due to debility of new 
competition area. Thus, whole economic and social structure is transformed. This is a 
revolution. 
 
3.1.2. Fordism As the Fourth Kondratiev 
According to Freeman and Perez (1988), the age of mass production may be 
considered typically as the fourth Kondratiev or the fourth long-wave period, which was 
established via the domination of electro-mechanical technologies, oil and petro-chemical 
industries, and other mass production industries. They frequently point at the 
characteristics of production and markets like ‘standardization, scale economies, 
oligopolistic competition, mass consumption of cheap goods, and vertical integration of 
corporations’. The approach includes not only these factors, but also the emphasis on the 
importance of socio-institutional arrangements, especially national policies under the 
‘banner of Keynesianism’. For neo-Schumpeterian approach, Keynesianism provided the 
tools which created sustainability – to link between employment, output and productivity 
growth (Amin, 1994: 12). 
Freeman and Perez (1988) label the breakdown of Fordism as a historical necessity, 
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in relation to the impropriety between an emerging techno-economic paradigm which 
could renew growth, and withdrawing socio-institutional framework of the fourth 
Kondratiev. In other words, institutional changes occurred more slowly than innovations in 
production. “This inertia is traced not only the failure of contemporary government 
policies to provide coordinated and directed industrial policy action, but also to the 
difficulties and time lags involved in radically changing embedded socio-cultural habits 
and norms across the wide range of institutions which constitute the ‘socio-institutional 
framework’ (Amin, 1994: 12). 
 
3.1.3. The Fifth Kondratiev with Steering Roles of Information Technologies and 
Microelectronics 
According to Freeman and Perez, people recently access the fifth Kondratiev, 
which is defined by the techno-economic realities rather than other factors, such as social 
and cultural changes. Recent transition has the ‘key factors’ playing a ‘steering’ role which 
are information technologies and microelectronics: Low-cost coal and steam-powered 
transportation in first Kondratiev; low-cost steel and heavy engineering industries in 1880s 
and 1890s; and oil and petro-chemical industries after 1930. 
The debate on information technology and microelectronics as the can be replaced 
as the fundamental sectors of the recent period within lots of study in a variety of 
disciplines. Likewise, it may be possible to offer opposing ideas provided by the studies 
that indicate successful transition depending on the social innovations rather than the 
techno-economic paradigm, like the ones on East Asian practices (see Shiomi and Wada, 
1995). 
Due to its definition of post-Fordism, the neo-Schumpeterian approach is criticized 
as being ‘technology determinist’. According to Freeman and Perez, the technology-
induced changes in product and communication systems are prior rather than 
organizational and market changes. On the other hand, they point out the dynamics of 
successful transition from one long-wave to another are depended the changes in the 
economic, social, and institutional structures. Especially, the institutional changes occupy a 
central place in the neo-Schumpeterian literature. “The transition from one techno-
economic paradigm to the next is considered to entail equally profound transformation of 
the institutional and social framework” (see cited in Elam, 1990: 46). 
Finally, the similarities between the neo-Schumpeterian and the regulationist 
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approach, evaluated in the following sections, should be mentioned. For Amin, “there is 
broad agreement the two approaches over: the systemic and cyclical nature of capitalist 
development; the periodization and general dynamics of Fordism; the significance of the 
degree of match; (…) and the stability of a ‘long wave’ or ‘long cycle’ of economic 
development” (Amin, 1994: 11). The major differences between the approaches is that 
while neo-Schumpeterian approach put the techno-economic paradigm to the center, 
regulation approach focus on the whole historical realities of the capitalist system by 
means of the ‘regime of accumulation’. 
 
3.2. The Flexible Specialization Approach 
This approach has been very popular since 1984 when American sociologists 
Charles Sabel and Michael Piore prepared the work named as “The Second Industrial 
Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity”. After this time, the framework of the flexible 
specialization has been supported, and criticized, by many studies, especially by the works 
of Jonathan Zeitlin and Paul Hirst (see Piore and Sabel, 1984; Sabel, 1989; Storper, 1989; 
and Hirst and Zeitlin, 1989). 
To begin with, flexible specialization is based on the new division of labour with 
respect to the craft production. It identifies complex and variable connections between 
institutions, markets and politics under the impact of technological development. Hirst and 
Zeitlin (1989) define the flexible specialization as “…the manufacture of a wide and 
changing array of customized products using flexible, general purpose machinery and 
skilled adaptable workers”.  
 
3.2.1. The Theory of ‘Industrial Dualism’ 
The scholars of the flexible specialization avoid highlighting concepts of ‘historical 
evolution’ and ‘transition’. They mostly focus on the production, especially technology 
and technical development of production related to workers’ ability and governmental 
applications. In other words, although governmental applications is prior within the 
framework, their basic argument is actually about production. It is “…a simple conceptual 
distinction between two opposites of industrial production: mass production and flexible 
specialization” (Nielsen, 1991 cited in Amin, 1994: 14). To the scholars of flexible 
specialization, these two concepts have evidential differences which can be summarized as 
“…mass production involves the use of special purpose (product specific) machines and of 
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semi-skilled workers to produce standardized goods while flexible specialization, or craft 
production, is based on skilled workers who produce a variety of customized goods” (see 
Amin, 1994: 14).  
Elam (1990) states that it is necessary to focus on the theory of industrial dualism 
(which is established by Michael Piore) in order to understand the flexible specialization 
thesis and its basic dualistic structure: mass production versus flexible specialization. 
Referring to Piore, Elam states:  
“The notion of a pervasive dualism in industrial societies gained favour in the 1970s. A 
series of dichotomies was identified spanning different economic systems and attempts were 
made to find common explanatory focus. The dichotomies included: 
a. In the enterprise structure of modern industrial economies between a large, monopolistic 
sector and a small, competitive sector; 
b. In developing economies between a modern, organized sector and a traditional, informal 
sector; 
c. In the labour market, between a stable core of high-waged workers (typically 
white/male) and an unstable periphery of low-waged workers (typically black/female)” 
(Elam, 1990: 51). 
This and similar dualistic structures have been emphasized within many discussions 
especially within the development studies since the nineteenth century. Piore and Sabel 
were deeply affected by these works. Thus, this dualistic perspective has moved the center 
of the debates on the flexible specialization framework as being one of, perhaps most 
popular of, the dualistic approaches. 
According to Piore, mass production and flexible specialization creates reciprocal 
effects; in spite of both do always exist. In progress, each paradigm always needs to be 
supported by the policy-making actors such as firms and governments. The dichotomist 
situation does not belong to the crisis or transitions, whereas, it must be explained with 
their own moments and government applications (Amin, 1994: 14). At this point, Elam’s 
note should be reminded: “Although Piore and Sabel also take up notion of technological 
paradigms, the emphasis is very much on social innovation and only secondarily on 
embodied technology” (Elam, 1990: 50).  
In contrast to some assertions based on criticisms against the dualist approach, it is 
accepted that flexible specialization approach cannot be easily defined as ‘technology 
determinist’ because of its interest in structure of governments, market and division of 
labour. According to Elam, flexible specialization approach can be seen as a neo-Smithian 
framework, because “…such a link has been seen by Piore as requiring a move away from 
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the basic tenets of the neo-classical economics and a return to classical political economy; 
or more precisely, to what he calls Adam Smith’s theory of technology.” Elam reminds 
Smith’s two postulates claiming the development of the productive forces: “firstly, that 
productivity is an increasing function of the division of labour; and, secondly, that the 
division of labour is limited by the extent of the market” (Elam, 1990: 51).  
 
3.2.2. The First Industrial Divide and Fordism 
The most important offer of flexible specialization framework on the Fordist era is 
an effort for the explanation of the whole economic and political structure related with 
changes in production. Thus, Piore and Sabel built a specific concept, the industrial divide, 
which is based on the changes in organization of work relations between capital and 
labour, and manufacturing technologies (Tomaney, 1994: 159). The theory of industrial 
divides focuses on the shifts from one hegemonic technological-organizational model of 
production to another. Piore and Sabel claim that these divides mark major periods in 
economic history and social organization within industrial capitalism (Storper, 1989: 197). 
That is to say, industrial divides are crossroads of industrial organizations. According to 
Piore and Sabel (1984), there have been two industrial divides, and the first industrial 
divide appeared at the early beginning of the twentieth century, coupling with the 
emergence of mass production and related production techniques that brought the 
hegemony on craft production methods to an end.  
Piore and Sabel (1984) state that mass production dominated main industries via 
the support of governmental applications during 1920s and 1930s, especially in USA and 
Europe. Thus, big industrial firms and giant factories went towards the center of 
manufacturing production. When labour and social structures were shaped by these 
dominances, Keynesian policies became the most acceptable economic model almost all 
over the world by their emphasis on the creation of sustaining and stable demand. 
Furthermore, there was a direct relation between national economic development and 
hegemonic structure of production. According to Sabel, “…national economic 
development was only marginally controlled by central political authorities” (Sabel, 1989: 
17). And Alfred Marshall, who is an important figure of the neo-classical economy, 
highlighted national policies rather than the character of industrial production after 1920s.  
Flexible specialization approach, in fact, points to the emergence of Fordism as an 
historical crossroads despite its avoidance in using historical view. Elam states “Piore and 
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Sabel do not see a new ‘long wave’ – referred to Kondratiev -, but a new ‘branching-point’ 
– a ‘brief interlude openness’ before the new technological trajectory is established” 
(Elam, 1990: 50). In this respect, it is possible to claim Piore and Sabel that they conceive 
the Fordist era as preparatory, or perhaps ‘missing’, period of ultimate production type, the 
flexible specialization. 
According to the flexible specialization approach, Fordist era may be considered so 
as to unravel the dichotomies, referring to Piore’s industrial dualism theory, in industrial 
societies to get domination of the monopolistic sector, modern-organized sectors, and low-
waged unskilled workers. In other words, it was temporarily resulted in the dichotomies of 
different economic systems, and then some priorities appeared more lightly, such as 
monopolistic sector over competitive sector, modern/organized sector over 
traditional/informal sector, and stable core of high-waged workers over unstable periphery 
of low-waged workers. Furthermore, if Piore and Sabel’s thoughts are based on Smithian 
economic view like Elam’s claims, Fordist era may be seen as a result of adjustment within 
the expanding markets and dividing labour, which provides the raise in productivity for 
Smithian economic view. Thus, the division of labour in the history of capitalism can be 
seen as the definitive social innovation, an innovation that forces to adjust market shares 
because division of labour is limited by the extent of the market (Elam, 1990: 50-2). In this 
respect, Elam enlarges the prefigurative influence of the market on the division of labour 
by adding three other factors to that of ‘extensiveness’. These are: a) the standardization of 
output; b) the stability of market demand; c) the uncertainty of market demand (Piore, 
1980 cited in Elam, 1990: 52). 
Following above explanations, it is possible to reach the heart of the idea on the 
first industrial divide: Piore points to the historical fact that “the co-existence of large and 
small-scale producers in the same industry in developed economies” (Elam, 1990: 52-3). 
Although increasing economic concentration need to reach ‘a greater share of the market 
until only one firm left in the industry’, there existed ‘significant degrees of market 
instability and uncertainty’. These existences force the capitalist system to combine large-
scale industries and small-scale industries in order to provide an enlarged division of 
labour. On the other hand, “the activities of modern craft producers have been a necessary 
complement to the activities of mass producers” (Elam, 1990: 53). According to Piore and 
Sabel, this reality appeared in Fordist era, and gave way to the transition towards flexible 
specialization. 
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3.2.4. The Flexible Specialization with Second Industrial Divide 
According to Piore and Sabel (1984), the second industrial divide broke out in the 
early 1970s, hand in hand with the Fordist crisis experiencing in USA. Changes in the 
market and the growth in demand for non-standardized and qualified goods are the 
prospects for the flexible specialization. The conditions of crisis times caused the rise of 
the non-specialist and highly flexible manufacturing technologies and flexible work 
practices. Scale economies have lost its importance, and thus small firms and smaller units 
of organizations had dominancy with skilled and innovative workers in industrial structure. 
The crisis of Fordism has resulted in many changes, and recession in the market, 
such as stagnation of demand, increasing uncertainty, breakdown of international 
agreements, and, the most importantly, threatening of the mass consumption. The demands 
for non-standardized, better quality, and short shelf life goods have started to increase, and 
flexible specialization, hence, has provided to be an alternative for the system.  
“The second development, also an opportunity for flexible specialization, is the rise of non-
specialist and highly flexible manufacturing technologies (numerically controlled as well as 
non-electronic) and work practices. These are said to favour smaller batch production 
without loss of scale economies in industrial efficiency, thus reducing the historic 
disadvantage of small firms and smaller units of organization… Craft production might well 
be possible” (Amin, 1994: 15). 
The most visible feature of flexible specialization in the current age is the rising 
importance of small firms (Piore and Sabel, 1984). According to this paradigm, not only 
flexible specialization created opportunities for small firms, but also the break-up of the 
mass markets created a trend favouring new small-scale producers. The economic crisis in 
the 1970s and 1980s appeared due to the twin notions: ‘saturation’ and ‘break-up’ of mass 
markets. Market changes insisted on the inevitable process through flexible specialization. 
The competition between mass production and craft production - industrial dualism - 
concluded with the victories of craft production.  
It is known that small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) survived from the 
crisis conditions in the market by means of turning them into the advantages: “During the 
1970s and early 1980s, (SMEs) seemed to be the most productive industrial organizations, 
and, in fact, the only ones which were able to avoid the economic crisis... The flexibility of 
small firms in terms of quantity and quality of production was accepted to be key element 
of success for industrial development in that period” (Erendil, 1998: 66).  
Piore and Sabel call attention to the ‘Third Italy’ experience with new forms of 
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worker co-operations where they see a way in the experiences for small-scale producers to 
cope with their problems (Piore and Sabel, 1984: 206). Tomaney states that Third Italy 
practice may be considered as an example of “craft production replaced mass production as 
the industrial paradigm” (Tomaney, 1994: 160). The organizations like the co-operations in 
Third Italy were easily integrated with the dominant forms of labour market of corporate 
and multinational firms; furthermore, co-operations of small and medium scaled firms 
achieved the ruin of the hegemony of some big firms. These experiences, for Piore and 
Sabel, have shown the prospect of flexible specialization as a future system in spite of its 
missing this prospect at one particular time:  
“…the new technologies open up the possibility for a reconstitution of labour relations and 
of production systems on an entirely different social, economic, and geographical basis. 
Piore and Sabel see a parallel between the current conjuncture and the missed opportunity of 
the mid-nineteenth century, when large-scale and eventually monopoly capital ousted the 
small firm and the innumerable small-scale co-operative ventures that had the potential to 
solve the problem of industrial organization along decentralized and democratically 
controlled lines.1” (Harvey, 1989: 189) 
According to this approach, SMEs provide two noticeable tools to cope with the 
problems: first, production is integrated and coordinated from computer-aided design 
(CAD) to computer-aided manufacture (CAM) that increases the possibility of efficient 
operation between separate work stations so that design and manufacturing can be linked, 
and additionally just-in-time production becomes possible. Second, due to the firms to 
change the organizational pattern according to the requirements of production and 
demand, firms may subcontract specialized production to small and medium sized 
specialist firms to decrease production cost. And finally, flexible automation and 
computerized management of flows may provide opportunities for vertical disintegration 
(Erendil, 1998: 69). 
Furthermore, the flexible specialization approach emphasizes that there are 
different types of flexible integration models. Among these types, one is quite widespread. 
In this type, large firms decentralize internally and adopt new organizational techniques or 
externalize certain stages of production due to the efficiency of flexibility in the face of 
changing market demand and cost considerations. This type is called as horizontal 
integration model which emphasizes that the vertically integrated firm (large-firm) is 
generally substituted by vertically disintegrated system based on a series of specialized 
SMEs. In this respect, when the firms gain more flexibility and have less fixed costs in 
                                                 
1 Meanwhile Harvey reminds the ‘Prodhon’s anarchism looms large’ 
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production process, a group of SMEs are legally independent from each other, but very 
much vertically integrated with a particular production process through cooperative inter-
firm linkages (Capello, 1996 cited in Erendil, 1998: 70).  
Another important model for integration of large and small firms based on 
international market is called as global commodity chains. In this respect, large 
transnational manufacturers coordinate the production networks, especially in the capital 
and technology-intensive sectors, such as automobile, computers, semi-conductors and 
heavy machinery, which is generally labeled as producer driven. On the other hand, large 
retailers, brand-named marketers and trading companies can organize decentralized 
production networks, which is generally seen in labour-intensive consumer goods and 
labeled as buyer driven (Gereffi, 1994 cited in Erendil, 1998: 70).  
The international integration models for industrial organizations are commonly 
discussed with references to flexible specialization approach. Within this model, different 
types of linkages may be identified by means of specific case studies, such as integration, 
disintegration, quasi-integration, and strategic alliances. Despite these studies, there has not 
been any consensus yet. On the other hand, these models propose a question for the 
agenda: Do the results of changing market structure provide opportunities only for SMEs 
over large firms, or do they also for contribute to the survival and protection of large-scale 
producers so that these large firms would provide extensive product differentiation besides 
mass production? Some scholars answer these questions by giving examples from the 
Japanese industry: “Most mass producers continue to survive today by providing families 
of interrelated products; Japanese industry has been leading the way by showing that 
previously unimaged degrees of product variety can be achieved within mass production 
enterprises… (General Motors) built a degree of variety and flexibility into mass 
production” (Elam, 1990: 56-7). 
Finally, the common criticisms to the flexible specialization approach may also be 
evaluated. According to Amin (1994: 15-6) and Tomaney (1994: 162-4), the most common 
criticism is the constitution of dual oppositions, mass production versus flexible 
specialization, in relation to the flexible specialization, where each may be thought as the 
complement of each other. Secondly, Piore and Sabel have been criticized being too naive 
in defending the possibility of a large-scale return to a craft industrial paradigm, on the 
grounds that the embedded structure of Fordism might persist and adapt to new 
circumstances. Thirdly, the approach makes the distortion by equating only industrial 
efficiency with competitiveness, thereby underestimating the power of the protagonists of 
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Fordism (e.g. multinational firms) to continue to dominate markets via their grip over 
finance, market outlets, distribution networks, advertising and so on. And, even where 
instances of flexible specialization can be identified, this does not necessarily offer the 
benefits for labour, as assumed by Piore and Sabel. 
Finally a reminder; Elam ironically labels Piore and Sabel’s point of view on 
industrial development: “Just as proto-industrialization has been dubiously characterized as 
‘industrialization before industrialization’; flexible specialization can be adventurously 
seen as referring to ‘industrialization after industrialization’!” (Elam, 1990: 54). 
 
3.3. The Regulation School Approach 
Regulation Theory was established by Marxian French Scholars in the 1970s, and 
ripened in the 1980s (see Aglietta, 1979; Lipietz, 1990, 1992 and 1998; Jessop, 1994 and 
1997; Esser and Hirsh, 1989; Knudsen, 1996; Elam, 1990; Amin, 1994; Harvey, 1990; 
Cho, 1997; Tomaney, 1994). This approach has created massive impact on social science 
as it provided methodological tools to understand how capitalist system could survive 
despite all contradictions. The theory, in fact, deserves this popularity because the debate 
of Fordism and Flexibilism, still occupy considerable place in the social sciences, 
originating from the Regulation Theory. It may be said that the approach is based on the 
explanation of the paradoxes in capitalism between instable and inconsistent conditions, 
which could be visible by crisis, regulation roles of institutions, and social modes to create 
economic reproduction.  
“The aim of the early French regulationists was to develop a theoretical framework which 
could encapsulate and explain the paradox within capitalism between its inherent tendency 
towards instability, crisis and change, and its ability to coalesce and stabilize around a set of 
institutions, rules and norms which serve to secure a relatively long period of economic 
stability” (Amin, 1994: 7).  
Firstly, the statements on the term of regulation may be evaluated. Elam notes that 
the French word ‘régulation’ does not carry such a narrow meaning as the English word 
‘regulation’. It refers more to the preservation of a set of norms and a ‘ways of life’, rather 
than a process of conscious adjustment (Elam, 1990: 67). Storper and Walker (1989) 
additionally tried to explain the content of regulation while considering this term that it 
maintains the institutional fabric of (capitalist) growth in a dynamic contradictory setting 
through state interventions and class compromises. Knudsen and Boggs (1996: 2) state that 
regulation consists of five dimensions: technology, labor relations, firm organization, 
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public policy, and locational decision-making. And finally, Knox and Pinch (2000: 32) 
emphasizes that regulation theorists argue that such tensions and problems are overcome 
by various regulative mechanisms, such as those embodied in legislation encompassing 
commerce, trade and labour relations, together with the activities of various institutions 
that govern these spheres.2 
The concept of regime is as important as the concept of regulation because the 
scholars of regulation approach see regime as “…partial, temporary and unstable result of 
embedded social practices rather than the pre-determined outcome of quasi-natural 
economic laws… its theorization of economic development and change claimed to give as 
much regard to historical processes as to the basic rules of the capitalist society” (Amin, 
1994: 7). Thus, their evolutions are based on the idea of ‘historical capitalism’ (see section 
2.1. in this study) and more particularly based on the Marxian term of ‘mode of 
production’ (see section 2.1.1. in this study). Eventually, it may be stated that the 
methodology of regulation approach is based on some key concepts which are definitely 
constituted by the terms of ‘regime’ and ‘mode’. 
 
3.3.1 Key Concepts of the Regulation Approach 
Regulation theory has built a number of key concepts identifying the core 
mechanisms at work in order to explain consistency of regimes in capitalist development. 
These are: regime of accumulation, mode of regulation, dominant industrial paradigm (or 
labour processes), mode of development, and hegemonic structure (or mode of 
societalization). It must be noted that there are some differences of opinion within 
regulationists due to the wide area of interest of the approach. Thus, these concepts are not 
commonly accepted, except the two terms: ‘regime of accumulation’ and ‘mode of 
regulation’.  
 
3.3.1.1. Regime of Accumulation 
Lipietz defines the regime of accumulation as follows: “The logic and laws of 
macro-economics describe the parallel development, over a long period, of the conditions 
of production on the one hand (productivity of labour, degree of mechanization, relative 
importance of the various branches of production) and, on the other hand, the conditions 
under which production is put to social use (household consumption, investment, 
                                                 
2 The examples of these phenomena could be found in Turkey that illustrated in section 5.3. 
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government spending, foreign trade)” (Lipietz, 1992: 2).  
On the other hand, Amin (1994: 8) states: “the regime of accumulation includes 
norms pertaining to the organization of production and work (the labour process), 
relationship and forms of exchange between branches of the economy, common rules of 
industrial and commercial management, principles of income sharing between wages, 
profits and taxes, norms of consumption and patterns of demand in the marketplace, and 
other aspects of economy.” Boyer, moreover, point at the regimes of accumulation which 
are defined as historical periods of capital accumulation characterized by the relative social 
stability and economic growth. Thus, regulationist approach focuses on variations of the 
capitalist mode of production, such as the putting-out system, manufactory, 
machinofacture, Fordism, post-Fordism, flexibilism, social-economic structure, and social 
spaces (Boyer, 1990: 33). Knudsen and Boggs (1996) and Lipietz (1992) additionally 
highlight, referring to the Marxian concept of ‘mode of production’, regime of 
accumulation includes both the organization of workers and applied technologies; and 
involve the general principles governing the labour process and the way it evolves.  
Regime of accumulation must be thought related with the capitalist crisis. 
Regulationists often refer to the capitalist crisis in relation to ‘accumulation of capital’ (see 
section 2.1.2. in this study), and often repeat that capitalist development should not be 
thought without crisis. For Peet (1991), one of the scholars who believes that the crisis is 
continually lived in capitalist system, basic rules of capitalism is that, in anywhere and in 
anytime, the regulations have two basic social objectives. The first is that the production of 
material goods is used in order to reproduce labour power. The second is the certain of a 
surplus of products, intended for one of two uses: investment in new means of production 
or to reproducer the capitalist class. According to Peet, these paradoxes create the crisis. 
Also, Amin defines the regime of accumulation as follows: “The regime of accumulation 
refers to a ‘set of regularities’ at the level of the whole economy, enabling a more or less 
coherent process of capital accumulation” (Amin, 1994: 8). Amin’s this perspective, 
supported by Lipietz and Jessop, can be taken as complementary to Peet’s ideas. 
 
3.3.1.2. Mode of (Social and Political) Regulation 
Mode of regulation, sometimes used as ‘mode of social and political regulation’, 
may be simply defined as a system of social and political institutions which provide a 
balance between production and consumption. Thus, this term generally refers to state 
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applications, organizations of local and locational decision-making, social behaviors –
norms and habits-, and political applications. These are not directly related with production 
levels, but these regulations are considered to be required within the reproduction 
processes. 
 “Mode of regulation that involves all the mechanisms which adjust the contradictory and 
conflictual behavior of individuals to the collective principles of the regime of accumulation. 
At the basic level, these means of adjustment are simply the extent to which entrepreneurs 
and workers are in the habit of conforming to these principles, because they recognize them 
as valid or logic. At another level, institutionalized forms are more important the rules of the 
market, social welfare provision, money, financial networks. These institutionalized forms 
can be state determined (laws, executive acts, public finances), private (collective 
agreements) or semi-public (a social security system)” (Lipietz, 1992: 2). 
Amin similarly draws attention to the regulation and reproduction provided by a 
given accumulation regime encompassing a wide range of areas including law, state, 
policy, political practices, industrial codes, governance, cultures of consumption. She 
claims that “the mode of regulation refers to the institutional ensemble (laws, agreements, 
etc.) and the complex of cultural habits and norms which secures capitalist reproduction as 
such. It consists of a set of formal and informal rules that codify the main social 
relationship” (Amin, 1994: 8). 
It is clearly seen in descriptions, that the idea of reproduction of capitalism, which 
has been never guaranteed, is placed in the heart upon mode of regulation mechanism. 
Knudsen and Boggs (1996) argue that reproduction of the system must be continually 
secured and resecured through a range of social norms, mechanisms, and institutions that 
help temporarily stabilize capitalism around a particular regime of accumulation. It is 
possible to consider this claim with Harvey’s statement (1990: 119) on the market: “Adam 
Smith’s celebrated ‘hidden hand’ of the market has never been sufficient in itself to 
guarantee stable growth for capitalism”. Thus, capitalist system has needed the tools which 
regulate the market and the society, which is labeled by regulationists as mode of 
regulation. 
Lipietz explains the relationship between regime of accumulation and mode of 
regulation: “A regime of accumulation is the macro-economic result of the way the mode 
of regulation functions, with a labour process model as its basis” (Lipietz, 1992: 3). Harvey 
points to an enlarged relation:  
“A regime of accumulation ‘describes the stabilization over a long period of the allocation of 
the net product between consumption and accumulation; it implies some correspondence 
between the transformation of both the conditions of production and the conditions of 
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reproductive of wage earners’. A particular system of accumulation can exist because ‘its 
schema of reproduction is coherent’. The problem, however, is to bring the behaviors of all 
kinds of individuals into some kind of configuration that will keep the regime of 
accumulation functioning. There must exist, therefore, ‘a materialization of the regime of 
accumulation taking the form of norms, habits, laws, regulating networks and so on that 
ensure the unity of the process, i.e. the appropriate consistency of individual behaviors with 
the schema of reproduction. This body of interiorized rules and social processes is called the 
mode of regulation” (Harvey, 1990:121-2). 
 
3.3.1.3. Other Concepts 
The key concepts of regulation theory are the ‘regime of accumulation’ and the 
‘mode of regulation’. However, “…being open-ended research programmes, regulation 
theories are so extended as to embrace a number of theoretical positions, each with 
different substantive emphases on key concepts” (Cho, 1997: 181). Elam claims that the 
result of the ‘marriage between Marxist political economy and institutionalist tradition’, - 
which allows to avoid mechanical explanations of capitalist development and techno-
economic determinism, - bring about more concepts on the subject. These are: Dominant 
industrial paradigm, mode of development, and hegemonic structure. 
The concept of dominant industrial paradigm (simultaneously known as labour 
processes), used by Jessop (1994) and Coriat (1979), refers to the pattern of industrial and 
work organization, and includes the nature of technologies, management rules, division of 
tasks, industrial relations and wage relations (Amin, 1994: 8). Jessop defines ‘labour 
processes’ more simply are: “…considered as a particular configuration of technical and 
social relations of production” (Jessop, 1994: 252). 
The second concept is mode of development, used by Lipietz (1990) in particular to 
denote the total pattern of development within an economy, which is based on the 
industrial paradigm, regime of accumulation, and mode of regulation (Amin, 1994: 8). 
Lipietz (1992) builds this concept in order to distinguish between the nation-states as a 
development model, and the global order or international configuration. This concept has 
been used by other authors who does not include to regulation theory scholars, like Manuel 
Castells or Ankie Hoogvelt (see Castells, 1987 and 1997; and Hoogvelt, 1997). 
The third concept is hegemonic structure (simultaneously used as mode of 
societalization or societal paradigm), used by Lipietz (1990), Jessop (1994), Esser and 
Hirsch (1989). It refers to a series of political compromises, social alliances and hegemonic 
processes of domination which feed into a pattern of mass integration and social cohesion, 
thus serving to underwrite and stabilize a given development path (Amin, 1994: 8). Lipietz 
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uses the term of social bloc to delineate a stable system of relations of domination, 
alliances and concessions between different social groups. A social bloc is hegemonic 
when its interests correspond to those of whole nation. For him, “the regime of 
accumulation, mode of regulation, hegemonic bloc and societal paradigm are all four the 
result of a process of conflictual historical evolution” (Lipietz, 1990: 340). 
 
3.3.1.4. Regulation Based on Hegemonic Structure 
The concept of ‘hegemonic structure’ is mostly used, and it, in fact, offers 
considerable differences within the approach from the classical French type of regulation 
theory, especially in the language of Esser and Hirsch (1989). Furthermore, it is sometimes 
identified as a different approach. Although the content of the regulation theory is adequate 
to contain this framework with respect to the understanding of some evidential differences 
within the evaluation of Fordism and post-Fordism, it would be better here to summarize 
this approach. 
This approach can be thought as more loyal to Gramsci’s original idea of Fordism 
and his interest in specifying the society-wide regulatory processes by which a new regime 
of accumulation obtains its authenticity as a hegemonic structure (Cho, 1997: 181). Cho 
offers a representation of the relations among labour process and industrial paradigm, a 
regime of accumulation, a mode of regulation, and a hegemonic structure in the figure 3.1. 
given below. In addition, hegemonic practices are represented in figure 3.2. where an 
internal concept of post-Fordism refers to the structure of capital accumulation, and these 
practices are articulated through a technological paradigm, industrial organization and 
social processes.  
Fig. 3.1. The structure of regulation theories 
 
Source: Cho, 1997: 182 
As Esser and Hirsch (1989: 71-93) use the term of ‘hegemonic structure’, they 
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define specific differences from French type of regulation theory and its bases of Marxian 
view. According to the scholars, Marxist theory reduces the complex structure of society to 
a simple infrastructure-superstructure model. Instead of this, Esser and Hirsch work on the 
assumption that “the history of capitalism on the world scale is characterized by a sequence 
of specific social formations, which differ from each other greatly, based on an unvarying 
basic structure in their forms of production and exploitation, conditions of socialization 
and class, as well as in the character of the state and the political rule.” (Esser and Hirsch, 
1989: 73). 
Fig. 3.2. Articulation between a regime of accumulation and mode of regulation: a structure 
of capitalist accumulation 
 
Source: Cho, 1997: 183 
Esser and Hirsch express the differences provided by their concepts such as mode 
of accumulation and a method of regulation. Both terms, ‘regime of accumulation’ and 
‘mode of regulation’, decompose classical regulation terms, by means of dominances of 
social impacts. In this way, they depart from the abstractly opposing of ‘economics’, 
‘politics’, and ‘ideology’ to ‘infrastructure’ and ‘superstructure’. The scholars use 
hegemonic structure to describe:  
“…the concrete historical connection between the ‘mode of accumulation’ and the ‘method 
of regulation’, which endows the economic form of capital reproduction and political-
ideological reproduction of the system as a whole, under the domination of the ruling 
classes, and with relative durability. In this way, each capitalist development is characterized 
by a specific hegemonic structure, i.e. particular form of valorization and class conditions 
and their institutional and normative reproduction” (Esser and Hirsch, 1989: 73-4). 
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3.3.2. Fordist Regime of Accumulation 
The fundamental differences between regulation approach and others can be seen 
through the evidential evaluation of the Fordist era. Postwar capitalism, which is 
considered by the regulation perspective as the Golden Age of capitalism, is a period that 
started by the passive revolution in 1950s without historical precedents when steady 
economic expansion was propelled by a simultaneous evolution of productivity and real 
wages. This passing age, with its Golden Age in the 1950s and 1960s, has been broadly 
named Fordism, and it is summarized as the age of intensive accumulation (continued 
growth of capitalist economies dependent not only on production good sectors, but also on 
consumption goods sector; thus, claimed to be the mass production dynamic, the detailed 
division of tasks and mechanization to raise productivity) with monopolistic regulation of 
the economy (workers were fully rather than partially integrated into capitalist systems as 
both producers and consumers). According to the approach, it was only with the postwar 
marriage of ‘intensive accumulation’ and ‘monopolistic regulation’ that capitalism became 
a universal experience and a fully integrated system. Furthermore, this marriage, conceived 
as a historical mode of development, is what the regulation perspective sees as constituting 
‘Fordism’ (Elam, 1990: 62-3 and Amin, 1994: 9). 
Jessop (1994: 253-4) summarized four differing ways used by the regulationists in 
their evaluations of this general structure: 
1. as a distinctive combination of labour processes, Fordism involves mass production of 
complex consumer durables based on moving assembly line techniques operated with 
the semi-skilled labour of the mass worker. The important point is that mass production 
is the main source of its dynamism. 
2. as a stable mode of macroeconomic growth, Fordism in its strict, ideal-typical sense 
should involve a virtuous circle of growth in relatively closed economies. This would 
be based on mass production, rising productivity based on economies of scale, rising 
income linked to productivity, increased mass demand owing to rising wages, 
increased profits based on full utilization of capacity and increased investment in 
improved mass production equipment and techniques. 
3. as a social mode of economic regulation, Fordism involves several key features. These 
comprise: the separation of ownership and control in large corporations with a 
distinctive multidivisional, decentralized organization subject to central controls; 
monopoly pricing; union recognition and collective bargaining; wages indexed to 
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productivity growth and retail price inflation; monetary emission and credit policies 
oriented to securing effective aggregate demand; state-sponsored social reproduction 
oriented to the generalization of norms of mass consumption and provision of 
infrastructure and means of collective consumption suitable to a Fordist mode of 
growth; and state involvement in managing the conflicts between capital and labour 
over both the individual and the social wage so that the virtuous circle of Fordist 
growth can be maintained. 
4. as general pattern of social organization, Fordism involves the consumption of 
standardized, mass commodities in nuclear family households and the provision of 
standardized, collective goods and services by the bureaucratic state. This typically 
implies that Fordist society is an urban-industrial, middle mass, wage-earning society. 
Jessop points at the nuance that Fordism sometimes refers to the co-presence, 
structural coupling, co-evolution, and strategic coordination of all four possible Fordist 
phenomena (Jessop, 1994: 254). In addition, Amin states that it is a description of an ideal-
type Fordism modeled around the US macroeconomics after the 1950s, and the regulation 
approach is careful to insist on the idea that Fordism in different national contexts is not 
envisaged as a clone of the ideal-type, rather as different combinations of Fordist and non-
Fordist features (Amin, 1994: 10). 
Lipietz (1990, 1992, and 1998) and Jessop (1994 and 1997) try to gather all 
different approaches of regulation school supported with methodological completeness, 
and they describe Fordism as an international system in a comprehensive manner. 
Jessop (1994: 254-5) emphasizes the Keynesian welfare state, which is closely 
related to the form and function of Fordism. Keynesian welfare state helps to balance the 
supply and demand, secure stable growth, and also permit Fordist firms to secure 
increasing returns to scale. Thus, the state acquires an important role in compensating for 
the rather limited forms of microeconomic flexibility in Fordist production. Furthermore, it 
acquired a key role in integrating the capital and consumer goods industries and in 
managing the wage relations. And finally, the state has the responsibilities in trade 
unionism, collective bargaining, and the consolidation of big business and social 
partnership. 
At the international level, Jessop’s welfare state descriptions were strongly shaped 
by the development of the Fordist mode of growth. It actually rooted successfully the basic 
dynamic of Fordist expansion and governmental policies (Jessop, 1994: 255). 
On the other hand, according to Lipietz (1990: 341-2) Fordist model of 
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development stood on a tripod. One leg was a dominancy of the conception and execution 
and the systematic incorporation of the know-how of technical workers in the automatic 
machines. This is materialized by Taylorism. The second leg was a regime of 
accumulation, involving growth in popular consumption and hence ‘outlets’, 
commensurate with productivity gains. The third leg was a set of norms of regulation 
including the conformity of employers and wage earners alike the model. In particular, 
Fordist mode of regulation drew upon collective agreements and the welfare state.  
Lipietz’s formula for the international (and of course national) is named as Fordist 
compromise. Lipietz, being one of the orthodox regulationists, bases his idea on ‘Fordist 
regime of accumulation’ - including mass production, polarization between skilled mental 
and deskilled operative labours, increasing mechanization, productivity and value added, 
stability of firms’ profitability with plant used full capacity and full employment. Thus, 
Fordist compromise became American way of life – a productivist model which was 
‘hedonist’ in that it was based on pursuit of happiness through the mass availability of a 
greater number of goods. Additionally, it was supported by Keynesian politics – including 
a social legislation which made employers to give their workers annual wage rises in line 
with increased national productivity, a welfare state which provided an advanced system of 
social security, a credit money issued by private banks though controlled by central banks 
where the economy was based on the available gold reserves. Finally, Fordist compromise 
turned into (or got based on) American Hegemony at the international level (Lipietz, 1992: 
2-13, and 1990: 341-5). 
Despite some conceptual differences, Esser and Hirsch (see the previous section for 
the explanations on their terms) agree with Lipietz’s hegemonic structure which had 
imposed itself as internationally dominant after the Second World War under the 
leadership of the USA (Esser and Hirsch, 1989: 75). At the outset, it should be noted that 
the scholars emphasize the process of concentration and the formation of new mass 
industries, the development of bureaucratized and centralized trade unions with 
comprehensive pay agreements, and expansion of the bureaucratized welfare state. 
Secondly, they point at the conditions of the reproduction of the work force with the 
stabilization of the model of mass consumption. Thirdly, they claim that a central 
corporatism, which was based on social-contractual cooperation between commercial 
associations, trade unions, parties and state administrations, was developed and a 
Keynesian state interventionism supported by it. The assurance of full employment and 
growth, expansion of welfare states and global control of the economic process of 
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reproduction, supported by the extended apparatus of financial and fiscal state intervention, 
corporate negotiation structures and national economic prognoses, were the determining 
characteristics of the Fordist hegemonic structure (Esser and Hirsch, 1989: 76). 
 
3.3.3. Breakdown of Fordist Accumulation 
The crisis of Fordism, which has been analyzed in quite detail by the regulation 
approach, appeared in the early 1970s. Here, before summarizing the reasons, the basic 
result of the crisis in Fordism that led to the worldwide collapse of the Fordist regime of 
accumulation and mode of regulation mechanisms should be evaluated.  
According to Amin (1994: 10), “…the slow-down of growth and recurrent 
recessions since the mid-1970s are seen by the regulation approach as symptoms of the 
crisis of Fordism, underpinning by mismatches and imbalance between its different levels 
of organization… It identifies four contributing factors with varying significance in 
different national context” (see Amin, 1994: 10): 
1. productivity gains decreased as a result of the social and technical limits of Fordism 
(workers resistance to the Fordist organization of work and increasing difficulties in 
‘balancing’ ever longer and more rigid production lines). 
2. the expansion of mass production led to an increasing globalization of economic flows 
which made national economic management increasingly difficult. 
3. Fordism led to growing social expenditure (the relative costs of collective consumption 
increased, because of the inapplicability of mass production methods in this area, leading 
to inflationary pressures and distributional conflicts). 
4. the consumption pattern has gradually changed towards a greater variety of use values 
(the new demands are at odds with standardization, the basis of economies of scale, and 
cannot easily be satisfied through mass production methods) (Nielsen, 1991 cited in 
Amin, 1994: 10). 
According to Lipietz, Fordist mode of development firstly entered into ‘economic’ 
crisis in advanced capitalist countries. This crisis included ‘a crisis of the model of labour 
organization based on the fragmentation of tasks, the division between ‘conception’ and 
‘execution’ and ever costly ‘mechanization’. In the late of 1960s, productivity began to fall 
in the developed capitalist countries. With increases in real wages, the cost of the fixed 
capital (buildings, machines, etc.) and total workforce began to rise. Thus, allowing for 
inflation, firms’ profitability is bound to fall. “The basic cause of these unfortunate 
development is to be found at the center of the Fordist labour process model: the crisis of 
the worker’s paradoxical involvement where Taylorism dominates” (Lipietz, 1992: 14-5). 
In addition, “it was a crisis of the ‘welfare state’, and it was a crisis of the nation state, 
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incapable of regulating an increasingly internationalized economy” (Lipietz, 1994: 343). 
On the other hand, Lipietz points out an important nuance: “for example in France, this 
crisis was exacerbated by another one which preceded the economic crisis: a crisis of the 
societal paradigm, in its adherence to the dominant conception of progress” (Lipietz, 1994: 
343). Although economic crisis emerged before the crisis of the societal paradigm, for him, 
the collapse of societal paradigm and impacts of rising policy of liberal-productivity 
(which includes ‘intensification of the productivist techno-economic imperative’, 
‘fragmentation of social identification’, ‘variety of forms of integration of the individual 
into the enterprise’; and ‘civil society against the welfare state) has been more efficient to 
breakdown the Fordist accumulation model. Finally, it may be stated that Lipietz favours 
the increasing economic power of the newly industrialized countries, especially Japan, 
where it created a treat for American hegemony at the international level, and the changes 
within the international market accelerated the expansion of the crisis to whole world 
(Lipietz, 1992: 17-23). In this respect, it is possible to claim that imperialism, as which an 
external relation, played a regulating role for capitalism of the global center, was not 
created specifically (internationally) to resolve the contradictions (Lipietz, 1986 cited in 
Peet, 1991: 154). 
 
3.3.4. Indefinite Times: Post-Fordism 
Although the regulationists accept that a watershed has been reached within the 
history of capitalism, no definite vision of the future such as ‘the fifth Kondratiev’ – for 
neo-Schumpeterian – or ‘flexible specialization’ is advanced yet. “The shape of post-
Fordism today is considered to be as ambiguous and open as the shape of Fordism was for 
Gramsci in the 1930s” (Elam, 1990: 65).  
It is definitely true that Fordism and post-Fordism are distinguished at various 
levels, structural and strategic moments. Jessop states: “…a minimum condition for 
referring to post-Fordism is to establish the nature of the continuity and discontinuity 
which justifies the claim that it is not just a variant form of Fordism but does actually 
succeed Fordism. Without significance discontinuity, it would not be post-Fordism; 
without significant continuity, it would not be post-Fordism” (Jessop, 1994: 257).  
According to Jessop (1994: 257), this double condition being related to the 
continuity and discontinuity found in one of the dimensions of Fordism, labour process, 
regime of accumulation, modes of societalization is satisfied where: 
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a) post-Fordism has demonstrably emerged from tendencies originating within 
Fordism but still marks a decisive break with it 
b) the ensemble of old and new elements in post-Fordism demonstrably displaces or 
resolves basic contradictions and crisis in Fordism – even if it is also associated 
with its own contradictions and crisis tendencies in turn.  
According to the regulation framework, indeed the crisis of Fordism does not 
guarantee in itself such a transition, and thus, there are three general driving forces behind 
the emergence of post-Fordism: the rise of new technologies, internationalization, the 
paradigm shift from Fordism to post-Fordism (Jessop, 1994: 260). 
Jessop (1994: 257-60) summarizes briefly possible features of consolidated post-
Fordism for regulation approach in terms of the four dimensions (which is similarly used 
the previous sections for explaining Fordist views): 
1. as a labour process, post-Fordism can be defined as a flexible production process 
based on flexible machines or systems and an appropriately flexible workforce. Its 
crucial hardware is microelectronics-based information and communications 
technologies… Flexible specialization complexes, which have long coexisted with 
Fordist mass production and now seem to have won a new lease of life both materially 
and ideologically, can be included the new technologies which have a key role in 
recharged sources of flexibility.  
2. as a stable mode of macroeconomic growth, post-Fordism would be based on 
dominance of a flexible and permanently innovative pattern of accumulation. As such 
its virtuous circle would be based on flexible production, growing productivity based 
on economies of scope and/or process innovations, rising incomes for polyvalent 
skilled workers and the service class, increased demand for new differentiated goods 
and services favoured by the growing discretionary element in these incomes, increased 
profits based on technological and other innovation rents and the full utilization of 
flexible capacity, reinvestment in more flexible production equipment and processes 
and/or new sets of products and/or new organizational forms and a further boost to 
productivity owing to economies of scope and constant innovation. 
3. as a social mode of economic regulation, post-Fordism would involve supply-side 
innovation and flexibility in each of the main areas or regulation. Thus the wage 
relation would be recomposed with a polarization between skilled and unskilled 
workers; there would be greater emphasis on flexibility in internal and external labour 
markets; a shift would occur towards enterprise – or plan – level collective bargaining; 
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and new forms of social wage would develop. 
4. with regard to a post-Fordist ‘mode of societalization’, it is too soon to anticipate what 
this would involve. As yet there is no obvious predominant post-Fordist mode of 
‘societalization’ comparable to Americanization in the Fordist era. Instead it is found 
an unresolved competition which involves at least Japanese, German, and American 
models – each of which is encountering mounting problems on its home ground. 
Esser and Hirsh emphasize that the crisis of Fordism is considered similarly with 
the orthodox scholars of the regulation school. According to the scholars, “a new, stable, 
international, hegemonic post-Fordist development has so far been unable to impose itself. 
In a national and an international context, the situation is characterized rather by a complex 
mixture of alternative strategies for overcoming the crisis, which are at the same time the 
subject of deep political-social conflicts” (Esser and Hirsch, 1989: 76). Indeed, the 
regulationists generally focus on the dimensions of political and social conflicts rather than 
the production process. 
Lipietz (1992 and 1994) emphasizes that the capitalist system needs a new 
‘compromise’ in order to regulate the new accumulation regime. It is expressed that “no 
technological determinism will light the way. The present industrial divide is first and 
foremost a political divide” (Leborgne and Lipietz, 1992 cited in Peck and Tickell, 1994: 
284). Lipietz considers post-Fordism as a first step towards historic goals: a step towards 
more democratic and more ‘self-managed’ society, a step towards the ‘humanization of 
humankind’, a step toward ecologically sustainable and macroeconomically stable model  
(Lipietz, 1994: 347-55). 
On the other hand, Jessop, not as being optimistic as Lipietz, draws attention to the 
post-Fordist state that replaced the center of the post-Fordist debate. To Jessop, this is a 
transition from the Keynesian welfare state to Schumpeterian workfare state. “It marks a 
clear break with the Keynesian welfare state as domestic full employment is downplayed 
in favour of international competitiveness and redistributive welfare rights take second 
place to a productivist reordering of social policy” (Jessop, 1994: 263). Jessop conceives it 
as the hollowing out of the national state, because while the national state still remains 
politically important, its capabilities to project its power even within its own national 
borders are decisively weakened both by the shift towards internationalized, flexible 
production systems and by the growing challenge posed risks emanating from the global 
environment (Lipietz, 1994: 263-4). 
According to Jessop, “the Schumpeterian workfare state could be seen as post-
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Fordist in one or both of two different respects: a) because it helps to resolve significant 
crisis tendencies within Fordism in general or the Fordist state in particular, and b) because 
it helps to consolidate the emerging dynamic of a post-Fordist accumulation regime” 
(Jessop, 1994: 264-6). Furthermore, there are many forms of Schumpeterian workfare 
state, which is based on the struggle among many capitalist modes, such as neo-liberalism, 
neo-corporatism, neo-statism and mixed strategies (Jessop, 1994: 266-9). 
On the other hand, Esser and Hirsch emphasized post-Fordist capitalism or 
international post-Fordist capitalism does not exist yet. “At best, there are tendencies 
towards it and starting points for it. But these can at least be specified on a national level 
and their changes of implementation and consequences can be evaluated” (Esser and 
Hirsch, 1989: 77).  
They point at the new mode of accumulation, shaped after 1970s, represented by 
German practices: 
1. The transition to post-Taylorist forms of organization of production and labour, on the 
basis of new information and communications technologies. This does not in any way 
lead to the ‘end of mass production’, but to a new technological constitution of it which 
is, however, associated with a massive laying-off of the work force, far-reaching 
processes of social marginalization and a strong fragmentation of the relationship 
between work and wages. 
2. A strengthened industrialization of the service sector, based on the new information and 
communication technologies (‘hyperindustrialization’), which lead to great many 
changes in service industry jobs, and radically changes the social structure of the 
workers (e.g. the relationship between workers and white-collar workers)… 
3. A new thrust of capitalization which is based on the industrialization of services and a 
further industrialization of agriculture, which leads to an increase in forced mobility and 
a rapid breakdown of family relationship. 
4. A decoupling of increases in productivity and the income of the masses, and thus 
transition to accumulation at a low level of growth, which is linked to an increase in 
differences in income and a increased differentiation of the consumer model. 
5. An ‘individualization’ and ‘pluralization of lifestyles’, based on a fragmentation of the 
relationship between wages and work, socialization according to information technology, 
consumer differentiation, increased competition for jobs whilst, at the same time, there is 
a relaxation in the disciplining effects of standardization waged work and socio-
psychological processes of redundancy (Esser and Hirsch, 1989: 77). 
According to Esser and Hirsch, the structure explained above point by point 
associated with the formation of a method of regulation. It gives “…a new emphasis to 
elements of monopolistic regulation, and combines them with a stronger control of the 
market, still controlled by the governments” (Esser and Hirsh, 1989: 77). Its characteristics 
are: 
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1. New relationship integrating branch structure and industry on the basis of advanced 
production technology, associated with strong international processes of concentration 
and a reorganization of the relationship between industrial and finance capital. Small 
businesses which are close to the market and innovative become more significant… 
2. A quantitative reduction and institutional fragmentation of the system of social security, 
resulting in a further division into different categories of waged workers. 
3. The weakening of the trade unions through mass employment processes of tertiarization, 
the heterogenization of working relationships and processes of social division within 
waged workers. 
4. The formation of new corporate forms, which are characterized by a close interweaving 
between the state and industry in the technology sector, a selective inclusion of 
privileged sectors of the workers in corporate arrangements, (selective-decentralized 
corporatism) (Esser and Hirsch, 1989: 77-8). 
The regulation approach has diffused to many studies in economic, social or 
governmental areas. On the other hand, some authors criticize the regulationists as being 
too undetermined and recondite. Indeed, Jessop’s concept of neo-Schumpeterian workfare 
state, Lipietz’s concept of new compromise for post-Fordism, and Esser and Hirsch’s 
concept of post-Taylorism or new trust etc. indicates a fact said by Peck and Tickell: “We 
cannot yet speak of a post-Fordist ‘regime of accumulation’ because such a system has yet 
to be comprehensively identified” (Peck and Tickell, 1994: 284). 
 
3.4. Evaluation of the Approaches 
Following the evaluations and statements of the previous sections, it may be 
claimed that the three approaches are the most valid and referred frameworks, and have not 
only some differences but also some similarities. Although none of the approaches is able 
to define the debate on transition to flexible production by itself, it, however, cannot be 
possible neither to produce mixed framework nor to ignore any of them. In other words, 
each approach has the capability to explain at least one dimension of the post-Fordism, but 
is inadequate to offer complete power of understanding. 
What is worth that is possible to identify post-Fordist scenarios such as flexible 
specialization, fifth Kondratiev, Neo-Smithian, and so on. Furthermore, it is still possible 
to deny post-Fordist transformation; for instance, the denial of post-Taylorism and the idea 
that information technology as a techno-economic paradigm that may be applied for 
flexible mass production in high-tech industries (see Table 3.1 and 3.2). 
However, we have to find the way to provide analytical tools to understand changes 
in the system. Despite the inadequacies of the approaches for a complete understanding, it 
can be said that for this study, the language of regulation theory is heuristically used to 
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understand changes in capitalist system with the emerging flexible production. Because, 
regulation theory provides a useful framework in examining the mode of production, 
labour relations, public policies, technological changes and geography associated with 
historical periods of modern/historical capitalism. Indeed, many authors, like Knudsen 
(1996) and Harvey (1990), believe that regulation theory provides a number of advantages 
over the previous political-economic frameworks:  
“Unlike modernization and dependency theories, regulation theory is not based on limited 
socio-cultural experience; unlike Althusserian structuralism, social and political institutions 
play an active and central role in the Regulationist framework and are not strictly derivative 
of economic logic alone. To existing Marxian concepts of mode of production and crisis, 
regulationists add concepts of mode of (social) regulation, and regime of accumulation, and 
they substantially redefine Marxian notions of geography and crisis” (Knudsen and Boggs, 
1996). 
Furthermore, regulation theory enables us not to fall into mechanical explanations 
such as ‘technological determinism’. In addition, it takes into account the social 
dimensions of the transitional processes. Elam supports this idea as follows: 
“Implicit in the regulation perspective’s desire to avoid mechanical explanations of capitalist 
development and techno-economic determinism is the aim of breaking down the 
compartmentalization of economics and politics and linking them in a dynamic integrated 
framework. In order to achieve this aim, attention has progressively shifted away from value 
theory approaches in Marxist political economy towards a greater concern with the varying 
social forms of capital” (Elam, 1990: 57). 
Harvey, who is one of the scientists speaking from within the language of 
‘regulation school’, claims that it is the best approach among current perspectives 
especially to explain political-economic transformations. He elaborates on “recent events 
as a transition in the regime of accumulation and its associated mode of social and political 
regulation” (Harvey, 1989: 121). Additionally, he emphasizes that although there are lots 
of signs and tokens of radical changes in labour processes, in consumer habits, in 
geographical and geopolitical configurations, in state powers and practices, people still 
live, especially in the West, in a society where production for profit remains the basic 
organizing principle of economic life (Harvey, 1989). In order not to fall into such a 
situation, we have to take into consideration Harvey’s following argument: “We need some 
way, therefore, to represent all the shifting and churning that has gone on since the first 
major post-war recession of 1973, which does not lose sight of the fact that the basic rules 
of a capitalist mode of production continue to operate as invariant shaping forces in 
historical-geographical development” (Harvey, 1989:121).  
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In other words, to use regulation school’s conceptions enables one to handle the 
complex relations among economic structure, social and cultural forms, habits and political 
implications. 
The capitalist system includes a strong social control based on the control of 
workers physically and mentally, and we must pay attention to this area in order to explain 
how flexible production changes the control mechanisms:  
“Education, training, persuasion, the mobilization of certain social sentiments (the work 
ethic, company loyalty, national or local pride) and psychological propensities (the search 
for identity through work, individual initiative, or social solidarity) all play a role and are 
plainly mixed in with the formation of dominant ideologies cultivated by the mass media, 
religious and educational institutions, the various arms of the state apparatus, and asserted by 
simple articulation of their experience on the part of those who do the work” (Harvey, 1990: 
124). 
On the other hand, there is an important question about regulation mechanisms: Are 
they valid for all over the world and all over the times? Knox and Pinch try to answer this 
question:  
“A crucial feature of the regulation approach is recognition of the fact that these regulative 
mechanisms vary considerably from nation to nation. However, it is argued that over time 
they tend to show certain similarities in different places. Furthermore, if we view economic 
systems from a broader perspective, it is argued that much more general sets of arrangements 
can be seen which serve to link production and consumption” (Knox and Pinch, 2000: 32). 
Finally, it is worth noting the point made by Myung-Rae Cho who considers the 
example of South Korea. Cho argues that South Korea can be classified by using different 
concepts such as ‘peripheral Fordism’ by Lipietz (1987), ‘the virtuosity of successful post-
Fordism’ by Leborgne (1992), and ‘paradigmatic exemplar of post-Fordism’ by Jessop 
(1992). Interestingly, these three authors are placed within the regulation school. Their 
ideas flourished from the same origin, that is, the Parisian School but they do not agree 
upon whether South Korea is to be classified as a post-Fordist country, or not  (Cho, 1997: 
180). This difference basically depends on how to interpret post-Fordism. Although 
regulationists have the strong and valid methodology, they are often separated from each 
other due to their different interpretations. These differences stems fundamentally from 
their concepts and the degree of attentions paid to different dimensions of the phenomenon. 
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Table 3.1. The geography of business organizations and (international) production: a 
summary review. 
 
 
Post-Fordist flexible specialization debate Regulation theory 
Causal 
explanation 
 Emergence of flexible production systems 
replaces Fordism 
 Vertical disintegration and agglomeration 
economies lead to new industrial spaces and 
districts 
 Contradictions in capitalism lead to 
crises in different phases 
 Resolution of crises from a harmony 
between regime of accumulation and 
mode of regulation 
 Breakdown of Fordism 
Analytical 
category 
 Production systems: Fordism and post-
Fordism 
 Transaction costs and scope economies 
 Territorial complexes 
 Social and economic transformations 
 Capitalist mode of production 
 Modes of regulation 
Useful 
dimension 
 Structures of capitalism 
 Relations of production 
 Socio-cultural change and spatial 
manifestations 
 Institutional mechanisms: the role of 
the state 
 Historical specificity 
 Integration of production with 
consumption sphere 
Criticism 
 
 Epistemological: ideal-typical models; 
unduly dualism 
 Theoretical: role of the state neglected; 
limited organizational forms; question of 
flexibility; unclear spatial relations and 
outcome of flexible production systems 
 Methodological: microeconomic analysis; 
extensive research; incompatible scale of 
analysis Empirical: no abrupt break from the 
past (Fordism) 
 Epistemological: lack of explanation 
of the 'workings' capitalism; 
incompatible levels of analysis 
 Theoretical: inadequate conceptual 
sensitivity to reality; 
 Ambiguity of ‘regulation'; neglect of 
space and consumption 
 Methodological: misuse of class; 
statistical analysis 
 Policy: little policy advocacy, neo-
Keynesian outlook 
Source: Erendil, 1998: 58 
On the other hand, it should be noted that the regulation approach has established a 
coherent perspective encompassing historical, functionalist and logical dimensions. The 
arguments creating the framework enable one to examine the capitalist development in 
relation to its permanent crisis-ridden nature and contradictory character, its dependence on 
conflicting relations within social classes, business, government, and society.  
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Table 3.2. A comparison of the main characteristics of the Fordist and the post-Fordist production systems 
 
Production 
systems 
Intrafirm relations: 
regime of accumulation 
Interfirm relations: 
regime of accumulation 
Institutional features: 
mode of regulation 
Spatial manifestations General impact 
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Industrial 
sectors: 
cars, 
machinery, 
household 
appliances 
Examples: 
northeast of 
USA; 
Midlands of 
UK; Rhine-
Ruhr of 
Germany; 
Northwest of 
Paris 
 
1. Mass-production forms: 
the search for internal 
economies of scale (Henry 
Ford type): 
 process-flow and 
assembly-line methods 
 technical division of 
labour (Adam Smith type) 
standardization of outputs 
 
2. Longer life-cycle of 
products 
 
3. Deskilling of labour: 
separation of mental from 
manual work 
 
4. Scientific management: 
Taylorist divisional 
hierarchy and labour 
control 
 
 
1. Horizontal vertical 
integration 
 
2. Market disposition and 
fierce interfirm stand-alone 
competition and collusion 
 
3. Alternatives of 
organization: 
markets and hierarchies 
 
4. Factories between 
upstream suppliers and 
downstream fabricators, 
which use batch-production 
methods 
 
 
1. Keynesianism: central 
government manipulation 
of macroeconomic 
variables 
 
2. Welfare state: social 
control by means of welfare 
legislation 
 
3. Strong unionization of 
the labour force: wage 
bargaining to increase mass 
consumption 
 
4. Domination of USA 
financial and military 
power 
 
5. Emergence of 
oligopolistic transnational 
corporations: 
growth of corporate power 
 
1. Rise of great 
manufacturing and 
industrial regions 
 
2. Regions as growth poles 
 
3. Highly uneven sectoral 
and spatial development 
 
4. Spatial division of 
labour: 
space of places 
 
5. Worldwide sourcing: 
economic expansion abroad 
 
1. Modernist era: new 
rationalized, commodified, 
modernist and populist 
democratic society 
 
2. Industrial growth and 
economic development 
 
3. Greater power to 
producers and business 
 
4. Social and cultural 
changes: 
 mass consumption 
 family privatized 
 
5. New politics of place 
 
 
 
 
 
 72
Table 3.2. Continued 
 
Production 
systems 
Intrafirm relations: 
regime of accumulation 
Interfirm relations: 
regime of accumulation 
Institutional features: 
mode of regulation Spatial manifestations 
General impact 
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-
 
 
Sectors 
(propulsive 
industries): 
craft (e.g. 
clothing)', 
high-tech 
(e.g. 
electronics); 
advanced 
services 
Examples: 
large 
metropolitan 
regions; 
Silicon 
Valley of 
USA: third 
Italy: 
scientific 
city of South 
Paris: New 
York; 
Tokyo and 
London; 
NUEs (Hong 
Kong, 
Singapore) 
 
 
1. Flexible production 
forms: 
search for external 
economics of scale and 
scope (Hanol type): 
 general-purpose 
equipment and labour 
processes 
 smaller individual units 
 greater product 
differentiation 
 programmable and 
automated  
 customized products 
 social division of 
labour 
 
2. Interconnected units of 
economic activities 
 
3. Reskilling of labour: 
need for their 
redeployability 
 
4. Decentralized 
management: greater 
degree of integration 
 
1. Vertical disintegration: 
 smaller and specialized 
firms 
 growth of 
subcontracting 
 substantial networks of 
firms 
 
2. External economies of 
scale and scope: 
 strategic 
interdependence 
 multiple transaction 
relations 
 
3. Extension of production 
processes: 
 extended social 
division of labour 
 supply-side innovation 
and flexibility 
 
4. Rise of informational 
economy 
 
 
1. Post-Keynesian/ 
neoconservative 'warfare' 
stale (Reageanism and 
Thatcherism): 
 fiscal policies: high 
military and defense 
spending  
 self-reliance: competition 
 entrepreneurialism 
 
2. Fluid internal and 
external labour markets: 
rapid labour turnover and 
job switching: 
 relaxed internal rules of 
work 
 new forms of social wage 
 flexible employment 
relation 
 reduced labour-union 
power 
 segmented labour 
markets 
 
3. Deregulated world 
financial and credit 
systems: ‘rootless’ capital 
and money 
 
1. New industrial spaces 
and territorial complex: 
 industrial and 
technology districts 
 spatial agglomeration 
 space of flows 
 
2. Revitalization of pre-
existing clusters: 
reclaiming localities 
 
3. Outward expansion of 
industrialization: 
regionalization of 
production 
 
4. Time-space compression: 
 continual recalibration 
of the meaning of time and 
space 
 expansion of spatial 
horizons of decision 
 
1. Postmodernist era: 
fragmentary and 
differential trajectories 
 
2. Economic and social 
restructuring 
 
3. Different social and 
institutional order: 
 rise of middle class  
 business presence in 
local politics  
 dual labour markets  
 weak labour unions  
 dual city phenomenon 
 
4. Local and regional 
development 
 
5. Selective development in 
the third world 
 
Source: Yeung, 1994 cited in Erendil, 1998: 68 
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Chapter 4 
DEBATES ON THE CITY & THE REGION 
The drastic changes and transformations that we have been experiencing for past 
several decades are subject to a dialectics between space and the activities on it. It should 
be noted that the city and the region are the active objects of these processes. Neither 
Fordism nor post-Fordism has been brought about without reference to space, place, 
geography, and location. 
The emerging conceptions of the ‘city’ and ‘region’ have direct links to the debates 
and issues of Fordism and flexible production. Among the scholars it has widely been a 
common concern to deal with space in a way to seek for what it provides and how it 
affects, rather than what is provided on it and how it is affected. Such a transition should 
also be seen as a fortunate effort thrived into the task of placing geography in its right 
context and place. But there remains one crucial point that is of special importance. Spatial 
theories are still interpreted as the additional explanations of the reality of the world we 
constitute and materialize while we live in (with) it. To clarify, it should be noted that the 
social theory builds the foundations and formulates the analysis in a predominant manner, 
and then comes the spatial theory on the defined grounds of thinking.  
In the modern capitalism, economy has become so fundamental in order to explain 
urban development and urban growth. As different from pre-modern (pre-industrial) 
period, “…the development of industrial capitalism shifted the balance between rural and 
urban, fostering the industrialization – urbanization nexus… Both the scale of production 
and international trading were unprecedented, as was the scale of urban growth in the core 
nations of the world economy” (Paddison, 2001: 241). 
It is believed that current changes in economic and urban structures are related to 
the emergence of flexible economies. Furthermore, the success of the new regime of 
accumulation tightly depends on the spatial patterns of the cities and the regions in Fordist 
era. The main relationship that support this claim is that the cities are ‘uniquely efficient 
motors of capital accumulation’ during the industrial capitalism which may be explained 
by considering the fact that they have created environments for the economies –scale, 
agglomeration, external, etc.–, the innovations, and entrepreneurial. Thus, the restructuring 
processes in the cities accompany with the restructuring in the world economy. In short, 
this chapter aims to summarize the debates on the city and the region. 
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4.1. Fordism and the City 
The relationship between Fordism and the city can be interpreted as being perfectly 
determinants of each other. The effects of the regime of Fordism on productive, social and 
economic structures are represented in the cities of the Fordist era. Indeed, Fordist 
accomplishment (or ‘compromise’ in the Lipietz’s (1992) term) as an accumulation regime 
to remember the ‘Golden Age’, which is based on this complete structure, as it is defined 
by ‘regulation school’, and the concept of ‘city’ should not be distinguished from this 
regime. It may be said that Fordism determined not only the regulation in Fordist plants, 
but also whole building environment, especially cities.  
 “The image of the Fordist town was characterized by strong agglomeration processes, the 
standardization and industrialization of construction, the nuclearization of the family and far-
reaching processes of social disintegration, resulting in the erosion of the traditional socio-
cultural milieux (e.g. workers’ settlements)… large-scale imposition of the car, extreme 
spatial-functional differentiations developed, characterized by suburbanism, the formation of 
satellite towns, the depopulation of the inner cities, the dying out of smaller production and 
business operations, whilst at the same time stores and discount supermarkets blossomed in 
parts of the inner city” (Esser and Hirsch, 1989: 79). 
The rationale for the rapid growth of industrial towns and cities in Europe and 
North America was the cooperative advantage of scale economies. The large-scale 
industrial plants required the assembly of large labour forces, much of them drawn from 
rural areas, and the rates of population growth were rapid, often 10 percent per year at peak 
growth rates (Lever, 2001: 273). 
Fig. 4.1. The classic industrial city, circa 1850-1945 
 
Source: Knox and Pinch, 2000: 69 
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Fig 4.2. The Fordist city, circa 1945-1975 
 
Source: Knox and Pinch, 2000: 69 
The Fordist city can be resembled a realm in some sources that abstracted below 
figure 4.2. “The key element of the realms model is the emergence of large self-sufficient 
suburban sectors, each focused on a downtown independent of the traditional downtown 
and the central city” (Knox and Pinch, 2000). From this model, it can be easily understood 
the automobile on urban form. The automobile provides the possibilities to create a city 
with several downtowns that each emulate the business mix formerly associated with the 
traditional downtown that caused the post-war II polycentric city (see Fig.4.3.). 
Fig 4.3. Urban realm model and urban morphology in post-war II 
 
 
Sources:  
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On the other hand, the fundamental characteristics of the Fordist town were based 
on not only production systems, but also ways of life: “Life in the nuclear family, 
standardized labour, television and cars became the basis of a new model of life and 
consumption and structured urban space. The ‘uncongeniality’ of the standardized towns, 
whose spaces were differentiated according to function, became a central issue for critical 
urban sociology” (Esser and Hirsch, 1989: 79). Under the ‘Fordist compromise’, 
furthermore, administrative applications (including both state and local governments, and 
subsidy policies) supported occurrence Fordist town. 
Albertsen (1988) points out the relationship between the spatial dynamic of Fordist 
accumulation and existing regional concentration of industrial production: “Large and 
growing firms in search of economies of scale were central processes in a process of 
spatial concentration of production, special function firms, collective means of production, 
and collective consumption which, once achieved, became preconditions for further 
industrial development” (Lapple, 1978 cited in Albertsen, 1988: 345). This process is 
particularly related to a ‘center-periphery structure’ which based on “…high employment, 
high wages, and in-migration of labor concentrated in central industrial regions, and 
unemployment, low wages, and out-migration concentrated in the surrounding peripheral 
areas” (Albertsen, 1988: 345). The complex relations between center and peripheral areas 
are evaluated in selected production activities reaching to technological maturity: “they 
were often centralized to branch plants and moved to the periphery in order to exploit 
cheap, stable, and unskilled labour” (Albertsen, 1988: 345). 
As the concept of ‘industrial capitalism’ is used in place of ‘modern capitalism’, 
the concept of ‘industrial city’ is generally used in place of ‘modern city’ or ‘Fordist city’. 
The debate on the industrial cities, in the Fordist era, particularly emphasized 
decentralization processes. One of the fundamental characteristics of the metropolitan 
areas and industrial cities of the center regions are that “a process of decentralization of 
industrial production and residence to the suburban areas gained momentum” (Albertsen, 
1988: 345). This process caused reshaping both ‘inner cities’ and ‘suburb cities’: “In the 
inner cities, working-class neighborhoods broke up and were left to the urban poor, and the 
factory was replaced by commercial and office buildings, cultural centers, hospitals, and 
universities. In the suburbs the Fordist model of consumption found its supporting pillars 
in the nuclear family, the home, and the car (Walker, 1981)” (Albertsen, 1988: 345-6). 
In his consideration of late-Fordism as a transitional period of capitalist 
development, Albertsen (1988) points to the consequences of rapid deindustrialization. 
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“Plant closures, technical rationalizations, or decentralization of production out of the 
regions afflicted the highly urbanized regions of Taylorized mass production, organized 
workers, developed infrastructure, and welfare provisions, and left then behind with falling 
levels of employment, increasing social problems, and local government fiscal crisis” 
(Albertsen, 1988: 346). 
This structure caused serious social conflicts such as one that “the process of 
turning residential areas near the city into slums as a preliminary step towards commercial 
use for predominantly ‘tertiary’ functions, the extension of inner-city branches of industry, 
the loss of infrastructure and the expulsion of the population from deep-rooted residential 
areas and the drastic reduction in quality of life” (Esser and Hirsch, 1989: 79). 
 
4.1.1. Main Characteristics of The Fordist City 
It is known that although mass production dominated in all advanced countries after 
Second World War, it existed in fact with the development of the very earliest industrial 
cities. But Fordism helped to consolidate the classic landscape of ‘smokestack’ cities” 
(Knox and Pinch, 2000: 33). After revolution of Henry Ford, the city life had to integrate 
to Fordist regulations, in other words, space had to be a component of Fordist production 
and lifestyles. In postwar period, it is materialized in the USA and Europe: “This 
integration of functions in an elaborate hierarchy was a key organizing principle of 
Fordism (known as vertical integration) and helped to consolidate the size and influence of 
the classical industrial cities. However, it was the product, as well as where it was 
produced, that transformed cities” (Knox and Pinch, 2000: 33). 
One of the main characteristics of the Fordist accumulation was based on 
equilibrium between ‘mass production’ and ‘mass consumption’. A result of this 
integration was seen – of course – in automobile industry. Soon after transition to mass 
production techniques in Henry Ford’s plants, e.g. River Rouge Plant, Ford’s workers 
reached the wage level to afford a car: “Thus, it was on the west coast of the United States 
in the developing city of Los Angeles that a newer, lower-density, sprawling, suburban city 
form began to emerge, facilitated by the relative ease of personal mobility afforded by the 
automobile” (Knox and Pinch, 2000: 33). The emergence of the mass consumption as 
predominant in society, “production enjoys economies of scale in the form of mass 
production, which is functionally decentralized and often multinationally organized and 
controlled” (Pacione, 1997; Wallace, 1990 cited in Lever, 2001: 273). Both processes, 
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emerging the suburban cities and decentralization of the production, appeared with a 
tendency towards homogenization. 
The transformation in the cities accelerated in Golden Age, especially in the US. 
The economy of the U.S. was greatly provoked by governments which spent on the 
interstate and intra-urban highway systems. These highway systems give opportunities to 
urban dwellers to decentralize out of inner-city areas into surrounding low-density 
suburban areas. “This resulted in greater distances between home, work and centers for 
shopping and therefore greatly boosted the automobile industry. The construction industry 
was also kept busy buildings new suburban dwellings as well as roads and there was also 
huge demand for domestic consumer products such as televisions, cookers and fridges” 
(Knox and Pinch, 2000: 34). 
An important component of the Fordist capitalism is the labour market that should 
be evaluated with the increased use of trade unions and collective bargaining that brings 
increasing income conversion. Politics had to aligned with occupation and organized 
labour, and the regional and class dimensions, which were achieved by using Keynesian-
liberal collectivism: “In terms of the space economy, pronounced regional specialization of 
early industrialization become overlaid by new spatial divisions of labour based on 
functional decentralization and specialization: regional unemployment disparities remain 
relatively stable, although industrial and economic structures may converge” (Gordon, 
1980; Martin, 1988 cited in Lever, 2001: 273). 
Harvey carries the debates to more clarified areas. He states, “The transformation 
of spatial configurations occurs through the continuous leap-frogging of different kinds of 
capital and labour power blessed with very different powers of mobility. And there is, in 
this, no danger provided that complementary is achieved within a requisite time-span” 
(Harvey, 1982: 408-9). In other words, Harvey argues that massive process of 
suburbanization represented a shift from the ‘primary circuit’ (investment in the 
production system) into the ‘secondary circuit’ (various consumption funds including the 
built environment) (see fig.4.4.).  
“This was extremely useful for the capitalist ‘commodity fetishism’ – an obsessional 
tendency for households to compete with one another and display their wealth through 
consumer products. In addition, since most families needed to raise a mortgage to purchase 
their properties, it was argued that this tended to stabilize the system, producing a class of 
dept-encumbered persons who were unlikely to petition for radical change” (Knox and 
Pinch, 2000: 34). 
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Fig. 4.4. The flow paths of capital flow 
 
Source: Harvey, 1982: 408 
Basically, there have been two approaches on what suburbanism is: first 
interpretation of decentralization portrays suburban families as hapless dupes of an 
economic system. This view is supported by Harvey’s interpretation, smacks of 
functionalism, attempting to ‘read off’ the causes of suburbanization through its assumed 
effects.’ Another approach seems more optimistic as follows:  
“Therefore stress the role of human agency and the ways in which capitalism satisfied the 
needs of people for material goods together with their desire to escape from overcrowded 
inner-city environments.’ In other words, it may be said that second view focuses on the 
human choices opposite to be concentrated functionalism, perhaps labeled as voluntarism. It 
assumes that ‘people have complete freedom to do what they wish free of all economic 
constraints… Nevertheless, whatever weight is given to these various factors, it is clear that 
Fordism and suburbanization were closely interconnected in US cities” (Knox and Pinch, 
2000: 34). 
Out of the U.S., in European cities, there has been much less suburbanization:  
“Although one might argue that cars such as the German Volkswagen Beetle, the French 
Citroen 2CV, the Italian Fiat Topolino and the British Morris Minor, together with the 
various autobahn, autoroute, autostrada and motorway systems of Europe, were of similar 
significance to the Model T and the interstate highway system in the United States, it was the 
development of the welfare state and welfare statism that helped stimulate demand in 
European cities” (Knox and Pinch, 2000: 34).  
Welfare states were prone to help to ameliorate uneven spatial development in 
European cities than the U.S. cities. In British cities, for example, it can be seen over state-
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provided housing (known as local authority or ‘council’ housing) in suburban areas as well 
as in inner-city renewal areas. On the other hand, in continental European cities although 
less number of housings was offered directly by the state and a greater reliance upon state-
funded, social housings were privately provided. Furthermore, “continental European cities 
have, in general, tended to have a much higher proportion of multi-storey dwellings than 
British cities” (Knox and Pinch, 2000: 35). 
In short, Fordism may be equated with the success of large cities and large city 
systems. The predominant modes of production required locations in large cities, not just as 
the homes of large industrial workforces but as the providers of the most advantageous sets 
of externalities. Large cities meant large local markets and an extensive array of advanced 
producer services, including data processing, financial and legal services education, 
personal and ancillary services, access to political decision makers. As the world economy 
globalized, the large cities remained the key locations in corporate structures and on 
informational networks (Clark, 1996). The success of Fordist production systems was 
equated with the success of large cities as economies, and debates on ‘the urban problem’ 
revolved around the most effective ways of slowing their growth.” (Lever, 2001: 274) 
When the collapse of Fordism emerged, classical Fordist town became inadequate 
to afford new spatial demands of flexible production. The center-periphery structure of 
Fordism broke up, while mature corporations, began to decentralize units of standardized 
manual production to dispersed localities also within the advanced nations, while 
concentrating managerial and financial functions within large metropolitan areas.  
“Regions, in the sense of concentrations of different industries within different areas, began 
to dissolve, and the corporations acquired the ability to forcing widely separated localities 
into competition with each other for nationally and globally mobile jobs. To use… the tropes 
of postmodern discourse: regional production space ‘imploded’ into ‘localities’ (Urry, 1981) 
and national productive space ‘exploded’ into a complex global space of interlinked 
localities, dominated by a few world centers of management and finance” (Albertsen, 1988: 
346-7).   
4.2. Post-Fordism and the City 
The last two decades have seen a transformation in the composition of the world 
economy, accompanied by the shift to services and finance, which have renewed the 
importance of major cities: “Spatial expansion became a necessary prerequisite to 
overcome the contradictions inherent in [the Fordist] mode of development… The 
resulting spatial division of labor from the core to the periphery, both within and between 
nations, resulted in a hierarchically structured population pyramid and spatially segmented 
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labor markets” (Mouleart and Swyngedouw, 1989: 62).   
To begin with, the common characteristics of the studies that focused on the ‘urban 
transition’ from Fordist city to post-Fordist city should be listed by referring to Sternberg 
(see Lever, 2001: 274). 
 There is a high value placed on knowledge or information within the process of wealth 
creation. 
 The postmodernist trend will extend consumerism into all areas of private and social 
life, including aesthetics, art, leisure, and pleasure. 
 Post-Fordism is characterized by global interdependence on production, finance, 
distribution, migration and trade. 
 A new mercantilism in which national coalitions between industry, government, and 
labour seek to develop strategic comparative advantages as a basis for national 
prosperity. 
 The growth of multinational enterprises and financial institutions run by a new class of 
global executives and professionals will shape consumption and production patterns. 
 Flexible specialization, characterized by new principles of production, specialist units 
of production, decentralized management and versatile technologies and workforces, 
will become the new system of production. 
 New social movements will come into being, humanizing capital with greater concerns 
for ethnic groups, for women and for the environment. 
 There is increasing rejection of the technocracy and consumerism which so 
characterized Fordism, and the growth of communitarian, social and religious values 
and traditions by way of replacement. 
In relation to their description of the ‘Fordist town’, explained in below section, 
Esser and Hirsch (1989: 79) argue that the crisis of Fordism was also a crisis of the Fordist 
town emphasizing the changes and transformations within the arrangement of spaces and 
the spatial matrix of social conflicts’. According to Esser and Hirsch “…spatial, social and 
political structure the ‘post-Fordist’ town will finally adopt. It is likely that it will be far 
more varied than the standardized type of town marked by Fordism, because of the social 
and regional heterogenization process” (Esser and Hirsch, 1989: 93). Furthermore, the 
authors emphasize the more trueness of the fact that “…the social-spatial structure of 
towns is always the result of political-social power relations, conflicts and compromises 
under given economic-structural conditions, which vary historically and in the context of 
particular struggles” (Esser and Hirsch, 1989: 93).  
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The key constituents of the post-Fordist city based on the economic changes that 
have seen the reduction in importance of scale economies and hence the need for large 
plants, in large cities. This has been accompanied by the growth of the small enterprise 
sector, requiring less labour employed more flexibly, and the transition from employment 
in manufacturing to employment in services. Higher levels of information, managerial 
changes such as just-in-time systems, and disintegration of vertical production ‘filieres’ or 
chains of production in single or multiple establishments will impact the urban hierarchy in 
different ways (Lever, 2001: 275). 
Fig. 4.5. The post-Fordist metropolis 
 
Source: Knox and Pinch, 2000: 69 
One of the most important arguments in the debates on the post-Fordist city is 
about urban scale economies. Henderson points out fundamentally the determinative 
relationship between cities and scale economies: “Scale economies are the basis of urban 
agglomeration – the reason we have cities” (Henderson, 2001: 243). This simple sentence 
indicates why the urban studiers and urban planners interest in scale economies. The 
importance and nature of scale economies are: “…critical in determining individual city 
sizes, what cities do, the size distribution of cities, the possibility of multiple equilibria in 
location patterns, the growth process of cities, inequality among residents of different 
cities, and the efficiency of variety of public policies trying to influence the geographical 
organization of economic resources” (Henderson, 2001: 243). Current debates on the post-
Fordism is underpinned this description. The reduction in the importance of the scale 
economies has been commonly pointed out. Furthermore, some authors claim that it is 
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related to the ‘end of the cities’. 
The assertion of the ‘end of the cities’ is evaluated more detailed by Sassen:  
 “At the end of the 20th century, massive developments in telecommunications and the 
ascendance of information industries led analysts and politicians to proclaim the end of the 
cities. Cities, they told us, would become obsolete as economic entities. With large-scale 
relocations of offices and factories to less congested and lower-cost areas than central cities, 
computerized workplaces can be located anywhere: in a clerical ‘factory’ in the Bahamas or 
in a home in the suburbs. The growth of information industries means that more and more 
outputs can be transmitted around the globe instantaneously. And the globalization of 
economic activity suggest that place –particularly the type of place represented by cities—no 
longer matters… National and global markets, as well as globally integrated operations, 
require central places where the work of running global systems gets done. Furthermore, 
information industries require a vast physical infrastructure containing strategic nodes with a 
hyper-concentration of facilities. Finally, even the most advanced information industries 
have a production process that is partly place-bound” (Sassen, 2000: 1). 
Globalization and improving telecommunication systems have been often examined 
in parallel with post-Fordism. With this respect, Albertsen (1988: 350) identifies three 
types of post-Fordist cities: 
1. ‘Postindustrializing’ cities with population growth, concentration of corporate 
management and related service activities, gentrification by the service class and 
the rise of ‘urban schizophrenia’ (Castells, 1985) due to the simultaneous coming 
of a new lumpen proletariat in low-paying manufacturing, service, and office jobs, 
2. Deindustrializing cities continuing the decline begun in the late-Fordist period, 
3. The new urban zones of the high-technology, industrializing regions, where highly 
remunerated professional are developing the Fordist model of suburban life into 
perfection on the back of low-wag deskilled workers (Saxenian, 1985; Storper and 
Scott, 1988).    
According to Peck and Tickell (1994: 307) “given the existence of severe 
reservations about the sustainability of flexible accumulation… It is impossible to make 
any conclusive statements about the spatial logics of post-Fordism”. Emphasizing the 
substantial shifts in the spatial ordering of the world economy under way, the authors point 
to an understanding of these processes in terms of an ‘accelerating uneven development’, 
rather than in terms of a new ‘global-local order’ (see Table 4.1). 
Peck and Tickell state that the crisis of Fordism and the search for a new 
institutional fix are both intrinsically geographical problems.  
“The collapse of Fordism-Keynesianism led to a crisis in which the nation state was 
decentered and its capacity to intervene eroded. In the vacuum created by the weakening of 
the nation state, a new set of global-local and almost by definition unstable. This alignment 
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of global-local relations –which Swyngedouw (1992) has termed ‘glocalization’– is not so 
much a new spatial order as a continuing spatial disorder. It is the geography of the 
unresolved crisis. Resolving the crisis, is, first and foremost, a supralocal matter: it is about 
overthrowing the ‘jungle rule’ of neo-liberalism at the level of the global economy and 
international political relations” (Peck and Tickell, 1994: 282). 
Table 4.1. Geographies of ‘jungle law’   
Spatial scale Regulatory ‘problem’ Putative solution 
International Unstable and volatile financial system, neo-
liberal in orientation, undermines national 
economic intervention and global spatiality 
A new hegemony? Unlikely to emerge. 
Triadic hegemony? Potential in European 
Union, North American Free Trade Area and 
Japan / ASEAN. 
Supranational institutions which reassert 
control over money/finance? Potential in Bank 
for international Settlements or World Bank 
but must be realized by democratization and 
eschewing of neo-liberalism. Financial 
cooperation and common currencies (i.e. 
European moves to single currency) diminish 
advantages of speculative global financial 
system, but render weak countries more 
vulnerable to external economic conditions. 
   
 Neo-mercantilism and worsening terms of 
trade for Third World induces significant 
risk in trading system. Uruguay round of 
GATT heralds neo-liberal trading regime, 
while maintaining relative protection of 
Anglo-Saxon financial sector. 
Enhanced role for GATT, as the International 
Trade Organization originally envisaged by 
Keynes? Unlikely to emerge. 
Formation and enhancement of regional 
trading blocs? Provide some protection for 
those within strong blocs, but detrimental 
impact on poorer and weaker states. 
   
 Regional trading and political blocs 
organized along neo-liberal lines. Creates 
supranational instability and exacerbates 
uneven development.    
Spatial redistributive policies to ameliorate 
worst effects of uneven development (at 
nation state and supranational levels).  
   
 ‘Regulatory arbitrage’, where corporations 
pressurize states to develop minimal 
restrictions, and ‘regulatory undercutting’ 
where states attempt to woo capital by 
imposing low standards (e.g. the British 
‘opt-out’ of the European Social Chapter). 
Supranational institutions to assert common 
minimum standards across a range of areas 
(i.e. European Commission on 48 hour 
working week; minimal capital adequacy 
standards). 
Development of high-skill rather than low 
labour-cost national base. 
National Mass unemployment. Renewed national Fordism-Keynesianism? 
Unlikely to emerge and changed international 
and productive environments mean that unable 
to form basis for new period of sustained 
growth. 
Supranational Keynesianism allied to ‘flexible 
production system’? 
   
 Neo-liberal regulation at national level 
unable to contain its geographical 
contradictions. 
Policies to stimulate growth in lagging regions 
and contain growth in core. Regional policy 
organized at national or supranational level? 
   
 ‘Hollowing out’ of the nation state, Supranational regulation to prevent pressures 
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undermines legitimacy of nation states 
unable to meet social welfare objectives. 
to minimize standards? International neo-
liberalism stimulates ‘regulatory undercutting’ 
and therefore needs to be overcome. 
  Progressive fiscal structures to forge new 
social compromise? 
   
Local Zero-sum competition between localities 
and regions encourages geographically 
uneven undermining of social standards 
and fragmentation. 
Embedding of capital within localities to 
stimulate a spatial fix, perhaps through 
provision of training or technological 
infrastructures. 
  National and supranational state activities to 
limit wasteful competition? 
   
 Local growth coalitions are inherently 
unstable and short-terms. 
Democratization of growth, emphasizing 
growth which benefits all inhabitants of 
region.  
Reduced emphasis on growth coalitions as 
conduit for development. Enhanced power for 
local and regional governments.  
   
 Local states increasingly seen as central to 
economic regeneration but powers of 
intervention are limited. 
Increased local political autonomy and power 
within wider structural frameworks.  
   
 Growing links among successful local 
states detrimental to weaker areas. 
National and supranational stimulation of 
regional development to enhance position of 
less developed regions. 
   
 ‘Flexible’ labour markets unable to contain 
contradictions. 
New, interfirm modes of skill formation and 
labour regulation reformed state regulation.  
Source: Peck and Tickell, 1994: 308-10.   
 
4.2.1. The Post-Industrial City 
Concepts ‘Post-industrial city’ and ‘post-Fordist city’ are used in place of each 
other for some scholars, which is definitely wrong. The post-industrial city refers to an 
emerging set of urban forms and functions that appears to be sufficiently different from the 
industrial city (Shaw, 2001: 284). The post-industrial city implies the city dominated by 
service activity, and the outcome of deindustrialization. It exhibits postmodern forms of 
consumption and culture, and the post-welfare society (Knox and Pinch, 2000: 420). The 
emergence of the post-industrial cities can be summarized as follows:  
“The result has been massive deindustrialization and the consequent transformation of the 
classical industrial city. Many factories have been closed and areas that once teemed with 
industrial activity have become urban wastelands or else have been transformed into 
shopping complexes or leisure centers. The decline of traditional heavy manufacturing 
industry has been especially pronounced in the industrial heartlands of Britain – the 
Midlands, the North, Wales and Scotland – and in the ‘rustbelt’ of the united states – 
including classic industrial cities such as Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit and Pittsburgh” (Knox 
and Pinch, 2000: 40). 
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Firstly, it should be clarified what post-industrialism is? According to Bell, it can 
be easily understood if one specific five dimensions, or components, of the term (Bell, 
1973: 14): 
 Economic sector: the change from a goods-producing to service economy. 
 Occupational distribution: the pre-eminence of the professional and technical class. 
 Axial principle: the centrality of theoretical knowledge as the source of innovation 
and of policy formulation for the society. 
 Future orientation: the control of technology and technological assessment. 
 Decision-making: the creation of a new ‘intellectual technology’. 
Today, we know that there is strong bridge between the post-industrialism and 
post-industrial cities:  
“Most older industrial societies began to experience the impact of industrial leveling off or 
decline and the growth of post-industrial service sectors, a series of changes in the world 
economy began to reshape urban networks and to hasten the development of a small number 
of world cities that possessed the resources to exploit and benefit from a new, more 
internationalized economic order… the dynamic changes that shaped the global, post-
industrial economic order also led to differential outcomes for different places” (Kantor, 
1987 cited in Shaw, 2001: 286). 
With the growth of multinational corporations all over the world, the weakening of 
national restraints on the free flow of capital between countries and regions, and the 
development of new types of investment instruments have affected the dynamics of urban 
networks worldwide.  
“While cities tied firmly to smokestacks and factories frequently suffered social and 
economic distress after 1970, those cities positioned to provide the services required by the 
new global order grew in affluence, commercial importance and economic power. Decisions 
made in these centers of post-industrial growth and change, frequently termed ‘global cities’ 
disproportionately affected the course of economic and technological developments in 
distant parts of the world” (Shaw, 2001: 286-7). 
The concept of ‘global city’ is generally used by referring to Saskia Sassen. 
According to her, while the decline of industrial centers as a consequence of the 
internationalization of production beginning in the 1960s has been thoroughly documented 
and explained, until recently the same could not be said about the rise of major service 
cities in the 1980s. Thus, producer services and consumer services found each other in 
abundance only in a relatively small number of places. As the global economy expanded, 
and the demand for these services increased, such post-industrial ‘command points’ as 
New York City, London, Paris, Tokyo and Hong Kong. Sassen theorized that global cities 
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constituted a new type of urban development (Sassen, 2001). 
Informational growth – or ‘informational revolution’ – is placed at the heart of the 
post-industrial debates. Knight and Sassen suggest that the continuous development of 
cities as knowledge centers is a form of economic development that has capabilities to 
invert old industrial cities: “With the advent of rapid, low-cost, worldwide communication, 
global economic networks have become the new driving force of economic growth, and in 
this context, information and knowledge have become critical to the creation of new 
wealth” (Knight, 1987 and Sassen, 1991 cited in Shaw, 2001: 292-3) (see Fig. 4.6. and 
4.7). 
Table 4.2. Transition to an information society 
 Agricultural Industrial Informational 
Industry location Dispersed Centralized Centralized with 
decentralization 
Industrial process 
specialization 
Handcraft Mass production Flexible 
Economic engine Human muscle Machines Human knowledge 
Product Customized Uniform Personalized 
Work conditions Informal Formal Team 
Dominant mode of 
interaction 
Face-to face Hierarchical line 
management 
Information 
networks 
Type of information 
transfer at work 
Verbal Paper Electronic 
Market orientation Local National Global 
Source: Newton and Manins, 1999:302 
Fig. 4.6. Technology transition and the changing space economy 
 
Source: Newton and Manins, 1999: 301 
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Finally, it should be useful to mention the urban form that determined knowledge-
centered approaches. “The emerging future city based around information technology is 
likely to be more of a multi-nodal city with distinct sub-centers that express a particular 
cultural and ecological identity. The idea of a city with just one major center (CBD) will 
become less and less obvious… the cities may begin to concentrate around central and sub-
centered nodes of quite intense urban activity in the global information technology era” 
(Newman et.al., 1999: 332-3). 
Fig 4.7. Future city – nodal/information city 
 
Source: Newman et.al, 1999: 334 
 
4.3. The Debates on Regional Economies 
In general, regional economics represents a framework within which the spatial 
character of economic systems may be understood. It can be identified as “…the factors 
governing the distribution of economic activity over space and to recognize that as this 
distribution changes, there will be important consequences for individuals and for 
communities” (Hoover and Giarratini, 2003). This classical definition has been mostly 
changed and discussed since 1970s. This section aims to examine the changes in the 
regional economies by drawing on certain studies.  
This section constitutes three sub-titles, and each one is summarized one 
fundamental study. First is belonged to Sabel (1989) that based on the idea of ‘re-emerging 
the regions as an economic unit’. The second is based on the study of Amin and Malmberg 
(1992) that focused on the balance between local and global tendencies by means of 
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specific evaluation of the ‘Europe of the regions’ project. And finally, the radical study of 
Peck and Tickell (1994) that claims current period is similar to ‘global/local disorder’ is 
summarized. 
 
4.3.1. The Region As an Economic Unit 
Sabel points to the changing role and position of regions within a historical context 
dating back to the specialized and flexible regions of Europe having a considerable 
sensitivity to the rapidly changing international markets. These regions –for instance, 
Lyons, Sheffield and Solingen, Birmingham and St Etienne- were called as the ‘Industrial 
Districts’ (Marshall) by the neo-classical economists, highlighting the ‘area’ they created, 
rather than the ‘firm’ as the matrix of production.  
“Until at least the mid-nineteenth century, the region was a natural unit of economic activity 
and analysis… By the 1960s, the region had become a derivative category of analysis and a 
secondary locus of economic activity. Despite continuing differences in national industrial 
structure, there was widespread agreement that the most effective productive unit was the 
giant corporation, which at the limit integrated in one physical structure the activities of 
independent firms in the industrial districts… In the early 1970s, as international competition 
increased and world markets fragmented, firms became more and more wary of long-term 
investments in product-specific machinery… They encouraged the reconsolidation of the 
region as an integrated unit of production ” (Sabel, 1989: 102-3).  
Sabel identifies five developments, each expediting the others and influenced by 
them as the signs of the re-emergence of the region as an economic unit (Sabel, 1989: 103-
4):  
1. The emergence of conspicuously successful, twentieth century variants of industrial 
districts in Italy, West Germany, Japan, Denmark, Austria, France, and the United 
States. 
2. The double convergence of large – and small - firm structures is a clear extension of 
the preceding two. 
3. The formation within one or several areas of flexible specialization of an industrial 
group composed of a large firm (where large is defined by local standards) with 
expertise in marketing and finance and smaller firms with expertise in production.  
4. The slow formation of local governments from welfare dispensaries to job-creation 
agencies is another development 
5.  The circumstantial evidence of the pervasiveness of the preceding four. It is that plant 
– or regional - level officials of American, West German and Italian trade unions are 
co-operating – often under dress - in the industrial reorganization. 
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If the existence or the provision of one clearly defined model of regional economy 
and organization common to all is one to be answered for the future predictions, so the 
need for such two tasks in relation to changing conditions. Sabel gives an answer:  
“Not all firms in the advanced capitalist countries will tie their future to specialization and 
regional co-operation” and adds emphasizing the forces driving many in a contrary direction: 
“Nor will the complex, closely connected structures of local and national government 
automatically adjust to the needs of firms that do regroup regionally. National political 
responses to the crisis have often obstructed such adjustment; and where local institutions 
have accommodated company reorganization, their reaction has been more a reflex of prior 
institutional developments than a strategic choice. Similarly, national unions he often 
blocked plant level adjustment where local circumstance favoured it… even if numerous 
regional economies do emerge, it is unlikely that they will survive without the help of still 
undefined national institutions” (Sabel, 1989: 104). 
What Sabel firmly marks is that any of these considerations do not alter the fact 
that the relation between the economy and its territory is changing.  
“Perhaps the most dramatic response to the continuing instability of international markets 
has been the formation or revitalization of regional economies that strongly resemble the 
nineteenth-century centers of flexible specialization… Whereas the firms of that volatile 
epoch [the Great Depression of the1930s] used traditional skills to maintain existing goods, 
the new industrial districts constantly renew their products and production methods” (Sabel, 
1989: 106). 
Sabel points to the emerging consideration of regions and regional economic 
formations in relation to the ‘new doctrine of endogenous growth’: “Independent of the 
emergence of the new industrial districts and the shift in large firms’ strategy, there has 
been a striking reorientation in the thinking of regional planners, local development 
officials, and the geographers, urbanists and regional economists who are their exponents 
and advisers” (Sabel, 1989: 126). In contrast to the old view on the regions as rich and 
poor geographies of production within the national maps and as administrative units 
responsive to the dispensing welfare services, Sabel provides a newer version:  
“Today, as increasing competition undermines the sense of security of even the most well-to-
do areas and national welfare systems strain to meet their obligations, these two perspectives 
are giving way to a single view of the region as an economic entity full of underused or 
unused resources that range from traditional artisanal skills to petty commerce. Prosperity 
depends, according to the new doctrine of endogenous growth, on developing these 
resources rather than importing the equipment and skills of a mass-production economy from 
the rich exterior” (Sabel, 1989: 126).  
Finally, it should be noted that Sabel adds that this new doctrine is partly a 
reflection of current thinking about the Third World like the old one.        
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4.3.2. Changing Balance Between ‘Local’ and ‘Global’ 
Dealing with the implications of the changes in the nature and organizational 
characteristics of production in Europe, Amin and Malmberg (1992) point to the schools of 
thought whose arguments are evaluated within the former chapters in detail. As to be 
remembered, they focus on the end of the dominant Fordist system of mass production, 
characterized by the urban agglomeration of production, and later, by the functional 
division of tasks between cities and regions which are hierarchically linked to each other.  
In their examination of the changing balance between localizing and globalising 
tendencies in the production system, Amin and Malmberg evaluate the possibility of the 
so-called ‘Europe of the regions’ strategy in their comprehensive work:  
“The geography of post-Fordist production is said to be, at once, local and global. The new 
organizational networks, involving foreign direct investment and alliances, are transnational 
in their operational structure. But in contrast to Fordism, production in individual localities, 
it is argued, is neither footloose nor reliant predominantly on nonlocal linkages. This is 
because the achievement of flexibility and new economies through the decentralization of 
management and production is said to favor the establishment of strong ties and linkages at a 
local level: the global integration of production, thus, could unleash powerful decentralizing 
tendencies and raise the potential for greater local embeddedness of the division of labor. 
Such a scenario, suggestive as it is of a ‘Europe of the regions’, stands in sharp contrast to 
the more familiar, Fordist, landscape of a small number of metropolitan regions and giant 
corporations dominating and controlling the development of the remaining majority of cities 
and regions” (Amin and Malmberg, 1992: 228).  
According to Amin and Malmberg, “the most powerful case for the possibility of a 
‘Europe of the regions’ comes from a group of writers speculating over the rise of locally 
agglomerated production systems out of the crisis of Fordism. Envisaged is a sort of return 
to a Smithian division of labor between self-contained, product-specialist regional 
economies” (Amin and Malmberg, 1992: 229). The authors note that this is a thesis derived 
from the work of Piore and Sabel, Scott and Storper, Hirst and Zeitlin, and some others 
deploying the concepts of flexible specialization or flexible accumulation to describe the 
new times of vertically disintegrated and locationally fixed production (Amin and 
Malmberg, 1992). 
They emphasize the statements on a dependence on locational proximity between 
different agents involved in any production filiére, implied by the radical transformation of 
the production system towards flexible intrafirm and interfirm arrangements, which 
combine the economies of scope and versatility. “Via the consolidation of particular 
product specialisms in different areas a federation of self-contained regional economies is 
anticipated, each economy with its own ‘Myrdalian’ cumulative causation effects, drawing 
 92
upon the external economies of agglomeration” (Amin and Malmberg, 1992: 230). The 
authors also state that the cases given within empirical analysis of this thesis are worth 
considering: High technology and innovation areas; Silicon Valley, Boston, Cambridge 
shire, the M4 corridor, Grenoble, Montpeiller, and some other technopoles which have 
launched new products; the industrial districts in semi-rural contexts (those in the Third 
Italy regions) and in inner-city environments (motion pictures in Los Angeles and the 
furniture industry in inner London), in which networks of small firms produce craft or 
better quality consumer goods; where leading-edge large engineering companies rely on 
local subcontracting and supply networks for their flexibility and innovative excellence 
(Baden-Württemberg). According to Amin and Malmberg (1992), the interesting aspect of 
this new approach is the (re)discovery of the locational importance patterns and linkages 
and the formation of interfirm relationships, notably in relation to the exchange of 
information between buyer and seller and its influence on linkage costs through the 
imposition of different kinds of transaction costs.  
On the other hand, there are various views on spatial aspects of this transformation 
of production system: In their distinction between standardized supplies and customer-
specific supplies, Fredriksson and Landmark (1979) state that distance-sensitive contacts 
limit the geographical area in which possible contractors should be located, if production 
with them is to be profitable; Scott (1983) focuses on the two forms of production, their 
association with different types of linkages, and the locational implications for small-scale 
activities, transport and communication costs on linkages will be high and sensitive to 
increasing distance and hence encouraging spatial agglomeration. For large-scale, highly-
standardized, and capital-intensive plants linkage costs will be less sensitive to increasing 
distances and hence having more decentralized location (Amin and Malmberg, 1992: 231-
2).           
Amin and Malmberg state that there exists a ‘globalising trend’ associated with the 
growing influence of transnational corporations (TNCs) over national and local economic 
development prospects, having “…important variations in the degree of direct and indirect 
TNC influence over different nations, localities, and sectors in Europe” (Amin and 
Malmberg, 1992: 234). Focusing on the corporate activity, the authors claim that 
“corporate activity is increasingly being articulated on a Europe-wide scale, with local 
fortunes more or less tightly locked into this process of economic integration… (and that) 
…the meaning of place is becoming increasingly defined within the hyperspace of 
corporate activity (Swyngedouw, 1989)” (Amin and Malmberg, 1992: 234). What they 
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strongly emphasize is that the actual form of development in individual cities and regions 
is a matter of the nature of the wider corporate division of labor and the position or status 
of different places within it. Additionally, although they highlights the possibilities for 
corporate activity based on the growing significance of networking as a form of 
organization and governance which contributes elements of ‘market’ and ‘hierarchy’, they 
state that “critical questions affecting local possibilities, namely the geographical scale at 
which corporate networking is occurring and the locus of control and command within 
these networks, the answers are far from clear” (Amin and Malmberg, 1992: 235). The 
networks are definite the centers of control within intracorporate hierarchies. They are 
visibly clustered around the major European cities. It is probable that the locus of control 
within the new global networks is more diffuse and less readily identifiable, thus making to 
situate the source of uneven development more difficult (Amin and Malmberg, 1992: 238). 
Additionally Amin and Malmberg examine the implications of major institutional 
changes proposed at a cross-European level on the geography of production and on 
prospects for local economic development, while focusing on as:  
“The implications of the emerging rules governing the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) of the EC’. “One of the meanings attached to the term ‘Europe of the Regions’ by the 
European Commission itself is the possibility, elucidated within the regional policy 
proposals attached to EMU, to reduce disparities within the EC via the introduction of 
various policies designed to improve industrial competitiveness in the less-favored regions 
(LFRs)” (Amin and Malmberg, 1992: 239).  
In their critical evaluation, the authors state that the Commission does not share the 
neo-liberal view that economic and monetary union will bring automatic efficiency and 
scale gains to all parties, including the LFRs and that it agrees with the argument that 
“integration left to the market only could well increase regional disparities by 
strengthening the hand of the strongest firms and the core regions” Amin and Malmberg, 
1992: 239).     
Amin and Malmberg (1992) considers the strategy to turn localities into self-
promoting islands of entrepreneurship as to face considerable difficulties if it is to become 
a universally viable strategy for local economic regeneration. The major processes of 
economic and political restructuring in Europe are characterized by contradictory spatial 
tendencies.  
“There are numerous indications of an increasing globalization of the production system, but 
also evidence of localization in particular industries and spatial contexts… Contradictions 
prevail also in the arena of regional and industrial policy. At the level of the nation-state, the 
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transition towards locally based entrepreneurialism as a mainstay for urban and regional 
regeneration is at once a boost to local productivity and a legitimation of a blurring in focus 
and direction of development priorities. Local ‘boosterism’, on the other side of the coin, is 
becoming accompanied by an intensification of interregional competition for investment and 
initiatives as national governments reduce their commitment to the principle of central 
coordination or regulation of the space economy” (Amin and Malmberg, 1992: 245). 
4.3.3. The Local Disorder 
Peck and Tickell (1994: 298) question whether there is an establishment of a ‘new 
spatial order’ or the geography of crisis, ‘a spatial disorder’. Pointing to the statement on 
an evidential global-local order, they focus on the possibility of project forward from the 
present crisis period of these geographical realities. The authors state that the symmetry 
implied in the terminology of global-local nexus is rather misleading. “The global-local 
nexus is, we would argue, a lopsided concept, comprised on the one hand of powerful 
processes of global disorder and on the other hand of largely reactive, and typically 
shallow, local responses” (Peck and Tickell, 1994: 298). 
Table 4.3. Spatial constitution of regulatory relations under and after Fordism 
Spatial 
Scale 
Fordism After Fordism 
Characteristics Contradictions Characteristics Contradictions 
Global 
system 
Bretton Woods 
financial system 
and GATT 
underwrite 
financial stability 
and global trade, 
acting as 
mechanisms which 
‘transmit’ Fordist 
features 
internationally. An 
international 
‘regulated space’. 
USA acts as 
governor and 
guarantor of 
regulatory order at 
some same time as 
exploiting the 
system for its own 
economic interests. 
US ideology of 
market undermines 
efficacy of 
international 
regulatory 
discourse. 
New international 
financial system 
operates outwith 
control of 
regulators, while 
‘market logic’ 
dominates 
negotiations over 
the GATT. 
Creation of 24 
hour global 
markets enable 
capital to engage 
in ‘regulatory 
arbitrage’, further 
undermining 
regulation. 
Financial system 
increasingly 
volatile and 
unstable. Economic 
cycles rapidly 
transmitted through 
system, 
accentuating both 
growth and decline 
and undermining 
basis for stable 
development. 
     
Global-
national 
relations 
Nation states have 
the capacity to set 
independent 
monetary policy 
within the context 
of US hegemony 
In later stages of 
Fordism, 
progressive 
internationalization 
of capital 
undermines 
economic self-
sufficiency of 
nation states. 
Transmission of US 
Nation states cede 
powers to 
emergent 
supranational 
bodies which 
attempt to control 
internationalization 
of financial and 
productive capital 
(e.g. BIS, 
National economies 
become further 
absorbed into 
global circuits of 
capital –
necessitating 
further 
supranationalization 
of power. This 
further undermines 
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‘domestic’ 
problems through 
global economy. 
European Union). 
TNCs engage in 
regulatory 
arbitrage. 
both nation state 
and relatively weak 
supranational 
regulatory 
structures.  
     
National 
scale 
Central regulatory 
functions 
dispensed by 
Keynesian welfare 
state which secures 
conditions for 
mass production 
and consumption. 
Fiscal crisis of 
nation state 
triggered by 
deindustrialization, 
rise of mass 
unemployment and 
loss of interest rate 
sovereignty. 
‘Hollowing out’ of 
nation state, as 
national 
governments cede 
power to 
supranational and 
local bodies. 
State loses some 
control over 
accumulation 
process and 
becomes more 
responsive to the 
demands of capital. 
Less able to meet 
social welfare 
objectives, further 
undermining 
cohesion of the 
national social 
formation. 
 
 
 
    
National-
local 
relations 
Centralization and 
consolidation of 
nation state powers 
as governments 
attempt to control 
national 
economies and 
introduce social 
welfare systems. 
Nation states week 
to ameliorate the 
worst effects of 
uneven 
development via 
regional policy. 
Political and 
economic 
contradictions of 
uneven 
development within 
nation state. Failure 
of regional policy 
following 
deepening 
peripheralization. 
Unstable. 
Geographically 
specific political 
responses. 
Targeted local 
interventionism 
replaced by 
selectivity based 
on market criteria. 
Increasing market 
competition 
between local state 
fosters ‘regulatory 
undercutting’. Zero-
sum local-local 
competition. Spatial 
inequalities 
exacerbated. 
     
Local 
scale 
Key regulatory 
functions around 
social reproduction 
dispensed through 
local welfare 
states. 
Fiscal crisis of 
national state 
transmitted to the 
local state, 
undermining local 
welfarism. 
Some argue local 
states have 
enhanced 
economic role. 
Supply-side local 
state managing, for 
example, training 
policy. 
Local states 
powerless in global 
economy, reacting 
to external 
economic forces. 
Few degrees of 
local freedom.  
Source: Peck and Tickell, 1994: 300-2 
According to them, “while some localities may be successful for some of the time, 
their success in the current global climate is only being achieved at the expense of the 
failure elsewhere. Local successes, moreover, are likely only to be transitory” (Peck and 
Tickell, 1994: 298). They claim that the recent arrangement of global-local relations is 
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‘chronically unstable’ and contradictory.  
“The table 4.3 illustrates the spatial contradictions of Fordism and the ways in which they 
contributed to the crisis of the Fordist regime of accumulation. It also indicates some of the 
spatial relations which characterize the unstable period since Fordism’s demise. This new 
geography is not, of course, the polar opposite of its predecessor, although there are 
fundamental differences between them. Global disorder seems to be intrinsically connected 
to local disorder” (Peck and Tickell, 1994: 298).  
According to Peck and Tickell, the argument “that the internationalization of 
accumulation has eroded the power of nation states is hardly contentious… Anew global 
system has yet to stabilize. Fuelled by neo-liberalism, the system seems still to be 
unraveling” (Peck and Tickell, 1994: 303). Rather, the authors state that tendentious shifts 
in local-level regulatory practices are perhaps even more fragile. Referring to the variants 
of localization thesis (Mayer, 1992), which see local states to have an enhanced role in the 
world economy because they have been able to by-pass national states, they state that such 
claims are, to say at least, debatable.  
“While cities and regions may be competing with each other, it is difficult to see that, in so doing, 
they are wielding significantly greater power than during the Fordist period. If nation states are 
insufficiently powerful to set their economic policy or to prevent transnational companies from 
engaging in regulatory arbitrage, local states will surely have even less success. To claim otherwise 
is to deproblematize uneven development as a process endemic to capitalism, and perhaps also to 
legitimate contemporary increases in spatial inequality” (Peck and Tickell, 1994: 303-4). 
 
4.4. The New Industrial Districts 
 ‘Industrial districts’ or ‘industrial complexes’ are the most well-known terms 
frequently used in the flexible production debate. Marshall defined the predecessor of the 
‘new’ industrial districts as the “concentration of specialized industries in particular 
localities” (Marshall, 1920, cited in Erendil, 1998: 71). Accompanying the decline of this 
type of ‘old’ industrial districts, the emergence of a new type has been introduced among 
the scholars of the debate. The Italian experience, and especially the case of ‘Third Italy’ 
has been marked as a common argument referring to the new industrial district and has 
contributed to the development of a model to be implemented in other candidate 
geographies of flexible production.      
Knox and Pinch define the new industrial districts as “a response to the increased 
transaction costs – the costs incurred in communicating with other organizations – which 
result from the post-Fordist externalization of production” (Knox and Pinch, 2000: 40). 
Despite the increased availability of advanced telecommunications systems – faxes, e-
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mails, the internet, teleconferencing and so on – there is growing evidence that many 
interactions are best undertaken on a face-to-face basis. This is especially the case when 
complex items of knowledge have to be exchanged and where transactions and facilitating 
face-to-face interactions is for these interacting organizations to cluster together. There are 
many examples of this clustering: Silicon Valley and Orange County in California and 
Route 128 around Boston in the United States, the M4 Corridor and ‘Motor Sport Valley’ 
in the United Kingdom, the ‘Third Italy’ (Bologna, Emilia, and Arezzo), Grenoble in 
France and Baden-Württemberg in Germany (Knox and Pinch, 2000). 
In addition, Knox and Pinch (2000) define the emerging characteristics of the new 
industrial spaces: 
1. There is a tendency for these new industrial agglomerations to be located some 
distance away from traditional ‘smokestacks’ cities. 
2. These new industrial spaces are often characterized by an environment that is 
relatively attractive compared with the older industrial cities. 
3. There are in some cases high social costs associated with rapid growth. 
Among particular cases, there is no doubt that the Third Italy has been a major case 
that gained vital attention, a highlighted by Bognasco in contrast to the impoverished South 
and the old industrial triangle of Genoa, Turin, and Milan.  
“It is a string of industrial districts stretching from the Venetian provinces in the North 
through Bologna and Florence to Ancona in the South, and producing everything from 
knitted goods (Carpi), to special machines (Parma, Bologna), ceramic tiles (Saussuolo), 
textiles (Como, Prato), agricultural implements (Reggio Emilia), hydraulic devices 
(Modena), shoes, white goods, plastic tableware, and electronic musical instruments 
(Ancona). But the example of the Third Italy is conquering the first two as the organizational 
practices of the industrial districts spread to Turin (factory automation) and the Canavese 
(software and computer equipment) in Piedmont, the Milanese provinces (furniture, machine 
tools) in Lombardy and Bari in the South” (Sabel, 1989: 107). 
On the other hand, two high-technology industrial districts of the United States 
have been widespread examples among the scholars: “the center of semiconductor 
production in Silicon Valley, south-east of San Francisco, and the concentration of mini-
computer producers along Route 128 circling Boston” (Sabel, 1989: 107).       
Sabel (1989) also highlights Los Angeles as the home to the technologically 
advanced agglomerations of firms specializing in processes required in the closely related 
motion- picture, television, video-game, and music-recording industries – as well as 
injection moulding, garments, and (in neighboring Orange County) aerospace products. 
“Geographers are beginning to see these assemblies of industrial districts as a new model 
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of urban reindustrialization, and to speak of Los Angeles as the ‘capital of the late 
twentieth century’” (Sabel, 1989: 107).    
The question whether these examples – though the cited ones here is just a portion - 
would provide generalizable conclusions or gatherings, has an answer given by Sabel: “A 
proverb has it that ‘for example is not a proof’. A list of modern industrial districts much 
longer than the preceding one would still not warrant general conclusions about the 
expansionary potential of the small-firm systems. Systematic efforts to assess the weight of 
such productive systems in the advanced economies are in their infancy (Sabel, 1989: 108). 
Another question is how to success a district that answered by Erendil (1998: 75). 
According to her, the success generating factors in the industrial districts are: 
 Interfirm division of labor 
 Accumulation of knowledge and innovative capacity 
 National and local modes of regulation 
 Institutions and collective actors 
Sabel (1989: 110) also states that “the new regional economies began to elaborate 
or revitalize systems for regulating co-operation between firms and workers that recalled 
the earlier controls on competition in the nineteenth –century industrial districts” during 
this period.   
“The greater part in the change in perception of the industrial districts reflected successive 
changes in the organization of the new regional economies. From the early 1970s to the early 
1980s the small and medium-sized firms learned to make efficiently flexible use of the new 
microprocessor-based technologies and elaborated extensive but generally informal co-
operative practices. From the early 1980s to the present they have begun to formalize 
relations among themselves by entering explicit but loose business alliances while also 
collectively expanding the range of services provided to the district as a whole” (Sabel, 
1989: 109).  
In sum, it should be say that geographical proximity, sectoral specialization, 
predominance of small and medium-sized firms, close interfirm collaboration, interfirm 
competition based on innovation rather than lowering wages, a socio-cultural identity 
which facilitates trust relations between firms and between employers and skilled workers, 
active self-help organizations, and active regional and municipal government strengthens 
the innovative capacity of local industry (see Erendil, 1998: 72). 
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Chapter 5 
A CASE STUDY ON MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY  
OF TURKEY  
IN RELATION TO FLEXIBLE PRODUCTION DEBATES 
The former chapters dealt with three fundamental debates, each of them is crucial 
to the understanding of the world economic formation and its dynamics since the 1970s. 
In Chapter 2, the very nature of capitalism has been the first fundamental area of 
interest. Throughout this chapter, it has been mainly emphasized that capitalism is a 
historical system having definite procedural laws. Especially in the second part of this 
chapter, the major focus has been on the modern capitalism. That modern capitalism was 
directed by industrial growth where the conflicts among its procedural laws could be 
stabilized by the structures related with industrial production and regulations have all been 
concerned within a historical perspective.    
The following chapter, Chapter 3, has mainly covered the debate on post-Fordism 
which has been developed in parallel to flexible production. This chapter has tried to 
evaluate the Great Depression and the following historical process under three different 
approaches, each representing a particular point of view and field of interest.   
The 4th Chapter has consisted of the city, region, and space dimensions of the 
debates on flexible production. The crucial point that the chapter has tried to bring about 
has been that any geography, its spaces and places are not constituted entities on which 
economic-social changes take place, but rather, crucial determining subjects of such 
changes.      
This chapter, Chapter 5, begins with a brief evaluation on the industrial and 
strategic processes experienced in Turkey before 1980. Following this section, the 
restructuring processes beginning with the officially declared “Stabilization and Structural 
Adjustment Program” (SSAP) of 1980s will be discusses in parallel to the debates on the 
unraveling of capitalism and on the establishment of new channels for the capitalist 
accumulation. What come after will be the changes and transformations at the urban and 
regional level brought about by this adjustment program closely related with the 
production processes. And finally, the claimed changes in particular variables of 
manufacturing industry will be analyzed in relation to the changes on the ‘economic 
growth’ and ‘competitiveness’ as the crucial indicators of industrial growth. The units of 
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analysis provided in this section will be the provinces and regions of Turkey.  
 In the last section of the case study, the changes in some indicators - derived from 
Sforzi (1988), Eraydın (1992) and the like - are analyzed in parallel to the developments in 
urban economic growth, structural adjustment, and competition advantages. Hence, the 
possibilities and potentials of the flexible production for post-1980 in Turkey are identified 
by the results on provincial units. 
 
5.1. Introduction 
As mentioned in the introductory section of the thesis, it is impossible to stand in 
isolation from the debates on flexible production began by the early 1960s and still go on 
all over the world. Turkey, experiencing a drastic restructuring process especially 
throughout the post-1980 period, did not break off the determinants mentioned in the 
former chapters. In spite of this reality, a few studies in the literature have been focused on 
the changes in the production processes and on the adaptation processes to such changes. 
Moreover, the spatial dimensions of the debate are generally neglected.             
This case study is contributed to the areas structural transformations, inter-sectoral 
changes, local economic growth, and competition advantages of spaces. It should be 
emphasized here that it aims to establish a linkage between urban and regional processes 
and flexible production debates. In addition, there are particular sub-aims each referring to 
a related debate discussed in the former chapters. These are: 
 To define the economic and industrial structure formed by the import substitutive 
industrialization strategies of the post-1960 period with its spatial context; 
 To define the post-1980 policies in relation to world level transition processes;  
 To analyze the structural changes at the urban and regional level brought about by 
Turkey’s adaptation policies;  
 To point to the relations of the new strategies formed within space with the flexibility 
debates;  
 To identify the provinces of the country which are the fast experiencing places of 
flexible transition; and,  
 To identify and map the potentials and possibilities provided by the flexible 
transformation by means of an evaluation of the provinces -if- having increasing 
possibilities in relation to the context of economic growth and competition 
probabilities. 
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Hence, the methodology included in the case study is fundamentally based on the 
testing of the general comprehension and interpretation process by the use of some 
quantitative analyses. Therefore, the case study is characterized both by its description of 
particular transformations within varying fields and by bringing about holistic outcomes 
via the quantitative techniques. 
 
5.1.1. The Using Techniques of the Case Study 
The compiled, converted and calculated data used in the case study was gathered 
from State Institute of Statistics (SIS), State Planning Organization (SPO), Ministry of 
Treasury, and former studies; thesis and books. The particular variables used in varying 
units are as follows: Population, growth rates of urban and total population, income per 
capita, Gross Domestic Products (GDP), GDP per capita, foreign capital, number of 
industrial firms, average firm size, profit rates, employment, value-added, produced value-
added per worker, labour wage, and stock changes. 
In the case study, the techniques providing data for a general interpretation, such as 
raw count, percentage and calculating growth rate, are also employed within this case 
study. In addition, as a means of providing data for an interpretation on economic growth, 
local competitiveness, adjustment capabilities, and investment conditions, which are of the 
crucial integral parts of the flexible production debates within the manufacturing industry, 
the technique of Shift Share Analysis is also used.      
The Shift Share Technique was introduced in 1960 by Edgar Dunn (Klosterman, 
1990: 177). Since that time, “it has been widely used in analyses of regional employment, 
structural change affecting different industries, industrial location, migration and economic 
growth” (Liu, et.al, 1999: 173). It has been used especially in analysis of regional or urban 
economies related with local economic development. Despite some critics on the limitation 
of the model, “a survey of the literature indicates that shift share analysis continues to be 
popular among planners, geographers and regional scientists… (because of the fact that) 
…it allows the researcher to quantitatively and comparatively test hypotheses about 
changes in employment or value-added by region or sector” (Knudsen, 2000: 177). 
The industrial shift-share analysis is actually a descriptive method. The main idea is 
the determination of ‘local (regional/urban) growth’ depending on the three factors: the 
first is the growth of the reference economy (country) itself in which it takes place; the 
second is the growth of the regional/urban industries within the system; and the third is the 
 102
spatial advantages of the region/city within the system compared with other regions/cities. 
With this respect, the method is also used with respect to three components in 
parallel to the factors: the first is the “National Growth Component” (regional share 
related with national growth) that indicates the effects on the sector of the local economy; 
if sector j in location i exactly matches the national trend. The comparison of the value in a 
certain evaluation criteria in a region/city is related to the development of the country, that 
is, a comparison of an increase in manufacturing employment of a region/city and the 
national growth. Evaluation of this component reveals the existing positive or negative 
momentum. The second is the “Industrial Mix (Shift) Component” (structural effect) that 
calculates the change in the sector j that can be attributed to the country’s industrial mix. 
Thus, it is a measure of the change in the selected indicator determined by the types of 
industry located in the country. If the region/city has a ‘favorable’ mix, comprising faster 
growing industries, it will experience faster growth for the selected indicator than the rest 
of the economy. This shift is positive (+) when the region/city is characterized by 
predominance of national growth, and it is negative (-) when the region/city is 
characterized by static growth or declining at the national level. And the third is the 
“Competitive Growth Component” (total regional shift) that defines the competitive and 
locational advantages of the sector. It may be used to evaluate the capability of structural 
adjustment and improvement in region/city with respect to the reach to the levels of faster 
growth and more applied investment. 
In this study, shift share analysis is applied by employment, GDP and value-added 
values. Now, we try to explain calculation methods for these three components.1 To begin 
with, ‘beginning period employment matrix’ is prepared. Afterward, similar matrices are 
prepared for following stages. 
Table 5.1. Sample of beginning period employment matrix for shift share analysis 
 Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3 Total Sectors
1st Region e0b1s1 e0b1s2 e0b1s3 e0b1st 
2nd Region e0b2s1 e0b2s2** e0b2s4 e0b2st 
3rd Region e0b3s1 e0b3s2 e0b3s5 e0b3st 
Total Regions e0bts1* e0bts2 e0bts6 e0btst*** 
* Total employment of the first sector in the country 
** Total employment of sector 2 in 3rd region 
*** Total employment of the country 
With these matrices, the growth (dij) and the rate of growth (rij) can be calculated; 
                                                 
1 It is generally resorted to the thesis prepared by Yunusoğlu (1995) in order to explain calculations. 
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dij = e1ij – e0ij  
(growth of region i in sector j)
rij = dij / e0ij  
(growth of region i in sector j) 
By using the matrices, the total growth rate (rbs) total rate of sector J within the 
country (rbj) and the growth rate of all sectors in a region (ris) can be calculated as 
follows; 
dbs = e1bs – e0bs dbs / e0bs = rbs 
dbj = e1bj – e0bj dbj / e0bj = rbj 
dis = e1is – e0is dis / e0is = ris 
The growth of sector j in region i (dij) can be evaluated as; 
National Growth Component (gij) = e0ij rbs 
Industrial Mix Component (kij) = e0ij rbj – e0ij rbs 
Competitive Growth Component (cij) = e0ij rij - e0ij rbj 
dij = e0ij rbs – e0ij (rbj – rbs) – e0ij (rij – rbj) = e0ij rij 
The industrial mix component would have a big value if the employment growth is 
greater in the region i and sector j. The advantages of a region represent the spatial 
advantages; therefore, it is explained with its further growth which is more than average of 
the country. And the locational advantages of the region can be calculated according to 
bias of the national growth (gij). Also, again spatial growth advantages can be calculated 
according to the comparison with regional growth. Consequently, it can be possible to 
classify the local economies as follows: 
TYPE I: The area in which both the competitive growth component and the 
industrial mix component has positive (+) values. Therefore, the local economy in this area 
both locational and accumulated advantages and it can be classified as “growth pole”  
TYPE II: The area in which the competitive growth component is negative (-) and 
the industrial mix component is positive (+). It is thought that the local economy in this 
area is in a “downward transitional process”. 
TYPE III: The area in which the competitive growth component is positive (+) and 
the industrial mix component is negative (-). The local economy in this area is in “upward 
transitional process” 
TYPE IV: “The fall area” in which both component are negative (-). 
On the other hand, selected spatial units (geographic regions, provinces and 
regional agglomeration centers) are used with respect to the level of analyses made. GIS is 
used as a tool for both locational and quantitative analyses during these processes.  
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5.2. Industrialization Strategies before 1980 in Turkey 
This section aims to summarize the industrialization strategies and their results in 
Turkey between 1923 and 1979. This history in fact consists of many dimensions and 
discussions that are not possible to completely examine in this study. We only try to point 
out main trends of industrialization and its determinants. 
General structure of the Turkey’s industry between 1923 and 1979 provides an 
ideal setting for tracing the slide of industrialization on the list of social and economic 
objectives. The start of Turkish industrialization can be traced back to the 1930s, when a 
highly interventionist state initiated an all-out industrialization strategy under heavy 
protection. Although the private sector started to exert itself increasingly after the early 
1950s, the state remained an active partner in the industrialization process. The main 
engine of industrialization was import substitution, which the government aimed to extend 
into intermediate and capital goods in the wake of the world economic crisis of the 1970s 
(Şenses, 1994: 1). 
Like all countries, Turkey’s industrial development can be described in terms of 
different stages which have been defined by capital accumulation processes, economic 
policies, industrial strategies, market regulations, political changes, financial policies and 
so on. These stages provide to indicate effects of industrial development in relation to 
different economic conditions. 
In this section, two main stages are defined: first is the period between 1923 and 
1961, from the establishment of the Republic to passing to the planned development 
economy; second is the period 1963 and 1979, from passing through import substitution 
strategies to passing through restructuring processes after the emergence of results of the 
Great Depression. 
 
5.2.1 Industrial Development between 1923 and1962 
Before focusing on the period between 1962 and 1979, we summarize the period 
between 1923 and 1961 in order to provide a complementary understanding. This period is 
divided into five stages, and each will be summarized point-by-point by using Erendil’s 
study (1998: 104-9). 
 
The period 1923-1929 
 The main aim of the economic policies was to help the development of the national 
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bourgeoisie through the state support, which was found to be essential for growth and 
modernization. The period can be defined as a reconstruction in open economy 
conditions (Boratav, 1989). 
 Turkey was integrated into the world economy as a country producing and 
exporting raw materials and importing consumer goods, similar to all independent 
countries in that period. 
 Although the driving sector in this period was agriculture, industrialization gained a 
momentum in this period, especially in the form of small establishments mostly in the 
textile sector.  
 The urban population in this period constituted only 12,7 percent of the total 
production and 40 per cent of this lived in İstanbul. The second largest city was İzmir 
due to its former relations with foreign countries (Eraydın, 1988). 
 
The Period 1930-1939 
 The main economic objectives can be summarized as protectionism and state 
control (Boratav, 1989). 
 In 1934, Sümerbank and Etibank were founded within the projectionist economic 
objectives.  
 In 1932-39 period, the share of private industrial interest in the national income 
rose from 3,4 percent to 6,2 percent and the share in total industrial production increased 
from 26,2 percent to 35,8 percent (Boratav, 1989). 
 There was a substantial growth rate in industry, which reached an annual growth 
rate of 11,6 percent in this period. Industry, which formed 9,9 percent of GDP in 1929, 
rose to 18,3 percent in 1939. This growth mainly depended on the production of light 
consumer goods, such as textiles and food. 
 The production of consumer goods, such as sugar, wheat and textiles and 
intermediary goods, such as iron and steel, paper and chemical goods were encouraged 
and the state supported the traditional interest groups in capital accumulation (Tekeli 
and İlkin, 1977). In the late of 1930s, the textile industry substituted 80 percent of the 
imports (Gülalp, 1987). 
 For the first time in history, the balance of foreign trade was positive due to the 
restriction in imports. 
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The Period 1940-45 
 Almost all the productive sectors experienced stagnation because of the war. There 
was substantial fall in production and capital accumulation. 
 Big landowners from various Anatolian cities had the opportunity for high capital 
accumulation which was used to purchase real estate or various establishments at very 
low prices in big cities (Boratav, 1989). 
 Large cities in Central Anatolia such as Ankara and Eskişehir and the cities in 
Çukurova region increased population (Eraydın, 1988). 
 
The Period 1946-53 
 In this period, Turkey was affected the main characteristics of the world economy 
which was developed after the war based on the internationalization of capital.  
 Protectionist and introverted policies were replaced by free trade and open 
economy policies.. 
 The Marshall Plan in this period aimed to increase agricultural production through 
mechanization. 
 In the early 1950s, most of the state expenditure was diverted to transportation, 
communication and construction investments (Gülalp, 1987). 
 This period was advantageous for the agricultural sector rather than industrial 
sector (Boratav, 1989). 
 
The Period 1954-61 
 Imports of certain goods were restricted and import substitution policies started to 
be applied, especially by the help of state investments. 
 As the share of the state investments increased, private investments also increased. 
 The internal structure of industrial sector did not change, and as a result, the 
economy became dependent on imports of industrial inputs instead of consumer goods 
(Boratav, 1989). 
 The main metropolitan centers and some regional centers attracted the investments. 
21 percent of the industrial growth was experiences in İstanbul. These figures were 7,2 
percent in Ankara and 5 percent in Bursa (Eraydın, 1988). 
 High rate of urbanization and expanding squatter housing areas were analyzed with 
respect to the capitalist development process in an underdeveloped economy. The 
 107
people lived in squatter areas provided the necessary reserve labour force for the 
industrial sector (Tekeli, 1982 and Eraydın, 1988). 
 The presence of unemployed and underemployed cheap labour in those centers 
hinders the decentralization tendencies of industrial establishments. 
 
5.2.2. Main Policies and Industrial Development between 1962 and 1979 
Early beginning of the period, in 1963, the First Five-year Development Plan was 
prepared, and therefore, long-term economic planning acquired importance. Although 
during the period short-term policies and financial problems always created conflicts with 
planning objectives, this plan is important because import substitution was clearly declared 
as national policy. Despite some similarities, policies, which were defined by the plan, 
differed from before import substitution policies such as those applied in 1930s and the 
second half of 1950s. In 1930s, import substitution was perhaps conscious strategy, 
whereas between 1954 and 1961 it was tried to apply due to outer forces such as plugged 
foreign trade possibilities. On the other hand, starting the import substitution by leading 
role of the first development plan caused evident changes in socio-politic structure and 
distribution relations (Boratav, 1993: 94-5). 
The three development plans prepared in the period between 1962 and 1976 also 
differed from each other. The first plan pointed out the governmental investments as 
development force. Though the second and third plans went on the same policies, they also 
gave preferences to private sectors by means of encouragement and subventions. Thus, the 
main role of the governments was limited to support private sector, and social objectives 
lost its attention (Boratav, 1993: 102). 
In this period, the changing demands of the bourgeoisie, both lived in urban and 
rural areas, forced the production of durable consumer goods. This trend encouraged the 
industrial development, but Turkey became increasingly dependent on developed countries 
in technology and main inputs. Meanwhile, it is the fact that the quality of goods was not 
enough to be exported. Despite some negative conditions, growing industry on durable 
consumer goods not only supplied to bourgeoisies, but also almost whole society, and then 
domestic market was evidently enlarged. Besides production of consumer goods, there was 
an increase in the production of intermediary goods, such as iron and steel, copper, 
aluminum, petro-chemical products, and construction goods which encouraged by the state 
investments (Boratav, 1993: 96). 
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The rapid growth in manufacturing output under this pattern of industrialization, 
which averaged 7,5 percent per annum during 1965-80, was responsible in establishing a 
large and diversified industrial base. This was accompanied by a rise in the share of 
manufacturing in GDP from 14,1 percent in 1963 to 19,1 percent in 1979 and considerable 
change in the structure of manufacturing value added and employment away from 
consumer goods toward intermediate and capital goods. The growth in the manufacturing 
production led to the creation of new capacities in both private and public sectors and 
depended mainly on expanding domestic market (Şenses, 1994: 53). 
The growth of durable goods production with very high import requirement was 
higher than intermediary goods, and meanwhile, the growth in the production of 
investment goods was much lower than intermediary goods production. This condition led 
to the continuation of high amounts of imports for industrialization. While at the beginning 
of the 1960s, 35-40 percent of the consumer goods were produced by the state, at the late 
of the 1970s; the state investments were concentrated on intermediary goods production. 
Thus, the state provided the private sector with the necessary inputs. The export of the 
country therefore still depended on agricultural products. The share of industrial products 
in total export, when was 13-18 percent in the 1960s, reached 20-39 percent in the 1970s 
(Boratav, 1993: 98). 
The period between 1962 and 1976, the economical growth continued despite the 
beginning the world crisis and increase in oil prices in 1974. In fact, the increase in oil 
prices was not emphasized much in the Turkey and then it was achieved to postpone the 
effects of the crisis by means of short-tem credits. Some quantitative indicators in the 
period between 1962-1976 are:  
 Turkey had relatively higher wages compared to other newly industrializing countries; 
for example the wages in Turkey was more than twice the wages in Taiwan, which 
was the most successful developing country for export capabilities in the 1970s 
(Boratav, 1993: 100). 
 The annual growth rate in GDP increased 6,6 percent (Boratav, 1993, 104). 
 The share of industry in GDP, which was 17,5 percent (in current prices) in 1960-61, 
rose to 21,2 percent in 1975-76. On the other hand, the share of agriculture fell from 
36,5 percent to 27 percent (Boratav, 1993: 105). 
 In this period, annual growth rate of industry was 9,6 percent, while same value for 
agriculture was 3,9 percent (Boratav, 1993: 105). 
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 The share of the services sector in GDP rose from 46 percent to 51,7 percent in this 
period (Boratav, 1993: 106). 
In the period between 1963-80, the growth is highest in the durable consumer 
goods and intermediate goods. On the other hand, the share of intermediate goods and 
investment goods in total industrial production reached 50 percent in 1980 (see Table 5.2). 
The structure of public manufacturing industry indicates that the state served the function 
of supporting the private sector by keeping prices low in some critical inputs. Furthermore, 
the share of state establishments in terms of production value and employment decreased 
from 44,2 percent to 36,4 percent between 1963 and 1980. In 1980, the public sector has a 
higher share than the private sector only in intermediate good production (Boratav, 1993: 
104-6). The table below shows the structure of manufacturing industry and sectoral 
distribution between 1963 and 1980 (see Table 5.2). 
Table 5.2. The structure of manufacturing industry and sectoral distribution (1963-1980) 
 Production Value (%)  Number of Workers (%)  
 THE STRUCTURE OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY  
Years 
Light 
Consumer 
Goods 
Durable 
Consumer 
Goods 
Intermediate 
Goods 
Investment 
Goods Total
Light 
Consumer 
Goods 
Durable 
Consumer 
Goods 
Intermediate 
Goods 
Investment 
Goods Total
1963 66,7 4,4 20,5 8,4 100 65,4 3,7 18,7 12,2 100 
1980 39,8 10,1 42,6 7,5 100 54,2 11,1 24,8 9,9 100 
 THE STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY  
Years 
Light 
Consumer 
Goods 
Durable 
Consumer 
Goods 
Intermediate 
Goods 
Investment 
Goods Total
Light 
Consumer 
Goods 
Durable 
Consumer 
Goods 
Intermediate 
Goods 
Investment 
Goods Total
1963 53,3 0,4 36,5 9,8 100 57,0 0,2 24,1 18,7 100 
1980 29,2 0,1 64,5 6,2 100 53,9 2,3 33,3 10,5 100 
 SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY  
Years 
Light 
Consumer 
Goods 
Durable 
Consumer 
Goods 
Intermediate 
Goods 
Investment 
Goods Total
Light 
Consumer 
Goods 
Durable 
Consumer 
Goods 
Intermediate 
Goods 
Investment 
Goods Total
1963 35,3 4,0 78,9 51,6 44,2 39,2 2,3 57,9 69,0 44,9 
1980 26,7 0,1 55,2 30,3 36,4 36,1 7,7 48,8 38,8 36,4 
Source: Boratav, 1993: 108 
According to Şenses (1993: 53-4), despite impressive growth performance in this 
period, a number of problems became increasingly apparent in the second half of the 
1970s, which in the final analysis rendered this pattern of industrialization nonsustainable. 
These problems can be briefly sketched under three main headings: 
1. extensive production over a long period of time was instrumental in the creation of 
sustainable rents and the emergence of a highly inefficient industrial structure. 
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2. relative factor prices were highly distorted, thanks to the maintenance over long 
periods of the time of overvalued exchange rates and severely negative real estates of 
interest under the deep financial repression. 
3. pushing the pace of industrialization too far beyond the available resources and the 
persistence of populist policies in the face of severe external shocks led to the 
emergence of macroeconomic instability of massive proportions in the late 1970s. 
In the second half of the 1970s, introverted, interventionist, import-substitution 
industrialization model started to manifest various bottlenecks and inefficiencies with 
effects of the world crisis of the 1970s. Commercial capital holders could make big profits 
in black market conditions. Thus, it created great expansion in the service sector and the 
share of income in this sector increased from 29,8 percent in 1975 to 42,5 percent in 1979. 
Meanwhile, the gross profits in the industrial sector decreased from 8,8 percent to 7,6 
percent. The increase in real incomes and raw material and energy shortages led to a 
capacity decrease in the industrial sector due to decreasing profits. These conditions 
prepared the structural changes in the economy (Boratav, 1993: 117). 
In fact, by the time the end of 1970s, Turkish economy came across the necessity of 
restructuring because of the many bottlenecks, which were caused by the model of import 
substitution and its absents. It is possible to see lots of indicators to show this situation. For 
instance, the share of exports in GNP was only 4,5 percent and much of it consisted of 
agricultural commodities. Second, the relative factor prices were highly distorted due to 
overvalued exchange rates and negative real rates of interest. Third, the rate of growth of 
the manufacturing output fell from 14.2 percent per annum in 1973-77 to -0,6 percent in 
1978-80 (Şenses, 1994 53-4).  
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5.3. Turkey’s Economy and Industrial Strategies since 1980 
This section of the study aims to explain historical evaluations of Turkey’s 
economy and industrial strategies since 1980, which materialized after the great depression 
caused plugged the Fordist accumulation processes, especially in international market. 
Crisis of Fordism and indefinite conditions in advanced capitalist countries affected other 
national economies especially less developed and underdeveloped ones.  
Changes in Turkey, which systematically occurred since 1980, can be called as 
‘restructuring process’. Boratav examined the period after 1980 in four phases: 1981-83 
liberal economy under the military regime; 1984-88 boom years of ANAP period and 
crisis; 1989-93 the shift to populism and convertibility; and, 1994 crisis (see Erendil, 1998: 
115). What evidently important in the period is that the establishment of the right-wing 
party, to say ANAP, and its well-known leader Turgut Özal certainly aimed to draw a new 
route for Turkey. The political agenda, the condition of social classes and the division of 
labour, the identity and culture as a means of social formation, the international relations, 
the modes of production and consumption, regime of accumulation, the way people think 
and live, that is to say, the whole life has been changed and transformed in Turkey. This 
process has been run hand in hand with those all over the world, and there is no doubt that 
it is ongoing (Kılıçkaya, 2002: 214). 
To begin with a sum, much rhetoric has occurred about restructuring/reforming 
processes in Turkey. Some of them may be highlighted: (Kılıçkaya, 2002: 215-6) 
 The privatization, decentralization, liberalization, and deregulation 
 The increasing mobility of capital at both national and transnational level 
 The rise of the capitalist class 
 The policies towards the import oriented economy (reorientation to import economy), 
and the increased importance of the export economy 
 The emergence and the spread of the free markets 
 The ongoing internal migration from rural to major cities 
 The rise of the informal economy, growth in the marginal sectors and marginalized 
social classes 
 The rise of the construction industry as a basic sector, and the tourism boom 
 The emergence of the war-economy  
 An increasing dependency on the IMF programs and the World Bank policies 
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 The establishment of the ‘consumer society’ and policies oriented towards the 
populism and the convertibility 
 The rapid growth in the media business 
 The increasing unemployment and poverty 
Changes and policies listed above have been seen as structural transformation in the 
economy. Although at the beginning of the period, GNP and per capita values have 
increased, their growth rates have never resolve basic economic problems radically (Table 
5.3.) Since 1980, Turkey has passed through crisis conditions, such as 1994 and 2001 
crises. 
Table 5.3. The main demographic and economic indicators of Turkey, 1980-2000 
  1980 1990 2000 
Population (thousand people) 44.737 56.473 65.293 
GNP-1987 prices (billion TL) 50.870 84.592 119.144 
Per capita-1987 prices (TL) 1.144.739 1.505.110 1.766.124 
Source: Compiled from SIS, 2001 
Table 5.4. The changes in the employment structure of Turkey, 1980-2000 
Employment by Kind of Activity in Turkey (1980-2000) 
 
Kind of Activity 
Turkey 1980 Turkey 1990 Turkey 2000 Growth Rate
(1980-2000)Employ. % Employ. % Employ. % 
Agriculture, Hunting, and Fishing 11105000 60,5 12547796 54 7449000 35,6 -0,33 
Mining and Quarrying 132000 0,7 130823 0,6 75000 0,4 -0,43 
Manufacturing 1976000 10,8 2781717 12 3611000 17,2 0,83 
Electricity, Gas, Water 33000 0,2 80324 0,3 88000 0,4 1,67 
Construction 765000 4,2 1184242 5,1 1333000 6,4 0,74 
Wholesale, Retail Trade, Hotel Services 1084000 5,9 1854306 8 3782000 18 2,49 
Transportation, Communication 531000 2,9 775427 3,3 1025000 4,9 0,93 
Financial Inst., Insurance, and Other Bus. S. 294000 1,6 541742 2,3 685000 3,3 1,33 
Social Services, and Personal Services 2425000 13,2 3344033 14,4 2886000 13,8 0,19 
Total 18345000 100 23240410 100 20934000 100 0,14 
Source: Compiled from SIS 
During the restructuring processes, the employment rate in agricultural sectors has 
regularly declined from 60,5 percent in 1980 to 35,6 percent in 2000, even though it is 
thought that Turkey has a comparative advantage in this sector. On the other hand, the 
employment rate in manufacturing industry has increased from 10,8 in 1980 to 17,2 in 
2000 (Table 5.4). It is known that one significant development has materialized in the 
services sectors; they have used advantages of the expanding foreign trade capabilities and 
reached incredible growth rates. These inter-sectoral changes indicate that Turkey’s 
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sectoral priorities have been transformed in this period, however it has not had enough to 
overcome economical bottlenecks or create a stable or sustainable economy. 
 
5.3.1. Adaptation Policies for Overcoming the Crisis: The Stabilization and 
Structural Adjustment Program 
The great depression in 1970s, which caused visible the transformations in the 
world economy, evidently began to affect the Turkish economy at the late of the 1970s. 
The bottlenecks emerged in this period could be seen clearly in some indicators, for 
example the rate of growth in manufacturing investment having declined from an average 
annual rate of 7,5 percent during 1963-77 to -10,2 percent during 1977-80 (Şenses, 
1994:53-4).  
According to Amsden, as Turkey is one of the late-industrializing countries, in the 
1980s, many industries in Turkey (like other late-industrializing countries) failed to create 
a higher skill or technology-intensive production either by diversifying into new markets or 
by moving into higher-quality segments in existing market. In addition, with the 
emergence of a global ideology of liberalization and deregulation, big business and big 
government have fallen into disrepute. The favored agent of the World Bank and IMF, 
which emphasized reforming the public sector (privatization), executing industrial change 
has become the small-scale firm (Amsden, 1994: 25). 
Unlike advanced countries which resolve the problems, caused by great depression, 
by means of changes in organization of production and new technologies, less developed 
countries and late-industrializing countries, did not afford the costs of developing or 
transferring new technologies. Thus, they focused on existing opportunities such as 
monetary and financial policies, institutionalization, and different ways in organizations. 
Finally, after the years of great depression, while advanced capitalist countries focused on 
the technological changes, new production systems, and approved financial techniques. 
However, less developed countries were not included to production debates (Eraydin, 
1992: 68). 
In the response to this condition and owing to the political climate by the military 
regime in the early 1980s, there have been rapid changes in the economic and social 
structure of Turkey.  
“The stabilization and structural adjustment program (SSAP) was introduced in January 
1980 against the background of a great deal of domestic political instability, initially as a 
short-term stabilization program under IMF auspices to cope with galloping inflation and 
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severe balance of payment difficulties. Under the guidance of the World Bank it was soon 
transformed to incorporate measures for structural adjustment, which over time increased in 
prominence. In fact, the main phases of economic policies under SSAP were, to a large 
extent, determined by the degree of influence of these two institutions in shaping domestic 
economic policies as well as developments in the domestic political environment” (Şenses, 
1994: 54). 
SSAP led to a radical transformation from import substitution under state direction 
towards export-oriented policies. The deregulation of interest rates in the organized 
markets for money, foreign exchange, stocks and securities, liberalization of import and 
export regimes are some of the major policy changes in line with the objective of export-
led growth (see in Erendil, 1998: 114). 
The main policies of SSAP were implemented by a strong team of technocrats and 
were guided by a three-year stand-by agreement with the IMF (1980-83) and five 
successive Structural Adjustment Loans (1980-84), followed by three Sectoral Adjustment 
Loans from the World Bank.  
Table 5.5. The main economic indicators of Turkey, 1980-90 
 
GNP 
Growth 
Manufacturing 
Growth Exports Imports 
Inflation 
Rate* 
PSBR** 
GNP 
1980 -1,1 -6,4 2,9 7,9 107,2 -10,5 
1981 4,1 9,5 4,7 8,9 36,8 -4,5 
1982 4,5 5,4 5,7 8,8 27,0 -4,3 
1983 3,3 8,7 5,7 9,2 30,5 -6,0 
1984 5,9 10,2 7,1 10,8 50,3 -6,5 
1985 5,1 5,5 8,0 11,6 43,2 -4,6 
1986 8,1 9,6 7,5 11,2 29,6 -4,7 
1987 7,5 9,9 10,2 14,3 32,0 -7,8 
1988 3,6 1,8 11,7 14,3 68,3 -6,2 
1989 1,9 3,2 11,6 15,8 69,6 -7,2 
1990 9,2 10,0 13,0 22,3 52,3 -10,2 
Source: Central Bank of Turkey, Annual Reports, Various issues; OECD, Economic Surveys, Turkey, 
various issues cited in Şenses, 1994: 56 
Percent for all columns except cols. 3-4, which are in billion dollars 
* Based on wholesale prices, 1981=100, 1981 weights for 1980-89 and 1987=100, 1987 weights for 1990 
** Public sector borrowing requirement 
According to Şenses (1994), SSAP could divide into two phases, roughly separated 
by the general elections in November 1987. The second phase of the SSAP represented a 
sharp contrast to the first, as the liberalization of political life elevated distributional issues 
to the foreground. During the first phase, SSAP was strongly challenged by sections of the 
population that lost out heavily, and the government yielded to these pressures. Without 
the straitjacket imposed by IMF and World Bank conditionally, these pressures in the face 
of growth-oriented policies that had commenced a few years earlier led to substantial rise 
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in public sector deficits, inflation and domestic and external debts (Table 5.5). Parallel to 
these developments, the second phase was also characterized by a number of policy 
reversals, most notably in exchange rate, wages and interest rates. Against this background, 
SSAP primarily aimed at reducing the role of the state in the industrialization process and 
policy realignment in both domestic factor markets and the foreign trade regime (Şenses, 
1994: 54-5). 
Eraydın (1992; 69) claims that two strategies developed in 1980s to overcome the 
crisis. The first is the improving the capability to export and, the second is an increasing 
foreign trade capacity. According to her, whole financial and legitimate regulations in 
1980s, completely called as SSAP, were based on these two strategies. Thus, in that period 
it was commonly based on foreign trade but not on industrialization (see Table 5.5).  
 
5.3.1.1. Expanding Foreign Trade and Institutional Regulations  
The important elements in the stabilization policy were the flexible exchange rate 
policy and trade liberalization, which aimed to promote export activities. It could be 
evidently seen in devaluations; for example, the depreciation of the lira was estimated to be 
55 percent between the end of 1979 and 1988 (Şenses, 1994: 56). Parallel to exchange rate 
policy, trade liberalization was pursued with the aim of promoting the export capacity and 
the main structural adjustments were made according to the principles of free market 
economy. The aims of the liberalized import policy was stated to be as follows: 
“…to secure protection within reasonable limits to the domestic industry, to provide 
continuous supply of raw materials and intermediary goods with competitive prices; to 
encourage investments, thus provide a favorable ground for the creation of employment and 
income in industrial and foreign trade sectors and to keep prices under control against 
inflationary tendencies” (see Erendil, 1998: 118). 
The attempts for liberalization represented a gradual process, entailing a move from 
quantitative restrictions to price measures. In addition, the emergence of the institutional 
reform by the views of improving administrative efficiency and informing exporters about 
external market opportunities was accompanied by the strong encouragement given for the 
consolidation of exporting firms. These are called as Foreign Trade Companies (FTCs). 
These are aimed to ‘exploit economies of scale, especially in marketing and serve as key 
intermediary to small scale exporters accounted for about one-half of total exports by 
second half of the 1980s (see Şenses, 1994: 57-8). These were initiated according to the 
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Japanese and Korean models, which proved to be successful since 1980; they have 
contributed to the growth in exports (Erendil, 1998: 126) (see Table 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8). 
By realizing a certain level of industrial exports, these firms could benefit from 
considerable privileges and rewards such as tax rebates and duty-free imports of machinery 
and inputs.  
“Therefore, in the mid-1980s, the existing marketing firms, as well as FTCs established by 
the largest conglomerates of Turkey benefited from these advantages by gaining this status. 
These amount of exports realized by these firms increased from US$ 427 in 1981 (9 percent) 
to US$ 4335 (46 percent) in 1987. After 1989, because of changes in incentive scheme, these 
companies lost their previous profitability; after that year, incentives started to be given to 
producers with export activities.” (Eraydın, 1993 cited in Erendil, 1998: 126) 
Table 5.6. Distribution of the industrial goods in total export and import (1980-1990) 
 Export Import 
Years All Industry 
Agricultural 
Goods 
Other 
Goods 
All 
Industry Petroleum
Other 
Goods 
1980 36,0 8,5 27,5 47,5 47,5 5,0 
1981 48,7 11,0 37,7 51,0 43,4 4,6 
1982 59,7 15,9 43,8 52,7 42,4 4,9 
1983 63,9 15,8 48,1 56,1 39,7 4,2 
1984 72,1 17,1 55,0 59,8 33,8 6,4 
1985 75,3 12,8 62,5 62,2 31,8 6,0 
1986 71,4 11,3 60,1 74,8 18,1 7,1 
1987 79,1 11,6 67,5 71,3 20,9 7,8 
1988 76,7 10,4 66,3 76,6 17,0 6,4 
1989 88,2 8,1 74,7 74,9 16,4 8,7 
1990 89,9 7,3 76,8 76,1 14,0 9,9 
Source: SPO, V. Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı Öncesinde Ekonomik Gelişmeler, January, 88, and SPO, “Main 
Economic Indicators 1985-91” cited in Eraydın, 1992: 72 
Table 5.7. Growth of foreign trade between 1980 and 1990 
 
Total Foreign Trade 
(million $) 
Foreign Industrial 
Trade (million $) 
Total 
Foreign 
Trade 
Years Export Import Export Import Annual Growth (%)
1980 2.910 7.909 1.047 3.759 28,7 
1981 4.703 8.933 2.290 4.641 61,6 
1982 5.746 8.843 3.430 4.657 22,2 
1983 5.728 9.235 3.658 5.177 -0,3 
1984 7.133 10.757 5.144 6.432 24,5 
1985 7.958 11.343 5.995 7.052 11,6 
1986 7.457 11.105 5.324 8.302 -6,3 
1987 10.190 14.163 8.065 10.101 36,7 
1988 11.162 14.339 8.943 10.979 14,4 
1989 11.625 11.967 9.086 10.282 4,1 
1990 12.959 17.053 10.280 11.682 11,5 
Source: SIS, and IMF World Economic Outlook April, 88 cited in Eraydın, 1992: 71 
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Table 5.8. Foreign trade between 1990 and 1994 (billion dollars) 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Exports 13,6 14,7 15,6 18,4 
Imports 21,0 22,9 29,8 23,2 
Foreign trade deficit 7,4 8,2 14,2 4,2 
Source: Boratav, 1997 cited in Erendil, 1998: 129 
As a result of these regulations, the foreign trade indicators have had attractive 
values: The rate of export in total GDP evidently increased from 4,74 percent in 1979 to 
14,94 in 1987. Similarly, the rate of import increased from 16,23 percent in 1979 to 20,96 
percent in 1987. It is known that these rates were much bigger than the European mean. 
Furthermore, the share of manufacturing goods in total export gained momentum, and 
reached to 76,7 percent in 1988 and to 89,9 percent in 1990 (Eraydın, 1992: 71). 
In the period between 1980-88, while total foreign trade increased 136 percent, 
both annual growth of export (18,29 percent) and import (7,72 percent) increased. Export 
of industrial goods increased from US$ 785,1 million in 1979 to US$ 10280.6 million in 
1990 (Eraydın, 1992: 70). However, developing export capabilities did not indicate stabile 
structure which could be seen in falling and rising of the rates, especially in 1990s.  
 
5.3.1.2. Impacts of the Foreign Direct Investments 
The structural adjustment program introduced in Turkey in 1980 placed major 
emphasis on foreign direct investment (FDI) that seen as a source of capital inflow and 
technology transfer. The liberalization of the trade, as a process that has gained momentum 
after 1980, has been materialized by a lot of specific changes designed to attract larger 
inflows of FDI. A brief experience of the data indicates that the new economic strategy 
implemented since 1980 has been quite effective in attracting foreign investment, although 
a large gap continued to exist between in authorized and actual inflows. The cumulative 
total of FDI authorized during the 1950-70 period had been recorded as 229 million. Yet, 
during the 1980-90 period, the cumulative total of FDI authorized emerged as US$ 6,189.9 
million (Öniş, 1994: 91). 
In 1979, a total of 91 companies had been in operation in Turkey, of which 76 were 
based in manufacturing and 14 in services. On the other hand, by the end of 1990, a total of 
1,813 companies were in operation of which 508 were in manufacturing, 1,224 in services 
and 81 in agriculture and mining (Öniş, 1994: 91) (see Table, 5.9). 
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Table 5.9. Sectoral distribution of authorized foreign investment in Turkey, 1980-90 (Selected 
years - Percent) 
Years Manufacturing Agriculture Mining Services
1980 91,5 0,0 8,5 
1983 36,6 0,0 13,4 
1985 60,9 4,6 34,5 
1988 58,7 3,9 37,4 
1990 64,0 6,3 29,7 
Average 61,4 2,4 36,2 
Source: SPO, 1987, 1990, 1991 cited in Öniş, 1994: 101 
Table 5.10. Sectoral composition of the stock of foreign capital in manufacturing and services 
in Turkey, end of 1989 (Selected years- percent) 
Sectors Sector's Share in Total Capital 
Sector's Share of Total Foreign 
Capital in Manufacturing 
A. Manufacturing   
Chemicals 12,5 24,5 
Food & Beverages 8,3 16,3 
Electrical & Electronics 6,9 13,5 
Iron & Steel 4,6 9,1 
Automotive Equipment 4,2 8,2 
Textiles 3,4 6,6 
Automotive Components 1,4 2,8 
Miscellaneous 9,7 19,0 
Total Manufacturing 51,0 100,0 
B. Services   
Trade 10,4 23,3 
Tourism 15,5 34,7 
Banking 8,8 19,7 
Miscellaneous 10,0 22,3 
Total Services 44,7 100,0 
Source: SPO, 1990 cited in Öniş, 1994: 103 
Inflows of FDI in Turkey, in 1988 and 1989, remarkably increased (see Table 5.10 
and 5.11). This raise was evaluated by some optimistic economists as the beginnings of a 
much larger wave of transnational investment that would lead to reach a stabile economy. 
The 1990s shows that this was only a utopia. The transnational companies are highly 
sensitive, as Öniş highlights:  
“…the macroinstitutional and policy environment of the host country. Even though surge of 
FDI flows to Turkey reached to a significant extent, when be attributed to the transformation 
of incentives through the liberalization of trade and payments regimes, elimination of 
bureaucratic controls and of discrimination in favor of domestic investors, and to a lesser 
extent comparatively low labour costs” (Öniş, 1994: 108).  
 119
Although these regulations have been gone on, the common idea that Turkish 
liberalization project has to find new tools to pull transnational corporations, if this is 
inevitable choice or only way to develop in 21st century has been widely discussed. 
Table 5.11. Inflows of FDI in selected countries, 1988, 1989 (In million of dollars) 
 1988 1989 
Turkey 406 738 
Brazil 1,794 744 
Mexico 635 1,852 
S. Korea 720 453 
Thailand 1,082 1,65 
Singapore 2,71 3,963 
Source: International Financial Statistics, various issues; SPO, 1990 cited in Öniş, 1994: 105 
Table 5.12. The sectoral breakdown of the authorized FDI in Turkey between 1980 and 2000 
(million dollar) 
Sectors 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Agriculture 0.00 6.37 65.56 31.74 59.74 
% 0 2.7 3.5 1.1 2.0 
Mining 0.00 4.26 47.09 60.62 6.32 
% 0 1.8 2.5 2.1 0.2 
Manufactur. 88.76 142.89 1,214.06 640.59 1,115.20 
% 91.5 60.9 65.2 16.7 36.4 
Services 8.24 80.97 534.45 849.48 1,878.64 
% 8.5 34.5 28.7 28.9 61.4 
Total 97.00 234.49 1,861.16 2,938.32 3,059.90 
Source: Ministry of Treasury (http://www.treasury.gov.tr) 
Table 5.13. The number of the firms with foreign capital in Turkey, 1980-2000 
 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Authorized FDI 97.00 234.49 1.861,16 2.938,32 3.059,90 
Realizations 35 158 1.005 1.127 1.719 
Firms with foreign capital 78 408 1856 3161 5328 
Source: Ministry of Treasury (http:// www.treasury.gov.tr) (01/08/2001) 
According to Kepenek and Yentürk, manufacturing industry was impacted 
negatively by liberalization policies and FDIs, because infrastructure investments provided 
by public sector was stopped due to huge deficit in public budged. In addition, raising 
interest rates caused to be hindered new investments; and inflation, monetary policies and 
similar financial policies reduced the competitive capability of manufacturing industry at 
both national and international levels. (Kepenek and Yentürk, 2001: 365) 
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Eraydın claims that the experiences of Turkey in 1980s are important to provide 
thinking of prior mechanisms which produced to adapt new macro-economic system. 
Eventually, it is possible to see emerging new spatial units, and adaptable changes in 
organizations, division of labour, relationship among the firms similar with results of the 
tries to overcome Fordist crisis (Eraydın, 1992: 69). 
In a similar but more interesting way, Öniş points out the relationship between 
foreign investment and flexible production. According to him, “foreign investment may 
play a key role in the process of industrial restructuring via the introduction of new, 
flexible technologies” so that developing sector-specific policies as well as a general 
improvement in incentives governing foreign investment (Öniş, 1994: 109). This point has 
been emphasized many times in relation to liberalization policies. At the same time, there 
has been a crucial discussion on an independent use of technology because it is commonly 
known that foreign investments offer technological improvement if only is it under the 
control of transnational corporations. 
 
5.3.2. Accumulation Processes, Growth, and Wage Regulation Policies 
With the introducing of the 1980 stabilization and structural adjustment program, 
Turkey has rested its development strategy on the model of export-led growth based on 
private initiative and the economy has entered into a process of integration with the world 
market. Meanwhile, it was a less understood aspect of structural adjustment that changed 
patterns of income distribution and acquisition of economic surplus (perhaps called as 
‘accumulation processes’) during adjustment by the industrial and financial capitalist 
classes, through various forms of price and nonprice coercive income transfer mechanisms 
(Yeldan, 1994:75). 
“The emergence of new modes of expropriation of economic surplus and their policy design 
has not been expressed openly as underlying objectives of the reform. However, such 
discourse on the distributional reality has been a synergistic component of the economic 
rationale of the postadjustment era. Indeed, reconstruction of the domestic economy and 
functioning of the labour market were shaped in this period through political 
authoritarianism, depoliticization and demobilization of the labour force… In the meantime, 
the rural economy has witnessed severe erosion of real income of the peasantry and 
intensification of the transfer of resources from villages to the urban industrial centers” 
(Yeldan, 1994: 75-6). 
Trading capabilities of agricultural sector declined to 48,8 percent between 1976 
and 1985. It was a result of a resource transfer from rural to urban sectors. It is claimed that 
this was the most serious crisis of this sector which had been experienced since 
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establishment of the Republic (Boratav, 1993: 135). The terms of trade were the worst for 
agricultural products, such as cereals, industrial raw materials, oil seeds and tuber crops. 
As a result, Central and East Anatolian regions which do not have diversified product 
pattern were affected the most severely (see Erendil, 1998: 116). 
Another claim for changes in accumulation channels is that they resulted by a shift 
to populist policies owing to trade union pressure and changes in the political climate after 
1987 elections. As Boratav states, there was a sharp increase in real wages (31,3 percent in 
the private and 16,4 percent in the public sector in 1989; 38,7 percent in the private and 
25,9 percent public sector in 1990). In 1990, the share wages in total manufacturing value-
added increased from 15,4 percent in 1988 to 21,7 percent in 1990, which is still lower 
than the level before 1970 (see Erendil, 1998: 116). 
There are many indicators which would prove to materialize changes in 
accumulation processes of the capital after 1980 such as breakdown of agricultural sectors. 
Additionally, another structural change could be that changes in shares of production by 
public and private sectors. The rate of value added of public sector decreased from 53 
percent in 1963 to 23 percent in 1995, while increased the share of private sector from 47 
percent to 77 percent in the same period. Similarly, the rate of employment decreased in 
public sector from 44 percent to 17 percent; in private sector increased 56 percent to 83 
percent (Table 5.14). In addition, in this period (between 1980-95) the shares of public 
sector increased only in manufacture of chemical goods and chemical petroleum. In all 
other sub-sectors, it is seen domination of private sector (see Table 5.14, 5.15. and 5.16). 
According to Yeldan (1994: 76-8), the realized production and accumulation 
patterns and the policy parameters suggest three distinct phases of growth in the domestic 
economy. Phase 1 covers the 1980-82 subperiod and is characterized by hesitant 
resumption of GDP growth, a rapid increase in manufactured exports, and decline in 
private investment along with intensification of capacity use in the manufacturing industry. 
Hence, this subperiod reveals a pure reorientation of the economy toward foreign markets 
based on a static stabilization of the domestic commodity and financial markets. 
Phase 2 of the Turkish adjustment process exhibits a rapid growth, especially in 
manufacturing, and covers 1983 through 1987. This phase is the continuation of a rapid 
export expansion and increased productivity gains in the manufacturing industry. External 
economy provided expanding growth opportunities; the retardation of private accumulation 
would be examined at more length in the third section. Additionally, the consumerist 
tendencies of the capitalist class have outweighed its entrepreneurial spirit throughout the 
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adjustment era, along with more receptive attitudes toward Western lifestyles based on 
consumerism. 
Table 5.14. Distribution of value-added and employment in manufacturing industry by public 
and private sectors, 1963-1995 
Years Public Sector (%) Private Sector (%) 
Value Added Employment Value Added Employment 
1963 53 44 47 56 
1970 54 36 46 64 
1975 48 35 52 65 
1980 33 36 67 64 
1985 38 30 62 70 
1990 32 26 68 74 
1995 23 17 77 83 
Source: Kepenek and Yentürk, 2001: 368 
Table 5.15. Distribution of value added in manufacturing industry by sub-sectors, 1980-1995 
Sector Public Sector (%) Private Sector (%) 
1980 1995 1980 1995 
31 Foot 25 16 14 16 
32 Textile 5 2 22 21 
33 Forestry 1 0 1 1 
34 Paper 3 3 3 3 
35 Chemistry 41 66 19 18 
36 Soil 3 1 10 9 
37 Metal 15 9 6 6 
38 Machine 7 4 25 25 
 TOTAL 100 100 100 100 
Source: Kepenek and Yentürk, 2001: 368 
Table 5.16. Distribution of value-added in manufacturing industry by sub-sectors according 
to public and private sectors, 1995 
Sector Public Sector Private Sector 
31 Foot 22 78 
32 Textile 3 97 
33 Forestry 6 94 
34 Paper 18 82 
35 Chemistry 53 47 
36 Soil 4 96 
37 Metal 30 70 
38 Machine 4 96 
Source: Kepenek and Yentürk, 2001: 369 
Phase 3 snaps the period since 1988, and reveals a subperiod during which political 
rationalities finally come to grips with the economic realities of the markets (Öniş, 1991). 
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The limits of orthodox stabilization based on price incentives and surplus extraction via 
wage suppression seem to have been reached, and the economy enters a period of cyclical 
growth. The faltering growth performance of the economy is accompanied by weakened 
managerial activity of the bureaucracy due to reform fatigue (Ersel, 1991), and what at face 
value seems to be a reversal of the standing macro policies. This observation suggests that 
the private sector was able to sustain its mode of surplus acquisition in this period via a 
process that can be termed the ‘supra-economic (rent)-inflation’ fed upon producer mark-
ups over prime costs (Yeldan, 1994: 76-8). 
Table 5.17. Production, accumulation and distribution in Turkey, 1980-90 
 
Stabilization Growth  via external adjustment 
Cyclical growth 
"reform fatigue" 
 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
I. Production and accumulation 
Annual Growth Rate: 
GDP -1,0 3,6 4,5 3,9 6,0 4,2 7,3 6,5 4,6 0,4 8,1 
Agriculture 1,7 0,1 6,4 -0,1 3,5 2,4 7,9 2,1 8,0 -11,5 11,3 
Manufacture -6,0 9,5 5,4 8,7 10,2 5,5 9,6 9,9 1,8 3,2 10,1 
Commerce -4,1 7,4 4,6 6,9 8,0 4,6 9,4 9,9 3,8 5,8 12,1 
Finance 1,8 1,9 1,6 0,5 4,5 3,5 3,7 3,6 4,7 1,8 3,5 
Private Manufacturing: 
Productivitya,b 100 109 117 114 115 121 147 163 156 - - 
Exportsa 100 230 405 649 725 891 758 1107 1301 1144 1269
Investmenta 100 101 97 95 98 107 122 113 105 90 115 
Capacity (%) 51 62 66 69 72 73 73 75 75 75 76 
II. Distribution and Prices 
Wage ratec 100 107 103 94 78 72 63 79 61 74 - 
Real profits            
Industryd 100 97 96 109 154 215 176 229 202 185 - 
Banking 100 120 94 167 293 279 476 662 708 485 611 
Real exc. Rate 100 104 115 125 141 136 130 109 109 93 70 
Interest (%)e -33 2,9 7,8 6,7 -4,5 7,6 12,6 5,9 -3,6 -2,1 -3,1 
Producer services           
Private man. 100 131 166 219 323 453 613 860 1546 2530 3637
Public man. 100 131 165 213 311 451 576 702 1219 2033 3241
Domestic terms of 
trade 100 92 84 87 88 87 99 - - - - 
Source: Yeldan, 1994: 77 
a: Index (1980=100) based on 1980 prices; b: Private Manufacturing value added per labour employed; c: 
Annual wage payments per labour in manufacturing; d: Total profits of 500 largest industrial firms; e: Annual 
average of the 1-year time deposits; f: Terms of trade between the prices received by farmers and the prices 
paid by them for current inputs and capital goods 
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According to Yeldan (1994: 79), in the context of the Turkish adjustment process, 
one can identify three main mechanisms for creating and sustaining of profit income for 
the capitalist class: 
 The first is determined by the position of the capitalist class against labour and 
other primary factors of production. 
 The second is based on the resolution of the integration process between the 
domestic and foreign capital. 
 The third mechanism is due to the process of surplus creation based on the position 
of the capitalist class vis-à-vis the state, through the exercise of power of the state 
apparatus in the formation of income shares in the economic sphere. 
One of the most important regulations of SSAP was basely implemented against the 
background of a highly restrictive environment for organized labour.  
“The military takeover in September 1980 saw the banning of all trade union activity, the 
suspension of free collective bargaining and strike activity, the imprisonment of a large 
number of trade union leaders and the introduction of new labour legislation aimed at 
curbing the power of trade unions in wage determination… The index of real wages and real 
labour costs declined from 100,0 in 1980 to 89,3 and 65,8 respectively in 1988. (Şenses, 
1994: 56-7) 
Akkaya similarly highlights that labour wages were regularly decreased by the 
governments after 1980 in order to reduce the production costs. The index of real wages 
declined from 100,0 in 1963 to 25,1 and 12,4 in 1988. Furthermore, per capita values 
increased in the same period from US$ 2,198 in 1979 to US$ 4,119 in 1988 (Akkaya, 
2001: 81). This meant that an uneven income distribution became more salient, and the gap 
among different revenue groups unfairly opened (see Table 5.18.). 
Table 5.18. Distribution of income by 20 percent groups, 2000 
Group 
Income of first 
1% group 
(percent) 
Group 
Household 
Income 
 (million TL) 
Six-Month 
Income per 
Family  
(million TL) 
Monthly Income 
per Family 
(million TL) 
Monthly 
Income per 
Family 
 (US $) 
Most wealthy 20 percent 54,88 21,455,965,979 7,477 1,246 2130 
Second 20 percent 19,03 7,439,996,949 2,593 432 739 
Third 20 percent 12,61 4,930,024,253 1,718 286 489 
Fourth 20 percent 8,63 3,373,997,566 1,176 196 335 
Fifth 20 percent 4,86 1,900,072,789 662 110 189 
Source: Sönmez, 2001: 76 
Each group constitutes 2,869,504 families. In 2000, number of households was 14,347,522; Population of 
Turkey was 63,703,000; Average household constituted 4.4 persons; US$ 1 was equal to 585,000 TL.  
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Yeldan (1994) illustrates nonconformity between the export and accumulation 
targets of the adjustment experience in below figure. 
Fig. 5.1. Structural schema of surplus extraction and disposition during structural 
adjustment in Turkey 
 
Source: Yeldan, 1994: 87 
Structural adjustment processes not only promotes an uneven income distribution, 
but also became the bastion of privilege for rent seeking groups supported with state 
policies.  
“Rent seeking involved both direct mechanisms, such as obtaining more favorable export 
subsidies (leading to significant overinvoicing practices), and indirect mechanisms, such as 
tax evasion, macro pricing policies and recording of existing legislation in crucial spheres of 
economic life… The basic inner conflict of such a mode of surplus transfer, namely the 
nonconformity between the industrialization targets and the emerging pattern of 
accumulation” (Yeldan, 1994: 88). 
 
5.3.3. Industrial Strategies: the Negligence in Industrialization 
Turkey, in fact, preferred the ‘outward-looking’ strategy with introducing the 
‘export-oriented industrialization’ that as a part of SSAP. Firstly, it should be noted that it 
is not original. The outward-looking industrial strategies had been introduced at least by all 
late-industrializing countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, 
India, Brazil and Argentina. It may be said that Turkey is the last country which achieved 
relatively industrialization experiences in comparison with other less developed countries. 
Especially success of Taiwan in 1970s (when the times of ‘Great Depression’), based on 
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integration of the world market and rapid industrialization according to small-scale 
industries, motivated other less developed countries in order to leap-up the ‘industrialized 
countries’ group. Actually, the international capitalist regulators, e.g. IMF and World 
Bank, encouraged the export-oriented model as to point at the Taiwan Model. And finally, 
the late industrialized countries, including Turkey, “resemble Japan’s former zaibatsu have 
sprung up since the Second World War. These groups have internalized the learning 
process to the point where diversifying into new industries appears to represent an 
important economy of scope” (Amsden, 1994: 27). 
The Taiwan model, with its emphasis on small firms and exports, has become 
doubly attractive because most other late-industrializing countries have expanded their 
exports in order to repay their foreign debts. Taiwan’s economy is one of the most export-
oriented in the world with exports amounting to over 50 percent of GNP. On the other 
hand, the Taiwan Model causes incredible dependency relation between developed and less 
developed countries.  
“(The late-industrializing countries) …have had to develop without the competitive asset of 
new pioneering technology, the driving force behind industrialization in eighteenth-century 
Britain and nineteenth-century United States. Instead, the process of late industrialization has 
been characterized by borrowing technology and the conscious mobilization of institutions – 
often big business and state bureaucracies – deliberately to push industrialization ahead” 
(Amsden, 1994: 25) 
Furthermore, in Turkey, it is seen that “the Turkish manufacturing industry became 
more, not less, dependent on unskilled, labour-intensive production between 1976 and 
1987. Average labour productivity tended to decrease rather than increase over time” 
(Amsden, 1994: 29).  
In addition, Turkish manufacturing industry has not benefited from positive 
changes created by export orientation policies. Although there was a sharp increase in the 
number of investment certificates, which increased from a total of 4.802 during 1968-80 to 
about 25.000 during 1981-90, the share of manufacturing (in investment benefiting from 
the incentives granted through these certificates) declined from 90,1 percent in 1979 to 
26,0 percent in 1983 and 40,3 percent in 1987 and 1988 (Güvemli, 1992). The sectoral 
distribution of investment certificates within manufacturing represented a move away from 
intermediate and investment goods toward export-oriented consumer goods such as textiles 
and clothing, which on average accounted for 45,3 percent of the total during 1988-90 
(Şenses, 1994: 58-9) (see Table 5.19). 
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The share of manufacturing in total fixed investment by the public sector declined 
from 23,8 percent in 1973 and 20,7 percent in 1978 to 18,7 percent in 1984 and only 4,5 
percent in 1990 (Table 5.18). This was reflected in the severe decline in the share of public 
sector manufacturing investment in total fixed investment, failing from 12 percent at the 
end of the 1970s to 7,3 percent in 1985, 5,7 percent in 1986, and 3,3 percent in 1987. 
Additionally, the poor record of public sector investment in the manufacturing sector can 
be linked to sharp increase in public sector deficits after the mid-1980s (Şenses, 1994: 59). 
Table 5.19. Sectoral distribution of gross fixed investment, 1973-90 
Gross Fixed Investment 1973 1978 1980 1984 1987 1990 
PU
BL
IC
 S
EC
TO
R
 Agriculture 9,3 10,4 7,0 8,8 9,1 9,5 
Manufacturing 23,8 20,7 28,9 18,7 6,3 4,5 
Energy 13,1 18,6 24,4 25,9 24,3 21,4 
Education 7,2 4,8 3,6 3,3 4,6 7,0 
Transportation 26,4 23,9 18,2 22,5 32,7 34,1 
Other 20,2 12,6 17,9 20,8 23,0 23,5 
TOTAL 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
  [46,9] [50,6] [56,0] [60,0] [53,6] [43,5] 
PR
IV
A
T
E
 S
E
C
T
O
R
 
Agriculture 14,3 11,5 8,2 13,3 6,6 4,8 
Manufacturing 33,9 29,9 24,6 27,6 26,3 27,5 
Transportation 12,6 22,6 12,1 20,1 12,4 12,7 
Tourism 1,9 1,0 0,6 1,2 3,8 6,2 
Housing 33,0 31,5 49,3 30,8 43,7 41,1 
Other 4,3 3,5 5,2 7,0 7,2 7,7 
TOTAL 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
  [53,1] [49,4] [44,0] [40,0] [46,4] [56,5] 
Source: State Planning Organization, Main Economic Indicators (1973-81), Ankara, April 1981, and Central 
Bank, Annual Report, various issues for other years cited in Şenses, 1994: 60 
Table 5.20. Import in manufacturing industry, 1997-1999 
SECTORS 1997 1998 1999 Annual Growth 
Value % Value % Value % 1997-98 1998-99 
Consumer Goods 132658 10,5 119903 9,6 129052 9,7 -9,6 7,6 
Intermediate Goods 418681 33 440243 35,4 470684 35,3 5,2 6,9 
Investment Goods 716460 56,5 685191 55 735401 55,1 -4,4 7,3 
TOTAL 1267799 100 1245338 100 1335137 100 -1,8 7,2 
Source: SPO, 1999: 48 
Table 5.21. Export in manufacturing industry, 1997-1999 
SECTORS 1997 1998 1999 Annual Growth 
Value % Value % Value % 1997-98 1998-99 
Consumer Goods 411.537 57,1 427.197 55,4 463.031 55,2 3,8 8,4 
Intermediate Goods 179.186 24,9 180.315 23,4 185.607 22,1 0,6 2,9 
Investment Goods 129.973 18,0 163.396 21,2 190.903 22,7 25,7 16,8 
TOTAL 720.696 100,0 770.908 100,0 839.541 100,0 7,0 8,9 
Source: SPO, 1999: 47 
 
 128
Table 5.22. Changes in industrial production, 1997-1999 
SECTORS 1997 1998 1999 Annual Growth  
Value % Value % Value % 1997-98 1998-99 
Consumer Goods 1.402.913 41,9 1.448.260 42,7 1.497.515 42,9 3,2 3,4 
Intermediate Goods 1.338.077 40,0 1.354.751 39,9 1.398.341 39,8 1,2 2,6 
Investment Goods 607.006 18,1 951.518 17,4 601.344 17,2 -2,6 1,7 
TOTAL 3.347.996 100,0 3.394.528 100,0 3.488.200 100,0 1,4 2,8 
Source: SPO, 1999: 46 
Şenses states “there has been a clear neglect of industrialization under SSAP, as 
evidenced also from the declared objective of the government to withdraw from direct 
manufacturing activity. This withdrawal was based primarily on the sharp reduction in 
public investment in the manufacturing sector as an integral part of the broader 
privatization objective” (Şenses, 1994: 59). This neglect may cause that the Turkey’s 
economy is much unstable and weak as being in 1990s (see section 2.2.1 in this study for 
‘the engine of economic growth’). Turkey has run into many crises such as ‘Gulf Crisis’ in 
1991, structural crisis in 1994, conjectural crisis in 1998 (EBSO, 1999), November Crisis 
in 2000 and February Crisis in 2001. Today, we live still under the crisis conditions 
probably due to in lieu of the neglect of industrialization after 1980 (see Table 5.20, 5.21, 
and 5.22). 
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5.4. Changes in Regional Structure and Main Urbanization Trends 
In this section, the changing regional structure of Turkey and the urbanization 
processes within the country in the post-1980 period are examined. The units for the 
analyses and interpretations are identified as the geographic regions and provinces. There 
is no doubt that none of these units provide responsive delineations in relation to the 
explanations of the changes in regional and urban structure. Because there exists no up-to-
date and satisfactory regional borders, and all the available data sets are coded with these 
units, they have been inevitably used. 
This section has three parts. The first includes the regional analyses, and focuses on 
two important changes: the former concerns the question how “uneven spatial 
development”, which dramatically emerged before 1980, takes a form after 1980 (more 
detailed analyses related with uneven spatial development are also placed in the following 
sections), and the latter includes the analyses on sectoral advantages and possibility of 
growth of each geographical region since 1980. In addition, this part consists of the 
definition of the relationship between uneven development and inter-sectoral distribution. 
In the second part, urban intensification centers are examined with respect to 
population movements and changes in provinces before and after 1980. 
In the third part, the restructuring processes of major cities in Turkey are evaluated, 
and then, sectoral growth and the distribution of the main sectors are relatively analyzed. 
 
5.4.1. Increasing Uneven Spatial Development 
It may be considered as an inevitable process that the new regulation mechanisms 
identified different priorities with respect to the new regional structures and urbanization 
processes during the post-1980 period. Due to Turkey’s efforts of integrate to the world 
economy, new spatial regulations were emerged. Thus, the regional structure of the 
country has been unraveled and restructured. The idea that the disparities among the 
regions have been raised in this period is widely accepted (Eraydın, 1992: 115) (see Table 
5.23, and 5.24.).  
According to Table 5.23, it can be said that the regional disparities reached 
considerable levels in the pre-1980 period. In this period, the inter-regional difference 
between less-developed and developed regions reached to almost three times by income 
values. Many scholars claim that this figure is related to the industrialization policies, 
which the investments were intensified on particular regions in order to encourage private 
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sector during 1960s and 1970s (see Boratav, 1993; Eraydın, 1992; Öniş, 1994; Özmucur 
and Karataş, 1994; and Şenses, 1994). 
Table 5.23. Income per capita by the geographical regions, 1980-86 
Regions 
Income per Capita 
(1979 Prices) 
Increase  
(%) 
Income per Capita 
(Max=100) 
1980 1986 1980-86 1980 1986 
Marmara and Aegean Regions 68.973 88.164 4,18 100,00 100,00 
Mediterranean Region 51.504 54.325 0,89 74,73 61,62 
Central Anatolia Region 38.267 45.920 3,09 55,52 52,08 
Black Sea Region 37.700 41.808 1,74 54,70 47,42 
Eastern and Southeastern 
Anatolia Regions 23.128 25.723 1,79 33,56 29,18 
Source: Eraydın, 1992: 116 
Table 5.24. GDP per capita by the geographical regions, 1990-2000 
Regions 
Income per Capita  
(1987 Prices) 
Growth 
Rate (%) 
Income per Capita 
(Max=100) 
1990 2000 1990-00 1990 2000 
Marmara and Aegean Regions 2.093.734 2.471.946 18,06 100,00 100,00 
Mediterranean Region 1.471.949 1.600.244 8,72 70,30 64,74 
Central Anatolia Region 1.364.945 1.644.222 20,46 65,19 66,52 
Black Sea Region 999.032  1.278.632 27,99 47,72 51,73 
Eastern and Southeastern 
Anatolia Regions 745.882  781.231 4,74 35,62 31,60 
Source: SIS, 1995 and 2001 
Fig. 5.2. Distribution of population by the geographic regions in Turkey, 2000 
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Source: Compiled from SIS, 2002 
Eraydın claims that regional disparities are not only the consequences of the new 
regime of accumulation, but also the natural consequences of a reckless kind of policy and 
the lack of the development of a new regional theory (Eraydın, 1992: 115). Eraydın’s claim 
on the lacking of policy is, for sure, a right emphasis. On the other hand, that the existing 
regime of accumulation accelerated the uneven development is worth attention. Moreover, 
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the adaptation process of the third world countries to the changing world economy 
following the great depression years has caused much exploitation is often highlighted (see 
Eraydın, 1992; Boratav, 1993; Öniş, 1994; and Şenses, 1994). Hence, the emphasis on the 
idea that the ‘new’ regime of accumulation has caused the disparities between regions were 
opened should not be neglected. 
According to the distribution of GDP per capita in the period between 1990 and 
2000 indicates that the disparities has gone on. On the other hand, it is noticeable that 
Central Anatolia Region has had higher GDP value than Mediterranean Region. It may be 
said that declining the tourism income during 1990s, which experienced many crises, has 
led to this shift. The state of underdevelopment of eastern regions continued with respect to 
production and income levels.      
 
5.4.1.1. Regional Growth in Relation to Sectoral Advantages 
In this part, the shift-share analysis is implemented on the geographic regions by 
main sectors, also includes three sub-sectors for manufacturing industry, in the period of 
1987-2000 (the data of the pre-1980 period could not be gathered). 
According to the analyses, it is seen that each region has reached development 
tendencies in particular sector(s), gained competitive advantages, adapted to the economic 
transformations by means of inter-sectoral changes. With the same respect, the regions 
which lost growth tendencies and/or competitive advantages are illustrated as ‘upward 
transitional’ or ‘downward transitional’ regions.    
The crucial point to be noticed here is that such analyses in less developed 
countries do not provide the absolutely true results in relation to changing international 
relations in different periods. Moreover, the factors, e.g. there is no widening of the 
economic growth to differing sectors, causes the lack of the results representing the 
expected positive interactions among the sectors, which all affect the analyses. In spite of 
these lacks, it is possible to reach satisfactory results in order to evaluate general and 
sectoral structure. 
The findings of the analyses according to ‘industrial mix component growth’, 
competitive growth component’ and ‘regional share’ are summarized as follows (see Table 
5.25): 
The Mediterranean Region has had the high growth rates, competitive advantages, 
and adequacies to enlarge its investments (showed the ‘growth pole’ (GP) or ‘development 
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core’ feature) in the sectors of ‘trade’ (4) and ‘import duties’ (12). The growth in the 
sectors of 2a, 3, 6, 8, 9, and 11 has almost ceased, and the investment opportunities have 
been nearly plugged (showed the ‘Fall Area’ (FA) feature). Although the high growth rates 
in the sectors of 2b, 2c, and 5 have remained, the competitive advantages have got lost 
(showed the ‘Downward Transitional Area’ (DTA) feature). It may be said that this 
situation has caused the adaptation problems, and the bottlenecks of new investments. On 
the other hand, the opportunities of investment in the sectors of 1, 7, and 10 have been 
raised, the competition advantages, however, increased. These sectors have not achieved 
the adequate growth rate still (showed the ‘Upward Transitional Area’ (UTA) feature).      
Although East Anatolia Region has showed the GP feature only in the sector of 
‘import duties’, it has showed the FA feature in nine sectors. On the other hand, it has had 
the greater growth rate in the sectors of 2b, 2c, 4, and 5 (showed the DTA feature).       
Aegean Region has showed the GP feature in four different sectors: 
‘manufacturing’, ‘trade’, ‘transportation and communication’, and ‘import duties’. On the 
other hand, it has showed the FA feature in the sectors of 1, 6, 8, 9, and 11. Although the 
growth rate is lower than national mean in the sectors of 2a, 3, 7, and 10, the region has 
had competitive advantages in these sectors.     
South East Anatolia Region has the feature of GP in the sectors of 2c, 5 and 12 it 
is may be said that public sector is generally dominated in the sectors of 2c and 5. The 
region has showed the low growth rates and narrowing opportunities in six sectors (the 
group of FA). In addition, only in the sectors of 2b and 4 have had relatively higher growth 
rates, but these sectors lost their competition capability. The sectors that the region could 
prevent their competition advantages have been agriculture and governmental services.   
Central Anatolia Region has showed the GP features in the sectors that have 
limited growth capability such as ‘electricity, gas and water’, and ‘import duties’. 
Although the region has had the higher growth rates than the national mean in 
‘manufacturing’, ‘trade’, and ‘transportation and communication’ sectors, the competition 
advantages and investment opportunities have narrowed in these sectors. 
Black Sea Region has showed the GP features in the sectors of ‘trade’, 
‘transportation and communication’. However, the region has showed the FA feature in 
seven sectors. The competition advantages and investment opportunities of some sectors, 
e.g. ‘construction’, and ‘ownership of dwelling’, have flourished.   
Marmara Region has had the considerable superiority in ‘manufacturing’ and 
‘trade’ sectors, and gained the high coefficient indicators both in the growth rates and 
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competitive advantages. Another GP feature of the region has been represented in the 
group of ‘electricity, gas, and water’. Moreover, the region has had the investment and 
competition advantages in five sectors. On the other hand, the region has showed the FA 
feature in the sectors of 1, 2a, 7, and 11.  
In the sectors of ‘financial institutions’, ‘business and personal services’, and 
‘imputed bank service charge’, the region has had higher kij and cij values than the 
national means. But as these sectors could limitedly contribute to the national economy, 
the region is included in the group of UTA.   
Table 5.25. The results of the shift share analysis by geographic regions according to GDP 
values of economic activities, 1987-2000 (*) 
 MEDITERRANEAN REGION 1987 2000 gij kij cij Type
1 Agriculture 2.097.033 2.817.045 1.234.758,81 -817.767,86 303.021,05 3 
2a Mining and Quarrying 89.602 93.213 52.758,76 -42.579,82 -6.567,94 4 
2b Manufacturing 1.742.801 2.394.935 1.026.182,65 251.033,04 -625.081,69 2 
2c Electricity, Gas, Water 186.309 374.416 109.701,03 183.942,16 -105.536,19 2 
3 Construction 581.764 606.057 342.549,79 -284.966,95 -33.289,85 4 
4 Trade 1.714.092 3.629.931 1.009.278,44 347.888,48 558.672,08 1 
5 Transportation and Communication 1.161.195 1.863.123 683.725,89 254.140,09 -235.937,98 2 
6 Financial Institution 158.826 178.697 93.518,70 -47.005,07 -26.642,63 4 
7 Ownership of Dwelling 491.095 659.059 289.162,77 -147.430,90 26.232,13 3 
8 Business and Personal Services 186.312 279.486 109.702,80 -7.521,66 -9.007,13 4 
9 (Less)Imputed Bank Service Charges 123.737 127.962 72.857,87 -48.290,65 -20.342,21 4 
10 Government Services 406.409 557.420 239.298,62 -113.234,19 24.946,57 3 
11 Private Non-profit Institution 14.672 18.860 8.639,05 -4.385,78 -65,28 4 
12 Import Duties 231.041 587.447 136.039,78 204.298,23 16.067,99 1 
13 GDP (in purchasers' value) 8.937.413 13.931.730 5.262.458,64    
 EAST ANATOLIA REGION 1987 2000 gij kij cij Type
1 Agriculture 878.173 1.046.155 517.079,06 -342.456,06 -6.641,00 4 
2a Mining and Quarrying 39.658 27.235 23.351,12 -18.845,90 -16.928,22 4 
2b Manufacturing 315.917 430.833 186.015,81 45.504,68 -116.604,49 2 
2c Electricity, Gas, Water 186.891 171.111 110.043,72 184.516,76 -310.340,48 2 
3 Construction 235.545 216.055 138.691,79 -115.377,61 -42.804,18 4 
4 Trade 417.066 676.572 245.573,59 84.646,83 -70.714,42 2 
5 Transportation and Communication 302.805 467.277 178.295,31 66.272,15 -80.095,46 2 
6 Financial Institution 50.221 49.031 29.570,74 -14.863,07 -15.897,67 4 
7 Ownership of Dwelling 205.612 247.016 121.066,87 -61.726,47 -17.936,40 4 
8 Business and Personal Services 28.561 36.194 16.817,07 -1.153,05 -8.031,02 4 
9 (Less)Imputed Bank Service Charges 33.341 29.612 19.631,59 -13.011,94 -10.348,65 4 
10 Government Services 390.025 469.359 229.651,51 -108.669,26 -41.648,26 4 
11 Private Non-profit Institution 9.511 7.116 5.600,19 -2.843,04 -5.152,15 4 
12 Import Duties 27.704 75.247 16.312,46 24.497,29 6.733,25 1 
13 GDP (in purchasers' value) 3.054.348 3.889.589 1.798.437,65    
 AEGEAN REGION 1987 2000 gij kij cij Type
1 Agriculture 2.700.757 3.198.579 1.590.238,92 
-
1.053.198,62 -39.218,30 4 
2a Mining and Quarrying 426.530 586.267 251.146,11 -202.691,59 111.282,48 3 
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2b Manufacturing 2.348.037 4.088.832 1.382.553,05 338.211,23 20.030,72 1 
2c Electricity, Gas, Water 405.644 832.530 238.848,17 400.490,76 -212.452,93 2 
3 Construction 713.452 810.526 420.089,31 -349.472,01 26.456,71 3 
4 Trade 2.523.417 4.667.028 1.485.818,95 512.147,37 145.644,68 1 
5 Transportation and Communication 1.276.695 2.311.283 751.733,71 279.418,51 3.435,77 1 
6 Financial Institution 341.187 350.147 200.895,10 -100.975,40 -90.959,70 4 
7 Ownership of Dwelling 668.869 961.010 393.838,29 -200.800,17 99.102,88 3 
8 Business and Personal Services 272.637 412.303 160.532,02 -11.006,72 -9.859,30 4 
9 (Less)Imputed Bank Service Charges 247.065 229.676 145.474,91 -96.421,69 -66.442,22 4 
10 Government Services 483.192 638.894 284.509,39 -134.627,57 5.820,18 3 
11 Private Non-profit Institution 4.078 3.695 2.401,18 -1.219,00 -1.565,17 4 
12 Import Duties 474.269 1.272.668 279.255,42 419.372,83 99.770,75 1 
13 GDP (in purchasers' value) 12.391.698 19.904.085 7.296.384,11    
 SOUTHEAST ANATOLIA REGION 1987 2000 gij kij cij Type
1 Agriculture 1.038.278 1.722.101 611.350,85 -404.891,28 477.363,43 3 
2a Mining and Quarrying 340.495 210.506 200.487,64 -161.806,84 -168.669,80 4 
2b Manufacturing 373.317 635.814 219.813,64 53.772,58 -11.089,22 2 
2c Electricity, Gas, Water 109.742 323.925 64.617,44 108.347,85 41.217,71 1 
3 Construction 300.502 270.332 176.939,27 -147.195,66 -59.913,61 4 
4 Trade 673.118 1.134.578 396.340,15 136.614,60 -71.494,76 2 
5 Transportation and Communication 342.876 750.609 201.889,60 75.042,12 130.801,27 1 
6 Financial Institution 52.110 63.719 30.683,01 -15.422,12 -3.651,88 4 
7 Ownership of Dwelling 357.476 395.467 210.486,26 -107.317,34 -65.177,92 4 
8 Business and Personal Services 43.878 61.909 25.835,91 -1.771,41 -6.033,49 4 
9 (Less)Imputed Bank Service Charges 45.828 47.151 26.984,09 -17.885,22 -7.775,87 4 
10 Government Services 268.593 410.272 158.150,86 -74.835,72 58.363,86 3 
11 Private Non-profit Institution 15.603 14.702 9.187,24 -4.664,07 -5.424,17 4 
12 Import Duties 35.749 121.226 21.049,45 31.611,09 32.816,46 1 
13 GDP (in purchasers' value) 3.905.909 6.068.009 2.299.847,23    
 CENTRAL ANATOLIA REGION 1987 2000 gij kij cij Type
1 Agriculture 2.380.288 2.444.893 1.401.542,84 -928.227,18 -408.710,66 4 
2a Mining and Quarrying 172.457 382.958 101.544,80 -81.953,40 190.909,60 3 
2b Manufacturing 1.589.923 2.741.025 936.166,21 229.012,49 -14.076,70 2 
2c Electricity, Gas, Water 158.608 437.945 93.390,34 156.593,07 29.353,59 1 
3 Construction 1.573.031 1.664.123 926.219,99 -770.521,79 -64.606,20 4 
4 Trade 2.581.471 4.406.031 1.520.001,86 523.929,89 -219.371,75 2 
5 Transportation and Communication 1.752.824 3.064.882 1.032.084,32 383.624,50 -103.650,82 2 
6 Financial Institution 286.871 274.180 168.913,17 -84.900,40 -96.703,77 4 
7 Ownership of Dwelling 723.783 988.937 426.172,33 -217.285,82 56.267,49 3 
8 Business and Personal Services 294.613 432.747 173.471,76 -11.893,92 -23.443,84 4 
9 (Less)Imputed Bank Service Charges 184.635 160.231 108.715,36 -72.057,22 -61.062,13 4 
10 Government Services 846.063 1.020.097 498.172,30 -235.731,14 -88.407,15 4 
11 Private Non-profit Institution 203.820 294.931 120.011,72 -60.926,18 32.025,46 3 
12 Import Duties 256.632 1.089.037 151.108,08 226.927,10 454.369,82 1 
13 GDP (in purchasers' value) 12.635.749 19.087.554 7.440.084,34    
 BLACK SEA REGION 1987 2000 gij kij cij Type
1 Agriculture 2.141.489 2.342.893 1.260.935,05 -835.104,11 -224.426,94 4 
2a Mining and Quarrying 225.497 179.262 132.775,41 -107.158,57 -71.851,84 4 
2b Manufacturing 1.200.752 1.972.902 707.017,54 172.956,31 -107.823,85 2 
2c Electricity, Gas, Water 135.183 284.706 79.597,41 133.465,66 -63.540,07 2 
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3 Construction 457.089 508.859 269.139,62 -223.897,07 6.527,45 3 
4 Trade 1.179.077 2.144.581 694.255,03 239.302,97 31.946,00 1 
5 Transportation and Communication 927.624 1.717.292 546.196,41 203.020,55 40.451,04 1 
6 Financial Institution 164.850 146.748 97.065,71 -48.787,89 -66.379,81 4 
7 Ownership of Dwelling 369.985 507.341 217.851,72 -111.072,65 30.576,93 3 
8 Business and Personal Services 98.078 149.739 57.749,53 -3.959,54 -2.128,99 4 
9 (Less)Imputed Bank Service Charges 120.794 90.947 71.124,99 -47.142,09 -53.829,90 4 
10 Government Services 465.941 548.824 274.351,79 -129.821,07 -61.647,72 4 
11 Private Non-profit Institution 34.148 27.603 20.106,76 -10.207,57 -16.444,19 4 
12 Import Duties 170.933 350.846 100.647,45 151.147,67 -71.882,13 2 
13 GDP (in purchasers' value) 7.449.851 10.790.650 4.386.563,85    
 MARMARA REGION 1987 2000 gij kij cij Type
1 Agriculture 2.078.254 2.390.121 1.223.701,50 -810.444,72 -101.389,78 4 
2a Mining and Quarrying 181.065 163.461 106.613,30 -86.044,01 -38.173,29 4 
2b Manufacturing 8.747.869 16.013.409 5.150.852,81 1.260.042,97 854.644,23 1 
2c Electricity, Gas, Water 299.410 1.392.610 176.296,29 295.606,34 621.297,37 1 
3 Construction 1.590.268 1.915.302 936.369,35 -778.965,03 167.629,69 3 
4 Trade 5.761.626 9.948.826 3.392.516,22 1.169.367,41 -374.683,63 2 
5 Transportation and Communication 2.896.325 5.480.606 1.705.391,76 633.892,06 244.997,17 1 
6 Financial Institution 1.233.906 1.895.502 726.539,02 -365.178,49 300.235,47 3 
7 Ownership of Dwelling 1.566.948 1.890.109 922.638,24 -470.411,13 -129.066,11 4 
8 Business and Personal Services 811.621 1.315.251 477.892,42 -32.766,21 58.503,79 3 
9 (Less)Imputed Bank Service Charges 1.241.434 1.707.714 730.971,60 -484.492,58 219.800,98 3 
10 Government Services 928.826 1.314.511 546.904,17 -258.790,68 97.571,51 3 
11 Private Non-profit Institution 36.958 44.295 21.761,32 -11.047,54 -3.376,78 4 
12 Import Duties 1.455.314 3.061.206 856.906,77 1.286.862,85 -537.877,62 2 
13 GDP (in purchasers' value) 26.346.957 45.117.496 15.513.412,17    
Source: Compiled and calculated from SIS, 2000 
(*) National rate of change in the sectors regularly: 0,20; 0,11; 0,73; 1,58; 0,10; 0,79; 0,81; 0,29; 0,29; 0,55; 0,20; 0,31; 
0,29; 1,47; 0,59 and national growth rate for 1987-00 is 0,59 
gij: Regional share related with national growth; kij: Industrial mix component growth; cij: Competitive growth 
component (Total regional shift) 
Types: 1- Growth Pole (GP); 2-Downward Transitional Area (DTA); 3-Upward Transitional Area (UTA); 4-Fall Area 
(FA) 
If the results of the shift analyses are compared with the per capita income and 
GDP values, it may be stated that ‘manufacturing’ sector is the most efficient sector in 
order to develop regional economy. The more detailed analyses related to this context are 
given in the following sections of the case study. 
It may be stated that the relatively balanced values of Mediterranean Region are 
related to the ‘trade’ sector (for sure, tourism based), and the relatively growth experienced 
in Black sea Region is related to the sectors of ‘trade’, ‘transportation and communication’, 
and ‘construction’.    
In the eastern regions, although the sectoral advantage has been gained in the 
sectors that the public sector is dominated, public investments have been inadequate in 
order to crate stable economy. Because the growth of other sectors was neglected, the 
disparities between the eastern and western regions have been opened.   
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Central Anatolia Region’s geographic advantages have caused the rapid growth in 
the sector of ‘transportation and communication’. Besides the capital city is located in this 
region, some indicators have reached high values. On the other hand, the development 
level and sectoral advantages have been relatively low.  
 
5.4.2. Demographic Changes and Emerging Urban Centers  
Eraydın (1992: 122) claims that the transition to flexible production is related to 
population movements by depending on the division of labour and its organization. Indeed, 
the examples that emerged in the second part of the 20th century, e.g. Silicon Valley and 
Third Italy, have created population movements. On the other hand, as Eraydın says, it is 
not possible to examine the flexible production in less developed countries only with 
population movements. Particularly it is known that there are many different determinants 
of the migration from rural to city. 
In short, it may be assumed that population movements show us some results like 
that: 
 Migration is important in providing the information related to the features of spatial 
structure as well as in determining the size of settlements. 
 The direction of population movements and emerging urban centers are important 
because of the social and economic values that it has created. 
 The defining of urban centers is important as to perceive the general urban 
structure. 
 To point at the new urban centers provides to reach deepening analyses in 
following sections. 
 
5.4.2.1. The General Structure before 1990 
İstanbul in Marmara Region, İzmir in Aegean Region, and Ankara in Central 
Anatolia Region have been the most essential migration centers since 1960s. Similar 
tendencies in the years between 1965 and 1970 are supported by founding new centers like 
Bursa, Kayseri, G.Antep, Konya, and Elazığ (Yener, 1977 cited in Eraydın, 1992: 123). In 
the period between 1970 and 1975, the process of ‘diffusion in the region’ appeared, and 
peripheries of the metropolitan centers began to get migration. Similar tendencies 
continued in the years 1975-80, and the migration boom emerged in İstanbul Metropolitan 
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Area. While not seeing the different processes in 1980s, the importance of İstanbul has 
increased day by day (Eraydın, 1992: 123). 
Eraydın explains the population changes of metropolitan cities in 1970-90 in 
relation to two factors: the first is the process of escaping from the centers, and the second 
is the process of directing the population movements by a foremost center. As a result of 
these factors, she states that metropoles have not lost their importance, but some new urban 
centers have been emerged (Eraydın, 1992: 124). Indeed, it may be seen that metropoles 
keep their importance during 1990s: 1/5 of the national population still lives in metropoles. 
Furthermore, 62 percent of overall population lives in İstanbul. This can be indicated that 
the process, which is assumed by Eraydın, have continued in recent years.  
Fig. 5.3. Rates of population increase by provinces between 1985 and 1990 
 
Source: Eraydın, 1992: 125 
Fig. 5.4. The provinces those had rapid population growth between 1985 and 1990 
 
Source: Eraydın, 1992: 125 
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Between 1985 and 1990, ten cities, which take place in east and north of the 
country, lost their population. On the other hand, the cities that had been migrated took 
place in shores of the country. The first group is intensified around İstanbul, the second is 
the shores of Mediterranean Region, and the third is some cities in Southeast Anatolia 
Region. The new centers are taken attention providing by four determinants: first is being 
export center; the second is replacing on the main trade routes; the third is being tourism 
center; and the fourth is supporting with big projects like ‘Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi’ 
(GAP). In addition, Antalya, İçel, Urfa and Diyarbakır were emerged as ‘new urban 
centers’ (Eraydın, 1992: 126). 
 
5.4.2.2. Main Trends after 1990 
In the period between 1990 and 2000, the provinces those have had the highest 
population increase are Antalya and İçel in the Mediterranean Region; İstanbul, Bursa, 
Tekirdağ, Yalova and Kocaeli in Marmara Region; Şanlıurfa, Van, Hakkari, Şırnak, 
Batman, G.Antep, Mardin and Diyarbakır in East and Southeast Anatolia Regions; Muğla, 
and İzmir in Aegean Region; Konya and Ankara in Central Anatolia Region; and Trabzon 
in Blacksea Region. The overall population increase is higher than 20 percent in those 
provinces. Antalya (42 percent) and Şanlıurfa (37 percent) are taken attention owing to 
high values.  Indeed, it may be said that the new urban centers have been intensified in four 
regions. During the same period, population increase has been continued in İstanbul, which 
have reached 33 percent. The rates of increase are 22 percent in İzmir, and 21 percent in 
Ankara. 
According to the urban population growth, the metropoles, which have probably 
reached their settlement borders, have taken place behind the row. The urban growth rates 
have been made 29 percent in İstanbul, 25 percent in İzmir, and 22 percent in Ankara 
which all are lower than Turkey’s mean. The highest growth rates of urban population are 
made in the East and Southeast Anatolia regions. Ten provinces that belonged to east 
regions have had over than 40 percent increase. This may be examined parallel with the 
existing civil war in that period, because it is known that emptying the rural areas of east 
regions became a governmental policy in the years of 1990s. On the other hand, Antalya 
and Şanlıurfa have continued to increase their urban population as being in 1980s. In 
addition, Rize and Yozgat have evidently exposed the migration from rural areas to cities. 
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In the period between 1990 and 2000, the overall population decreased in the 
provinces of Edirne, Kırşehir, Sivas, Çorum, Zonguldak, Karabük, Kars, Bayburt, Artvin, 
Bartın, Kastamonu, Kilis, Sinop, Ardahan and Tunceli. The population growth rates 
materialized lower than Turkey’s mean in full 57 provinces including Adana, Denizli, 
Hatay, Kayseri, Eskişehir, Manisa and Samsun. While urban population growth had 
negative (-) value in only Kilis, it may be noticeable that the provinces where located in 
different regions have had so low values such as Bayburt, Karabük, Zonguldak and 
Tunceli. Furthermore, 45 provinces have had lower rates than Turkey’s mean by urban 
population growth, including İzmir, Ankara, Kocaeli, Adana, Kayseri, Samsun and 
Eskişehir.  
In 1990s, many external factors have affected the population movements such as 
the civil war, special governmental policies, short-term crises, and the like. If we try to 
point at general results; 
 The provinces in East and Southeast Anatolia Regions have had misleading rates 
especially in urban population growth due to decreasing rural population in the civil 
war years. Although there are no important transformations in economic and social 
structures during the period, some provinces, including Hakkari, Van, Şırnak, Ağrı, 
Mardin, Muş, Adıyaman, and Batman, have had abnormal values. 
 In 1990s, İstanbul has protected its central position. Its periphery cities, meanwhile, 
have experienced rapid growth. Thus, the provinces in Marmara Region have been 
appeared as being the most attractive centers. In addition, it is taken attention that 
Kocaeli and Yalova have had the higher rates than overall population growth 
according to the urban population growth.  
 Antalya has protected its central position because of developing tourism facilities. 
 Although Ankara and İzmir could be still replaced as central cities, their growth 
tendencies have made lower than previous period. The provinces where locates in 
the periphery of both metropoles have reached the high growth rates. 
 İçel, Gaziantep, Urfa, and Diyarbakır have protected their central positions. 
 In Blacksea Region, Samsun has been getting lost its central position, while 
Trabzon has been taken attention as the only attractive center. 
 Adana has significantly lost its central position. 
In 1990s, it may be said that Eraydın’s claim on the metropoles for 1970s and 
1980s, ‘the process of directing the population movements by a foremost center’, has been 
proved. Particularly surrounding cities of three metropoles have faced the intensive 
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migration. In addition, similarly as Eraydın says, the provinces which takes steps by 
showing at least a feature of both being ‘an exporting center’ and/or being ‘an industrial 
center to restructured to adapt new accumulation processes’, have protected their 
attractive center roles. The attraction capabilities of tourism and trade facilities have been 
increased, while new spatial priorities have caused remaining disparities among the cities. 
Eventually, the spatial processes in cities, which diversified in 1980s compared to former 
years, have continued parallel to demands of the new accumulation regime, even though 
many outer factors existed such as civil war, uneven spatial development and the like. 
 
5.4.3. The Restructuring Processes in Major Cities and Sectoral Advantages of Cities 
The process that has experienced since the 1980s is important due to not only 
adaptation effort of Turkey to the world economy, but also emergence a new form of 
urbanization. This period has created both new functions and new difficulties for the cities. 
Especially the metropolitan areas and the foreign trade centers have been foremost cities. 
The accumulation that stemmed from the urban rent (see section 5.3.2. of this chapter) 
created synthetic sprawl around the metropolises. Hence, the major cities that achieved to 
integrate with these processes have been included the process of a rapid growth (Eraydın, 
1992: 112-4).    
Eraydın summarizes the urban consequences of the new regime of accumulation 
under these headings: 
 The new migration waves to metropolitan areas were emerged. 
 The new urban growth poles were appeared. 
 The regional disparities were opened. 
 The investments on residence, second housing, tourism facilities increased though 
productive investments decreased.  
 The tourism sector gained considerable importance.   
Kılıçkaya (2002: 219-0) similarly claims that the 1980s can be considered as ‘a 
turning point for the spatial changes and transformations for the major cities in Turkey’. 
Afterwards, Kılıçkaya listed the ‘macro level evidences of these processes within the 
cities’: 
 The international or the global relations of cities: The global inflows and outflows of 
capital (especially TNCs and MNCs) and investments (especially FDI), goods, people, 
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innovation, information realized in these cities; the rise of the number of firms with 
foreign capital. 
 The relational competitiveness of these cities in global – regional – national - sub-
national markets, the rising economic sectors within these processes, and the newly 
injected competitive activities, and land uses. 
 International organizations (expo, fairs, sports tournaments (Olympiads, Olympic 
Games, F 1), festivals, biennales, congress and conferences) taking place in these 
cities. 
 The city’s economic, environmental, cultural, and legal agreements and responsive 
arrangements with international and supranational institutions (such as World Bank, 
IMF, UN, etc.), with foreign countries, cities and firms. 
 The decentralization of governmental activities at the national level and the rise of 
local governmental arrangements, political changes with respect to territorial 
circumstances and boundary-jurisdiction changes. 
 The large (also the intermediate and minor, even parcel) scale projects –such as 
infrastructure, transportation, land development, (organized) industrial districts, free 
zones, off-zones, great entertainment activities, tourism districts, hotels, business 
districts, office towers-plazas- developing global, inter-regional, and inter-city 
linkages. 
 The information and communication infrastructure established within these cities (and 
the regions comprising a group of cities) articulating the city (and the region) to global 
networking. 
 The specialization in rising sectors within the economic restructuring processes at the 
worldwide level. 
 The relational positioning of these cities within the economic-geographical hierarchy 
in the country. 
 The changes in the inter-relations between the cities with respect to economic, social, 
cultural, and political dimensions.    
 Transformation of the property relations and property ownership pattern within their 
wider regions. 
 The rise of NGOs and their inter-national relations. 
 The rise of producer services, especially finance, real estate, insurance, and 
transportation. 
 The emergence of gated communities within cities and their wider regions. 
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 The decentralization of industry from the core-cities and CBDs, and mixed use 
developments within the cities. 
 The suburban growth, urban sprawl, and urban decline.  
 The consumption culture imposed by the popular culture has been restructuring the 
consumption patterns and consumption spaces.   
Related to the above changes, the integration to foreign markets and the sectoral 
growths especially in transportation, financing, communication and insurance have been 
mostly concentrated in three major cities. Among them, İstanbul has a considerable 
superiority (see Table 5.26).      
In parallel to the changes in the accumulation channels, the national urbanization 
growth rate raised to 4,91 percent in the period of 1980-85 from 4,23 percent in the period 
of 1975-80. İstanbul and İzmir are typical examples of this increase (İkeda, 1990). At the 
same period, urban changes and the income disparities were clearly represented in the 
space (Eraydın, 1992: 118-9).   
Table 5.26. The number of the firms with foreign capital in selected provinces in Turkey, 
March 2002 
 Trade TransportActivities 
Comm-
unication 
Bank. 
& Fin. 
Act. 
Finan-
cial 
Leasing 
Insu-
ring 
Invest. 
Financing 
R&D 
Act. 
İstanbul 1493 189 31 35 8 28 56 12 
Ankara 250 7 8 1 0 0 4 2 
İzmir 120 4 1 0 0 0 3 0 
İçel 116 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Antalya 44 5 0 1 0 0 2 0 
Muğla 22 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bursa 26 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Adana 24 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Gaziantep 21 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Manisa 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Aydın 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Konya 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Uşak 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Afyon 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Denizli 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Balıkesir 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kütahya 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Diyarbakır 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: Compiled from Ministry of Treasury (http://www.treasury.gov.tr) cited in Kılıçkaya, 2002: 221 
Furthermore, the metropolitan populations and their shares in national total 
population have continued to increase between 1990 and 2000. The share has increased 
from 15,1 percent in 1970 to 21,0 percent in 2000. The urban population shares of 
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metropoles have remained same after 1980. This may be evaluated that urbanization 
processes have widened to whole nation in 1980s. On the other hand, İstanbul has always 
been the most attractive center, and its share in total metropoles populations has increased 
from 55,8 percent in 1970 to 61,8 percent in 2000 with a stable growth (see Table 5.27).   
Table 5.27. The distribution of metropolitan population, 1970-2000 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Population of Metropolitan Areas 
İstanbul 2.980.000 4.670.000 6.630.000 8.800.000 
Ankara 1.580.000 2.230.000 2.580.000 3.200.000 
İzmir 840.000 1.300.000 1.760.000 2.230.000 
TOTAL 5.400.000 8.200.000 10.970.000 14.230.000 
Share of Metropolitan Areas (%)     
In Total Population 15,1 18,5 19,4 21,0 
In Urban Population 46,4 43,9 32,6 32,3 
Share of Istanbul in Metropolitan Areas 55,8 57,0 60,4 61,8 
Source: Compiled from Eraydın, 1992: 120 and SIS, 2001 (www.die.gov.tr) 
It is known that the emergence of new trade centers and tourism centers has been 
supported by the increase of the housing stock since 1984 when established the “Toplu 
Konut İdaresi”. In the following years, although the housing funds provided from the 
establishment went in bottleneck, the construction industry has continued to grow during 
1990s. In addition, the legalization process of ‘gecekondu’ districts went on in the 1980s, 
and consequently all the major cities faced to infrastructure problems.   
Eraydın (1992: 121) emphasizes that the local governments could not be 
restructured as being experienced in the Western countries in these process. Thus, the 
transformations that would facilitate the transition to flexible production systems could not 
be achieved.  
 
5.4.3.1. Provincial Growth in Relation to Sectoral Advantages 
In this section, the shift-share analysis according to GDP values is implemented by 
main sectors (includes 3 sub-sectors in manufacturing industry) for the period of 1987-
2000* according to the provinces. 
As a result of the analyses, the provinces those having own growth trends and 
competitive advantages of certain sector(s) are defined. It may be said that they could 
develop rapid structural adaptations depending on the economical transformations. In the 
same way, the provinces those have lost their improvement and/or competition capabilities, 
                                                 
* Regular data of the years before 1987 could not be reached. 
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and the provinces those having transitional processes by upwardly or downwardly are 
divided. 
The analyses are not seemed as meaningful as transferring and evaluating all 
provinces of Turkey. Especially the analyses of the provinces that have introverted 
economy do not supply noteworthy outcomes. Therefore, 13 provinces (İstanbul, Ankara, 
İzmir, Bursa, Adana, Konya, Gaziantep, İçel, Antalya, Diyarbakır, Kayseri, Kocaeli and 
Manisa) having the highest urban population by the year of 2000 are selected, and then 
these major cities are analyzed. 
The cautions, which are given before analyses in section 5.4.1.1 are also in valid for 
this section: This kind of techniques cannot always provide effective result for Third 
World countries, nevertheless, correct results related to the general and sectoral structure 
can be acquired as follows:  
İstanbul has showed “Growth Pole” (GP) feature in the sectors of ‘manufacturing 
industry’ and ‘electricity, gas, and water’. Meanwhile, it has grown rapidly in basic sectors 
such as ‘trade’, ‘transportation and communication’ comparing with the country. In 
‘Agriculture’ and ‘non-profit institutions’, which have had little contribution to the urban 
economy, the province has showed “Fall Area” (FA) feature. This is an interesting point 
that İstanbul has carried competition and investment advantages in five different sectors. 
Furthermore, it has grown rapidly in many sectors, and kept its attractiveness since as a 
result of being both the biggest metropolis of Turkey and the most powerful gate that 
opens to the international market. These are also verified by means of the high values of 
indicators. 
Ankara presents a view that it partly lost its competitive advantages. On the other 
hand, it has been still growing faster in the basic sectors such as ‘manufacturing industry’, 
‘trade’, and ‘transportation and communication’. In the sector of ‘ownership of dwelling’, 
it has had competitive advantage. But, it has showed the FA feature in five sectors. This is 
verified that the city, though it is one of three attraction points, has been relatively losing 
its attraction features and growth trends. 
The third biggest city of Turkey, İzmir, has showed GP feature only in, like the 
other big cities, ‘electricity, gas water’ and ‘import duties’ that has been related to the 
harbor functions. It has had a high growth rates in the sectors of ‘manufacturing industry’, 
‘trade’, and ‘transportation and communication’. Except these sectors, the competition 
advantages of İzmir have increased in some sectors such as ‘ownership of dwelling’ and 
‘governmental services’ recent years. 
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There has been an important growth and competitive potential of Bursa particularly 
in ‘manufacturing industry’. Although the city has been losing its competitive advantages 
in the sector of ‘trade’, it has got relatively competition advantages in the sector of 
‘business and personal services’.  
Adana has showed GP feature in the sectors of ‘electricity, gas, water’ and ‘trade’. 
Even though much the province still has rapid growth in ‘manufacturing industry’ and 
‘transportation and communication’ sectors, it has begun to lose its competition power in 
these sectors. Furthermore, it has showed FA feature in the sector of ‘agriculture’, which 
had been effective in the city economy for a years. 
In the sectors of ‘manufacturing industry’, ‘trade’, and ‘transportation and 
communication’, although Gaziantep has had increasing trends, it has been losing its 
competitive advantages. On the other hand, it has showed FA feature in eight sectors, this 
may be showed that the sectoral advantages of province are limited.  
In Konya, ‘agriculture’ sector has had a similar view with Adana. Especially in the 
second half of 1990s, the share of ‘agricultural’ products has decreased significantly in 
national GDP. Hence, Konya has showed FA feature in this sector recent years. Even 
though the province has had the high growth rates in the sectors of ‘trade’ and 
‘manufacturing’, competitive advantages in these sectors have been narrowed. 
The specialization of Antalya and İçel in the sector of ‘tourism’ has reflected to the 
sectors of ‘trade’ and ‘transportation and communications’. Diyarbakır has not showed 
any GP feature. However, it has reached to the high growth rates in four sectors. For 
Manisa, ‘industry’, ‘trade’ and ‘transportation and communication’ sectors have been 
important. Kayseri has been losing its competition advantages despite the high growth rate 
in ‘manufacturing’ sector, and this process has affected negatively the sectors of ‘trade’ 
and ‘transportation and communication’.  
In Kocaeli where is located in the diffusion area of İstanbul, the high growth in 
‘manufacturing industry’ has limited significantly. Despite the competitive advantages that 
the city has caught in many sectors, it has too low growth rates and insufficient investment 
probabilities in some sectors, such as ‘financial institutions’, ‘banking’, and ‘business’ 
services. This may shows the effects of İstanbul. 
It is possible to point out many different results according to the shift-share 
analyses. If a general evaluation is summarized: 
 There is a specialization processes in provincial unit, which has similarities with the 
regional processes. The provinces have played foremost roles in certain sector(s). 
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 There is a total growth relatively in the metropolises those having wide hinterlands. On 
the other hand, İstanbul has been taken attention as the most important place by means 
of its competitive advantages, investment possibilities and growth rates. 
 The rapid development is observed in the provinces those having the high growth rates 
and/or competition advantages in ‘manufacturing industry’. 
 In ‘trade’ sector, the growth advantages that spread relatively a wide group of 
provinces are noticeable. 
 The sector of ‘agricultural’ has been losing its porter role for the big cities. 
 Besides the regional disparities, the provincial disparities have been taken attention 
even among the major cities. 
 Inter-sectoral changes in Turkey’s major cities have been made after 1980s. This may 
be evaluated in relation to post-Fordism debates with turning out the neo-Smithian 
economy, pointed at by ‘flexible specialization’ approach that explained in previous 
chapters. 
Table 5.28. The results of the shift share analysis by major provinces according to GDP 
values of economic activities, 1987-2000 (*) 
 ISTANBUL 1987 2000 gij kij cij Type
1 Agriculture 187.668 118.558 110.677,03 -73.359,62 -106.427,42 4 
2a Mining and Quarrying 78.048 81.033 46.028,74 -37.162,35 -5.881,38 4 
2b Manufacturing 4.914.420 9.049.716 2.898.274,77 703.269,15 533.752,08 1 
2c Electricity, Gas, Water 171.290 715.298 101.018,12 168.951,18 274.038,70 1 
3 Construction 971.430 1.126.131 572.899,97 -476.748,08 58.549,11 3 
4 Trade 4.347.158 7.308.211 2.563.732,52 878.217,53 -480.897,05 2 
5 Transportation and Communication 1.881.196 3.398.459 1.109.433,65 409.957,78 -2.128,43 2 
6 Financial Institution 983.881 1.634.110 580.242,93 -292.104,48 362.090,55 3 
7 Ownership of Dwelling 1.066.781 1.186.859 629.133,13 -321.256,11 -187.799,03 4 
8 Business and Personal Services 673.918 1.060.311 397.442,53 -27.838,29 16.788,76 3 
9 (Less)Imputed Bank Service Charges 1.028.657 1.525.399 606.649,54 -402.416,08 292.508,54 3 
10 Government Services 482.122 677.415 284.331,02 -134.653,86 45.615,84 3 
11 Private Non-profit Institution 26.981 26.155 15.912,02 -8.090,48 -8.647,54 4 
12 Import Duties 708.325 1.421.468 417.734,03 625.673,52 -330.264,55 2 
13 GDP (in purchasers' value) 15.464.563 26.278.326         
 ANKARA 1987 2000 gij Kij cij Type
1 Agriculture 446.133 387.415 263.106,54 -174.393,85 -147.430,68 4 
2a Mining and Quarrying 40.533 74.840 23.904,30 -19.299,68 29.702,38 3 
2b Manufacturing 848.575 1.229.425 500.446,34 121.433,78 -241.030,13 2 
2c Electricity, Gas, Water 83.589 237.631 49.296,54 82.447,66 22.297,80 1 
3 Construction 1.085.305 1.035.520 640.057,65 -532.634,44 -157.208,21 4 
4 Trade 1.506.610 2.559.281 888.521,89 304.366,97 -140.217,86 2 
5 Transportation and Communication 1.021.068 1.581.580 602.173,93 222.515,24 -264.177,17 2 
6 Financial Institution 174.123 161.508 102.688,88 -51.695,39 -63.608,50 4 
7 Ownership of Dwelling 388.408 527.466 229.063,27 -116.967,25 26.961,98 3 
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8 Business and Personal Services 217.090 294.033 128.028,63 -8.967,58 -42.118,05 4 
9 (Less)Imputed Bank Service Charges 104.984 87.440 61.914,22 -41.070,30 -38.387,92 4 
10 Government Services 422.193 495.819 248.987,94 -117.916,04 -57.445,90 4 
11 Private Non-profit Institution 192.202 275.613 113.350,96 -57.633,36 27.693,41 3 
12 Import Duties 156.656 773.058 92.387,73 138.376,47 385.637,80 1 
13 GDP (in purchasers' value) 6.477.501 9.545.749         
 İZMİR 1987 2000 gij Kij cij Type
1 Agriculture 604.064 673.327 356.246,20 -236.129,24 -50.853,96 4 
2a Mining and Quarrying 20.862 35.516 12.303,35 -9.933,39 12.284,04 3 
2b Manufacturing 1.675.624 2.445.919 988.197,75 239.787,13 -457.689,87 2 
2c Electricity, Gas, Water 39.203 181.047 23.119,93 38.667,72 80.056,35 1 
3 Construction 343.678 337.744 202.683,79 -168.666,63 -39.951,16 4 
4 Trade 1.280.913 2.065.466 755.417,29 258.771,42 -229.635,71 2 
5 Transportation and Communication 706.051 1.193.303 416.392,94 153.865,47 -83.006,41 2 
6 Financial Institution 211.547 218.257 124.759,65 -62.806,20 -55.243,45 4 
7 Ownership of Dwelling 290.234 431.141 171.165,24 -87.402,61 57.144,37 3 
8 Business and Personal Services 168.880 235.484 99.596,83 -6.976,12 -26.016,71 4 
9 (Less)Imputed Bank Service Charges 140.069 129.762 82.605,57 -54.795,74 -38.116,83 4 
10 Government Services 226.421 302.780 133.531,58 -63.238,06 6.065,48 3 
11 Private Non-profit Institution 1.586 1.655 935,34 -475,58 -390,77 4 
12 Import Duties 368.324 1.024.255 217.218,75 325.345,81 113.366,44 1 
13 GDP (in purchasers' value) 5.797.317 9.016.134         
 BURSA 1987 2000 gij kij cij Type
1 Agriculture 459.191 487.006 270.807,48 -179.498,24 -63.494,24 4 
2a Mining and Quarrying 20.839 10.632 12.289,78 -9.922,44 -12.574,35 4 
2b Manufacturing 883.858 1.973.610 521.254,46 126.482,89 442.014,65 1 
2c Electricity, Gas, Water 23.505 128.380 13.862,05 23.184,06 67.828,89 1 
3 Construction 161.446 208.285 95.212,63 -79.232,75 30.859,12 3 
4 Trade 506.564 832.593 298.745,66 102.336,60 -75.053,27 2 
5 Transportation and Communication 280.273 606.289 165.290,75 61.078,22 99.647,03 1 
6 Financial Institution 76.405 79.149 45.059,78 -22.683,88 -19.631,90 4 
7 Ownership of Dwelling 120.122 154.120 70.841,84 -36.174,18 -669,66 4 
8 Business and Personal Services 48.441 90.840 28.568,04 -2.001,01 15.831,97 3 
9 (Less)Imputed Bank Service Charges 38.024 35.369 22.424,62 -14.875,19 -10.204,43 4 
10 Government Services 88.609 118.703 52.257,08 -24.747,98 2.584,90 3 
11 Private Non-profit Institution 5.530 2.701 3.261,31 -1.658,22 -4.432,10 4 
12 Import Duties 142.215 358.743 83.871,17 125.620,53 7.036,31 1 
13 GDP (in purchasers' value) 2.778.974 5.015.684         
 ADANA 1987 2000 gij kij cij Type
1 Agriculture 501.041 526.135 295.488,48 -195.857,45 -74.537,03 4 
2a Mining and Quarrying 8.344 18.031 4.920,87 -3.972,97 8.739,11 3 
2b Manufacturing 692.174 1.031.525 408.208,99 99.052,30 -167.910,30 2 
2c Electricity, Gas, Water 31.761 104.884 18.731,02 31.327,33 23.064,65 1 
3 Construction 155.073 98.810 91.454,16 -76.105,08 -71.612,09 4 
4 Trade 447.749 868.179 264.059,57 90.454,73 65.915,70 1 
5 Transportation and Communication 385.199 403.301 227.170,76 83.944,11 -293.012,88 2 
6 Financial Institution 76.284 77.175 44.988,42 -22.647,96 -21.449,46 4 
7 Ownership of Dwelling 87.749 81.175 51.749,89 -26.425,20 -31.898,69 4 
8 Business and Personal Services 53.053 64.861 31.287,96 -2.191,52 -17.288,44 4 
9 (Less)Imputed Bank Service Charges 66.176 60.483 39.027,24 -25.888,40 -18.831,83 4 
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10 Government Services 127.276 136.592 75.060,91 -35.547,44 -30.197,46 4 
11 Private Non-profit Institution 1.140 106 672,31 -341,84 -1.364,48 4 
12 Import Duties 89.788 213.767 52.952,39 79.311,01 -8.284,41 2 
13 GDP (in purchasers' value) 2.590.454 3.565.131         
 GAZİANTEP 1987 2000 gij kij cij Type
1 Agriculture 230.424 215.656 135.892,35 -90.072,98 -60.587,37 4 
2a Mining and Quarrying 1.003 77 591,52 -477,58 -1.039,94 4 
2b Manufacturing 219.051 364.456 129.185,13 31.346,90 -15.127,03 2 
2c Electricity, Gas, Water 11.078 37.754 6.533,24 10.926,74 9.216,02 1 
3 Construction 63.294 98.051 37.327,58 -31.062,76 28.492,18 3 
4 Trade 342.694 542.562 202.103,48 69.231,41 -71.466,89 2 
5 Transportation and Communication 113.270 175.481 66.800,88 24.684,25 -29.274,13 2 
6 Financial Institution 27.630 30.530 16.294,77 -8.203,07 -5.191,70 4 
7 Ownership of Dwelling 152.508 161.559 89.941,46 -45.927,07 -34.963,38 4 
8 Business and Personal Services 23.393 31.083 13.796,00 -966,32 -5.139,68 4 
9 (Less)Imputed Bank Service Charges 29.510 26.067 17.403,50 -11.544,47 -9.302,03 4 
10 Government Services 49.695 60.421 29.307,58 -13.879,52 -4.702,06 4 
11 Private Non-profit Institution 8.260 8.880 4.871,33 -2.476,83 -1.774,50 4 
12 Import Duties 21.162 41.543 12.480,27 18.692,69 -10.791,97 2 
13 GDP (in purchasers' value) 1.233.951 1.741.987         
 KONYA 1987 2000 gij kij cij Type
1 Agriculture 739.180 568.198 435.930,74 -288.946,23 -317.966,51 4 
2a Mining and Quarrying 32.959 45.317 19.437,54 -15.693,34 8.613,80 3 
2b Manufacturing 310.883 435.694 183.342,97 44.488,35 -103.020,32 2 
2c Electricity, Gas, Water 18.855 22.278 11.119,72 18.597,55 -26.294,27 2 
3 Construction 164.804 209.871 97.193,01 -80.880,75 28.754,74 3 
4 Trade 308.559 470.466 181.972,39 62.335,42 -82.400,81 2 
5 Transportation and Communication 237.459 486.011 140.041,23 51.748,02 56.762,75 1 
6 Financial Institution 31.987 30.279 18.864,30 -9.496,62 -11.075,68 4 
7 Ownership of Dwelling 109.418 132.370 64.529,17 -32.950,72 -8.626,45 4 
8 Business and Personal Services 24.321 34.416 14.343,29 -1.004,65 -3.243,63 4 
9 (Less)Imputed Bank Service Charges 22.903 20.029 13.507,02 -8.959,78 -7.421,25 4 
10 Government Services 112.720 118.312 66.476,52 -31.482,04 -29.402,48 4 
11 Private Non-profit Institution 2.914 3.025 1.718,53 -873,79 -733,74 4 
12 Import Duties 30.696 85.344 18.102,94 27.114,21 9.430,85 1 
13 GDP (in purchasers' value) 2.101.852 2.639.553         
 ANTALYA 1987 2000 gij kij cij Type
1 Agriculture 428.299 560.783 252.588,95 -167.422,52 47.317,57 3 
2a Mining and Quarrying 749 3.571 441,72 -356,63 2.736,91 3 
2b Manufacturing 106.279 172.558 62.677,94 15.208,86 -11.607,81 2 
2c Electricity, Gas, Water 47.148 69.261 27.805,49 46.504,23 -52.196,72 2 
3 Construction 157.845 211.602 93.088,95 -77.465,49 38.133,54 3 
4 Trade 376.739 1.114.593 222.181,49 76.109,22 439.563,30 1 
5 Transportation and Communication 225.346 470.734 132.897,60 49.108,30 63.382,09 1 
6 Financial Institution 22.053 34.220 13.005,74 -6.547,32 5.708,58 3 
7 Ownership of Dwelling 74.508 112.138 43.941,03 -22.437,74 16.126,71 3 
8 Business and Personal Services 40.666 69.963 23.982,74 -1.679,84 6.994,10 3 
9 (Less)Imputed Bank Service Charges 20.760 28.926 12.243,19 -8.121,42 4.044,23 3 
10 Government Services 74.813 107.187 44.120,90 -20.894,83 9.147,93 3 
11 Private Non-profit Institution 1.432 1.805 844,52 -429,40 -42,12 4 
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12 Import Duties 11.603 39.212 6.842,86 10.249,09 10.517,05 1 
13 GDP (in purchasers' value) 1.546.719 2.938.699         
 DİYARBAKIR 1987 2000 gij kij cij Type
1 Agriculture 186.132 319.260 109.771,18 -72.759,19 96.116,01 3 
2a Mining and Quarrying 138.019 56.571 81.396,58 -65.717,39 -97.127,19 4 
2b Manufacturing 47.008 52.365 27.722,93 6.726,99 -29.092,92 2 
2c Electricity, Gas, Water 87.301 139.239 51.485,69 86.108,98 -85.656,66 2 
3 Construction 61.257 65.982 36.126,26 -30.063,06 -1.338,20 4 
4 Trade 169.475 232.215 99.947,73 34.237,52 -71.445,25 2 
5 Transportation and Communication 80.203 121.908 47.299,65 17.478,16 -23.072,81 2 
6 Financial Institution 8.858 8.893 5.224,00 -2.629,85 -2.559,15 4 
7 Ownership of Dwelling 43.866 48.226 25.869,93 -13.210,04 -8.299,89 4 
8 Business and Personal Services 9.840 10.883 5.803,13 -406,47 -4.353,66 4 
9 (Less)Imputed Bank Service Charges 7.143 6.440 4.212,58 -2.794,38 -2.121,20 4 
10 Government Services 94.758 133.560 55.883,45 -26.465,36 9.383,91 3 
11 Private Non-profit Institution 2.557 2.916 1.507,99 -766,74 -382,25 4 
12 Import Duties 5.627 10.791 3.318,52 4.970,41 -3.124,93 2 
13 GDP (in purchasers' value) 927.758 1.196.370         
 İÇEL 1987 2000 gij kij cij Type
1 Agriculture 439.462 643.480 259.172,32 -171.786,15 116.631,83 3 
2a Mining and Quarrying 1.424 3.072 839,80 -678,03 1.486,23 3 
2b Manufacturing 577.038 691.210 340.307,64 82.575,97 -308.711,62 2 
2c Electricity, Gas, Water 17.104 32.861 10.087,07 16.870,46 -11.200,53 2 
3 Construction 110.628 87.554 65.242,76 -54.292,83 -34.023,93 4 
4 Trade 328.571 633.671 193.774,45 66.378,27 44.947,28 1 
5 Transportation and Communication 193.628 412.699 114.191,94 42.196,19 62.682,87 1 
6 Financial Institution 24.391 25.334 14.384,57 -7.241,45 -6.200,12 4 
7 Ownership of Dwelling 114.913 158.141 67.769,84 -34.605,51 10.063,67 3 
8 Business and Personal Services 48.514 70.230 28.611,09 -2.004,02 -4.891,07 4 
9 (Less)Imputed Bank Service Charges 6.958 6.490 4.103,47 -2.722,01 -1.849,47 4 
10 Government Services 66.824 101.465 39.409,39 -18.663,55 13.895,16 3 
11 Private Non-profit Institution 7.016 12.109 4.137,68 -2.103,81 3.059,13 3 
12 Import Duties 70.711 214.459 41.701,75 62.460,03 39.586,22 1 
13 GDP (in purchasers' value) 1.993.265 3.079.797         
 MANİSA 1987 2000 gij kij cij Type
1 Agriculture 661.154 832.470 389.914,98 -258.445,78 39.846,81 3 
2a Mining and Quarrying 78.760 92.007 46.448,64 -37.501,37 4.299,73 3 
2b Manufacturing 246.777 911.787 145.536,51 35.314,57 484.158,91 1 
2c Electricity, Gas, Water 98.973 186.210 58.369,24 97.621,61 -68.753,84 2 
3 Construction 65.710 77.512 38.752,41 -32.248,45 5.298,04 3 
4 Trade 307.091 611.035 181.106,64 62.038,85 60.798,51 1 
5 Transportation and Communication 117.437 223.572 69.258,37 25.592,34 11.284,29 1 
6 Financial Institution 28.691 25.742 16.920,49 -8.518,07 -11.351,42 4 
7 Ownership of Dwelling 113.534 160.543 66.956,57 -34.190,23 14.242,66 3 
8 Business and Personal Services 27.790 48.093 16.389,13 -1.147,95 5.061,83 3 
9 (Less)Imputed Bank Service Charges 17.111 15.587 10.091,20 -6.693,91 -4.921,28 4 
10 Government Services 52.561 67.406 30.997,80 -14.679,98 -1.472,82 4 
11 Private Non-profit Institution 120 179 70,77 -35,98 24,21 3 
12 Import Duties 26.731 52.179 15.764,58 23.611,87 -13.928,45 2 
13 GDP (in purchasers' value) 1.808.217 3.273.149         
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 KAYSERİ 1987 2000 gij kij cij Type
1 Agriculture 133.140 148.407 78.519,20 -52.044,56 -11.207,63 4 
2a Mining and Quarrying 6.821 5.036 4.022,68 -3.247,80 -2.559,88 4 
2b Manufacturing 144.110 238.705 84.988,74 20.622,60 -11.016,34 2 
2c Electricity, Gas, Water 5.076 22.719 2.993,57 5.006,69 9.642,74 1 
3 Construction 83.920 145.524 49.491,74 -41.185,36 53.297,62 3 
4 Trade 261.494 374.011 154.215,85 52.827,30 -94.526,15 2 
5 Transportation and Communication 109.563 171.247 64.614,68 23.876,41 -26.807,09 2 
6 Financial Institution 15.521 15.071 9.153,50 -4.608,03 -4.995,47 4 
7 Ownership of Dwelling 42.454 56.585 25.037,21 -12.784,82 1.878,62 3 
8 Business and Personal Services 17.379 23.521 10.249,25 -717,89 -3.389,36 4 
9 (Less)Imputed Bank Service Charges 9.784 7.571 5.770,11 -3.827,55 -4.155,55 4 
10 Government Services 81.702 102.769 48.183,68 -22.818,89 -4.297,79 4 
11 Private Non-profit Institution 3.395 3.670 2.002,20 -1.018,02 -709,18 4 
12 Import Duties 20.181 74.271 11.901,73 17.826,16 24.362,11 1 
13 GDP (in purchasers' value) 914.972 1.373.965         
 KOCAELİ 1987 2000 gij kij cij Type
1 Agriculture 81.449 122.468 48.034,47 -31.838,50 24.823,02 3 
2a Mining and Quarrying 67 11.217 39,51 -31,90 11.142,39 3 
2b Manufacturing 1.917.852 2.561.187 1.131.051,49 274.450,73 -762.167,22 2 
2c Electricity, Gas, Water 10.553 86.219 6.223,62 10.408,91 59.033,47 1 
3 Construction 112.246 171.940 66.196,98 -55.086,90 48.583,92 3 
4 Trade 323.349 507.579 190.694,78 65.323,31 -71.788,09 2 
5 Transportation and Communication 199.306 438.967 117.540,53 43.433,56 78.686,90 1 
6 Financial Institution 63.583 71.256 37.498,02 -18.877,16 -10.947,86 4 
7 Ownership of Dwelling 91.294 131.398 53.840,55 -27.492,76 13.756,21 3 
8 Business and Personal Services 23.856 36.680 14.069,05 -985,45 -259,61 4 
9 (Less)Imputed Bank Service Charges 72.976 55.389 43.037,53 -28.548,60 -32.075,93 4 
10 Government Services 98.748 153.192 58.236,54 -27.579,74 23.787,20 3 
11 Private Non-profit Institution 295 537 173,98 -88,46 156,48 3 
12 Import Duties 485.549 986.529 286.352,09 428.892,32 -214.264,40 2 
13 GDP (in purchasers' value) 3.335.170 5.223.778         
Source: Compiled and calculated from SIS, 2000 
(*) National rate of change in the sectors regularly: 0,20; 0,11; 0,73; 1,58; 0,10; 0,79; 0,81; 0,29; 0,29; 0,55; 
0,20; 0,31; 0,29; 1,47; 0,59 and national growth rate for 1987-00 is 0,59 
gij: Regional share related with national growth; kij: Industrial mix component growth; cij: Competitive 
growth component (Total regional shift) 
Types: 1- Growth Pole (GP); 2-Downward Transitional Area (DTA); 3-Upward Transitional Area (UTA); 4-
Fall Area (FA) 
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Fig. 5.5. The analyses on the provinces of Turkey according to the population changes 
TOTAL POPULATION BY THE YEAR 2000 
THE POPULATION GROWTH BETWEEN 1990 AND 2000 
THE POPULATION GROWTH COMPARED TO THE COUNTRY (1990-2000) 
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Fig. 5.6. The shift share analyses on the geographic regions & the provinces of Turkey 
according to GDP values (1987-2000) 
 
COMPETITIVE GROWTH COMPONENT  
IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY BY REGIONS  
 
 
 
 
 
COMPETITIVE GROWTH COMPONENT  
IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY BY MAJOR PROVINCES 
 
 
 153
5.5. Industrial Development Before 1980 In Relation To Urban Priorities 
 In this section, urban priorities, which were appeared by industrial development 
before 1980, are defined to be a background for the analyses of the period after 1980. Here, 
the movement point is the Eraydın’s (1992) assertion “spatial priorities”. By this way, the 
regions are described that requires for following analyses. 
According to Eraydın, different spatial units of Turkey appeared in the 1980’s. 
Industrial development and structural transformation (changes in the technology of 
production, the organization of production, and the distribution of the labour and its 
utilization in production processes) created new spatial priorities, which depend on the 
changes of the possibilities that cities and regions presented. These priorities can be 
defined as the processes that ‘agglomeration in existing industrial centers’, ‘diffusion from 
core to periphery’, and ‘appearance of new focuses’. In the diffusion processes, 
productivity and economic growth have gotten much importance. (Eraydın, 1992: 128) 
Before analyzing the post-1980 era, it may be useful to define pre-1980 period 
including the spatial distribution of manufacturing industry. 
After first industrial development of Turkey in 1930s, the industrial investments in 
1940s were generally ceased, and agricultural products significantly increased. On the 
other hand, existing industrial firms intensified at certain regions, especially in Marmara 
and Aegean regions. They are taken attention because of manufacturing agglomeration 
which based on industries of textile, agricultural products and raw materials. (Avcı, 2000) 
Fig. 5.7. The distribution of industrial establishments in Turkey, 1940s 
 
Source: Avcı, 2000: 39 
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During 1950s, magnificent industrial investments were made by public sector. It 
may be seen that governmental investments were concentrated on particularly two sectors: 
food (especially sugar), and textile (woven) industries (Avcı, 2000: 44). These industries 
were distributed both developed and less developed areas in Turkey to decrease the spatial 
disparities among regions. 
Fig. 5.8. The distribution of public industrial establishments in Turkey, 1950s 
 
Source: Avcı, 2000: 45 
Turkey was exposed rapid growth in manufacturing industry in 1960s. When 
arriving the years of 1970s, two basic points in relation to industrial development 
appeared. These are (Eraydın, 1992: 129): 
 Industrial investments tended to locate outside the big centers. 
 Even though the investments moved outside the centers/cores, they located 
surroundings of major metropolises and regional centers. 
A development model, which is defined as escaping from the increasing costs of 
metropolises and concentrating periphery points, may be labeled as an investment model 
that improves at individual base; do not go away agglomeration economies; and takes on 
shape due to the firms those integrating gradually. 
In 1980s, these tendencies were broken. Industrial investments returned to 
metropolises, and even some local production areas emerged. Thus, 1980s is a period in 
which both the investment character and firm behaviors changed.  
Industrial data before ‘Great Depression’ show that the employment share increased 
rapidly (8.19 percent between 1971 and 1974). The fastest increase was made in Trakya 
and Central Anatolia Region. Between 1974 and 1979, when the crisis intensified, the 
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employment share decreased 3.73 percent. Interestingly, the rates of less-developed 
regions were higher than the developed regions. Between 1971 and 1982, it is seen that the 
provinces where located at the east side of the country could not increase their employment 
rates, and the growths were intensified in some groups where located in different regions. 
Between 1979 and 1982, the employment share in industry decreased 1.85 percent. 
Meanwhile, the total industry workers decreased (see Table 5.29. and Fig.5.7). 
Table 5.29. Annual growth rate of employment in manufacturing industry, 1971-82 (included 
the workplaces which employed at least 10 people)  
PROVINCE 1971-1974 1974-1979 1979-1982 PROVINCE 1971-1974 1974-1979 1979-1982 
Adana 14,06 4,05 -0,07 Izmir 8,37 1,25 -5,93 
Adıyaman 2,26 4,9 5,1 Kars - 31,41 -9,04 
Afyon -5,62 8,06 36,05 Kastamonu 4,34 7,47 11,88 
Ağrı - - -4,92 Kayseri 11,69 6,1 -0,5 
Amasya 10,14 1,68 0,96 Kırklareli 16,05 3,2 11,73 
Ankara 7,71 1,88 2,03 Kırşehir -12,33 17,77 19,59 
Antalya -3,17 10,8 -0,07 Kocaeli 9,03 7,96 2,58 
Artvin 0 4,08 -5,19 Konya 31,82 3,67 2,24 
Aydın 4,94 0,39 4,51 Kütahya 3,89 -1,02 5,53 
Balıkesir 4,63 5,99 0,1 Malatya 3,32 5,98 0,37 
Bilecik 7,7 17,46 19,51 Manisa 11,82 2,21 10,41 
Bitlis -10,05 17,91 -20,33 K.Maraş 3,84 11,93 -0,41 
Bolu 6,29 12,46 5,96 Mardin - - 23,47 
Burdur 2,54 13,7 6,44 Muğla 143,78 4,27 1,94 
Bursa 16,61 3,65 3,5 Muş 0 13,62 4,77 
Çanakkale 78,4 1,33 7,04 Nevşehir -1,6 12,1 5,25 
Çankırı 50,28 -3,72 -15,69 Niğde 27,51 14,07 0,64 
Çorum 6,67 12,04 -1,42 Ordu -3,25 5,78 0,79 
Denizli 3,37 12,81 6,01 Rize -2,86 4,49 -4,59 
Diyarbakır 2,82 7,33 -4,45 Sakarya 20,34 5,21 -1,7 
Edirne 19,15 34,81 8,05 Samsun 12 9,35 -0,82 
Elazığ 6,66 1,2 -4,27 Siirt -50,86 54,78 1,01 
Erzincan 4,76 1,96 7,26 Sinop 4,17 10,01 7,89 
Erzurum 5,32 2,82 -4,52 Sivas 0,55 0,4 -4,53 
Eskişehir 6,72 1,86 -2,11 Tekirdağ 35,57 -32,85 6,26 
Gaziantep 4,23 5,99 12,26 Tokat 11,68 5,36 2,65 
Giresun 17,94 3,94 2,14 Trabzon 8,87 3,19 -4,84 
Gümüşhane - - -7,17 Urfa 9,15 5,12 17,49 
Hakkari - - 34,2 Uşak 5,86 2,68 2,08 
Hatay 12,3 42,11 3,24 Van 18,93 -3,1 6,21 
Isparta 20,42 11,06 4,73 Yozgat 80,83 -3,3 25,4 
Içel 17,67 2,73 2,41 Zonduldak 4,78 3,32 -5,29 
Istanbul 6,91 0,69 2,82 TURKEY 8,19 3,73 1,85 
Source: Eraydın, 1992: 130 
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Fig.  5.9. The distribution of industrial establishments in Turkey, 1970s 
 
Source: Avcı, 2000: 51 
Fig. 5.10. Annual employment increase in manufacturing industry, 1981-82 (%) 
 
Source: Eraydın, 1992: 131 
Basic findings in relation to the spatial distribution of industry in 1970s are below: 
 The growths of Tekirdağ, Bursa, and Kocaeli in 1970s may be evaluated in scope 
of industrial development in İstanbul and its diffusion processes. 
 The growth tendency of İstanbul turned towards east, and diffused to Sakarya and 
Kocaeli in 1970s.  
 In 1970s, Organized Industrial Districts also affected positively the industrial 
growth in Marmara Region. In the following years, local/domestic capital 
integrated to these investments. 
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 The locational and special dynamics of Bursa regularly improved since 1960s. It 
has become one of the fastest growing industrial centers. 
 In 1970s, the Metropolitan Area of İzmir started to diffuse through Manisa. 
 Denizli achieved a significant leap by means of the local capitals and small-scale 
industry skills in depression years. From this respect, it is resembled to the 
development of flexible production centers in the world.  
 Rapid industrialization was made in a group of provinces including Afyon, Isparta, 
Burdur, and Muğla. 
 The third group that has rapid industrialization, following İstanbul region and İzmir 
region, is Ankara region including Yozgat, Çankırı, Çorum, Niğde, Nevşehir and 
Kırşehir [perhaps one add, K.Maraş]. 
 
5.6. Evaluation of Regional Industrial Development After 1980 
It is obvious that industry was agglomerated in certain regions In 1970s. At this 
point, it is necessary to make the study fit on a region-based ground for both following the 
regional economies that have been frequently expressed in flexible production literature, 
and understanding the transformation in regional agglomerations after 1980 in Turkey. In 
this section, the regional boundaries are described, and then transformation of industry 
after 1980 is analyzed used by different variables. Finally, the differences at regional scale 
that have been appeared in relation to Turkey’s adaptation processes to flexible 
accumulation are analyzed. 
There are not updated region boundaries in hand due to the lack of effective politics 
of regional planning. Here, it seems to be the most reliable option to lean on the study 
including some descriptions about regions that were prepared before. We follow the same 
traces. 
Eraydın (1992) determines four regions to industrial analyses. These regions that 
also used in this study are below: 
İstanbul Region; includes the provinces of İstanbul, Kocaeli, Bursa, Sakarya, Tekirdağ and 
Yalova. 
İzmir Region: includes the provinces of İzmir, Manisa, Aydın and Denizli. 
Adana Region: includes the provinces of Adana, Hatay, İçel and Osmaniye. 
Ankara Region: includes the provinces of Ankara and Kırıkkale. 
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Region Centers: formed by the provinces of Kayseri, Samsun, Konya, Eskişehir and 
Gaziantep. This group is the expression of certain points of industrial agglomeration more 
than a characterization of a region.  
The progress of some indicators after 1980 in respect to the regions is analyzed in 
following sections. 
 
5.6.1. The Distribution of Industrial Firms 
By the year of 1980, 5 percent of 8707 manufacturing industry located belonged to 
public sector in Turkey. In 1990, the number of the firms increased to 8871, the share of 
public sector did not change too much. In that period, there was a little increase in the 
number of the firms in the country (see Table 5.30). 
 In 1980, 54 percent of overall firms in the country were located in İstanbul Region, 
which clearly shows the heaviness of the region. By the same year, 14 percent of the firms 
were located in İzmir Region, 6.5 percent in Ankara Region, and 4 percent in Adana 
Region. The dimensions of spatial disparities may be seen evidently by the way that only 
15 percent of total firms were located outside of the agglomeration centers in 1980. 
Although the little decrease in the share of Ankara was reflected to the other provinces 
group positively, uneven situation did not close by the year of 1990. 
During the period between 1980 and 1990, although public investments increased 
0.49 percent, the governmental shares decreased in İstanbul (-16.67), İzmir (-11.54) and 
Adana (-21.5) regions. In addition, the public investments completely paused in Ankara 
Region. It may be said that limited public investments in 1980s were moved from the 
metropolitan regions to Region Centers. However, this governmental intervention was 
inadequate to solve uneven distribution of manufacturing industry. On the other hand, the 
growth in the country was generally carried by private sector. 
By the year of 1999, the share of public sector decreased to 2.5 percent. This 
situation reflected to all regions and the share of public sector decreased in every group. It 
attracts attention that, between 1990 and 1999 although public investments decreased about 
30 percent, general investments increased about 27 percent. This means, in 1990s the 
public resigned from manufacturing industry, thoroughly and the growth was 
turned/revolved to private sector. 
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Table 5.30. The changes in number of firms by regions 1980,1990, and 1999 
Regions Sector (*) 
1980 1990 Growth 
(1980-90)  
(%) 
1999 Growth 
(1990-99) 
(%) 
Number of 
Firms % 
Number 
of Firms % 
Number 
of Firms % 
İSTANBUL 
REGION 
A 4.672 53,66 4.678 52,73 0,13 5.372 47,70 14,84 
B 66 0,76 55 0,62 -16,67 41 0,36 -25,45 
C 4.606 52,90 4.623 52,11 0,37 5.331 47,34 15,31 
İZMİR 
REGION 
A 1.217 13,98 1.237 13,94 1,64 1.651 14,66 33,47 
B 26 0,30 23 0,26 -11,54 19 0,17 -17,39 
C 1.191 13,68 1.214 13,69 1,93 1.632 14,49 34,43 
ADANA 
REGION 
A 340 3,90 320 3,61 -5,88 492 4,37 53,75 
B 19 0,22 15 0,17 -21,05 10 0,09 -33,33 
C 321 3,69 305 3,44 -4,98 482 4,28 58,03 
ANKARA 
REGION 
A 560 6,43 521 5,87 -6,96 897 7,97 72,17 
B 40 0,46 40 0,45 0,00 34 0,30 -15,00 
C 520 5,97 481 5,42 -7,50 863 7,66 79,42 
REGION 
CENTERS 
A 607 6,97 608 6,85 0,16 981 8,71 61,35 
B 37 0,42 38 0,43 2,70 29 0,26 -23,68 
C 570 6,55 570 6,43 0,00 952 8,45 67,02 
OTHERS 
A 1.311 15,06 1.507 16,99 14,95 1.868 16,59 23,95 
B 220 2,53 239 2,69 8,64 156 1,39 -34,73 
C 1.091 12,53 1.268 14,29 16,22 1.712 15,20 35,02 
TURKEY 
A 8.707 100,00 8.871 100,00 1,88 11.261 100,00 26,94 
B 408 4,69 410 4,62 0,49 289 2,57 -29,51 
C 8.299 95,31 8.461 95,38 1,95 10.972 97,43 29,68 
Source: Compiled and calculated from SIS, 2000 (*) A: Total; B: Public Sector; C: Private Sector 
Between 1990 and 1999, the increase of the total firm numbers, 72 percent in 
Ankara Region, 54 percent in Adana Region, 34 percent in İzmir Region, 15 percent in 
İstanbul Region, and 61 percent in Region centers, is noticeable. During the same period, 
the growth reached to 24 percent in other provinces. As mentioned above, this growth has 
been acquired in spite of the regression in public sector. This shows that private sector has 
played the foremost role in the national market in 1990s. However, this progress has not 
solved the regional disparities in spite of the little decrease in İstanbul Region.  
 
5.6.2. The Changes in Employment 
By the year of 1980, the employment in manufacturing industry was about 787000 
persons in Turkey. 37 percent of this number was employed in public sector. Parallel to the 
investments shares, agglomeration regions played foremost role by workforce distribution. 
When the distribution of the labours and the number of the firms are compared, it is seen 
that İstanbul and İzmir regions maintained their superiority. On the other hand, it may be 
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noteworthy that Adana Region and Region Centers had much employment values 
comparing to the firm numbers (see Table 5.31). 
By the year of 1990, there is not a noticeable change in distribution of labours. The 
most remarkable change of the period between 1980 and1990 was made in public sector. 
In this period, the employment of public sector decreased 13 percent. Despite this decrease, 
total number of labours increased 30 percent due to the effort of the private sector. The 
growth rate of private sector came close to 55 percent.  
It is noticeable that, between 1980 and 1990, while all the regions were being 
affected from the regression of the workforce in public sector, 7.63 percent increase were 
made in Adana Region. Furthermore, Adana Region had the lowest growth tendency 
among all the regions. 
Table 5.31. The changes in employment by regions 1980,1990, and 1999 
Regions Sector (*) 
1980 1990 Growth 
(1980-90)  
(%) 
1999 Growth 
(1990-99) 
(%) 
Employ-
ment % 
Employ-
ment % 
Employ-
ment % 
İSTANBUL 
REGION 
A 339.427 43,13 472.726 46,18 39,27 526.411 47,33 11,36 
B 55.763 7,09 39.384 3,85 -29,37 19.721 1,77 -49,93 
C 283.664 36,04 433.342 42,33 52,77 506.690 45,56 16,93 
İZMİR 
REGION 
A 96.900 12,31 134.881 13,18 39,20 156.264 14,05 15,85 
B 27.126 3,45 25.370 2,48 -6,47 14.230 1,28 -43,91 
C 69.774 8,87 109.511 10,70 56,95 142.034 12,77 29,70 
ADANA 
REGION 
A 71.213 9,05 75.816 7,41 6,46 60.779 5,46 -19,83 
B 22.763 2,89 24.500 2,39 7,63 11.177 1,00 -54,38 
C 48.450 6,16 51.316 5,01 5,92 49.602 4,46 -3,34 
ANKARA 
REGION 
A 41.179 5,23 52.181 5,10 26,72 65.188 5,86 24,93 
B 23.588 3,00 21.087 2,06 -10,60 13.501 1,21 -35,97 
C 17.591 2,24 31.094 3,04 76,76 51.687 4,65 66,23 
REGION 
CENTERS 
A 73.452 9,33 82.352 8,04 12,12 94.695 8,51 14,99 
B 44.498 5,65 33.058 3,23 -25,71 16.056 1,44 -51,43 
C 28.954 3,68 49.294 4,82 70,25 78.639 7,07 59,53 
OTHERS 
A 159.471 20,26 198.655 19,41 24,57 208.127 18,71 4,77 
B 113.451 14,42 106.363 10,39 -6,25 59.013 5,31 -44,52 
C 50.837 6,46 98.493 9,62 93,74 149.457 13,44 51,74 
TURKEY 
A 786.995 100,00 1.023.669 100,00 30,07 1.112.228 100,00 8,65 
B 287.189 36,49 249.762 24,40 -13,03 133.698 12,02 -46,47 
C 499.806 63,51 773.907 75,60 54,84 978.530 87,98 26,44 
Source: Compiled and calculated from SIS, 2000 (*) A: Total; B: Public Sector; C: Private Sector 
Employment values by the year of 1999 show that İstanbul Region is again the 
evident attraction center. Among the regions, the decrease of attraction features in Adana 
Region and the decrease of the share of workforce in the provinces that are outside of the 
agglomeration centers are also important. In other words, in this period, the hegemony of 
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İstanbul and regional disparities are highlighted again. Another indicator supporting this 
assertion is the changes in growth rates between 1990 and 1999. The remarkable widening 
occurred in İstanbul, İzmir and Ankara regions (between 11 percent and 25 percent) in 
spite of the decrease of public employment. While a big bottleneck occurred in Adana 
Region (20 percent in total, 55 percent in public sector), a little widening (4.7 percent) is 
made in the group of other provinces.  
  
5.6.3. The Changes in Value-Added: 
In the country, about 40 percent of total value-added was produced by public sector 
by the year of 1980. Parallel to the distribution of investments and employment, İstanbul 
Region played foremost role. On the other hand, it may be noticeable that about 12 percent 
of total value-added was produced by public sector in İstanbul. This kind of high rate (10,3 
percent) can be seen in the provinces that are placed outside of the agglomeration centers. 
These values may be evaluated as a result of a strategy oriented to the spread of public 
investments to different regions (see Table 5.32).  
Table 5.32. The changes in value-added by regions 1980,1990 and 1999 (*) 
Regions Sector (**) 
Value-
Added 1980 
(million) 
1980 
(%) 
Value-Added 
1990 
(million) 
1990 
(%) 
Growth 
(1980-90)  
(%) 
Value-
Added 1999 
(million) 
1999 
(%) 
Growth 
(1990-99)  
(%) 
İSTANBUL 
REGION 
A 394.753 48,15 969.025 51,04 145,48 1.023.753 49,46 5,65 
B 97.884 11,94 173.085 9,12 76,83 130.492 6,30 -24,61 
C 296.869 36,21 795.940 41,93 168,11 893.261 43,16 12,23 
İZMİR 
REGION 
A 105.896 12,92 309.011 16,28 191,81 335.378 16,20 8,53 
B 41.996 5,12 134.658 7,09 220,64 130.144 6,29 -3,35 
C 63.900 7,79 174.352 9,18 172,85 205.234 9,92 17,71 
ADANA 
REGION 
A 108.767 13,27 166.700 8,78 53,26 175.685 8,49 5,39 
B 55.337 6,75 78.871 4,15 42,53 28.661 1,38 -63,66 
C 53.430 6,52 87.829 4,63 64,38 147.025 7,10 67,40 
ANKARA 
REGION 
A 30.975 3,78 90.790 4,78 193,11 159.595 7,71 75,79 
B 19.149 2,34 48.153 2,54 151,46 74.745 3,61 55,22 
C 11.826 1,44 42.637 2,25 260,53 84.850 4,10 99,01 
REGION 
CENTERS 
A 54.091 6,60 90.883 4,79 68,02 103.465 5,00 13,84 
B 33.087 4,04 34.695 1,83 4,86 14.042 0,68 -59,53 
C 21.004 2,56 56.188 2,96 167,51 89.423 4,32 59,15 
OTHERS 
A 121.081 14,77 260.663 13,73 115,28 271.189 13,10 4,04 
B 84.915 10,36 124.300 6,55 46,38 76.310 3,69 -38,61 
C 39.902 4,87 146.043 7,69 266,00 195.072 9,43 33,57 
TURKEY 
A 819.906 100,00 1.898.474 100,00 131,55 2.069.668 100,00 9,02 
B 332.368 40,54 593.763 31,28 78,65 454.394 21,95 -23,47 
C 487.538 59,46 1.304.711 68,72 167,61 1.615.274 78,05 23,80 
Source: Compiled and calculated from SIS,  
(*) All values fixed by 1980 prices. (**) A: Total; B: Public Sector; C: Private Sector 
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In the period between1990 and 1999, a progress has been parallel to the two former 
indicators mentioned above. While İstanbul Region has gone on the leader position as 
being the most powerful production center, Ankara and İzmir regions have relatively 
widened. On the other hand, the share of produced value-added in Adana Region, Region 
Centers and the other provinces decreased. It is noticeable while the share of public sector 
has generally decreased; little increases have been made in İzmir and Ankara regions. This 
affected the total produced value-added positively.  
On the other hand, between 1980 and 1990, the growth rates of value-added 
reached relatively high values compared with the investment rates. It may be said that the 
participation of the enterprises, which established before 1980, to production caused this 
situation. Furthermore, though produced value-added of manufacturing industry in Turkey 
increased about 132 percent between 1980 and 1990, it increased only 9 percent between 
1990 and 1999. This has reflected to all regions, the growth rates reached to incredible 
numbers in first half of the last two decades, they, however, decreased too much in second 
half.  
 
5.6.4. The Changes in Produced Value-Added per Worker: 
The values of produced value-added per worker, which has evidently affected on 
the productivity, have showed changeable structure after 1980. By the year of 1980, it is 
noteworthy that though Region Centers, Ankara Region and the other provinces had low 
values, Adana Region had relatively high values (see Table 5.33). 
In 1990, even though the values generally increased, the growths in Adana Region, 
Region Centers and the other provinces remained below Turkey’s mean. The most 
noteworthy growth occurred in İzmir and Ankara regions. By the year of 1990, a recession 
was seen in whole country. Each group except Adana and Ankara regions were affected by 
this recession.  
Between 1990 and 1999, the rates of produced value-added per worker have 
decreased in İstanbul and İzmir regions, Region Centers and the other provinces group. It 
may be said that this decrease has been caused because of the inefficiency of private sector. 
During same period, Ankara Region has reached to relatively high values on the contrary 
the other groups. 
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Table 5.33. The changes in produced value-added per worker by regions, 1980, 1990 and 
1999 (*) 
Regions Sector (**) 
V.A. Per 
Worker 
1980 
V.A. Per 
Worker 
1990 
Growth 
(1980-90)  
(%) 
V.A. Per 
Worker 1999 
Growth 
(1990-99)  
(%) 
İSTANBUL 
REGION 
A 1.162.998 2.049.866 76,26 1.944.778 -5,13 
B 1.755.357 4.394.816 150,37 6.616.913 50,56 
C 1.046.552 1.836.747 75,50 1.762.933 -4,02 
İZMİR 
REGION 
A 1.092.838 2.290.986 109,64 2.146.226 -6,32 
B 1.548.183 5.307.768 242,84 9.145.716 72,31 
C 915.814 1.592.100 73,85 1.444.966 -9,24 
ADANA 
REGION 
A 1.527.348 2.198.749 43,96 2.890.560 31,46 
B 2.431.006 3.219.238 32,42 2.564.264 -20,35 
C 1.102.786 1.711.533 55,20 2.964.085 73,18 
ANKARA 
REGION 
A 752.204 1.739.896 131,31 2.448.234 40,71 
B 811.811 2.283.537 181,29 5.536.275 142,44 
C 672.276 1.371.215 103,97 1.641.616 19,72 
REGION 
CENTERS 
A 736.413 1.103.587 49,86 1.092.612 -0,99 
B 743.562 1.049.522 41,15 874.535 -16,67 
C 725.427 1.139.845 57,13 1.137.138 -0,24 
OTHERS 
A 759.267 1.312.137 72,82 1.302.999 -0,70 
B 748.473 1.168.637 56,14 1.293.110 10,65 
C 784.901 1.482.778 88,91 1.305.203 -11,98 
TURKEY 
A 1.041.819 1.854.578 78,01 1.860.830 0,34 
B 1.157.315 2.377.314 105,42 3.398.656 42,96 
C 975.454 1.685.876 72,83 1.650.715 -2,09 
Source: Compiled and calculated from SIS,  
(*) All values fixed by 1980 prices. (**) A: Total; B: Public Sector; C: Private Sector 
The most remarkable result of the indicators can be seen in public sector. A clear 
widening has existed in the produced value-added per worker of public sector, although 
there have had rapid decreases in the values of investments, number of labours, and 
produced value-added (except Adana Region and Region Centers). It is obvious that this 
has a close relation with the recession politics of governments. In addition, the invalidity of 
“idle public worker” assertion that expressed frequently in privatization programs may be 
asserted. Furthermore, even though there was an evident recession in private sector (2.09 
percent in Turkey, 4.02 percent in İstanbul Region, 9.24 percent in İzmir Region), the 
number of public workers increased (43 percent in average, 143 percent in Ankara region). 
 
5.6.5. The Changes in Labour Wages: 
By the year of 1980, labour wages were below Turkey’s mean in İstanbul, İzmir, 
Adana regions and Region Centers. In 1990, they were below Turkey’s mean only in İzmir 
Region and Region Centers. When arriving the year of 1999, all groups except Region 
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Centers were above Turkey’s mean. The progress of the wages since 1980 may be 
evaluated as a balancing process (see Table 5.34). 
Since 1980, the labour wages of public sector have been generally higher than the 
wages of private sector. Moreover, the difference between two sectors evidently increased 
in 1990s. Between 1980 and 1990, the acceleration in the national economy that was 
gained by foreign trade improvement reflected to the wages. In 1990s, the wages, whereas, 
considerably decreased. Between 1990 and 1999, although the wages increased about 27 
percent in public sector, Turkey’s mean decreased about 4 percent.  
 According to the wage levels, although the relatively high wages were made in 
Ankara Region and the other provinces in 1980, Adana and Ankara regions went to the 
fore in 1990. By this year, the other provinces group protected Turkey’s mean. This 
situation can be again seen in 1999. İstanbul Region has had parallel movement with 
Turkey’s mean since 1980. Even though the wages have been generally low in Region 
Centers and İzmir Region, the public sector wages reached twice Turkey’s average). 
Table 5.34. The changes in labour wages by regions, 1980, 1990, and 1999 (*) 
Regions Sector (**) 
Wage per 
worker 
(1980) 
Wage per 
worker 
(1990) 
Growth 
(1980-90) 
(%) 
Wage per 
worker 
(1999) 
Growth 
(1990-99) 
(%) 
Variation of 
Wages 
1980 1990 1999 
İSTANBUL 
REGION 
A 319.621 406.941 27,32 394.409 -3,08 0,99 1,01 1,02 
B 420.225 540.909 28,72 613.705 13,46 1,30 1,34 1,58 
C 299.844 394.766 31,66 385.874 -2,25 0,93 0,98 0,99 
İZMİR 
REGION 
A 275.521 354.382 28,62 343.580 -3,05 0,85 0,88 0,88 
B 321.168 539.552 68 808.043 49,76 0,99 1,33 2,08 
C 257.775 311.484 20,84 297.047 -4,63 0,80 0,77 0,76 
ADANA 
REGION 
A 320.672 474.191 47,87 495.025 4,39 0,99 1,17 1,27 
B 413.390 576.822 39,53 701.941 21,69 1,28 1,43 1,81 
C 277.110 425.191 53,44 448.399 5,46 0,86 1,05 1,15 
ANKARA 
REGION 
A 389.980 472.767 21,23 445.397 -5,79 1,20 1,17 1,15 
B 520.943 550.395 5,65 705.729 28,22 1,61 1,36 1,82 
C 214.371 420.121 95,98 377.397 -10,17 0,66 1,04 0,97 
REGION 
CENTERS 
A 311.224 353.329 13,53 308.143 -12,79 0,96 0,87 0,79 
B 369.500 457.153 23,72 569.837 24,65 1,14 1,13 1,47 
C 221.662 283.702 27,99 254.712 -10,22 0,68 0,70 0,66 
OTHERS 
A 343.341 406.052 18,26 395.137 -2,69 1,06 1,00 1,02 
B 418.075 507.959 21,5 646.282 27,23 1,29 1,26 1,66 
C 199.756 300.287 50,33 296.626 -1,22 0,62 0,74 0,76 
TURKEY 
A 323.644 404.392 24,95 388.544 -3,92 1,00 1,00 1,00 
B 409.890 519.977 26,86 660.169 26,96 1,27 1,29 1,70 
C 274.086 367.089 33,93 351.432 -4,27 0,85 0,91 0,90 
Source: Compiled and calculated from SIS,  
(*) All values fixed by 1980 prices. (**) A: Total; B: Public Sector; C: Private Sector 
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5.6.6. Evaluation: General Highlighted Points 
 Here, there are some points to be highlighted: 
 As a result of loosing efficiency of Keynesian politics in the world, the recession of 
public sector from production areas has evidently existed in Turkey.  
 The decrease of public sector investments has caused to decrease the number of 
labours.  
 In spite of recession in public sector, general values have increased in the regions that 
have relatively benefited from public investments. This may show that public 
investments still play ‘engine’ role in Turkey.   
 Between 1980 and 1990, little steps were taken to solve regional disparities providing 
by existing public investments transported outside the agglomeration centers. In 1990s, 
this politic, however, was left. Thus, decreasing public investments fairly deepened 
regional disparities. 
 Turkey’s manufacturing industry caught a production trend bigger than the one 
provided by investments between 1980 and 1990 because the effects of making 
enterprises, which had worked idle capacity, earned to the national economy. After 
1990, both the shrinking of public sector and the reaching to optimum capacity in 
enterprises have caused to relative regression in production values. 
 After 1980, labour productivity in manufacturing industry has tended to increase in 
public sector in spite of decreasing in private sector. It may be said that this is the 
contrary view to the dominant rhetoric of privatization politics. 
 In 1990s, the labour wages have been evidently decreased in private sector. Although 
public sector has kept the increasing rates in order to set a kind of balance, Turkey’s 
mean receded due to the employment recession in this sector.  
 In public sector, the period of decrease in workforce and recession in production were 
balanced by the way increasing the labour wages. This factor provided relative 
stabilization in the productivity field. However, this caused to go out the general 
stabilization targets. 
 In 1990s, a trend such fragmentation of firms due to the dissolution/downfall in scale 
economies and production in smaller units has been effective in Turkey. Thus, the 
number of total firms has obviously increased. This is appropriate to the expected 
results of flexible transformations. 
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 The emergence of the direct relation between wages per labour and produced value-
added after 1980 verifies an idea that the increase of the wages affects production 
positively. However, Turkey economy that has frequently lived short-time depressions 
could not provide a consistent wage politics. Hence, the regular productivity increase 
could not be applied. 
 New investment trends have not gone out of agglomeration centers that shaped before 
1980. Thus, the spatial disparities have been opened increasingly. 
 İstanbul Region is still the most powerful attraction center. 
 Adana Region has fairly lost its attraction feature between 1980 and 1999. 
 
5.6.7. The Shift-Share Analysis by Regions 
In this section, the shift-share analysis by the regions is implemented according to 
employment values. Thus, some results related to the regional growth, structural 
transformation and competitive capability are defined. 
Table 5.35. The results of the shift analysis by employment according to regions (*) 
Regions Period between 1980-1990 Period between 1990-1999 
gij kij cij gij kij cij 
İstanbul Region 57.519,55 44.556,76 31.222,69 56.781,92 -15.885,75 12.788,83 
İzmir Region 16.420,75 12.720,11 8.840,14 16.201,36 -4.532,62 9.714,26 
Adana Region 12.067,81 9.348,17 -16.812,98 9.106,71 -2.547,76 -21.595,95 
Ankara Region 6.978,22 5.405,59 -1.381,81 6.267,77 -1.753,52 8.492,75 
Region Centers 12.447,23 9.642,08 -13.189,31 9.891,79 -2.767,40 5.218,62 
Other Provinces 27.024,08 20.933,84 -8.773,92 23.861,63 -6.675,71 -7.713,91 
Source: Compiled and calculated from SIS, 2000 
(*) The national growth rate for 1980-90 is 0,17; and for 1990-99 is 0,12. The national rate of change in 
manufacturing industry for 1980-90 is 0,30; and for 1990-99 is 0,09 
gij: The regional share related with the national growth; kij: The industrial mix component growth; cij: The 
competitive growth component (Total regional shift) 
 
 Between 1980 and 1990, İstanbul and İzmir regions showed “growth pole” feature, 
and Ankara Region, Adana Region, Region centers and the other provinces showed 
“downward transitional area” feature. This shows that Ankara and Adana regions, Region 
Centers and the other provinces began to lose investment possibilities and competitive 
advantages in the sector of manufacturing industry. İstanbul Region’s high “industrial mix 
component” and “regional shift” values show that its economic growth and competitive 
advantages increased rapidly. On the contrary, low “regional shift” value of Adana Region 
and Region Centers shows that they lost competitive advantages (see Table 5.35). 
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 It is seen that a serious recession has existed in manufacturing industry between 
1990 and 1999. Taking the other sectors to the foreground in national economy, and 
negligence of industrialization resulted that all industrial mix component values are 
negative. While İstanbul, İzmir, and Ankara regions and Region Centers have kept their 
competition advantages, Adana Region and the other provinces have lost their competition 
and investment probabilities. 
Fig. 5.11. The distribution of major industrial establishments in Turkey, at beginning of the 
2000s 
 
Source: Avcı, 2000: 58 
As a result, manufacturing industry has lost its attractiveness due to the plugging of 
industrial accumulation channels between 1990 and 1999. As it is explained in general 
economic analysis, this situation indicates the reality of negligence of manufacturing 
industry that is the engine of stabile and rapid growth. This neglect caused (and will cause) 
spatial disparities, unstable growth and deepening economic problems. 
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Table 5.37. The firm structure in private sector by provinces, 1980-1990-1999 
 1980 1990 1999 1980-1990 1990-1999 
PROVINCE 
Total 
Number 
of Firms 
Average 
Firm-
Sized 
Total 
Number 
of Firms
Average 
Firm-
Sized 
Total 
Number 
of Firms
Average 
Firm-
Sized 
Changes 
in firm 
number 
Changes 
in firm 
size 
Changes 
in firm 
number 
Changes 
in firm 
size 
ADANA 195 171 179 198 223 132 -16 27 44 -66 
ADIYAMAN 1 0 4 28 12 57 3 28 8 30 
AFYON 37 30 92 39 102 39 55 10 10 -1 
AĞRI 4 13 2 0 5 26 -2 -13 3 26 
AKSARAY 0 0 11 23 26 36 11 n.a. 15 13 
AMASYA 18 31 21 75 26 75 3 44 5 0 
ANKARA 520 34 471 65 856 60 -49 31 385 -5 
ANTALYA 47 70 38 100 51 96 -9 30 13 -4 
ARDAHAN 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 n.a. 1 n.a. 
ARTVİN 3 16 1 0 3 76 -2 -16 2 76 
AYDIN 75 58 87 69 95 75 12 10 8 7 
BALIKESIR 92 41 71 82 95 97 -21 41 24 14 
BARTIN 0  0  0 0 18 57 0 n.a. 18 n.a. 
BATMAN 0  0 1 0 3 34 1 n.a. 2 34 
BAYBURT 0  0 0 0 4 17 0 n.a. 4 n.a. 
BİLECİK 24 68 36 297 54 207 12 229 18 -90 
BİNGÖL  0 0 1 0 0 0 1 n.a. -1 n.a. 
BİTLİS 0 0 2 0 1 0 2 n.a. -1 0 
BOLU 52 57 90 90 126 107 38 34 36 17 
BURDUR 22 28 28 38 41 42 6 11 13 4 
BURSA 388 75 438 147 763 125 50 72 325 -22 
ÇANAKKALE 25 188 30 217 27 163 5 29 -3 -54 
ÇANKIRI 4 25 6 59 17 64 2 34 11 6 
ÇORUM 54 25 79 40 87 50 25 15 8 10 
DENİZLİ 116 52 94 106 357 98 -22 54 263 -8 
DİYARBAKIR 7 19 9 25 23 34 2 6 14 10 
EDİRNE 29 96 38 122 53 87 9 27 15 -36 
ELAZIĞ 15 71 19 83 25 66 4 12 6 -17 
ERZİNCAN 14 32 14 43 10 50 0 12 -4 7 
ERZURUM 29 17 19 25 19 43 -10 8 0 19 
ESKİŞEHİR 110 57 120 97 163 99 10 40 43 2 
GAZİANTEP 135 42 113 105 260 85 -22 63 147 -20 
GİRESUN 24 74 23 69 25 105 -1 -5 2 36 
GÜMÜŞHANE 0 0 3 46 0 0 3 n.a. -3 n.a. 
HAKKARİ 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 n.a. 0 0 
HATAY 52 64 58 72 73 66 6 7 15 -5 
İÇEL 74 160 68 172 173 84 -6 12 105 -88 
IĞDIR  0 0  0 0 2 0 0 n.a. 2 n.a. 
ISPARTA 44 47 50 55 45 80 6 8 -5 25 
İSTANBUL 3.885 54 3.734 79 3.622 80 -151 24 -112 2 
İZMİR 845 60 868 86 985 79 23 25 117 -7 
K.MARAŞ 17 40 38 63 71 110 21 23 33 47 
KARABÜK  0 0 0  0 48 165 0 n.a. 48 n.a. 
KARAMAN 0  0 17 134 24 214 17 n.a. 7 80 
KARS 3 40 6 14 4 68 3 -26 -2 54 
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KASTAMONU 13 57 25 42 30 67 12 -15 5 25 
KAYSERİ 97 105 103 143 177 132 6 38 74 -12 
KİLİS  0 0   0 0 0 0 n.a. 0 n.a. 
KIRIKKALE  0 0 10 50 7 46 10 n.a. -3 -4 
KIRKLARELİ 33 33 40 152 79 178 7 118 39 27 
KIRŞEHİR 7 22 16 55 9 161 9 33 -7 106 
KOCAELİ 213 142 258 181 512 112 45 39 254 -69 
KONYA 138 34 135 53 263 49 -3 19 128 -4 
KÜTAHYA 38 57 43 93 46 137 5 36 3 44 
MALATYA 16 45 15 97 49 99 -1 52 34 3 
MANİSA 155 54 165 116 195 113 10 63 30 -4 
MARDİN 2 0 2 0 10 35 0 0 8 35 
MUĞLA 18 27 15 33 31 37 -3 6 16 4 
MUŞ 0 0 0 0 3 12 0 n.a. 3 n.a. 
NEVŞEHİR 22 35 29 40 29 46 7 5 0 6 
NİĞDE 11 130 5 392 13 152 -6 262 8 -239 
ORDU 49 56 44 78 50 77 -5 22 6 -1 
OSMANİYE  0 0   0 13 59 0 n.a. 13 n.a. 
RİZE 11 21 30 80 22 66 19 59 -8 -14 
SAKARYA 60 56 83 69 130 87 23 13 47 18 
SAMSUN 90 24 99 39 89 49 9 15 -10 10 
SİİRT 1 0 0 0 1 0 -1 n.a. 1 n.a. 
SİNOP 19 33 22 82 26 32 3 48 4 -50 
SİVAS 18 26 15 22 15 43 -3 -5 0 21 
ŞANLIURFA 4 118 9 58 11 46 5 -60 2 -11 
TEKİRDAĞ 60 155 110 200 275 166 50 45 165 -34 
TOKAT 28 42 46 38 40 51 18 -4 -6 13 
TRABZON 44 39 32 55 61 44 -12 17 29 -11 
TUNCELİ   0 1 0 0 0 1 n.a. -1 n.a. 
UŞAK 74 28 47 65 60 81 -27 37 13 16 
VAN 10 27 5 11 7 31 -5 -16 2 20 
YALOVA   0   0 29 201 0 n.a. 29 n.a. 
YOZGAT 10 56 15 60 17 46 5 5 2 -15 
ZONGULDAK 98 33 62 56 54 53 -36 24 -8 -3 
TURKEY 8.299 60 8.461 91 10.972 89 162 31 2.511 -2 
Source: Compiled and calculated from SIS, 2000 
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Table 5.38. Wage and profit changes in manufacturing industry by provinces 1980-1990-1999 
(private sector) 
 1980 1990 1999 1980 1990 1999 
PROVINCE Wage Per-Worker 
Wage Per-
Worker 
Wage Per-
Worker 
Profit Over 
Per Worker
Profit Over 
Per Worker
Profit Over 
Per Worker 
ADANA 264.129 418.396 484.761 818.796 1.236.671 1.060.864 
ADIYAMAN 0 146.359 212.715 0 482.072 724.539 
AFYON 161.378 231.067 195.549 584.769 851.144 902.557 
AĞRI 80.000 0 159.869 420.000 0 1.574.359 
AKSARAY 0 173.289 128.383 0 822.998 484.739 
AMASYA 138.989 407.939 414.762 277.978 187.602 104.012 
ANKARA 214.371 423.205 378.336 457.905 960.756 1.268.466 
ANTALYA 229.488 234.874 245.899 311.838 626.320 696.277 
ARTVİN 41.667 0 265.405 562.500 0 2.543.701 
AYDIN 275.650 250.609 257.261 585.499 926.441 854.646 
BALIKESIR 216.459 399.470 356.885 1.040.222 1.686.254 2.052.310 
BARTIN 0 0 221.501 0 0 920.015 
BATMAN 0 0 88.306 0 0 79.066 
BAYBURT 0 0 202.210 0 0 970.127 
BİLECİK 279.609 415.248 531.507 659.951 1.780.331 1.429.789 
BOLU 247.367 391.395 338.547 616.378 1.792.737 1.232.073 
BURDUR 121.113 165.371 127.536 487.725 345.515 297.756 
BURSA 260.333 351.502 327.850 611.971 1.268.076 1.126.808 
ÇANAKKALE 257.216 365.496 296.105 611.842 2.177.173 1.937.066 
ÇANKIRI 158.416 188.502 223.409 712.871 557.101 582.640 
ÇORUM 64.680 129.766 186.813 317.587 317.735 472.271 
DENİZLİ 170.736 238.413 183.988 537.611 833.942 678.594 
DİYARBAKIR 67.164 215.040 156.358 410.448 129.377 359.777 
EDİRNE 211.323 271.278 256.935 495.492 1.375.970 1.276.825 
ELAZIĞ 173.546 269.725 298.139 288.931 826.652 855.093 
ERZİNCAN 154.195 198.023 249.644 1.018.141 688.490 102.970 
ERZURUM 148.980 236.931 252.890 418.367 1.049.522 1.013.660 
ESKİŞEHİR 300.144 412.327 339.418 555.058 1.210.868 921.969 
GAZİANTEP 151.858 199.801 181.195 216.814 548.737 645.915 
GİRESUN 201.463 267.898 191.277 568.374 1.254.840 626.927 
GÜMÜŞHANE 0 156.369 0 0 193.194 0 
HATAY 194.370 257.865 254.639 688.230 1.542.592 1.380.124 
İÇEL 336.997 505.078 448.265 883.835 1.345.898 5.845.124 
ISPARTA 203.954 279.558 315.427 748.312 945.678 1.469.945 
İSTANBUL 285.056 368.833 346.137 649.784 1.259.509 1.285.105 
İZMİR 281.640 319.298 330.290 724.655 1.334.115 1.263.402 
K.MARAŞ 122.239 217.384 192.891 279.823 846.430 610.602 
KARABÜK 0 0 398.757 0 0 332.682 
KARAMAN 0 134.628 161.189 0 470.829 466.953 
KARS 191.667 187.690 387.057 675.000 269.916 924.492 
KASTAMONU 202.685 259.790 210.484 991.946 911.186 492.799 
KAYSERİ 254.973 265.668 249.683 663.694 867.102 1.006.372 
KIRIKKALE 0 229.875 227.636 0 355.057 586.788 
KIRKLARELİ 123.862 438.609 470.756 813.297 2.219.322 1.558.898 
KIRŞEHİR 177.632 245.465 384.959 381.579 326.797 619.068 
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KOCAELİ 444.631 666.983 694.731 1.497.315 2.861.709 2.396.464 
KONYA 155.232 300.087 300.080 472.985 893.382 984.146 
KÜTAHYA 166.667 245.344 238.327 276.230 610.123 525.911 
MALATYA 147.222 277.496 188.106 283.333 473.626 369.942 
MANİSA 165.727 338.234 372.643 376.424 1.416.343 1.582.971 
MARDİN 0 0 420.581 0 0 4.220.592 
MUĞLA 808.642 222.250 153.235 281.893 747.311 522.831 
MUŞ 0 0 210.213 0 0 188.367 
NEVŞEHİR 156.047 179.503 161.340 119.636 356.805 463.992 
NİĞDE 246.681 297.183 350.267 345.912 903.035 1.377.414 
ORDU 197.464 236.860 237.188 1.308.333 1.224.116 1.411.101 
OSMANİYE   272.713 0 0 2.734.416 
RİZE 90.517 262.352 175.770 323.276 579.617 734.386 
SAKARYA 394.333 384.887 445.961 654.073 1.491.932 1.233.923 
SAMSUN 163.453 190.238 206.328 417.355 613.443 968.909 
SİNOP 77.409 421.012 103.503 139.021 430.314 242.980 
SİVAS 142.251 234.147 357.791 282.378 688.093 1.343.222 
ŞANLIURFA 138.298 155.907 146.840 227.660 507.961 1.316.821 
TEKİRDAĞ 252.471 293.053 340.075 955.952 1.366.617 1.107.769 
TOKAT 134.697 165.323 174.902 192.668 430.217 883.909 
TRABZON 194.690 215.535 178.746 674.336 830.778 699.476 
UŞAK 152.395 158.322 132.458 237.059 400.499 287.868 
VAN 134.831 196.936 186.027 352.060 560.340 1.320.389 
YALOVA 0 0 518.623 0 0 2.400.238 
YOZGAT 315.978 429.498 434.102 2.382.406 1.528.135 2.338.461 
ZONGULDAK 165.149 222.037 180.750 509.576 776.452 795.929 
TURKEY 274.086 367.089 351.432 701.368 1.318.787 1.299.283 
Source: Compiled and calculated from SIS, 2000 
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Table 5.39. The produced value-added (VA) per worker in private sector by provinces & the 
structure of public sector establishments, 1980-1990-1999 
 PRIVATE SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR 
 1980 1990 1999 1980 1990 1999 
PROVINCE Produced VA Per Worker 
Produced VA 
Per Worker 
Produced VA 
Per Worker Firm
Employ-
ment Firm
Employ-
ment Firm 
Employ-
ment 
ADANA 1.082.925 1.655.068 1.545.624 12 6.463 10 8.417 6 3.059 
ADIYAMAN 0 628.432 937.255 3 1.123 5 1.712 2 1.647 
AFYON 746.147 1.082.210 1.098.106 6 3.535 9 3.836 7 2.614 
AĞRI 500.000 0 1.734.228 3 346 4 1.058 1 621 
AKSARAY 0 996.286 613.123 0 0 2 108 1 49 
AMASYA 416.968 595.541 518.774 2 1.764 2 246 0 0 
ANKARA 672.276 1.383.961 1.646.802 40 23.588 31 12.220 26 8.138 
ANTALYA 541.326 861.195 942.176 8 2.621 6 2.088 4 709 
ARDAHAN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ARTVİN 604.167 0 2.809.106 7 3.570 8 3.634 4 1.260 
AYDIN 861.149 1.177.049 1.111.907 4 2.144 4 1.912 5 840 
BALIKESIR 1.256.682 2.085.724 2.409.195 10 3.851 6 5.036 5 2.829 
BARTIN 0 0 1.141.516 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BATMAN 0 0 167.372 0 0 1 607 1 490 
BAYBURT 0 0 1.172.337 0 0 1 20 0 0 
BİLECİK 939.560 2.195.579 1.961.296 3 743 2 650 0 0 
BİNGÖL 0 0 0 0 0 1 95 1 86 
BİTLİS 0 0 0 5 1.111 4 557 1 280 
BOLU 863.744 2.184.132 1.570.620 5 1.550 6 1.839 3 560 
BURDUR 608.838 510.886 425.292 4 1.143 3 1.224 3 952 
BURSA 872.304 1.619.578 1.454.658 7 3.657 9 6.591 8 3.577 
ÇANAKKALE 869.058 2.542.668 2.233.172 3 234 3 354 2 320 
ÇANKIRI 871.287 745.604 806.049 4 240 3 621 1 399 
ÇORUM 382.267 447.501 659.084 2 664 2 419 1 579 
DENİZLİ 708.347 1.072.355 862.582 1 1.257 5 2.153 1 64 
DİYARBAKIR 477.612 344.417 516.135 6 1.678 9 2.598 6 1.189 
EDİRNE 706.816 1.647.248 1.533.760 3 209 2 108 0 0 
ELAZIĞ 462.477 1.096.377 1.153.232 8 4.018 9 4.725 4 2.464 
ERZİNCAN 1.172.336 886.513 352.614 3 1.672 5 2.119 3 1.015 
ERZURUM 567.347 1.286.453 1.266.550 7 1.884 7 2.008 3 987 
ESKİŞEHİR 855.202 1.623.195 1.261.387 8 10.537 7 6.814 5 4.250 
GAZİANTEP 368.673 748.539 827.110 5 1.530 4 1.022 4 395 
GİRESUN 769.837 1.522.738 818.204 3 1.392 3 1.251 2 699 
GÜMÜŞHANE 0 349.563 0 1 34 0 0 2 149 
HAKKARİ 0 0 0 1 24 2 107 1 63 
HATAY 882.600 1.800.458 1.634.763 4 15.677 2 14.459 2 7.186 
İÇEL 1.220.832 1.850.976 6.293.388 3 623 3 1.624 2 932 
ISPARTA 952.266 1.225.236 1.785.372 4 1.669 3 1.358 1 149 
İSTANBUL 934.841 1.628.342 1.631.242 34 30.434 27 18.630 20 9.073 
İZMİR 1.006.296 1.653.412 1.593.691 16 21.775 11 19.837 10 12.652 
K.MARAŞ 402.062 1.063.814 803.492 2 1.267 3 1.907 1 769 
KARABÜK 0 0 731.439 0 0 0 0 0 0 
KARAMAN 0 605.457 628.142 0 0 2 1.011 1 187 
KARS 866.667 457.605 1.311.549 3 735 3 866 3 791 
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KASTAMONU 1.194.631 1.170.976 703.282 4 1.460 8 2.234 4 1.320 
KAYSERİ 918.667 1.132.770 1.256.056 5 4.219 6 3.944 3 1.175 
KİLİS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 144 
KIRIKKALE 0 584.932 814.424 0 0 9 8.867 8 5.363 
KIRKLARELİ 937.158 2.657.931 2.029.654 4 1.925 4 1.539 1 619 
KIRŞEHİR 559.211 572.262 1.004.026 1 16 1 390 0 0 
KOCAELİ 1.941.946 3.528.692 3.091.196 14 14.452 11 8.952 7 4.085 
KONYA 628.216 1.193.469 1.284.226 10 13.561 10 11.167 9 5.678 
KÜTAHYA 442.897 855.467 764.238 3 3.523 1 2.283 2 1.388 
MALATYA 430.556 751.122 558.047 4 5.796 5 5.086 6 2.892 
MANİSA 542.151 1.754.577 1.955.614 5 1.950 3 1.468 3 674 
MARDİN 0 0 4.641.173 1 33 2 103 1 183 
MUĞLA 1.090.535 969.560 676.066 5 2.285 3 1.868 4 869 
MUŞ 0 0 398.580 1 46 3 1.090 1 692 
NEVŞEHİR 275.683 536.308 625.332 2 465 2 484 2 463 
NİĞDE 592.593 1.200.218 1.727.681 4 605 3 1.452 1 809 
ORDU 1.505.797 1.460.976 1.648.289 3 390 2 272 2 227 
OSMANİYE 0 0 3.007.130 0 0 0 0 0 0 
RİZE 413.793 841.969 910.156 32 18.923 34 11.134 33 8.973 
SAKARYA 1.048.406 1.876.819 1.679.884 9 6.741 6 4.662 4 2.481 
SAMSUN 580.808 803.681 1.175.237 9 14.651 11 10.111 8 4.558 
SİİRT 0 0 0 3 3.661 2 359 0 0 
SİNOP 216.430 851.326 346.483 2 1.053 3 835 1 123 
SİVAS 424.628 922.239 1.701.013 5 4.294 6 4.591 4 3.443 
ŞANLIURFA 365.957 663.868 1.463.661 4 413 7 821 2 132 
TEKİRDAĞ 1.208.423 1.659.670 1.447.844 2 479 2 549 2 505 
TOKAT 327.366 595.540 1.058.811 4 2.170 5 2.758 4 2.592 
TRABZON 869.027 1.046.313 878.223 11 4.765 13 3.626 10 2.661 
TUNCELİ 0 0 0 0 0 1 40 1 27 
UŞAK 389.453 558.821 420.326 1 1.108 1 939 3 809 
VAN 486.891 757.276 1.506.417 4 556 7 1.382 5 1.307 
YALOVA 0 0 2.918.861 0 0 0 0 0 0 
YOZGAT 2.698.384 1.957.634 2.772.563 2 483 1 340 2 882 
ZONGULDAK 674.725 998.489 976.679 14 22.404 9 20.575 2 6.601 
TURKEY 975.454 1.685.876 1.650.715 408 287.189 410 249.762 289 133.698
Source: Compiled and calculated from SIS, 2000 
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Table 5.40. The changes in overall working-hour by private sector, 1980-1990-1999 
 1980 1990 1999 Changes 
PROVINCE 
Working-hour per 
worker (annual 
mean) 
Working-hour 
per worker 
(annual mean)
Working-hour 
per worker 
(annual mean)
1980-1990 1990-1999 
ADANA 1.466 1.915 1.941 449 26 
ADIYAMAN n.a. 1.936 1.967 n.a. 32 
AFYON 1.838 1.974 1.949 137 -26 
AĞRI 2.100 n.a. 2.151 n.a. n.a. 
AKSARAY n.a. 1.775 1.867 n.a. 92 
AMASYA 1.515 1.071 1.769 -443 698 
ANKARA 1.852 1.686 1.766 -166 80 
ANTALYA 1.373 1.731 1.908 358 177 
ARDAHAN n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
ARTVİN 1.733 n.a. 1.539 n.a. n.a. 
AYDIN 1.782 1.981 1.857 199 -124 
BALIKESIR 1.693 1.885 1.860 192 -25 
BARTIN n.a. n.a. 1.858 n.a. n.a. 
BATMAN n.a. n.a. 2.098 n.a. n.a. 
BAYBURT n.a. n.a. 1.991 n.a. n.a. 
BİLECİK 1.651 1.942 1.936 291 -6 
BİNGÖL n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
BİTLİS n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
BOLU 1.639 1.924 1.833 284 -91 
BURDUR 1.556 1.903 2.123 347 220 
BURSA 1.661 1.962 1.921 301 -41 
ÇANAKKALE 1.882 2.186 1.903 304 -283 
ÇANKIRI 1.580 1.788 1.822 209 34 
ÇORUM 1.876 1.745 2.008 -131 263 
DENİZLİ 1.685 2.014 2.070 329 55 
DİYARBAKIR 3.939 2.027 1.887 -1.912 -140 
EDİRNE 1.493 2.048 1.962 554 -85 
ELAZIĞ 1.665 1.587 1.997 -78 411 
ERZİNCAN 1.960 1.829 1.514 -131 -315 
ERZURUM 2.158 2.028 2.114 -130 86 
ESKİŞEHİR 1.784 1.858 1.884 74 25 
GAZİANTEP 2.555 2.256 2.129 -299 -126 
GİRESUN 1.686 1.705 1.715 19 10 
GÜMÜŞHANE n.a. 1.431 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
HAKKARİ n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
HATAY 1.854 1.950 1.929 96 -21 
İÇEL 1.501 1.964 1.959 463 -6 
IĞDIR n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
ISPARTA 1.577 1.874 1.938 297 64 
İSTANBUL 1.742 1.842 1.794 100 -48 
İZMİR 1.668 1.843 1.797 175 -46 
K.MARAŞ 1.441 2.169 2.141 728 -28 
KARABÜK n.a. n.a. 2.171 n.a. n.a. 
KARAMAN n.a. 2.059 1.783 n.a. -276 
KARS 1.898 1.655 1.600 -243 -54 
KASTAMONU 1.080 1.926 1.992 846 67 
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KAYSERİ 1.619 1.993 2.014 374 21 
KİLİS n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
KIRIKKALE n.a. 2.045 1.573 n.a. -472 
KIRKLARELİ 1.754 2.039 1.911 285 -128 
KIRŞEHİR 1.634 2.118 1.769 484 -348 
KOCAELİ 1.424 1.693 1.619 269 -74 
KONYA 1.929 1.787 1.963 -142 176 
KÜTAHYA 1.802 1.895 2.300 92 405 
MALATYA 1.678 2.489 2.077 810 -411 
MANİSA 1.961 1.925 1.899 -36 -26 
MARDİN n.a. n.a. 1.360 n.a. n.a. 
MUĞLA 1.245 1.595 1.916 349 321 
MUŞ n.a. n.a. 2.008 n.a. n.a. 
NEVŞEHİR 1.621 1.877 2.046 256 169 
NİĞDE 1.531 2.137 2.072 606 -65 
ORDU 1.639 1.977 1.719 338 -258 
OSMANİYE n.a. n.a. 1.578 n.a. n.a. 
RİZE 1.801 1.300 1.735 -501 435 
SAKARYA 1.587 1.739 1.737 151 -2 
SAMSUN 1.834 1.915 1.872 80 -43 
SİİRT n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
SİNOP 1.612 2.226 1.974 614 -252 
SİVAS 1.635 2.158 1.797 523 -362 
ŞANLIURFA 3.980 1.918 1.932 -2.062 13 
TEKİRDAĞ 1.559 2.022 1.934 463 -88 
TOKAT 2.077 1.921 1.977 -156 57 
TRABZON 2.082 1.764 1.810 -318 46 
TUNCELİ n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
UŞAK 2.113 2.238 2.214 124 -23 
VAN 1.247 1.927 1.703 680 -224 
YALOVA n.a. n.a. 1.644 n.a. n.a. 
YOZGAT 1.608 1.750 1.606 142 -145 
ZONGULDAK 1.828 2.027 2.146 199 119 
TURKEY 1.698 1.874 1.861 176 -12 
Source: Compiled and calculated from SIS, 2000 
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5.7. Evaluation of the Selected Variables in Relation to Flexible 
Production 
This section aims to prepare a mapping which includes the possibilities and 
probabilities of flexible production in Turkey’s provinces. For this, some requirements 
(‘inputs’) have defined by the thesis. These are: 
 All industrial analyses should be based on two assertions: first is that industrial 
development should accelerate the economic growth, and second is that it should 
increase the productivity. 
 Industrial production should provide local economic growth as well as national growth. 
 The changes in economic variables are evaluated positively/optimistically if only 
performing former two facts. 
It should be noted here that the studies those focuses on the flexible production 
generally neglect these three facts, which described above. Indeed, the relationship 
between a locality/region and flexible production should be analyzed successfully 
providing by reaching not only the more flexible level, but also higher growth rate and 
more diversified competitive advantages. 
The former chapters of the study include the changes that have occurred by means 
of the emergence of flexible production. Some of them have been thought as only assertion 
of specific approaches. This section tries to analyze the assertions that are unavoidably 
limited by data-sets and spatial units. The main assumption of the indicators is derived 
from two basic studies: Eraydın (1992) and Sforzi (1988). 
The first and most known result of transition to more flexible level in production is 
getting smaller the average firm-size, and increasing overall number of the firms. 
According to the experiences in many localities and ‘new’ industrial districts, before all 
else Third Italy, these types of changes in firm-size and firm numbers facilitate to be 
formed ‘vertical disintegration’; improved ‘face-to-face’ and ‘network’ types 
subcontracting processes. 
The second indicator of the transition is about improving technological innovation 
possibilities. Sforzi (1988) describes two main factors that could create technological 
innovations: the falling rates of the profit and/or the increases of the labour wages 
encourage the firms in sequent period to behave more innovative (see Eraydın, 1992). This 
claim is analyzed in the case study, but it is the fact that this relation cannot be seen 
directly in less developed or late-industrializing countries like Turkey. 
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The third indicator of the transition is about produced value-added per worker. 
Besides increasing the productivity, it is expected to increase value-added per worker 
thorough flexible production. 
Additionally, the important changes in the structure of the employment with 
transition to flexibility. The overall employment, for example, generally declined in the 
transitional processes. This indicator should be examined related to the firm-size and total 
number of the firms. Another change in employment is the decreasing overall working-
hour in relation to emergence the ‘flexible labour market’. 
With particular attention, because the transitional processes have emerged parallel 
to neo-liberal and enterprise economy, recession of the public investments is thought as 
part of the flexible production. However, this indicator is not be related to only production 
processes.  
The last indicator that used our analyses is directly related to flexible production is 
that decreasing stocks of the commodities. This is not only an indicator but also necessity 
of more flexible production. 
Finally, it should remind that the analyses are generally implemented by private 
sector because the public sector does not have efficient role in the transitional processes.  
In addition, the provinces are used as the spatial unit due to limits of our data-set.  
 
5.7.1. The Distribution of Industrial Firms 
Analysis of the total number of firms and the average size of firms (the average 
number of workers of each firm) indicates that the lower value of the average firm-size is 
generally caused due to less developed industry; and sometimes little growth of the 
industry can be reflected the huge growth rates in total number of the firms. In addition, the 
public sector emphasizes the firm-size misleadingly; so looking at only private sector may 
be trustworthier. These types of problems make evaluation more difficult. But still we can 
emphasize some specific points: 
In the period between 1980 and 1990, Turkey’s provinces, and of course the 
country, were not faced the noticeable changes in firm structure. Some highlighted points 
as follows: 
 It may be said that the provinces those had developing tendencies in manufacturing 
industry increased its total number of firms, such as (the number in parentheses shows 
the numbers of added firms) Afyon (55), Bursa (50), Tekirdağ (50), Kocaeli (45), Bolu 
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(38), Çorum (25), İzmir (23), Sakarya (23), and K.Maraş (21). 
 In that period, some industrial regions had negative (-) values according to the change 
in overall firm numbers such as İstanbul (-151), Ankara (-49), Zonguldak (-36), Uşak  
(-27), G.Antep (-22), Denizli (-22), B.Esir (-21), Adana (-16), Trabzon (-12), Antalya 
(-9), İçel (-6), and Konya (-3). 
 The noticeable changes in the firm-size were made in the provinces of Kastamonu       
(-15) and Tokat (-4). 
In the period between 1990 and 1999, the change in the average firm-size of 
Turkey is –2. This period really differ from the former period according to firm structure, 
which some highlighted points are: 
 Almost all provinces have increased the overall firm number. The provinces those 
mostly taken attention: Ankara (385), Bursa (325), Denizli (263), Kocaeli (254), 
Tekirdağ (165), G.Antep (147), Konya (128), İzmir (117), İçel (105), Kayseri (74), 
Sakarya (47), Adana (44), Eskişehir (43), Kırklareli (39), Bolu (36), Malatya (34), 
K.Maraş (33), Manisa (30), Trabzon (29), B.Esir (24), Bilecik (18), Muğla (16), 
Aksaray, Edirne, Hatay (15), D.Bakır (14), Antalya, Burdur, Uşak (13), and Afyon 
(10). 
 In that period, some industrial regions have had negative (-) values according to the 
change in overall firm numbers such as İstanbul (-112), Samsun (-10), Zonguldak, and 
Rize (-8). 
 16 provinces have increased the small-sized firms such as Niğde (-239), Bilecik (-90), 
İçel (-88), Kocaeli (-69), Adana (-66), Sinop (-50), Edirne (-36), Tekirdağ (-34), Bursa 
(-22), Gaziantep (-20), Elazığ (-17), Yozgat (-15), Kayseri (-12), Ş.Urfa, Trabzon (-11), 
Denizli (-8), İzmir (-7), Hatay, Ankara (-5), Konya, Antalya, and Manisa (-4). 
Furthermore, these provinces may be classified as successfully providing two 
tendencies: increasing the overall firm number and decreasing the average firm-size. 
The changes in the overall firm number and the average firm-size could not be 
evaluated directly paralleled to flexible production. On the other hand, these highlighted 
provinces are used in following analyses as to compare other indicators. 
 
5.7.2. The Falling Rate of Profits and Innovation Capabilities 
Sforzi’s (1988) claim that ‘the falling rate of profits causes emerging technological 
and/or flexible innovations’ is tested in this section (see Eraydın, 1992). Firstly, we would 
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define which provinces’ profits decreased in 1980s. Afterwards, the results are compared 
with emergence the rapid growth and/or locational and competitive advantages in 1990s 
using by the results of the shift-share analysis.  
Although the profit is not equal to the subtraction of value-added from labour 
wages definitely, this account may be used in place of the profit values (Eraydın, 1992). 
The results are summarized as follows: 
 Between 1980 and 1990, the falling rates of profit in manufacturing industry mostly 
occurred in these provinces: Yozgat, Artvin, Ağrı, Kars, Erzincan, Diyarbakır, Çankırı, 
Burdur, Amasya, Ordu, Kastamonu, Kırşehir, and Çorum. 
 The provinces, which had lost the rate of profits in 1980s, have not had similar rates in 
1990s. They generally increased their profit rates, like that Sforzi says, except 
Erzincan, Burdur, Amasya, and Kastamonu. 
If these results are evaluated compared with the shift-share analysis results in the 
period between 1990 and 1999: 
 Artvin, Ağrı, Kars, Diyarbakır, Çankırı, Burdur, Kastamonu, Kırşehir, and Çorum have 
positive (+) values in ‘industrial mix component’ (IMC) and ‘competitive growth 
component’ (CGC) according to the overall manufacturing industry. 
 There are no provinces that have negative (-) values in both indicators. 
 Although Erzincan, Amasya, Ordu and Yozgat have positive (+) values in IMC, they 
have negative (-) values in CGC according to the overall manufacturing industry. 
 According to ‘textile’ industry (32): Amasya and Kastamonu have positive (+) values 
in both indicators. Even though Burdur has positive (+) value in IMC, it has negative  
(-) value in CGC. 
 According to ‘food, beverage, and tobacco’ industry (31): Kars, Kastamonu and Burdur 
have positive (+) values in both indicators. Although Yozgat, Erzincan, Amasya and 
Ordu have positive (+) values in IMC, they have negative (-) values in CGC. 
 According to ‘wood and wood products’ industry (33): Ordu has positive value in both 
indicators. Though Burdur and Kastamonu have positive (+) values in IMC, they have 
negative values (-) in CGC. 
 According to ‘non-metallic mineral products’ industry (36): Burdur and Ordu have 
positive values in both indicators. Though Kastamonu and Amasya have (+) value in 
IMC, they have negative (-) value in CGC. 
 We do not have adequate data by sub-sectors for Artvin, Ağrı, Diyarbakır, Kırşehir and 
Çankırı in order to reach more detailed results. 
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In the period between 1990 and 1999, the falling rates of profit are mostly made in 
these provinces: Kırklareli, Giresun, Erzincan, Bolu, Kocaeli, Kastamonu, Bilecik, 
Aksaray, Eskişehir, Tekirdağ, Sakarya, Çanakkale, K.Maraş, Muğla, Sinop, Adana, Hatay, 
Denizli, Bursa, Trabzon, Uşak, Malatya, Edirne, Kütahya, Amasya, Aydın, İzmir, Burdur, 
Erzurum. It is not possible to determine what these provinces are going to face in future. 
On the other hand, it should not be neglected that Turkey’s profit rates generally decreased 
in 1990s.  
 
5.7.3. The Labour Wages and Innovation Capabilities 
The second claim of Sforzi (1988) is that the increased in labour-wages causes 
emerging technological and flexible innovations is tested in this section (see Eraydın, 
1992). Firstly, the changes in labour-wages are defined according to provinces. 
Afterwards, the results are compared with the emergence of rapid growth and/or 
competitive advantages using by the results of the shift-share analysis. The results are:  
 Between 1980 and 1990, the increase of labour wages was made higher than the 
Turkey’s mean in full 20 provinces. 13 of them (Sinop, Kırklareli, Amasya, Ankara, 
Manisa, Rize, Diyarbakır, Bolu, Bilecik, Malatya, Yozgat, Eskişehir, and K.Maraş) 
showed  ‘growth pole’ (GP) feature according to shift-share analysis. 
 Although Balıkesir, İçel, Adana, Konya, Kocaeli, Çanakkale, and Elazığ had lost their 
competitive advantages in the period between 1980 and 1990, they continued to pay 
high wages to workers. 
 Balıkesir and Konya had noticeable shift. Even though both provinces were labeled 
‘downward transitional areas’ (DTA) in the period between 1980 and 1990, they 
continued to cost high labour-wages. Interestingly they leaped up to GP group in the 
period between 1990 and 1999. This shift may be evaluated as conforming the Sforzi’s 
criteria. 
 Beside Balıkesir and Konya, 8 provinces (Kırklareli, Ankara, Rize, Diyarbakır, Bolu, 
Malatya, Eskişehir, and K.Maraş) have reached the positives (+) values in both 
indicators between 1990 and 1999. These provinces generally have reached the high 
rates in ‘textile’ industry (32) except Bolu, Bilecik, and Elazığ.  
 Eight provinces (Kırklareli, Amasya, Kocaeli, Ankara, Konya, Malatya, Çanakkale, 
and K.Maraş) have showed GP feature according to ‘textile’ industry (32) in the period 
between 1990 and 1999. 
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 Between 1990 and 1999, the increase of labour-wages has been higher than Turkey’s 
mean in 33 provinces. 17 of them have had lost their competitive advantages in the 
same period. Referring to Sforzi, they would reach more innovative production in 
following years. 
It is seen that Sforzi’s wage criterion interestingly provides more efficient results 
than his profit criteria. According to Turkey’s industrial experiences, the increasing costs 
of labour-wages motivate the employers to invest more flexible sectors despite the fact that 
does not mean completely ‘innovation’. 
 
5.7.4. The Produced Value-Added Per Worker 
It is known that the transition to flexible production results to increase produced 
value-added per worker (see Chapter 3). In this part, we define the provinces that increased 
this value in the periods 1980-90 and 1990-99. 
In the period between 1980 and 1990: 
 The Increase of produced value-added per worker is higher than the country’s mean in 
15 provinces: Kırıkkale, Çanakkale, Kocaeli, Bolu, Bilecik, Manisa, Edirne, Hatay, 
Balıkesir, Sakarya, Eskişehir, Giresun, Bursa, Erzurum, and Ankara. 
 Many provinces have lower value than Turkey’s mean, interestingly including İstanbul, 
İzmir, Adana, Konya, Tekirdağ, Gaziantep, K.Maraş, Denizli and Trabzon 
In the period between 1990 and 1999: 
 The Increase of produced value-added per worker is higher than the country’s mean in 
43 provinces: 
  The provinces have lower value than Turkey’s mean includes İzmir, Adana, Bursa, 
Hatay, Tekirdağ, Eskişehir, Kocaeli, Sakarya, K.Maraş, Denizli and Trabzon 
The changes in the indicator do not provide interpretational results. On the other 
hand, it is important to define the provinces which reached the highest values. By the year 
of 1999, (orderly) İçel, Mardin, Kocaeli, Osmaniye, Yalova, Artvin, Yozgat, Balıkesir, 
Çanakkale, Kırklareli, Bilecik, Manisa, Isparta, Ağrı, Niğde, Sivas, and Sakarya achieved 
to overcome Turkey’s mean. 
 
5.7.5. The Structure of Public Sector 
In the periods of 1980-1990 and 1990-1999, the number of firms belonged to public 
sector in Turkey regularly decreased. During these two decades, the overall number of the 
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firms in the manufacturing industry declined from 408 to 289. This distributed to provinces 
by 14 establishments in Ankara and İstanbul, 12 in Zonguldak, 7 in Kocaeli, 6 in Adana 
and İzmir, 5 in Balıkesir and Sakarya, 4 in Antalya, Bitlis, Elazığ and Erzurum.  
Employment in public sector similarly decreased from 287.189 in 1980 to 133.698 
in 1999 (153.491 workers) including 21.361 workers in İstanbul, 15.803 in Zonguldak, 
15.450 Ankara, 10.367 in Kocaeli, 10.093 in Samsun, 9.950 in Rize, 9.123 in İzmir, 8.491 
in Hatay, 7.883 in Konya, 6.287 in Eskişehir, 4.260 in Sakarya, 3.661 in Siirt, 3.404 in 
Adana, and 3.044 in Kayseri. 
These distributions show that although the recession in both public investments and 
public employment in manufacturing industry may be related to transition to flexible 
systems, it could not be examined by only this because of existing many outer factors. It 
may be useful to evaluate in relation to other indicators, which will be done in the last 
section of the case study. 
 
5.7.6. The Changes in Overall Working-Hour 
Flexible systems provide lower working-hour for labour because of improving 
subcontracting systems, flexible labour market and like. This section aims to analyze how 
the working-hour changes in Turkey by provinces. 
Firstly, the annual mean of working-hour per labour is calculated. Afterwards, the 
changes in this indicator are determined according to the years of 1980, 1990, and 1999. 
The findings are as follows: 
 By the year of 1980, Turkey’s mean is 1.698 hours. 32 provinces have lower values 
than Turkey’s mean including Adana, Antalya, Kocaeli, Tekirdağ, Sakarya, Bursa and 
İzmir. The lowest values are seen in the provinces of (orderly) Kastamonu, Muğla, 
Van, Antalya, Kocaeli, Kahramanmaraş, Adana, Edirne and İçel. 
 By the year of 1990, Turkey’s mean is 1.874 hours. 21 provinces have lower values 
than Turkey’s mean including Ankara, Kocaeli, Antalya, Sakarya, Trabzon, Konya, 
İstanbul, İzmir and Eskişehir. The lowest values are seen in the provinces of (orderly) 
Amasya, Rize, Gümüşhane, Elazığ, Muğla, Kars, Ankara and Kocaeli. 
 By the year of 1999, Turkey’s mean is 1.861 hours. 27 provinces have lower values 
than Turkey’s mean including Kocaeli, Sakarya, Ankara, İstanbul, İzmir and Trabzon. 
The lowest values are seen in the provinces of (orderly) Mardin, Erzincan, Artvin, 
Kırıkkale, Osmaniye, Kars, Yozgat, Kocaeli, Yalova, Van and Giresun. 
 175
The changes in working-hour are evaluated with shift-share analyses results. By 
this way, it may be pointed out the provinces while decreasing per working-hour, increased 
growth and/or competitive capabilities. 
 Between 1980 and 1990, the working-hour per worker was decreased in 15 provinces, 
and all of them could have positive (+) values in IMC. Whereas, only 8 provinces 
(Diyarbakır, Rize, Amasya, Gaziantep, Ankara, Konya, Çorum, and Manisa) could 
have positive (+) values in CGC. At the same time, these provinces showed the ‘growth 
pole’ (GP) feature. 
 Between 1990 and 1999, the working-hour per worker has decreased in 35 provinces, 
and all of them could have, as being in the former period, positive (+) values in IMC. 
However, only 15 provinces (Malatya, Sivas, Kırşehir, Van, Diyarbakır, Kırklareli, 
Gaziantep, Bolu, Tekirdağ, Kars, Bursa, Kahramanmaraş, Balıkesir, Uşak, and 
Sakarya), which have showed the GP feature, could have positive (+) values in CGC.  
 
5.7.7. The Changes in Stocks 
One of the most important fundamental differences between Fordist mass 
production and flexible production is that although mass production is based on getting 
stock the standardized goods, flexible production is based on the market demands without 
stock. Thus, in this part, we try to evaluate changes in stocks in provinces. 
Between 1980 and 1990, the provinces those the mostly reduced of their stocks are 
in row Trabzon, Kocaeli, Samsun, Kayseri, Antalya, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Konya, 
Kastamonu, Nevşehir, Kırşehir, Çorum, Hatay, Erzurum and Kırklareli. Between 1990 and 
1999, the number of the provinces those reduced of the stocks is greatly raised. Some of 
them: Sakarya, Kocaeli, Afyon, Amasya, İçel, Isparta, Gaziantep, Bilecik, Trabzon, Elazığ, 
Şanlıurfa, Diyarbakır, Zonguldak, Hatay, Karabük, Kocaeli, Nevşehir, Sinop, and Kayseri. 
In the 1980s, the stock reducing was made in concentrating to the sub-sectors of 
‘manufacture of food, beverages, and tobacco’ (31), ‘manufacture of paper and paper 
products’ (34), ‘manufacture of chemicals’ (35), ‘manufacture of non-metallic mineral 
products’ (36), and ‘basic metal industries’ (37). In 1990s, almost whole sub-sectors have 
been included to them. 
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5.7.8. Evaluation 
 This section aims to grade the results of the previous analyses as to define 
probabilities and potentials of the provinces. By this way, it is possible to prepare a ranking 
that indicates the flexibility possibilities of each city. In addition, the sift-share analysis is 
implemented by provinces according to the number of labours in ‘textile’ (32) industry 
because many authors in Turkey, e.g. Eraydın (1992) and Pınarcıoğlu (2000), claim that 
this industry has too much potentials to integrate the world market and passing through 
more flexible production organizations. According to the analyses (see Table 5.36): 
 The provinces those has the most potential to adapt flexible production were not 
replaced different from agglomeration centers. The most scored provinces, Kocaeli, 
Ankara, Bursa, İçel, Konya, Sakarya, and Gaziantep, had already reached the 
advantages of the urban scale economies before 1980. 
 The provinces replacing surroundings of the metropoles, such as Denizli, Sakarya, 
Tekirdağ, Amasya and Balıkesir, have high probabilities that they may try to integrate 
to world economy using by the metropoles’ advantages. 
 Adana and İzmir are replaced behind in the row.  
 Different types of cities replacing different regions, such as Diyarbakır, 
Kahramanmaraş, Kayseri, Bolu, Çorum, Eskişehir, Kastamonu, Malatya and Manisa, 
have had high grades relatively. 
At last, if evaluating the results of the shift-share analysis by the ‘textile’ industry: 
 Between 1980 and 1990, the agglomeration centers like İstanbul, Adana, Bursa, İzmir, 
İçel, Kayseri, Gaziantep and Tekirdağ had the highest ‘industrial mix component’ 
values. Aydın, Denizli, Antalya, and Manisa followed them. 
 At the same period, Tekirdağ, Denizli, Eskişehir Malatya, and Samsun had the high 
‘comparative component growth’ values. 
 Between 1990 and 1999, the results of the former period are confirmed, and Denizli, 
Tekirdağ, Gaziantep, Kırklareli, Kahramanmaraş, Malatya, Kastamonu and Uşak have 
reached the higher values. 
 Despite these increase, the industrial centers, such as İstanbul, Bursa, and İzmir are still 
on the top. 
It may be said that two different analyses are collided with each other. Hence, 
besides existing agglomeration centers, some small-cities have had potentials to transform 
more flexible level if they prefer the correct technologies and strategies. 
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Fig. 5.12. The shift share analyses on the provinces according to employment values for ‘textile’ and ‘manufacturing’ industries 
COMPETITIVE GROWTH COMPONENT  
BY MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY (1980-1990) 
COMPETITIVE GROWTH COMPONENT  
BY MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY (1990-1999) 
 
COMPETITIVE GROWTH COMPONENT  
BY TEXTILE INDUSTRY (1980-1990) 
COMPETITIVE GROWTH COMPONENT  
BY TEXTILE INDUSTRY (1990-1999) 
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Fig. 5.13. The ranking map by provinces according to possibilities and potentials through flexible transformations 
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Table 5.36. The ranking table by provinces according to possibilities and potentials of flexible 
transformations (*) 
PROVINCES Firm Structure 
Criteria 
I 
Criteria 
II 
Value-Added per 
Worker 
Public Sector 
Structure 
Working-
Hour Stocks
Total 
Grade 
KOCAELİ 18  4 2 2  6 32 
ANKARA 17  3 2 4 1  27 
BURSA 19   1  1  21 
İÇEL 13  1 2   3 19 
KONYA 6  8 1 1 1 1 18 
SAKARYA 4   2 2 1 5 14 
GAZİANTEP 6   1  2 4 13 
DENİZLİ 12       12 
TEKİRDAĞ 11     1  12 
AMASYA  3 4   1 3 11 
BALIKESİR   6 3 1 1  11 
ADANA 5  3  2   10 
İZMİR 7  1  2   10 
KIRKLARELİ 2  5 1  1 1 10 
D.BAKIR 1 3 2 1  2  9 
K.MARAŞ 3  5   1  9 
KAYSERİ 4   1 1  3 9 
BOLU 4  2 1  1  8 
ÇORUM 2 3  1  1 1 8 
ESKİŞEHİR 3  3 1 1   8 
KASTAMONU 1 6     1 8 
MALATYA 2  5   1  8 
MANİSA 2  2 3  1  8 
AFYON 3   1   3 7 
BİLECİK 2  1 2   2 7 
BURDUR 1 5      6 
ELAZIĞ 1  1 1 1  2 6 
KARS  4  1  1  6 
KIRŞEHİR  3  1  1 1 6 
ORDU  4 1 1    6 
TRABZON 1      5 6 
AĞRI  3  2    5 
ARTVİN  3  2    5 
ÇANAKKALE   3 2    5 
HATAY 1  1 1 1  1 5 
ISPARTA    2   3 5 
İSTANBUL    1 4   5 
RİZE   2 1 1 1  5 
SAMSUN   1 1 1  2 5 
ŞANLIURFA   1 1   3 5 
ANTALYA    1 1  2 4 
ÇANKIRI  3  1    4 
EDİRNE 2  1 1    4 
ERZURUM    2 1  1 4 
YOZGAT  2  2    4 
ZONGULDAK    1 3   4 
KIRIKKALE   1 2    3 
NEVŞEHİR    1   2 3 
NİĞDE   1 2    3 
SİVAS    2  1  3 
(*) Calculated from previous tables 
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Chapter 6 
CONCLUSION 
This thesis has aimed to investigate the debates on the transition from Fordist mass 
production to flexible production. This productive scope has been enlarged so as to serve 
to the needs of building a view to provide a complete understanding on the transition 
debates which have the profound contents concerning economic, social, political, cultural, 
and spatial dimensions. It should be said that the thesis has mostly intensified economic 
and spatial dimensions by means of establishing three fundamental legs.  
The first leg of the study has regarded the dominant system, ‘capitalism’, in a 
universal manner. The interpretation of the capitalist system has been important because 
the growing importance of flexible production is directly related with it. Many authors 
have tried to explain what is exactly made in the system by means of the emergence of the 
transition to flexible production. Thus, ‘the discussion of the flexibility’ refers to ‘the 
discussion of the capitalist transformation’. Under this perspective, to define what 
capitalism is and why the relationship between production types (e.g. mass production, 
craft production, flexible production and the like) and capitalist procedural laws, have been 
subject to evaluation. The thesis has tried to compensate this need in order to build a leg of 
the study. Indeed, this leg has built the capabilities to evaluate what the approaches on 
flexible production say, and to prefer the one to be of help in understanding the whole 
transformation. 
The second leg of the study has regarded the ‘city’ and the ‘region’ as the definitely 
subjects of the flexible production debates. The vital point is underpinned that the current 
phase of capitalist transformation is linked to urban and regional restructuring. In other 
words, the shifts towards the emergence of flexible production have brought many 
questions regarding the city and the region. Furthermore, they have become the key factors 
of successful capital accumulation. This leg has tried to bring about that any geography, its 
spaces and places are not constituted entities on which economic-social changes only take 
place, but rather, are the crucial determining subjects of such changes. 
The third leg of the study has regarded the case study on manufacturing industry in 
Turkey. This leg is underpinned by the comprehension that Turkey should not be isolated 
from flexible production debates including political, social, institutional and productive 
changes that has been experienced especially after 1980. The influential changes, which 
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took place in all national economies following the crisis of Fordism, have evidently 
affected the organizations of space in Turkey. What’s more, Turkey has clearly searched 
how to adapt to world economy that has been regularly changing. Third leg has concerned 
the dimensions of these adaptation trials. 
It may be claimed that these three legs provide us the general perception on 
capitalist transformation and changes of the world economy in relation to flexible 
production; and additionally provide the capabilities to evaluate/determine implications 
within our geography, Turkey. Certain concluding remarks could be given here under this 
perspective: 
 Following the introduction, the second chapter concerned the agendas on the 
‘capitalism’ as a ‘historical’ and an ‘industrial’ system. This section claims that capitalism 
is a ‘growth oriented’ (Harvey, 1989) that means a stable and continual growth is a 
prerequisite for vitality in order to sustain the capitalist accumulation. This thesis agrees 
with that the concept of ‘mode of production’ should be replaced at the heart of the 
understanding tries of the system because it provides the explanation of the fundamental 
factors of capitalism.  
In addition, the nature of the system is defined providing by the realization dynamic 
that is so-called as the ‘accumulation of capital’. It basically refers to the processes that 
capital acquired, broadly concerns social processes with division of labour. According to it, 
the class struggle and organization of the labour processes are the most important factors in 
shaping the capitalist system. Under state of the plugged social reproduction, the general 
crisis with interrupted capital accumulation is made. One of the assumptions of the thesis is 
that current crisis in the capitalist system, related to the emergence of flexible production, 
has appeared due to this type of disequilibrium among ‘mode of production’, 
‘accumulation of capital’, and ‘social reproduction’. 
 The approaches on the transition to flexible production are the major focal areas of 
the third chapter. Thus, three frameworks, which have been the most valid and referred 
approaches, are evaluated in detail within this chapter. Firstly, it should be noted that these 
approaches have not only some differences but also some similarities.  
The neo-Schumpeterian approach, established by Freeman and Perez (1988), stems 
from Kondratiev’s work on long-waves of ‘boom’ and ‘bust’. According to this 
framework, Fordism could be labeled as typically ‘fourth Kondratiev’ that was built on the 
predomination of mass consumption industries. And the ‘fifth Kondratiev’, post-Fordist 
period, is defined by leading the key factors of ‘information technologies’.  
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The second approach, flexible specialization, has been established by Piore and 
Sabel (1984). The framework draws an opposition between mass production and flexible 
specialization or craft production. According to Piore and Sabel, the ‘first industrial divide’ 
appeared at the early beginning of the twentieth century, coupling with the hegemony of 
mass production on craft production methods. And the ‘second industrial divide’ appeared 
pioneered with the non-specialist, highly flexible manufacturing and design, and the 
flexible work practices which favors small-scale production in 1970s.  
The regulation approach, the third approach, was pioneered in France in 1970s. The 
important nuance of the framework that it provides the methodological tools to understand 
how capitalist system could survive in spite of all contradictions. In other words, the aim of 
the approach has been to build a methodology which could explain the paradoxes within 
capitalism based on the inherent tendency towards instability, crisis, and changes. For this, 
they have offered two key concepts, ‘regime of accumulation’ and ‘mode of regulation’, to 
be of use in explaining how to stabilize around a set of institutions, rules, norms, and habits 
that cause to secure a relatively long period of economic stability.  
This thesis agrees with the critics on the neo-Schumpeterian approach as being 
much ‘technology determinist’ (Elam, 1990), on the flexible specialization approach as 
being too naïve (Amin, 1994), and on regulation approach as being much recondite (Cho, 
1997). On the other hand, the detailed evaluation on the technological growth, socio-
institutional structure, labour relation, institutional structure, and space that have been 
developed by these frameworks cannot be easily neglected. 
Even though none of the approaches is able to define the debate on the transition to 
flexible production, it cannot be possible neither to produce mixed framework nor to 
ignore any of them. Indeed, each approach may explain at least one dimension of flexible 
production, but each is inadequate to offer complete power of understanding. On the other 
hand, we have to find the way to provide analytical tools to understand changes in the 
system. Despite its inadequacies, for this study, it can be said that the language of 
regulation theory is heuristically used in order to understand the changes in capitalist 
system with the emergence of flexible production. The regulation theory provides a useful 
framework in examining the mode of production, labour relations, public policies, 
technological changes and geography associated with historical periods of 
modern/historical capitalism. Furthermore, regulation theory enables us not to fall into 
mechanical explanations. 
 The changes of the ‘city’ and the ‘region’ in transitional periods are the major focal 
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areas of the fourth chapter. It may be said that current changes in economic and urban 
structures are related to the emergence of flexible economies. Furthermore, the success of 
the new regime of accumulation tightly depends on the spatial patterns of the cities and the 
regions. Thus, the restructuring processes in the cities accompany with the restructuring in 
the world economy.  
Within this chapter, it is revealed that Fordism and the city were interpreted as 
being perfectly determinants of each other. The effects of the Fordist regime, thus, on 
productive, social and economic structures are represented in the Fordist city as shaping 
polycentric large cities with suburbs that based on the economies of scale. On the other 
hand, the post-Fordist city has been discussed related with information technologies, 
deindustrialization, small-city economies and the like. 
Another important debate areas of ‘regional economies’ and ‘new industrial 
districts’ are summarized with different views that concluded each locality might represent 
different results. The selected authors, Sabel (1989), Amin and Malmberg (1992), and Peck 
and Tickell (1994) arrived the very different results spatially and ideologically that none of 
them could be ignored.  
Many geographers and planners have agreed with the Sabel’s definition on the 
regions, where in Europe, East Asia, and America, as the emergence of “new economic 
unit” and “new doctrine of endogenous growth”. Furthermore, Amin and Malmberg’s 
claim that there exists “changing balance between local and global” may be taken into 
consideration for only thing emerging the project of “Europe of the Regions”. On the other 
hand, when Peck and Tickell says there exists local and global (dis)order ‘after Fordism’, 
they touch on the negative points  not only in political, but also spatial.  
Due to the new mode of production and organizational changes, the ‘new industrial 
districts’, which based on not only the high-tech industries but also the craft production, 
have been unavoidably emerged. However, all assertions on ‘new regions’ and ‘new 
industrial districts’ are referred to specific localities. Thus, it is hard to define general facts. 
It may be said that this area could be defined only by means of the case studies. 
 And finally, the fundamental statements and evaluations derived from the former 
chapters are explored in the case study on manufacturing industry in Turkey at the fifth 
chapter. The case study is underpinned by the understanding that Turkey could not be 
isolated from the flexible production and post-Fordism debates. In addition, the structure of 
the city and the region has been transformed by means of growing flexibility in the world, 
and Turkey has tried to be a partner within this system since 1980.  
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The period after 1980 is evaluated in detail because the changes in Turkey’s 
economy systematically have been brought about since that time, which is called as the 
‘restructuring process’ by many authors. The great depression in 1970s, in fact, which 
caused as being visible by the transformations in the world economy, evidently began to 
emphasize Turkish economy at the late of the 1970s. Thus, the “Stabilization and 
Structural Adjustment Program” (SSAP) was introduced in January 1980 against the 
background of a great deal of domestic political instability. SSAP led to radical 
transformation from import substitution under state direction towards export-oriented 
policies, which could cause the negligence in industrialization. This gave way to the 
transformation of not only the accumulation regime, but also the urban and regional 
structures. This thesis evaluated the fact that all restructuring processes partly concerned 
the aim of the integration to emerging necessity of flexibility. Thus, urban and regional 
structures in Turkey have been transformed since that time, too. 
It may be considered as an inevitable process that the new regulation mechanisms 
identified different priorities with respect to the new regional structures and urbanization 
processes during the post-1980 period. Due to Turkey’s efforts of integrate to the world 
economy, new spatial regulations have been emerged. Thus, the regional structure of the 
country has been unraveled and restructured. With this respect, the main urbanization 
trends and the changes in regional structure are evaluated in the case study 
Firstly found that the disparities among the regions have been opened since 1980. 
This is evaluated with the fact that each geographical region concentrated certain sector(s) 
that can be interpreted as ‘specialization’ such as Marmara Region in ‘manufacturing’ and 
‘trade’ industries; Aegean Region in ‘manufacturing’, ‘trade’, and ‘transportation and 
communication’ industries; Mediterranean Region in ‘trade’ and ‘import duties’ industries; 
Central Anatolia Region in ‘electricity, gas, water’ and ‘import duties’ industries, and so 
on. Thus it may be said that the regions those specialized in the sectors of ‘industry’ and 
‘trade’ could have reached economically more developed level. Similarly, if the results of 
the shift share analyses are compared with the GDP values, it may be stated again that 
‘manufacturing’ sector is the most efficient sector in order to develop regional economy. 
Afterwards, the urbanization tendencies are analyzed by the use of demographic 
movements. Therefore, it was found that while metropoles pulled the population through 
its surrounding cities, several older centers – e.g. Adana and Samsun – lost their attraction 
features. In addition, it is seen that Antalya, İçel, Gaziantep, Urfa, Diyarbakır and Trabzon 
have protected their central positions during the 1990s. What’s more, it may be confirmed 
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the Eraydın’s (1992) assertion that the population changes of metropolitan cities after 1970 
in relation to two factors: the first is the process of escaping from the centers, and the 
second is the process of directing the population movements by a foremost center. As a 
result of these factors, metropoles have not lost their importance, but some new urban 
centers have been emerged. It should be noted here that there are many external factors that 
have affected the population movements such as civil war, special governmental policies, 
short-term crisis and so on. The most evident results of them could be seen in East and 
Southeast Anatolia Regions that have had misleading growth rates. 
Then, the shift-share analysis is implemented by the major cities in Turkey 
according to main sectors in order to search whether there exist ‘specialization’ processes 
and spatial disparities or not. As a consequence, it is seen that the disparities among 
Turkish provinces have been made in parallel to improvement of sectoral advantages in 
certain sector(s) as the like being among the regions.  
According to analyses on major cities, there is a total growth relatively in the 
metropolises those having wide hinterlands. For example, İstanbul has been taken attention 
by its competitive advantages, investment possibilities and growth rates. Secondly, it can 
be seen that the rapid development is observed in the provinces those having the high 
growth rates and/or competition advantages in ‘manufacturing industry’. And interestingly, 
inter-sectoral changes in Turkey’s major cities have been made after 1980s that may be 
evaluated in relation to post-Fordist debates with turning out the neo-Smithian economy, 
pointed at by ‘flexible specialization’ approach. 
In the following section, regional industrial development in Turkey is analyzed by 
using Eraydın’s (1992) description of the ‘region’. In this part, all the changes in firm 
structure, employment, value-added, produced value-added per worker, and labour wages 
are analyzed. All variables are evaluated by the classification as ‘public’ or ‘private’ 
sectors. These analyses provide lots of important results about industrial agglomeration 
centers. For example, İstanbul Region is still the most powerful attraction center, and İzmir 
Region have protected its foremost role. On the other hand, Adana Region has evidently 
lost its attraction feature. Similarly, region centers, e.g. Kayseri, Samsun, Konya, Eskişehir 
and so on, has faced the economic recession that may be a result of dragged the public 
sector from production areas in relation to the loosing efficiency of Keynesian politics in 
the world. Finally, it should be said that in 1990s, a trend such fragmentation of firms due 
to the dissolution/downfall in scale economies and production in smaller units has been 
effective in Turkey. Thus, the number of total firms has obviously increased. This is 
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appropriate to the expected results of flexible transformations 
At the last section of the case study, the assertions that occurred (or just claimed) 
through flexible production are analyzed used by Turkey’s provinces as the unit. These 
assertions derived from previous chapters and the studies on flexibility, especially of 
Eraydın (1992) and Sforzi (1988). Afterwards, the provinces are graded. The final results 
are – again – compared with the results of the shift-share analyses. Eventually, it was fixed 
that the provinces having much potentials through flexible transformations are not different 
from the agglomeration centers, which were shaped in the pre-1980 period. In addition to 
this fact, it is highlighted that the importance of urban scale economies still remains in 
some major cities. What’s more, it may be said that the provinces replacing surroundings 
of the metropoles have high potentials that means they try to integrate to world economy 
using by the advantages of neighboring metropoles.  
To conclude in a few words, it may be stated that this thesis has provided the 
coherency of the theoretical evaluations and empirical findings. That the approaches to 
flexible production offer probabilities has been justified by the Turkish case concerned in 
this thesis. Moreover, it may be explained by the case study that the urban and regional 
structures of Turkey cannot be regarded as excluded from these processes. The thesis has 
tried to identify the Turkey’s potentials, possibilities and realities in relation to the flexible 
production, and hence provide directions for further research within the debate.  
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APPENDICES  
 a  
Appendix A. Developing countries and territories by income group: Classification system of 
the organization for economic cooperation and development 
LICs: 61 Low-income Countries MICs: 73 Middle-income Countries 
Afghanistan (AS)* 
Angola (AF) 
Bangladesh (AS)* 
Benin (AF)* 
Bhutan (AS)* 
Bolivia (LA) 
Burkina Faso (AF)* 
Burundi (AF)* 
Cape Verde (LA)* 
Central African Republic (AF)* 
 Chad (AF)* 
China (AS) 
Comoros (AF)* 
Djibouti (AF) 
Egypt (AF/ME) 
El Salvador (LA) 
Equatorial Guinea (AF) 
Ethiopia (AF)* 
Gambia (AF)* 
Ghana (AF) 
Guinea (AF)* 
Guinea-Bissau (AF)* 
Haiti (LA)* 
Honduras (LA) 
India (AS) 
Kampuchea (AS) 
Kenya (AF) 
Laos (AS)* 
Lesotho (AF)* 
Liberia (AF) 
Madagascar (AF) 
Malawi (AF)* 
Maldives (AS)* 
Mali (AF)* 
Mauritania (AF) 
Mayotte (AF) 
Mozambique (AF) 
Myanmor (AS) 
Nepal (AS)* 
Niger (AF)* 
Pakistan (AS) 
Rwanda (AF)* 
Saint Helena (LA) 
Sao Tomé and Principe (AF) 
Senegal (AF) 
Sierra Leone (AF) 
Solomon Islands (Br.) (AS) 
Somalia (AF)* 
Sri Lanka (AS) 
Sudan (AF)* 
Tanzania (AF)* 
Togo (AF) 
Tokelau Islands (AS) 
Tonga (AS) 
Tuvalu (AS) 
Bahamas (LA) 
Bahrain (ME) 
Barbados (LA) 
Belize (LA) 
Bermuda (LA) 
Botswana (AF) 
Brunei (AS) 
Chile (LA) 
Colombia (LA) 
Congo (AF) 
Cook Island (AS) 
Costa Rica (LA) 
Cuba (LA) 
Cyprus (ME) 
Dominican Republic (LA) 
Falkland Island (LA) 
Fiji (AS) 
Gibraltar (ME) 
Guadeloupe (LA) 
Guatemala (LA) 
Guiana, French (LA) 
Guyana (LA) 
Israel (ME) 
Ivory Coast (AF) 
Jamaica ((LA) 
Jordan (ME) 
Kiribati (AS) 
Lebanon (ME) 
Macao (AS) 
Malaysia (AS) 
Malta (ME) 
Martinique (LA) 
Mauritius (AF) 
Morocco (AF) 
Nauru (AS) 
Netherlands Antilles (AS) 
New Caledonia (AS) 
Nicaragua (LA) 
Niue (AS) 
Oman (ME) 
Pacific Islands (U.S.) (AS) 
Panama (LA) 
Papua New Guinea (AS) 
Paraguay (LA) 
Peru (LA) 
Philippines (AS) 
Polynesia, French (AS) 
Reunion (AF) 
Saint-Pierre and Miquelon (LA) 
Seychelles (AF) 
Surinam (LA) 
Swaziland (AF) 
Syria (ME) 
Thailand (AS) 
Trinidad and Tobago (LA) 
 b  
Uganda (AF)* 
Vanuatu (AS) 
Vietnam (AS) 
Yemen (ME)* 
Zaire (AF) 
Zambia (AF) 
Tunisia (AF) 
TURKEY (E) 
Uruguay (LA) 
Wallis and Futuna Islands (AS) 
Western Samoa /AS) 
West Indies (LA) 
Zimbabwe (AF) 
NICs: 11 Newly Industrializing Countries OPEC: 13 Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries 
Argentina (LA) 
Brazil (LA) 
Greece (E) 
Hong Kong (AS) 
Mexico (LA) 
Portugal (E) 
Singapore (AS) 
South Korea (AS) 
Spain (E) 
Taiwan (AS) 
Yugoslavia (E) 
Algeria (AF) 
Ecuador (LA) 
Gabon (AF) 
Indonesia (AS) 
Iran (ME) 
Iraq (ME) 
Kuwait (ME) 
Libya (AF) 
Nigeria (AF) 
Qatar (ME) 
Saudi Arabia (ME) 
United Arab Emirates (ME) 
Venezuela (LA) 
Source: Todaro, 1994: 29-0 
* LLDCs (29 least-developed countries) 
NOTE: AF = Africa (and offshore islands); AS = Asia (including the Pacific); LA = Latin America 
(including the Caribbean); ME = Middle East; E = Europe.  
 
 c
Appendix B. Distribution of population by provinces 1990-2000 (Ordered in row by urban 
growth rate) 
  1990  2000  
Annual Growth 
Rate 
 PROVINCES TOTAL URBAN  TOTAL URBAN  TOTAL URBAN 
          
01. Hakkari 172 479 71 522  236 581 139 455  31,59 66,76 
02. Van 637 433 262 562  877 524 446 976  31,96 53,19 
03. Şırnak 262 006 125 264  353 197 211 328  29,86 52,28 
04. Ağrı 437 093 158 758  528 744 252 309  19,03 46,31 
05. Mardin 558 275 249 032  705 098 391 249  23,34 45,16 
06. Batman 344 121 194 664  456 734 304 166  28,30 44,62 
07. Antalya 1 132 211 602 194  1 719 751 936 330  41,79 44,13 
08. Muş 376 543 103 089  453 654 159 503  18,63 43,64 
09. Rize 348 776 134 082  365 938 205 245  4,80 42,56 
10. Tekirdağ 468 842 258 440  623 591 395 377  28,52 42,51 
11. Şanlıurfa 1 001 455 551 614  1 443 422 842 129  36,55 42,30 
12. Adıyaman 510 827 222 102  623 811 338 939  19,98 42,26 
13. Bitlis 330 115 144 029  388 678 219 511  16,33 42,13 
14. Yozgat 578 719 209 947  682 919 315 156  16,55 40,61 
15. Iğdır 142 601 55 547  168 634 81 582  16,76 38,43 
16. Trabzon 795 849 331 321  975 137 478 954  20,31 36,84 
17. Bingöl 249 074 86 648  253 739 123 470  1,86 35,40 
18. Bursa 1 596 161 1 153 007  2 125 140 1 630 940  28,62 34,67 
19. Erzurum 848 201 400 983  937 389 560 551  10,00 33,49 
20. Siirt 243 435 110 221  263 676 153 522  7,98 33,13 
21. Aksaray 330 569 144 217  396 084 200 216  18,08 32,80 
22. Bilecik 175 797 90 471  194 326 124 380  10,02 31,82 
23. Diyarbakır 1 096 447 595 440  1 362 708 817 692  21,73 31,71 
24. Gaziantep 1 010 396 738 245  1 285 249 1 009 126  24,05 31,25 
25. Çankırı 249 344 104 132  270 355 141 186  8,09 30,43 
26. Muğla 562 809 198 080  715 328 268 341  23,97 30,35 
27. Malatya 704 359 369 243  853 658 499 713  19,22 30,25 
28. Konya 1 752 658 963 128  2 192 166 1 294 817  22,37 29,59 
29. İstanbul 7 195 773 6 779 594  10 018 735 9 085 599  33,09 29,27 
30. Elazığ 498 225 274 045  569 616 364 274  13,39 28,45 
31. Bolu 262 919 107 551  270 654 142 685  2,90 28,26 
32. Karaman 215 181 106 051  243 210 139 912  12,24 27,70 
33. Kahramanmaraş 894 264 407 215  1 002 384 536 007  11,41 27,47 
34. Isparta 434 771 229 796  513 681 301 561  16,67 27,17 
35. Osmaniye 384 104 237 847  458 782 311 994  17,76 27,13 
36. Kütahya 577 905 243 151  656 903 318 869  12,81 27,10 
37. Niğde 301 691 97 286  348 081 126 812  14,30 26,50 
38. Gümüşhane 168 845 59 551  186 953 77 570  10,18 26,43 
39. Tokat 718 738 308 999  828 027 401 762  14,15 26,24 
40. Aydın 824 816 384 711  950 757 493 114  14,21 24,82 
41. Çanakkale 432 263 168 629  464 975 215 571  7,29 24,55 
42. İzmir 2 694 770 2 137 721  3 370 866 2 732 669  22,38 24,55 
43. Artvin 212 833 66 097  191 934 84 198  -10,33 24,20 
44. İçel 1 267 253 788 576  1 651 400 999 220  26,47 23,67 
45. Giresun 499 617 223 678  523 819 283 316  4,73 23,63 
 d
46. Kırklareli 309 512 149 532  328 461 189 202  5,94 23,52 
47. Ankara 3 236 378 2 836 802  4 007 860 3 540 522  21,37 22,15 
48. Kocaeli 920 255 579 681  1 206 085 722 905  27,04 22,07 
49. Adana 1 549 233 1 125 149  1 849 478 1 397 853  17,71 21,70 
50. Uşak 290 398 146 809  322 313 182 040  10,42 21,50 
51. Düzce 273 679 105 834  314 266 130 632  13,82 21,05 
52. Balıkesir 974 274 468 758  1 076 347 577 595  9,96 20,87 
53. Denizli 750 882 337 416  850 029 413 914  12,40 20,43 
54. Çorum 608 660 254 272  597 065 311 897  -1,92 20,42 
55. Afyon 738 979 306 209  812 416 371 868  9,47 19,42 
56. Amasya 359 265 162 343  365 231 196 621  1,65 19,15 
57. Manisa 1 154 418 590 374  1 260 169 714 760  8,76 19,11 
58. Nevşehir 289 509 112 955  309 914 136 523  6,81 18,95 
59. Kayseri 944 091 606 001  1 060 432 732 354  11,62 18,93 
60. Samsun 1 161 207 527 362  1 209 137 635 254  4,04 18,61 
61. Ordu 826 886 348 028  887 765 416 631  7,10 17,99 
62. Erzincan 299 251 144 144  316 841 172 206  5,71 17,78 
63. Kırıkkale 350 360 243 378  383 508 285 294  9,04 15,89 
64. Sinop 265 153 86 441  225 574 101 285  -16,16 15,84 
65. Kastamonu 423 206 148 861  375 476 174 020  -11,96 15,61 
66. Ardahan 163 731 34 038  133 756 39 725  -20,22 15,45 
67. Eskişehir 641 301 477 436  706 009 557 028  9,61 15,41 
68. Kırşehir 256 684 126 745  253 239 147 412  -1,35 15,10 
69. Sakarya 683 281 404 742  756 168 459 824  10,13 12,76 
70. Yalova 135 121 87 032  168 593 98 661  22,13 12,54 
71. Bartın 205 834 43 662  184 178 48 002  -11,11 9,47 
72. Edirne 404 599 210 421  402 606 230 908  -0,49 9,29 
73. Sivas 766 821 384 832  755 091 421 804  -1,54 9,17 
74. Hatay 1 109 754 531 707  1 253 726 581 341  12,19 8,92 
75. Kars 355 823 130 391  325 016 142 145  -9,05 8,63 
76. Burdur 254 899 129 112  256 803 139 897  0,74 8,02 
77. Tunceli 133 584 50 799  93 584 54 476  -35,58 6,99 
78. Zonguldak 653 739 235 546  615 599 250 282  -6,01 6,07 
79. Karabük 244 177 152 469  225 102 157 756  -8,13 3,41 
80. Bayburt 107 330 41 295  97 358 41 356  -9,75 0,15 
81. Kilis 130 198 87 219  114 724 74 985  -12,65 -15,11 
 TOTAL 56 473 035 33 656 275  67 803 927 44 006 274  18,28 26,81 
Source: SIS, 2001 (www.die.gov.tr) 
 e
Appendix C. International standard industrial classification of manufacturing industry – 
second revision -  
3 MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
31 Manufacture of food, beverages, and tobacco 
32 Textile, wearing apparel, and leather industries 
33 Manufacture of wood, and wood products including furnish 
34 Manufacture of paper of paper products, printing and publishing 
35 Manufacture of chemicals and of chemical petroleum, coal, rubber, and plastic products 
36 Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products except products of petroleum and cool 
37 Basic metal industries 
38 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment, transport equipment, professional 
and scientific and measuring and controlling equipment 
39 Other manufacturing industries 
Source: SIS, 1996: 40-3; Genel Sanayi ve İşyerleri Sayımı: Kapsam ve Yöntem 
 f
Appendix D. The results of the shift share analysis by provinces according to employment, 
1980-1990-1999 
PROVINCES SECTOR 1980 1990 gij rbj kij cij 
ADANA 38 1.319 2.821 224,23 0,48 413,16 864,61 
ADANA 36 1.309 1.433 222,53 0,38 268,77 -367,30 
ADANA 35 3.135 6.455 532,95 0,43 800,36 1.986,69 
ADANA 34 182 0 30,94 0,69 94,09 -307,03 
ADANA 33 415 241 70,55 0,24 29,27 -273,82 
ADANA 32 23.534 19.719 4000,78 0,77 14.031,64 -21.847,42 
ADANA 31 3.271 4.444 556,07 0,47 995,70 -378,77 
ADANA 3 33.283 35.455 5658,11 0,55 12.594,78 -16.080,89 
AFYON 36 198 1.677 33,66 0,38 40,65 1.404,69 
AFYON 35 363 678 61,71 0,43 92,67 160,62 
AFYON 31 403 830 68,51 0,47 122,67 235,82 
AFYON 3 1.103 3.619 187,51 0,55 417,39 1.911,10 
AFYON 38 0 225 0 0,48 0,00 0,00 
AĞRI 3 50 0 8,5 0,55 18,92 -77,42 
AMASYA 31 394 1.341 66,98 0,47 119,93 760,09 
AMASYA 3 554 1.578 94,18 0,55 209,64 720,18 
AMASYA 38 0 32 0 0,48 0,00 0,00 
AMASYA 36 0 205 0 0,38 0,00 0,00 
ANKARA 38 6.808 15.434 1157,36 0,48 2.132,53 5.336,11 
ANKARA 37 977 1.673 166,09 0,45 272,47 257,44 
ANKARA 36 1.665 2.123 283,05 0,38 341,86 -166,91 
ANKARA 35 661 732 112,37 0,43 168,75 -210,12 
ANKARA 34 911 1.098 154,87 0,69 470,97 -438,84 
ANKARA 33 624 1.495 106,08 0,24 44,01 720,91 
ANKARA 31 5.467 5.329 929,39 0,47 1.664,16 -2.731,55 
ANKARA 3 17.591 30.598 2990,47 0,55 6.656,69 3.359,84 
ANTALYA 38 66 0 11,22 0,48 20,67 -97,89 
ANTALYA 35 113 113 19,21 0,43 28,85 -48,06 
ANTALYA 32 2.038 2.286 346,46 0,77 1.215,11 -1.313,57 
ANTALYA 31 939 1.121 159,63 0,47 285,83 -263,46 
ANTALYA 3 3.303 3.799 561,51 0,55 1.249,90 -1.315,41 
ANTALYA 36 0 165 0 0,38 0,00 0,00 
ARTVİN 3 48 0 8,16 0,55 18,16 -74,32 
AYDIN 38 220 746 37,4 0,48 68,91 419,69 
AYDIN 36 362 850 61,54 0,38 74,33 352,13 
AYDIN 35 79 76 13,43 0,43 20,17 -36,60 
AYDIN 32 3.262 3.481 554,54 0,77 1.944,90 -2.280,44 
AYDIN 31 397 574 67,49 0,47 120,85 -11,34 
AYDIN 3 4.386 5.976 745,62 0,55 1.659,73 -815,35 
BALIKESİR 38 491 831 83,47 0,48 153,80 102,73 
BALIKESİR 37 117 0 19,89 0,45 32,63 -169,52 
BALIKESİR 35 598 945 101,66 0,43 152,67 92,67 
BALIKESİR 32 1.121 750 190,57 0,77 668,37 -1.229,94 
BALIKESİR 31 1.294 2.750 219,98 0,47 393,89 842,13 
BALIKESİR 3 3.779 5.846 642,43 0,55 1.430,03 -5,46 
BALIKESİR 36 0 497 0 0,38 0,00 0,00 
BİLECİK 38 619 4.693 105,23 0,48 193,89 3.774,88 
BİLECİK 36 321 4.184 54,57 0,38 65,91 3.742,52 
 g
BİLECİK 32 242 0 41,14 0,77 144,29 -427,43 
BİLECİK 31 144 135 24,48 0,47 43,83 -77,31 
BİLECİK 3 1.638 10.693 278,46 0,55 619,84 8.156,70 
BİLECİK 37 0 719 0 0,45 0,00 0,00 
BOLU 38 701 1.320 119,17 0,48 219,58 280,25 
BOLU 36 486 1.285 82,62 0,38 99,79 616,59 
BOLU 35 268 635 45,56 0,43 68,42 253,02 
BOLU 33 813 2.272 138,21 0,24 57,34 1.263,45 
BOLU 31 636 2.012 108,12 0,47 193,60 1.074,28 
BOLU 3 2.943 8.124 500,31 0,55 1.113,67 3.567,02 
BURDUR 36 196 328 33,32 0,38 40,24 58,44 
BURDUR 31 154 191 26,18 0,47 46,88 -36,06 
BURDUR 3 611 1.073 103,87 0,55 231,21 126,92 
BURDUR 38 0 239 0 0,48 0,00 0,00 
BURDUR 33 0 129 0 0,24 0,00 0,00 
BURDUR 32 0 186 0 0,77 0,00 0,00 
BURSA 38 9.809 19.976 1667,53 0,48 3.072,55 5.426,92 
BURSA 37 900 0 153 0,45 251,00 -1.304,00 
BURSA 36 1.170 1.329 198,9 0,38 240,23 -280,13 
BURSA 35 1.285 2.468 218,45 0,43 328,06 636,49 
BURSA 33 465 828 79,05 0,24 32,79 251,16 
BURSA 32 12.831 31.213 2181,27 0,77 7.650,21 8.550,52 
BURSA 31 2.331 7.354 396,27 0,47 709,56 3.917,17 
BURSA 3 28.936 64.237 4919,12 0,55 10.949,81 19.432,07 
BURSA 34 0 411 0 0,69 0,00 0,00 
ÇANAKKALE 36 3.550 4.204 603,5 0,38 728,89 -678,39 
ÇANAKKALE 31 1.103 2.239 187,51 0,47 335,75 612,74 
ÇANAKKALE 3 4.712 6.521 801,04 0,55 1.783,09 -775,13 
ÇANKIRI 3 101 353 17,17 0,55 38,22 196,61 
ÇORUM 38 80 292 13,6 0,48 25,06 173,34 
ÇORUM 36 1.012 2.086 172,04 0,38 207,78 694,18 
ÇORUM 31 233 330 39,61 0,47 70,93 -13,54 
ÇORUM 3 1.376 3.183 233,92 0,55 520,70 1.052,38 
DENİZLİ 38 1.465 1.674 249,05 0,48 458,89 -498,94 
DENİZLİ 37 473 861 80,41 0,45 131,91 175,68 
DENİZLİ 36 197 121 33,49 0,38 40,45 -149,94 
DENİZLİ 35 445 328 75,65 0,43 113,61 -306,26 
DENİZLİ 33 182 228 30,94 0,24 12,84 2,22 
DENİZLİ 32 2.579 5.798 438,43 0,77 1.537,67 1.242,90 
DENİZLİ 31 526 441 89,42 0,47 160,11 -334,53 
DENİZLİ 3 6.062 9.999 1030,54 0,55 2.293,95 612,51 
DİYARBAKIR 31 42 101 7,14 0,47 12,78 39,08 
DİYARBAKIR 3 134 224 22,78 0,55 50,71 16,51 
EDİRNE 32 1.473 2.611 250,41 0,77 878,24 9,35 
EDİRNE 31 1.052 1.414 178,84 0,47 320,23 -137,07 
EDİRNE 3 2.773 4.653 471,41 0,55 1.049,34 359,25 
EDİRNE 36 0 233 0 0,38 0,00 0,00 
ELAZIĞ 38 48 86 8,16 0,48 15,04 14,80 
ELAZIĞ 36 327 594 55,59 0,38 67,14 144,27 
ELAZIĞ 31 129 568 21,93 0,47 39,27 377,80 
ELAZIĞ 3 1.066 1.586 181,22 0,55 403,39 -64,61 
ERZİNCAN 38 73 0 12,41 0,48 22,87 -108,28 
 h
ERZİNCAN 31 218 140 37,06 0,47 66,36 -181,42 
ERZİNCAN 3 441 606 74,97 0,55 166,88 -76,85 
ERZİNCAN 36 0 259 0 0,38 0,00 0,00 
ERZURUM 38 54 0 9,18 0,48 16,91 -80,09 
ERZURUM 31 301 376 51,17 0,47 91,62 -67,79 
ERZURUM 3 490 471 83,3 0,55 185,42 -287,72 
ESKİŞEHİR 38 817 4.031 138,89 0,48 255,92 2.819,19 
ESKİŞEHİR 37 253 1.021 43,01 0,45 70,56 654,43 
ESKİŞEHİR 36 2.195 1.889 373,15 0,38 450,68 -1.129,83 
ESKİŞEHİR 33 154 273 26,18 0,24 10,86 81,96 
ESKİŞEHİR 32 291 1.558 49,47 0,77 173,50 1.044,03 
ESKİŞEHİR 31 2.393 2.637 406,81 0,47 728,43 -891,24 
ESKİŞEHİR 3 6.257 11.680 1063,69 0,55 2.367,74 1.991,57 
GAZİANTEP 38 379 404 64,43 0,48 118,72 -158,15 
GAZİANTEP 37 39 108 6,63 0,45 10,88 51,49 
GAZİANTEP 35 714 756 121,38 0,43 182,28 -261,66 
GAZİANTEP 34 99 191 16,83 0,69 51,18 23,99 
GAZİANTEP 32 3.634 8.878 617,78 0,77 2.166,69 2.459,53 
GAZİANTEP 31 502 1.151 85,34 0,47 152,81 410,85 
GAZİANTEP 3 5.650 11.812 960,5 0,55 2.138,04 3.063,46 
GİRESUN 31 1.673 1.350 284,41 0,47 509,26 -1.116,67 
GİRESUN 3 1.777 1.585 302,09 0,55 672,44 -1.166,53 
GÜMÜŞHANE 3 0 139 0 0,55 0,00 0,00 
HATAY 38 516 1.195 87,72 0,48 161,63 429,65 
HATAY 36 126 139 21,42 0,38 25,87 -34,29 
HATAY 35 511 459 86,87 0,43 130,46 -269,33 
HATAY 33 68 0 11,56 0,24 4,80 -84,36 
HATAY 32 1.541 740 261,97 0,77 918,79 -1.981,76 
HATAY 31 577 432 98,09 0,47 175,64 -418,73 
HATAY 3 3.339 4.151 567,63 0,55 1.263,53 -1.019,16 
HATAY 37 0 1.113 0 0,45 0,00 0,00 
İÇEL 38 819 1.090 139,23 0,48 256,54 -124,77 
İÇEL 36 1.997 2.250 339,49 0,38 410,03 -496,52 
İÇEL 35 1.789 2.452 304,13 0,43 456,73 -97,86 
İÇEL 33 158 0 26,86 0,24 11,14 -196,00 
İÇEL 32 6.257 4.922 1063,69 0,77 3.730,60 -6.129,29 
İÇEL 31 808 818 137,36 0,47 245,96 -373,32 
İÇEL 3 11.828 11.710 2010,76 0,55 4.475,89 -6.604,65 
ISPARTA 33 440 380 74,8 0,24 31,03 -165,83 
ISPARTA 32 612 1.013 104,04 0,77 364,89 -67,93 
ISPARTA 31 494 324 83,98 0,47 150,37 -404,35 
ISPARTA 3 2.074 2.752 352,58 0,55 784,83 -459,41 
ISPARTA 35 0 443 0 0,43 0,00 0,00 
İSTANBUL 39 2.443 4.285 415,31 0,53 890,75 535,94 
İSTANBUL 38 70.984 80.851 12067,28 0,48 22.234,91 -24.435,19 
İSTANBUL 37 11.015 11.826 1872,55 0,45 3.071,95 -4.133,50 
İSTANBUL 36 13.493 12.600 2293,81 0,38 2.770,40 -5.957,21 
İSTANBUL 35 26.657 34.974 4531,69 0,43 6.805,48 -3.020,17 
İSTANBUL 34 8.239 12.756 1400,63 0,69 4.259,37 -1.143,00 
İSTANBUL 33 4.387 3.279 745,79 0,24 309,38 -2.163,17 
İSTANBUL 32 59.258 116.279 10073,86 0,77 35.331,30 11.615,84 
İSTANBUL 31 15.205 17.825 2584,85 0,47 4.628,41 -4.593,26 
 i
İSTANBUL 3 211.681 294.675 35985,77 0,55 80.103,22 -33.094,99 
İZMİR 39 397 285 67,49 0,53 144,75 -324,24 
İZMİR 38 11.668 15.381 1983,56 0,48 3.654,86 -1.925,42 
İZMİR 37 2.299 3.590 390,83 0,45 641,16 259,01 
İZMİR 36 2.958 3.875 502,86 0,38 607,34 -193,20 
İZMİR 35 4.295 5.180 730,15 0,43 1.096,51 -941,66 
İZMİR 34 1.511 2.633 256,87 0,69 781,15 83,98 
İZMİR 33 764 781 129,88 0,24 53,88 -166,76 
İZMİR 32 11.078 22.119 1883,26 0,77 6.605,02 2.552,72 
İZMİR 31 16.017 20.492 2722,89 0,47 4.875,59 -3.123,48 
İZMİR 3 50.987 74.336 8667,79 0,55 19.294,23 -4.613,02 
K.MARAŞ 37 33 0 5,61 0,45 9,20 -47,81 
K.MARAŞ 31 152 323 25,84 0,47 46,27 98,89 
K.MARAŞ 3 679 2.395 115,43 0,55 256,94 1.343,63 
K.MARAŞ 38 0 157 0 0,48 0,00 0,00 
K.MARAŞ 32 0 1.704 0 0,77 0,00 0,00 
KARS 31 120 83 20,4 0,47 36,53 -93,93 
KARS 3 120 83 20,4 0,55 45,41 -102,81 
KASTAMONU 33 529 501 89,93 0,24 37,31 -155,24 
KASTAMONU 31 52 67 8,84 0,47 15,83 -9,67 
KASTAMONU 3 745 1.055 126,65 0,55 281,92 -98,57 
KASTAMONU 36 0 309 0 0,38 0,00 0,00 
KASTAMONU 32 0 121 0 0,77 0,00 0,00 
KAYSERİ 38 1.759 3.382 299,03 0,48 550,99 772,98 
KAYSERİ 37 1.077 488 183,09 0,45 300,36 -1.072,45 
KAYSERİ 35 181 0 30,77 0,43 46,21 -257,98 
KAYSERİ 33 38 0 6,46 0,24 2,68 -47,14 
KAYSERİ 32 6.139 7.479 1043,63 0,77 3.660,25 -3.363,88 
KAYSERİ 31 885 2.950 150,45 0,47 269,39 1.645,16 
KAYSERİ 3 10.205 14.771 1734,85 0,55 3.861,72 -1.030,57 
KIRKLARELİ 38 48 522 8,16 0,48 15,04 450,80 
KIRKLARELİ 31 978 775 166,26 0,47 297,70 -666,96 
KIRKLARELİ 3 1.098 6.060 186,66 0,55 415,50 4.359,84 
KIRKLARELİ 36 0 2.624 0 0,38 0,00 0,00 
KIRKLARELİ 32 0 1.422 0 0,77 0,00 0,00 
KIRŞEHİR 3 152 875 25,84 0,55 57,52 639,64 
KOCAELİ 38 9.421 12.486 1601,57 0,48 2.951,02 -1.487,59 
KOCAELİ 37 5.254 9.227 893,18 0,45 1.465,28 1.614,54 
KOCAELİ 36 3.431 4.856 583,27 0,38 704,46 137,27 
KOCAELİ 35 8.076 14.012 1372,92 0,43 2.061,79 2.501,29 
KOCAELİ 34 1.244 1.192 211,48 0,69 643,12 -906,60 
KOCAELİ 32 1.209 0 205,53 0,77 720,84 -2.135,37 
KOCAELİ 31 1.284 1.302 218,28 0,47 390,85 -591,13 
KOCAELİ 3 30.351 46.708 5159,67 0,55 11.485,27 -287,94 
KOCAELİ 33 0 696 0 0,24 0,00 0,00 
KONYA 38 907 1.957 154,19 0,48 284,11 611,70 
KONYA 37 202 354 34,34 0,45 56,34 61,32 
KONYA 36 684 528 116,28 0,38 140,44 -412,72 
KONYA 35 321 235 54,57 0,43 81,95 -222,52 
KONYA 32 510 0 86,7 0,77 304,08 -900,78 
KONYA 31 1.938 3.514 329,46 0,47 589,93 656,61 
KONYA 3 4.664 7.156 792,88 0,55 1.764,93 -65,81 
 j
KONYA 34 0 455 0 0,69 0,00 0,00 
KÜTAHYA 36 1.081 2.144 183,77 0,38 221,95 657,28 
KÜTAHYA 33 412 304 70,04 0,24 29,06 -207,10 
KÜTAHYA 31 127 798 21,59 0,47 38,66 610,75 
KÜTAHYA 3 2.154 3.997 366,18 0,55 815,11 661,71 
KÜTAHYA 35 0 181 0 0,43 0,00 0,00 
KÜTAHYA 32 0 570 0 0,77 0,00 0,00 
MALATYA 36 58 0 9,86 0,38 11,91 -79,77 
MALATYA 32 407 1.163 69,19 0,77 242,66 444,15 
MALATYA 31 138 76 23,46 0,47 42,01 -127,47 
MALATYA 3 720 1.449 122,4 0,55 272,46 334,14 
MANİSA 38 654 5.977 111,18 0,48 204,86 5.006,96 
MANİSA 36 4.397 4.030 747,49 0,38 902,80 -2.017,29 
MANİSA 35 239 2.234 40,63 0,43 61,02 1.893,35 
MANİSA 32 1.875 4.350 318,75 0,77 1.117,93 1.038,32 
MANİSA 31 907 1.935 154,19 0,47 276,09 597,72 
MANİSA 3 8.339 19.200 1417,63 0,55 3.155,60 6.287,77 
MANİSA 37 0 184 0 0,45 0,00 0,00 
MUĞLA 33 59 83 10,03 0,24 4,16 9,81 
MUĞLA 32 279 127 47,43 0,77 166,35 -365,78 
MUĞLA 31 42 0 7,14 0,47 12,78 -61,92 
MUĞLA 3 486 500 82,62 0,55 183,91 -252,53 
NEVŞEHİR 38 31 0 5,27 0,48 9,71 -45,98 
NEVŞEHİR 36 111 528 18,87 0,38 22,79 375,34 
NEVŞEHİR 31 405 420 68,85 0,47 123,28 -177,13 
NEVŞEHİR 3 769 1.157 130,73 0,55 291,00 -33,73 
NİĞDE 3 1.431 1.959 243,27 0,55 541,51 -256,78 
ORDU 31 2.089 2.824 355,13 0,47 635,89 -256,02 
ORDU 3 2.760 3.443 469,2 0,55 1.044,42 -830,62 
ORDU 35 0 72 0 0,43 0,00 0,00 
RİZE 3 232 2.396 39,44 0,55 87,79 2.036,77 
SAKARYA 38 251 2.489 42,67 0,48 78,62 2.116,71 
SAKARYA 35 1.336 335 227,12 0,43 341,08 -1.569,20 
SAKARYA 33 651 490 110,67 0,24 45,91 -317,58 
SAKARYA 31 807 1.914 137,19 0,47 245,65 724,16 
SAKARYA 3 3.388 5.727 575,96 0,55 1.282,07 480,97 
SAKARYA 36 0 215 0 0,38 0,00 0,00 
SAMSUN 38 351 343 59,67 0,48 109,95 -177,62 
SAMSUN 36 232 478 39,44 0,38 47,63 158,93 
SAMSUN 35 515 763 87,55 0,43 131,48 28,97 
SAMSUN 32 194 497 32,98 0,77 115,67 154,35 
SAMSUN 31 760 1.122 129,2 0,47 231,34 1,46 
SAMSUN 3 2.178 3.875 370,26 0,55 824,19 502,55 
SAMSUN 37 0 339 0 0,45 0,00 0,00 
SAMSUN 33 0 333 0 0,24 0,00 0,00 
SİNOP 36 476 1.244 80,92 0,38 97,73 589,35 
SİNOP 3 633 1.797 107,61 0,55 239,54 816,85 
SİVAS 31 293 160 49,81 0,47 89,19 -272,00 
SİVAS 3 471 324 80,07 0,55 178,23 -405,30 
ŞANLIURFA 3 470 518 79,9 0,55 177,85 -209,75 
TEKİRDAĞ 38 3.639 5.579 618,63 0,48 1.139,87 181,50 
TEKİRDAĞ 36 347 1.094 58,99 0,38 71,25 616,76 
 k
TEKİRDAĞ 35 246 0 41,82 0,43 62,80 -350,62 
TEKİRDAĞ 32 3.338 11.739 567,46 0,77 1.990,21 5.843,33 
TEKİRDAĞ 31 1.517 2.466 257,89 0,47 461,78 229,33 
TEKİRDAĞ 3 9.308 21.995 1582,36 0,55 3.522,28 7.582,36 
TEKİRDAĞ 34 0 591 0 0,69 0,00 0,00 
TEKİRDAĞ 33 0 317 0 0,24 0,00 0,00 
TOKAT 36 627 693 106,59 0,38 128,74 -169,33 
TOKAT 31 296 636 50,32 0,47 90,10 199,58 
TOKAT 3 1.173 1.757 199,41 0,55 443,88 -59,29 
TOKAT 33 0 137 0 0,24 0,00 0,00 
TRABZON 38 168 213 28,56 0,48 52,62 -36,18 
TRABZON 37 63 180 10,71 0,45 17,57 88,72 
TRABZON 36 225 0 38,25 0,38 46,20 -309,45 
TRABZON 35 232 92 39,44 0,43 59,23 -238,67 
TRABZON 31 927 992 157,59 0,47 282,18 -374,77 
TRABZON 3 1.695 1.774 288,15 0,55 641,41 -850,56 
UŞAK 38 68 0 11,56 0,48 21,30 -100,86 
UŞAK 36 372 367 63,24 0,38 76,38 -144,62 
UŞAK 32 1.439 2.602 244,63 0,77 857,97 60,40 
UŞAK 31 144 0 24,48 0,47 43,83 -212,31 
UŞAK 3 2.067 3.052 351,39 0,55 782,18 -148,57 
VAN 3 267 56 45,39 0,55 101,04 -357,43 
VAN 31 267 56 45,39 0,47 81,28 -337,67 
YOZGAT 36 373 0 63,41 0,38 76,58 -512,99 
YOZGAT 31 40 253 6,8 0,47 12,18 194,02 
YOZGAT 3 557 907 94,69 0,55 210,78 44,53 
ZONGULDAK 38 119 0 20,23 0,48 37,28 -176,51 
ZONGULDAK 37 1.430 1.584 243,1 0,45 398,81 -487,91 
ZONGULDAK 36 803 912 136,51 0,38 164,87 -192,38 
ZONGULDAK 31 565 523 96,05 0,47 171,99 -310,04 
ZONGULDAK 3 3.185 3.493 541,45 0,55 1.205,25 -1.438,70 
TURKEY 39 3.077 4.722 523,09    
TURKEY 38 125.524 186.182 21339,08    
TURKEY 37 24.632 35.689 4187,44    
TURKEY 36 47.514 65.347 8077,38    
TURKEY 35 53.158 75.766 9036,86    
TURKEY 34 13.622 22.980 2315,74    
TURKEY 33 11.475 14.235 1950,75    
TURKEY 32 148.829 262.866 25300,93    
TURKEY 31 71.975 106.120 12235,75    
TURKEY 3 499.806 773.907 84967,02    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 l
PROVINCES SECTOR 1990 1999 gij rbj kij cij 
ADANA 38 2821 3542 338,52 0,25 369,84 12,64 
ADANA 36 1433 1009 171,96 0,16 53,49 -649,45 
ADANA 35 6455 5217 774,60 0,17 346,76 -2.359,36 
ADANA 33 241 267 28,92 0,81 165,15 -168,07 
ADANA 32 19719 15273 2.366,28 0,37 4.882,38 -11.694,66 
ADANA 31 4444 3418 533,28 0,16 191,57 -1.750,85 
ADANA 3 35455 29511 4.254,60 0,26 5.119,79 -15.318,39 
ADANA 37 0 315 0,00 0,12 0,00 0,00 
ADANA 34 0 470 0,00 0,08 0,00 0,00 
ADIYAMAN 3 111 688 13,32 0,26 16,03 547,65 
AFYON 38 225 529 27,00 0,25 29,50 247,50 
AFYON 36 1677 1686 201,24 0,16 62,60 -254,84 
AFYON 35 678 246 81,36 0,17 36,42 -549,78 
AFYON 31 830 1034 99,60 0,16 35,78 68,62 
AFYON 3 3619 3937 434,28 0,26 522,59 -638,87 
AFYON 33 0 130 0,00 0,81 0,00 0,00 
AFYON 32 0 312 0,00 0,37 0,00 0,00 
AĞRI 3 0 128 0,00 0,26 0,00 0,00 
AKSARAY 31 170 175 20,40 0,16 7,33 -22,73 
AKSARAY 3 251 930 30,12 0,26 36,25 612,63 
AKSARAY 38 0 340 0,00 0,25 0,00 0,00 
AKSARAY 32 0 239 0,00 0,37 0,00 0,00 
AMASYA 38 32 0 3,84 0,25 4,20 -40,04 
AMASYA 36 205 123 24,60 0,16 7,65 -114,25 
AMASYA 31 1341 1218 160,92 0,16 57,81 -341,73 
AMASYA 3 1578 1956 189,36 0,26 227,87 -39,23 
AMASYA 32 0 465 0,00 0,37 0,00 0,00 
ANKARA 38 15434 26182 1.852,08 0,25 2.023,46 6.872,46 
ANKARA 37 1673 1660 200,76 0,12 -2,80 -210,96 
ANKARA 36 2123 3488 254,76 0,16 79,25 1.030,99 
ANKARA 35 732 2023 87,84 0,17 39,32 1.163,84 
ANKARA 34 1098 1975 131,76 0,08 -47,90 793,14 
ANKARA 33 1495 2549 179,40 0,81 1.024,48 -149,88 
ANKARA 31 5329 5353 639,48 0,16 229,72 -845,20 
ANKARA 3 30598 51365 3.671,76 0,26 4.418,43 12.676,81 
ANKARA 39 0 85 0,00 0,65 0,00 0,00 
ANKARA 32 0 8050 0,00 0,37 0,00 0,00 
ANTALYA 36 165 550 19,80 0,16 6,16 359,04 
ANTALYA 35 113 570 13,56 0,17 6,07 437,37 
ANTALYA 32 2286 2805 274,32 0,37 566,01 -321,33 
ANTALYA 31 1121 701 134,52 0,16 48,32 -602,84 
ANTALYA 3 3799 4884 455,88 0,26 548,59 80,53 
ANTALYA 38 0 112 0,00 0,25 0,00 0,00 
ARTVİN 3 0 228 0,00 0,26 0,00 0,00 
AYDIN 38 746 1264 89,52 0,25 97,80 330,68 
AYDIN 36 850 1266 102,00 0,16 31,73 282,27 
AYDIN 35 76 0 9,12 0,17 4,08 -89,20 
AYDIN 32 3481 3491 417,72 0,37 861,89 -1.269,61 
AYDIN 31 574 864 68,88 0,16 24,74 196,38 
AYDIN 3 5976 7148 717,12 0,26 862,95 -408,07 
 m
AYDIN 33 0 154 0,00 0,81 0,00 0,00 
BALIKESİR 38 831 1146 99,72 0,25 108,95 106,33 
BALIKESİR 36 497 598 59,64 0,16 18,55 22,81 
BALIKESİR 35 945 747 113,40 0,17 50,76 -362,16 
BALIKESİR 32 750 392 90,00 0,37 185,70 -633,70 
BALIKESİR 31 2750 5959 330,00 0,16 118,55 2.760,45 
BALIKESİR 3 5846 9196 701,52 0,26 844,18 1.804,30 
BALIKESİR 37 0 70 0,00 0,12 0,00 0,00 
BALIKESİR 33 0 284 0,00 0,81 0,00 0,00 
BİLECİK 38 4693 3940 563,16 0,25 615,27 -1.931,43 
BİLECİK 37 719 0 86,28 0,12 -1,20 -804,08 
BİLECİK 36 4184 5579 502,08 0,16 156,19 736,73 
BİLECİK 31 135 167 16,20 0,16 5,82 9,98 
BİLECİK 3 10693 11161 1.283,16 0,26 1.544,10 -2.359,26 
BİLECİK 35 0 632 0,00 0,17 0,00 0,00 
BİLECİK 34 0 463 0,00 0,08 0,00 0,00 
BOLU 38 1320 2188 158,40 0,25 173,06 536,54 
BOLU 36 1285 0 154,20 0,16 47,97 -1.487,17 
BOLU 35 635 1692 76,20 0,17 34,11 946,69 
BOLU 33 2272 2103 272,64 0,81 1.556,93 -1.998,57 
BOLU 31 2012 4970 241,44 0,16 86,73 2.629,83 
BOLU 3 8124 13486 974,88 0,26 1.173,13 3.213,99 
BOLU 37 0 647 0,00 0,12 0,00 0,00 
BOLU 32 0 842 0,00 0,37 0,00 0,00 
BURDUR 38 239 488 28,68 0,25 31,33 188,99 
BURDUR 36 328 633 39,36 0,16 12,24 253,40 
BURDUR 33 129 85 15,48 0,81 88,40 -147,88 
BURDUR 32 186 237 22,32 0,37 46,05 -17,37 
BURDUR 31 191 284 22,92 0,16 8,23 61,85 
BURDUR 3 1073 1727 128,76 0,26 154,94 370,30 
BURSA 38 19976 25325 2.397,12 0,25 2.618,93 332,95 
BURSA 36 1329 1931 159,48 0,16 49,61 392,91 
BURSA 35 2468 4118 296,16 0,17 132,58 1.221,26 
BURSA 34 411 0 49,32 0,08 -17,93 -442,39 
BURSA 33 828 1446 99,36 0,81 567,40 -48,76 
BURSA 32 31213 47546 3.745,56 0,37 7.728,27 4.859,17 
BURSA 31 7354 10122 882,48 0,16 317,01 1.568,51 
BURSA 3 64237 95000 7.708,44 0,26 9.275,99 13.778,57 
BURSA 37 0 3534 0,00 0,12 0,00 0,00 
ÇANAKKALE 36 4204 1575 504,48 0,16 156,93 -3.290,41 
ÇANAKKALE 31 2239 2193 268,68 0,16 96,52 -411,20 
ÇANAKKALE 3 6521 4408 782,52 0,26 941,65 -3.837,17 
ÇANAKKALE 32 0 368 0,00 0,37 0,00 0,00 
ÇANKIRI 3 353 1095 42,36 0,26 50,97 648,67 
ÇORUM 38 292 590 35,04 0,25 38,28 224,68 
ÇORUM 36 2086 2123 250,32 0,16 77,87 -291,19 
ÇORUM 31 330 421 39,60 0,16 14,23 37,17 
ÇORUM 3 3183 4348 381,96 0,26 459,63 323,41 
ÇORUM 37 0 76 0,00 0,12 0,00 0,00 
ÇORUM 32 0 694 0,00 0,37 0,00 0,00 
D.BAKIR 3 224 791 26,88 0,26 32,35 507,77 
DENİZLİ 38 1674 1889 200,88 0,25 219,47 -205,35 
 n
DENİZLİ 37 861 1042 103,32 0,12 -1,44 79,12 
DENİZLİ 36 121 2240 14,52 0,16 4,52 2.099,96 
DENİZLİ 35 328 556 39,36 0,17 17,62 171,02 
DENİZLİ 33 228 0 27,36 0,81 156,24 -411,60 
DENİZLİ 32 5798 27403 695,76 0,37 1.435,57 19.473,67 
DENİZLİ 31 441 1029 52,92 0,16 19,01 516,07 
DENİZLİ 3 9999 35074 1.199,88 0,26 1.443,88 22.431,24 
DENİZLİ 34 0 544 0,00 0,08 0,00 0,00 
EDİRNE 36 233 328 27,96 0,16 8,70 58,34 
EDİRNE 32 2611 2410 313,32 0,37 646,48 -1.160,80 
EDİRNE 31 1414 1673 169,68 0,16 60,95 28,37 
EDİRNE 3 4653 4602 558,36 0,26 671,91 -1.281,27 
ELAZIĞ 38 86 197 10,32 0,25 11,27 89,41 
ELAZIĞ 36 594 555 71,28 0,16 22,17 -132,45 
ELAZIĞ 31 568 499 68,16 0,16 24,49 -161,65 
ELAZIĞ 3 1586 1662 190,32 0,26 229,02 -343,34 
ERZİNCAN 31 140 128 16,80 0,16 6,04 -34,84 
ERZİNCAN 3 606 498 72,72 0,26 87,51 -268,23 
ERZURUM 31 376 363 45,12 0,16 16,21 -74,33 
ERZURUM 3 471 826 56,52 0,26 68,01 230,47 
ESKİŞEHİR 38 4031 6263 483,72 0,25 528,48 1.219,80 
ESKİŞEHİR 37 1021 0 122,52 0,12 -1,71 -1.141,81 
ESKİŞEHİR 36 1889 2486 226,68 0,16 70,52 299,80 
ESKİŞEHİR 33 273 711 32,76 0,81 187,08 218,16 
ESKİŞEHİR 32 1558 1855 186,96 0,37 385,76 -275,72 
ESKİŞEHİR 31 2637 3434 316,44 0,16 113,68 366,88 
ESKİŞEHİR 3 11680 16112 1.401,60 0,26 1.686,62 1.343,78 
ESKİŞEHİR 35 0 660 0,00 0,17 0,00 0,00 
ESKİŞEHİR 34 0 472 0,00 0,08 0,00 0,00 
GAZİANTEP 38 404 782 48,48 0,25 52,97 276,55 
GAZİANTEP 37 108 72 12,96 0,12 -0,18 -48,78 
GAZİANTEP 35 756 1368 90,72 0,17 40,61 480,67 
GAZİANTEP 34 191 341 22,92 0,08 -8,33 135,41 
GAZİANTEP 32 8878 16799 1.065,36 0,37 2.198,17 4.657,47 
GAZİANTEP 31 1151 1976 138,12 0,16 49,62 637,26 
GAZİANTEP 3 11812 22025 1.417,44 0,26 1.705,68 7.089,88 
GAZİANTEP 36 0 412 0,00 0,16 0,00 0,00 
GAZİANTEP 33 0 275 0,00 0,81 0,00 0,00 
GİRESUN 31 1350 2506 162,00 0,16 58,20 935,80 
GİRESUN 3 1585 2619 190,20 0,26 228,88 614,92 
HATAY 38 1195 1347 143,40 0,25 156,67 -148,07 
HATAY 37 1113 1853 133,56 0,12 -1,86 608,30 
HATAY 36 139 286 16,68 0,16 5,19 125,13 
HATAY 35 459 0 55,08 0,17 24,66 -538,74 
HATAY 32 740 624 88,80 0,37 183,22 -388,02 
HATAY 31 432 489 51,84 0,16 18,62 -13,46 
HATAY 3 4151 4828 498,12 0,26 599,42 -420,54 
İÇEL 38 1090 1445 130,80 0,25 142,90 81,30 
İÇEL 36 2250 2829 270,00 0,16 83,99 225,01 
İÇEL 35 2452 1864 294,24 0,17 131,72 -1.013,96 
İÇEL 32 4922 5762 590,64 0,37 1.218,68 -969,32 
İÇEL 31 818 1846 98,16 0,16 35,26 894,58 
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İÇEL 3 11710 14491 1.405,20 0,26 1.690,95 -315,15 
İÇEL 34 0 160 0,00 0,08 0,00 0,00 
İÇEL 33 0 444 0,00 0,81 0,00 0,00 
ISPARTA 33 380 521 45,60 0,81 260,40 -165,00 
ISPARTA 32 1013 1693 121,56 0,37 250,82 307,62 
ISPARTA 31 324 591 38,88 0,16 13,97 214,15 
ISPARTA 3 2752 3619 330,24 0,26 397,40 139,36 
ISPARTA 36 443 375 53,16 0,16 16,54 -137,70 
İSTANBUL 39 4285 6400 514,20 0,65 2.253,54 -652,74 
İSTANBUL 38 80851 76923 9.702,12 0,25 10.599,87 -24.229,99 
İSTANBUL 37 11826 7137 1.419,12 0,12 -19,78 -6.088,34 
İSTANBUL 36 12600 11232 1.512,00 0,16 470,35 -3.350,35 
İSTANBUL 35 34974 31697 4.196,88 0,17 1.878,77 -9.352,65 
İSTANBUL 34 12756 11198 1.530,72 0,08 -556,53 -2.532,19 
İSTANBUL 33 3279 3588 393,48 0,81 2.247,00 -2.331,48 
İSTANBUL 32 116279 128521 13.953,48 0,37 28.790,44 -30.501,92 
İSTANBUL 31 17825 14834 2.139,00 0,16 768,40 -5.898,40 
İSTANBUL 3 294675 291530 35.361,00 0,26 42.551,83 -81.057,83 
İZMİR 39 285 501 34,20 0,65 149,89 31,91 
İZMİR 38 15381 19255 1.845,72 0,25 2.016,51 11,77 
İZMİR 37 3590 5013 430,80 0,12 -6,00 998,20 
İZMİR 36 3875 4469 465,00 0,16 144,65 -15,65 
İZMİR 35 5180 7445 621,60 0,17 278,26 1.365,14 
İZMİR 34 2633 3378 315,96 0,08 -114,88 543,92 
İZMİR 33 781 1498 93,72 0,81 535,19 88,09 
İZMİR 32 22119 18247 2.654,28 0,37 5.476,62 -12.002,90 
İZMİR 31 20492 18005 2.459,04 0,16 883,37 -5.829,41 
İZMİR 3 74336 77811 8.920,32 0,26 10.734,31 -16.179,63 
K.MARAŞ 38 157 435 18,84 0,25 20,58 238,58 
K.MARAŞ 32 1704 6528 204,48 0,37 421,91 4.197,61 
K.MARAŞ 31 323 419 38,76 0,16 13,92 43,32 
K.MARAŞ 3 2395 7799 287,40 0,26 345,84 4.770,76 
K.MARAŞ 37 0 118 0,00 0,12 0,00 0,00 
KARAMAN 31 2279 4573 273,48 0,16 98,24 1.922,28 
KARAMAN 3 2279 5136 273,48 0,26 329,09 2.254,43 
KARS 3 83 272 9,96 0,26 11,99 167,05 
KASTAMONU 36 309 341 37,08 0,16 11,53 -16,61 
KASTAMONU 33 501 0 60,12 0,81 343,32 -904,44 
KASTAMONU 32 121 928 14,52 0,37 29,96 762,52 
KASTAMONU 31 67 125 8,04 0,16 2,89 47,07 
KASTAMONU 3 1055 2023 126,60 0,26 152,34 689,06 
KAYSERİ 38 3382 5570 405,84 0,25 443,39 1.338,77 
KAYSERİ 37 488 786 58,56 0,12 -0,82 240,26 
KAYSERİ 32 7479 8256 897,48 0,37 1.851,78 -1.972,26 
KAYSERİ 31 2950 2051 354,00 0,16 127,17 -1.380,17 
KAYSERİ 3 14771 23323 1.772,52 0,26 2.132,97 4.646,51 
KAYSERİ 36 0 305 0,00 0,16 0,00 0,00 
KAYSERİ 33 0 5434 0,00 0,81 0,00 0,00 
KIRIKKALE 38 270 232 32,40 0,25 35,40 -105,80 
KIRIKKALE 3 496 322 59,52 0,26 71,62 -305,14 
KIRIKKALE 31 226 90 27,12 0,16 9,74 -172,86 
KIRKLARELİ 38 522 841 62,64 0,25 68,44 187,92 
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KIRKLARELİ 36 2624 2571 314,88 0,16 97,95 -465,83 
KIRKLARELİ 32 1422 6339 170,64 0,37 352,08 4.394,28 
KIRKLARELİ 31 775 2337 93,00 0,16 33,41 1.435,59 
KIRKLARELİ 3 6060 14094 727,20 0,26 875,08 6.431,72 
KIRKLARELİ 35 0 1165 0,00 0,17 0,00 0,00 
KIRKLARELİ 33 0 159 0,00 0,81 0,00 0,00 
KIRŞEHİR 3 875 1448 105,00 0,26 126,35 341,65 
KOCAELİ 38 12486 20469 1.498,32 0,25 1.636,96 4.847,72 
KOCAELİ 37 9227 7519 1.107,24 0,12 -15,43 -2.799,81 
KOCAELİ 36 4856 3892 582,72 0,16 181,27 -1.727,99 
KOCAELİ 35 14012 18077 1.681,44 0,17 752,71 1.630,85 
KOCAELİ 34 1192 1083 143,04 0,08 -52,01 -200,03 
KOCAELİ 33 696 1116 83,52 0,81 476,95 -140,47 
KOCAELİ 31 1302 3182 156,24 0,16 56,13 1.667,63 
KOCAELİ 3 46708 57389 5.604,96 0,26 6.744,76 -1.668,72 
KOCAELİ 39 0 45 0,00 0,65 0,00 0,00 
KOCAELİ 32 0 2006 0,00 0,37 0,00 0,00 
KONYA 38 1957 3956 234,84 0,25 256,57 1.507,59 
KONYA 37 354 478 42,48 0,12 -0,59 82,11 
KONYA 36 528 1299 63,36 0,16 19,71 687,93 
KONYA 35 235 1016 28,20 0,17 12,62 740,18 
KONYA 34 455 757 54,60 0,08 -19,85 267,25 
KONYA 31 3514 4249 421,68 0,16 151,48 161,84 
KONYA 3 7156 12831 858,72 0,26 1.033,34 3.782,94 
KONYA 33 0 297 0,00 0,81 0,00 0,00 
KONYA 32 0 779 0,00 0,37 0,00 0,00 
KÜTAHYA 36 2144 4928 257,28 0,16 80,03 2.446,69 
KÜTAHYA 35 181 202 21,72 0,17 9,72 -10,44 
KÜTAHYA 33 304 338 36,48 0,81 208,32 -210,80 
KÜTAHYA 32 570 0 68,40 0,37 141,13 -779,53 
KÜTAHYA 31 798 255 95,76 0,16 34,40 -673,16 
KÜTAHYA 3 3997 6311 479,64 0,26 577,18 1.257,18 
MALATYA 32 1163 3749 139,56 0,37 287,96 2.158,48 
MALATYA 31 76 660 9,12 0,16 3,28 571,60 
MALATYA 3 1449 4856 173,88 0,26 209,24 3.023,88 
MALATYA 36 -362 101 -43,44 0,16 -13,51 519,95 
MANİSA 38 5977 8803 717,24 0,25 783,61 1.325,15 
MANİSA 37 184 253 22,08 0,12 -0,31 47,23 
MANİSA 36 4030 4987 483,60 0,16 150,44 322,96 
MANİSA 35 2234 1156 268,08 0,17 120,01 -1.466,09 
MANİSA 32 4350 1787 522,00 0,37 1.077,05 -4.162,05 
MANİSA 31 1935 4478 232,20 0,16 83,41 2.227,39 
MANİSA 3 19200 22001 2.304,00 0,26 2.772,53 -2.275,53 
MANİSA 34 0 190 0,00 0,08 0,00 0,00 
MANİSA 33 0 347 0,00 0,81 0,00 0,00 
MARDİN 3 0 347 0,00 0,26 0,00 0,00 
MUĞLA 33 83 0 9,96 0,81 56,88 -149,84 
MUĞLA 32 127 319 15,24 0,37 31,44 145,32 
MUĞLA 31 0 126 0,00 0,16 0,00 0,00 
MUĞLA 3 500 1159 60,00 0,26 72,20 526,80 
MUĞLA 38  154 0,00 0,25 0,00 0,00 
MUĞLA 36  472 0,00 0,16 0,00 0,00 
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NEVŞEHİR 36 528 378 63,36 0,16 19,71 -233,07 
NEVŞEHİR 31 420 271 50,40 0,16 18,11 -217,51 
NEVŞEHİR 3 1157 1341 138,84 0,26 167,07 -121,91 
NİĞDE 3 1959 1981 235,08 0,26 282,88 -495,96 
NİĞDE 32 1959 1195 235,08 0,37 485,04 -1.484,12 
ORDU 35 72 0 8,64 0,17 3,87 -84,51 
ORDU 31 2824 2748 338,88 0,16 121,74 -536,62 
ORDU 3 3443 3872 413,16 0,26 497,18 -481,34 
ORDU 36 0 460 0,00 0,16 0,00 0,00 
ORDU 33 0 467 0,00 0,81 0,00 0,00 
RİZE 3 2396 1443 287,52 0,26 345,99 -1.586,51 
SAKARYA 38 2489 5392 298,68 0,25 326,32 2.278,00 
SAKARYA 36 215 424 25,80 0,16 8,03 175,17 
SAKARYA 35 335 1144 40,20 0,17 18,00 750,80 
SAKARYA 33 490 480 58,80 0,81 335,78 -404,58 
SAKARYA 31 1914 2576 229,68 0,16 82,51 349,81 
SAKARYA 3 5727 11369 687,24 0,26 826,99 4.127,77 
SAKARYA 32 0 910 0,00 0,37 0,00 0,00 
SAMSUN 38 343 495 41,16 0,25 44,97 65,87 
SAMSUN 37 339 499 40,68 0,12 -0,57 119,89 
SAMSUN 36 478 516 57,36 0,16 17,84 -37,20 
SAMSUN 35 763 515 91,56 0,17 40,99 -380,55 
SAMSUN 33 333 409 39,96 0,81 228,19 -192,15 
SAMSUN 32 497 941 59,64 0,37 123,06 261,30 
SAMSUN 31 1122 973 134,64 0,16 48,37 -332,01 
SAMSUN 3 3875 4348 465,00 0,26 559,56 -551,56 
SİNOP 36 1244 508 149,28 0,16 46,44 -931,72 
SİNOP 3 1797 825 215,64 0,26 259,49 -1.447,13 
SİVAS 31 160 72 19,20 0,16 6,90 -114,10 
SİVAS 3 324 646 38,88 0,26 46,79 236,33 
ŞANLIURFA 3 518 507 62,16 0,26 74,80 -147,96 
TEKİRDAĞ 38 5579 9402 669,48 0,25 731,43 2.422,09 
TEKİRDAĞ 36 1094 1212 131,28 0,16 40,84 -54,12 
TEKİRDAĞ 34 591 889 70,92 0,08 -25,78 252,86 
TEKİRDAĞ 33 317 429 38,04 0,81 217,23 -143,27 
TEKİRDAĞ 32 11739 28034 1.408,68 0,37 2.906,55 11.979,77 
TEKİRDAĞ 31 2466 3612 295,92 0,16 106,30 743,78 
TEKİRDAĞ 3 21995 45562 2.639,40 0,26 3.176,13 17.751,47 
TEKİRDAĞ 35 0 1668 0,00 0,17 0,00 0,00 
TOKAT 36 693 768 83,16 0,16 25,87 -34,03 
TOKAT 33 137 0 16,44 0,81 93,88 -247,32 
TOKAT 31 636 668 76,32 0,16 27,42 -71,74 
TOKAT 3 1757 2056 210,84 0,26 253,72 -165,56 
TOKAT 32 0 519 0,00 0,37 0,00 0,00 
TRABZON 38 213 426 25,56 0,25 27,93 159,51 
TRABZON 37 180 202 21,60 0,12 -0,30 0,70 
TRABZON 35 92 101 11,04 0,17 4,94 -6,98 
TRABZON 31 992 1446 119,04 0,16 42,76 292,20 
TRABZON 3 1774 2693 212,88 0,26 256,17 449,95 
TRABZON 36 0 242 0,00 0,16 0,00 0,00 
TRABZON 33 0 179 0,00 0,81 0,00 0,00 
UŞAK 36 367 0 44,04 0,16 13,70 -424,74 
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UŞAK 32 2602 3740 312,24 0,37 644,25 181,51 
UŞAK 3 3052 4834 366,24 0,26 440,72 975,04 
UŞAK 31 0 91 0,00 0,16 0,00 0,00 
VAN 31 56 215 6,72 0,16 2,41 149,87 
VAN 3 56 215 6,72 0,26 8,09 144,19 
YOZGAT 31 253 90 30,36 0,16 10,91 -204,27 
YOZGAT 3 907 781 108,84 0,26 130,97 -365,81 
ZONGULDAK 37 1584 216 190,08 0,12 -2,65 -1.555,43 
ZONGULDAK 36 912 1086 109,44 0,16 34,04 30,52 
ZONGULDAK 31 523 461 62,76 0,16 22,55 -147,31 
ZONGULDAK 3 3493 2879 419,16 0,26 504,40 -1.537,56 
ZONGULDAK 38 474 309 56,88 0,25 62,14 -284,02 
ZONGULDAK 33 0 277 0,00 0,81 0,00 0,00 
ZONGULDAK 32 0 530 0,00 0,37 0,00 0,00 
TURKEY 39 4722 7772 566,64    
TURKEY 38 186182 232933 22.341,84    
TURKEY 37 35689 39912 4.282,68    
TURKEY 36 65347 75628 7.841,64    
TURKEY 35 75766 88928 9.091,92    
TURKEY 34 22980 24735 2.757,60    
TURKEY 33 14235 25698 1.708,20    
TURKEY 32 262866 359495 31.543,92    
TURKEY 31 106120 123429 12.734,40    
TURKEY 3 773907 978530 92.868,84    
 
